AGRICULTURE DECISIONS

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Beginning in Volume 60, each part of AGRICULTURE DECISIONS has all the parties for that volume, including consent decisions, listed alphabetically in a supplemental List of Decisions Reported. The alphabetical List of Decisions Reported and the subject matter Index (from the beginning of the annual Volume) are included in a separate volume, entitled Part Four.

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(Cited as: 379 F.3d 466).


Lamers challenged the Milk Marketing Order which allows members of a certain class of handlers (Class III) to “opt out” of the milk pooling plan while Class I handlers were required to pay assessment into the pool. During times of “price inversion,” Class I handlers may have to pay a premium in addition to the standard Class I price. Lamers desired to avoid assessments on Class I milk purchases and withheld their assessments. The court cited with approval the Secretary’s difference in treatment of the several classes of handlers as having a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest which is the orderly administration and adequate supply of the fluid milk market to establish parity prices to farmers. The court was highly deferential to the agency’s rule making and application of those rules and affirmed the District court’s ruling of a money judgment against Lamers.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

JUDGES: Before RIPPLE, ROVNER and DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

Lamers Dairy (“Lamers”) sought an exemption from Milk Marketing Order No. 30, promulgated under the Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 7 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. After the Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture ("the USDA") denied the petition in a final administrative order, Lamers sought review in the district court. The USDA counterclaimed for enforcement of the Secretary’s decision and for a judgment against Lamers in an amount equal to the unpaid monetary assessments due under the terms of the marketing order. The district court granted summary judgment to the USDA on Lamers’ complaint and on the USDA’s counterclaim. It ordered further proceedings on the amount due. Subsequently, the district court denied a motion for reconsideration by Lamers and entered an amended judgment awarding the Government $850,931.26. Lamers appeals. For the reasons set forth in the following opinion, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

I

BACKGROUND

A. Facts

Lamers Dairy, a Wisconsin family-operated dairy, has as its principal business the handling and packaging of fluid milk. In this appeal, Lamers challenges aspects of the federal milk-marketing regulatory scheme. To understand the nature of Lamers’ challenges, we must discuss briefly the dairy industry and the regulatory and market forces governing it.¹

1. The Dairy Industry

In the dairy industry, dairy farmers, also referred to as “producers, “produce and sell raw milk to “handlers.” Handlers, in turn, prepare the milk product for resale to consumers or serve as intermediaries to those who do. Consumer dairy products, such as fluid milk beverages, ice cream and cheese, can all be produced from “Grade A” or “fluid grade” raw milk. In the consumer market, however, milk beverages generally command a higher price than non-fluid products, which are known also as “manufactured dairy products.” For this reason, the market into which dairy farmers sell their product more highly values (and pays a premium price for) Grade A milk ultimately used to produce beverage milk. This market premium based on end use creates an incentive among producers to divert their Grade A product to fluid milk handlers. Were this incentive not controlled, lower market prices would result, harming milk production revenues.

2 Grade B milk, on the other hand, which is subject to slightly less stringent sanitary standards, cannot be used to produce fluid milk beverages. In 1999, only about three percent of milk marketed failed to meet Grade A standards. See Manchester & Blayney, supra note 1, at 2.

3 Prior to refrigeration, not all producers could pursue these premium prices. We have discussed previously the change to the market precipitated by refrigeration:

If milk were perishable, as it was in the days before refrigerated storage and transportation, dairy farmers serving urban markets (where milk is more likely to be consumed in fluid form than made into cheese or butter) would get higher prices for their output than dairy farmers remote from cities, who being unable to ship their milk a long distance would perform sell most of it to manufacturers of cheese and other dairy products. But when refrigerated storage and transportation arrived on the scene, it became feasible for the remote dairy farmers—Wisconsin dairy farmers, for example—to ship milk to cities in other states, pushing down the price of fluid milk there and so hurting the dairy farmers who were located near those cities.

4 See Alto Dairy, 336 F.3d at 563 (“Such a diversion, what economists call ‘arbitrage,’ would undermine and, if uncontrolled, . . . reduce the incomes of dairy farmers as a group.”).
Alto Dairy, 336 F.3d at 562. This change in the competitive environment provided an impetus for regulation. See Id. at 562-63.

The dairy industry also is characterized by daily and seasonal fluctuations in supply and demand. Consumer demand fluctuates significantly on a daily basis, primarily due to consumer buying patterns; milk production, on the other hand, is relatively constant on a daily basis. Conversely, milk production varies seasonally based on the animals’ nutritional health. In fall and winter months, less milk is produced, but in spring and summer months, more milk is produced. To meet consumer demand in the winter, producers must maintain large herds; these same herds over-produce in the summer. Given milk’s perishable quality, the supply must go to market at least every other day. Historically, handlers were thus able to obtain summer supplies at bargain prices.

2. The Regulatory Scheme

In the wake of the Great Depression, in an attempt to address these unique industry characteristics, Congress enacted various provisions governing the dairy industry as part of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (“the AMAA”). A driving purpose of the AMAA was “to remove ruinous and self-defeating competition among the producers and permit all farmers to share the benefits of fluid milk profits according to the value of goods produced and services rendered.” Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 180-81, 24 L. Ed. 2d 345, 90 S. Ct. 314 (1969). The AMAA, as amended, thus ensures that producers receive a uniform minimum price for their product, regardless of the end use to which it is put.

To accomplish this objective, the statute contains several mechanisms. First, it authorizes the Secretary to classify milk according to its end use and to establish minimum prices for each end-use classification. See 7 U.S.C. § 608c(5)(A). Second, it authorizes the Secretary to establish a uniform minimum price, termed the “blend price,” based on a weighted average of all units of production of classes of milk sold to handlers associated with a
marketing area. See id. Third, it requires handlers to pay producers the blend price, regardless of the end use to which the milk will be put. See id. § 608c(5)(B). Fourth, it authorizes a method for adjustments in payments among handlers so that the final amount paid by each handler equals the value of the milk that handler has purchased, according to the minimum prices established. See id. § 608c(5)(C). Overall, the provisions attempt to promote orderly milk-marketing by maintaining minimum prices for producers and limiting the competitive effects of excess supply of Grade A milk.

Although it protects producers, the AMAA regulates handlers only. Pursuant to the AMAA directives, the Secretary has classified milk into the following classes of utilization: Class I milk includes fluid milk processed and bottled as a beverage; Class II milk includes soft milk products such as cottage cheese, sour cream, yogurt and ice cream; Class III includes hard cheese and cream cheese; and Class IV includes raw milk used for butter and dry milk powder. As directed by the AMAA, the Secretary has established a uniform pricing scheme for each of these classes of milk, as well as the average blend price.5 Handlers governed by milk-marketing orders must pay producers this uniform blend price. The process of blending the prices of the different classes of milk on a monthly basis has come to be known as “pooling.”

This uniform minimum pricing is intended to reduce the incentive producers would have to divert all fluid milk to Class I handlers and, literally, to flood that market. As the system operates, dairy producers within a marketing area receive the guaranteed uniform blend price for their milk, regardless of the end use to which it is put. Because the uniform price is a weighted average, some handlers pay producers

5 The minimum prices are derived from regulatory formulas, the exact intricacies of which are not relevant here. Speaking generally, Class III and Class IV prices are derived by surveying the retail price of products such as cheese and butter and then factoring out certain manufacturing costs. Class I prices are computed by adding appropriate location differentials to Class III and IV prices. See 7 C.F.R. § 1000.50. Because of this pricing system, it is sometimes said that Class III and IV handlers receive “make allowances” based on their manufacturing costs.
less for their milk than its market worth while other handlers pay more. Handlers who pay less to producers must make compensating payments into the producer settlement fund while handlers who pay more to producers may withdraw compensating payments from the fund. Thus, within the regulatory scheme, handlers ultimately pay an amount equal to the utilization value of the milk they purchase. This simplified example of the regulatory scheme by the district court for the District of Connecticut is helpful:

Suppose Handler A purchases 100 units of Class I (fluid) milk from Producer A at the minimum value of $3.00 per unit. Assume further that Handler B purchases 100 units of Class II (soft milk products) milk from Producer B at the minimum value of $2.00 per unit, and that Handler C purchases 100 units of Class III (hard milk products) milk from Producer C at $1.00 per unit. Assuming that this constitutes the entire milk market for a regulatory district, during this period the total price paid for milk is $600.00, making the average price per unit of milk $2.00. Thus, under the regulatory scheme, Producers A, B, and C all receive $200.00 for the milk they supplied, irrespective of the use to which it was put. However, Handler A must, in addition to the $200.00 that it must tender to Producer A, pay $100.00 into the settlement fund because the value of the milk it purchased exceeded the regulatory average price. Along the same vein, Handler C will receive $100.00 from the settlement fund because it will pay Producer C more than the milk it received was worth.

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6 Compensating payments to and from the settlement fund are actually determined by more complicated formulas that account for the total value of the handler’s milk utilization as well as various credits and adjustments for transportation, assembly and plant location.

7 Outside the regulatory system, economic realities may require some handlers to pay out-of-pocket premiums to producers, over and above the uniform blend price, in order to acquire their milk supply. These out-of-pocket premiums are not taken into consideration in the calculation of amounts owed to the settlement fund. See Manchester & Blayney, supra note 1, at 7 (“The prices set are minimums–market conditions can and often do lead to prices higher than the minimums.”).
The record in this case does not contain documentation of any periods of price inversion. However, throughout the litigation of this case, the USDA has addressed arguments regarding this occasional market occurrence. Furthermore, the Secretary of the USDA has issued statements recognizing the disruption to the regulatory scheme caused by price inversion. See Milk in the New England and Other Marketing Areas, Dep’t of Agric., 64 Fed. Reg. 16,026, 16,102 (Apr. 2, 1999) (“The first problem is readily evident in class price relationships during the latter part of 1998. The frequent occurrence of price inversions during that period indicates that some alteration to both the proposed and current methods of computing and announcing Class I prices may be necessary.”). This court may take judicial notice of reports of administrative bodies, see Menominee Indian Tribe v. Thompson, 161 F.3d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1998), and it is therefore appropriate for this court to consider the reality of this occasional market occurrence.
prices are set retrospectively, based on actual market prices during the pertinent time period. The USDA has explained:

Class price inversion occurs when a market’s regulated price for milk used in manufacturing exceeds the Class I (fluid) milk price in a given month, and causes serious competitive inequities among dairy farmers and regulated handlers. Advanced pricing of Class I milk actually causes this situation when manufactured product prices are increasing rapidly.

Milk in the New England and Other Marketing Areas, Dep’t of Agric., 64 Fed. Reg. 16,026, 16,102 (Apr. 2, 1999). Thus, price inversions occur during times of increased demand for manufactured products, primarily cheese.

Under Order No. 30, Class III handlers are not required to participate in the regulatory pooling. They may either join the pool or remain outside the minimum price structure. (This is true to some extent under other milk-marketing orders as well.) When Class III handlers withdraw from the pool, or “de-pool,” they are not obligated to make compensating payments to the settlement fund. During times of price inversion, then, Class III handlers have an incentive to withdraw from the pool. The USDA has explained the effect of price inversions on the dairy industry:

In the past when price inversions have occurred, the industry has contended with them by taking a loss on the milk that had to be pooled because of commitments to the Class I market, and by choosing not to pool large volumes of milk that normally would have been associated with Federal milk order pools. When . . . [price inversions occur], it places fluid milk processors and dairy farmers or cooperatives who service the Class I market at a competitive disadvantage relative to those who service the manufacturing milk market.

Milk used in Class I in Federal order markets must be pooled, but milk for manufacturing is pooled voluntarily and will not be pooled if the returns from manufacturing exceed the blend price of the marketwide pool. Thus, an inequitable situation has developed where
milk for manufacturing is pooled only when associating it with a marketwide pool increases returns. *Id.*

When producers prefer to sell outside the pool due to higher manufacturing returns, Class I handlers may have to pay out-of-pocket premiums to attract their supply.

Thus, during times of price inversion, Class III handlers who de-pool may pay *less than* the Class III price. At the same time, Class I handlers inside the pool may be forced practically to pay *more than* the Class I price because of extra-regulatory premiums. In sum, the ability of Class III handlers to de-pool under Order No. 30 has negative economic consequences on Class I handlers who must remain within the pool.

**B. Administrative and District Court Proceedings**

In September 1999, Lamers stopped making required compensating payments into the settlement fund. Instead, Lamers filed an administrative petition with the USDA for exemption and/or modification of the provisions of Order No. 30. Lamers’ petition alleged that Order No. 30 violated equal protection and contravened the AMAA by permitting “unfair trade practices.” Lamers sought relief in the form of an order exempting it from pooling and from the obligation to make payments into the producer settlement fund. After an evidentiary hearing, an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) sustained Order No. 30 and dismissed Lamers’ petition. Lamers appealed to a USDA judicial officer. The judicial officer affirmed the ALJ. Lamers then brought an action in the district court, and the USDA counterclaimed for enforcement of the Secretary’s decision.

The district court affirmed the Secretary. It determined that, as to Lamers’ “unfair trade practices” claim, Lamers was attempting to sue under a non-existent right. As to Lamers’ equal protection claim, the district court noted that the economic regulation was subject to rational basis scrutiny and concluded that the provisions of the regulatory scheme survived challenge under that standard. The district
court subsequently ordered Lamers to pay $850,931.26 to the settlement fund. Lamers timely appeals.

II

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. See Indiana Family & Soc. Servs. Admin. v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 476, 479 (7th Cir. 2002). All facts are drawn and all inferences viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

B. Equal Protection Claims

Lamers contends that the ability of Class III handlers to “de-pool,” and its inability to do so, violates its right to equal protection of the law. When considering an equal protection claim, we first must ask whether the governmental action involves fundamental rights or targets a suspect class. See, e.g., Eby-Brown Co., LLC v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Agric., 295 F.3d 749, 754 (7th Cir. 2002). The distinction drawn by the Secretary between Class I and Class III handlers is based upon the end use to which these handlers put producer milk. It therefore clearly does not involve fundamental rights or target a suspect class and is merely an economic regulation. See, e.g., Id. Such an economic classification “is accorded a strong presumption of validity.” Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319, 125 L. Ed. 2d 257, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993). The presumption applies not only to legislative actions, but also extends to administrative action. See Pac. States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176, 185-86, 80 L. Ed. 138, 56 S. Ct.
We therefore review the Secretary's difference in treatment to determine whether there is a conceivably rational relationship to a legitimate interest. See *FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc.*, 508 U.S. 307, 313, 124 L. Ed. 2d 211, 113 S. Ct. 2096 (1993); *United States R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz*, 449 U.S. 166, 174-79, 66 L. Ed. 2d 368, 101 S. Ct. 453 (1980). Practically, our review must be highly deferential:

Equal protection is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices. In areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.

*Beach Communications*, 508 U.S. at 313. Governmental action only fails rational basis scrutiny if no sound reason for the action can be hypothesized. See *Northside Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. City of Indianapolis*, 902 F.2d 521, 522 (7th Cir. 1990). Furthermore, a circumspect approach is especially appropriate in reviewing a challenge to the federal milk-marketing regime. See *Blair v. Freeman*, 125 U.S. App. D.C. 207, 370 F.2d 229, 232 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (“A court’s deference to administrative expertise rises to zenith in connection with the intricate complex of regulation of milk-marketing. Any court is chary lest its disarrangement of such a regulatory equilibrium reflect lack of judicial comprehension more than lack of executive authority.”); *see also Zuber v. Allen*, 396 U.S. 168, 172, 24 L. Ed. 2d 345, 90 S. Ct. 314 (1969) (describing federal milk-marketing regime as a “labyrinth”).

The USDA submits that the different treatment of Class I and Class III handlers is rationally based because of the purposes of regulation and the differing marketing conditions faced by fluid milk and cheese producers. We agree. The AMAA charges the Secretary of Agriculture with establishing and maintaining orderly marketing
conditions so as to establish parity prices to farmers. See 7 U.S.C. § 602(1). The Secretary also is charged with establishing and maintaining orderly marketing conditions so as to ensure an orderly flow of supply and thereby prevent unreasonably fluctuating prices. See Id. In order to achieve these legitimate marketing objectives, it is conceivably rational for the Secretary to treat Class I and Class III handlers differently with respect to pooling requirements.

In assessing the rationality of the Secretary’s action, we must recall the relevant supply and demand characteristics of the market. As we have noted previously, the milk production industry is highly subject to seasonal fluctuations and characterized by excess supply. That excess cannot be stored by producers; it must be marketed. Fluid milk products less easily are stored and transported than milk in other forms. They are more perishable and thus more subject to the fluctuations in daily demand. They are generally more highly valued. These circumstances affect the market for producer milk in critical ways and thus provide a rational basis for different pooling requirements among fluid milk and manufacturing handlers. To maintain stability in the milk market, the Secretary reasonably can require that milk used to produce fluid products be pooled while exempting other handlers from obligatory pooling. Indeed, the AMAA is premised on obligatory pooling of Class I milk, so that all producers may partake of its economic benefits. See Zuber, 396 U.S. at 180-81 (“The plain thrust of the federal statute was to remove ruinous and self-defeating competition among the producers and permit all farmers to share the benefits of fluid milk profits according to the value of goods produced and services rendered.”).

Next, we must keep in mind that “pooling” essentially requires handlers to pay out a uniform minimum price for their supply and is required, in part, to maintain prices for producers. See Alto Dairy v. Veneman, 336 F.3d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 2003) (describing milk-pricing system as means of “redistributing wealth from consumers to producers of milk”). Class I handlers’ end use typically represents the “cream of the crop,” or the highest end use of Grade A producer milk, and so Class I purchases in the pool generally raise the blend price. Class III handlers, however, can use lower-standard Grade B milk in
their products, and their purchases in the pool of higher-standard Grade A milk generally lower the blend price. It is relatively unsurprising, then, that the Secretary deems pooling by Class I handlers vital to the regulatory scheme but deems pooling by Class III handlers less essential, even though price inversions sometimes occur that disrupt normal marketing conditions.

Finally, we note that the history of the milk-marketing regime evidences primary concern with producer competition to make sales to the fluid milk market, not the manufacturing market. See Zuber, 396 U.S. at 180-81 (discussing AMAA purpose “to remove ruinous and self-defeating competition” among producers for sales in the fluid milk market); see also Block v. Cnty. Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 343, 81 L. Ed. 2d 270, 104 S. Ct. 2450 (1984) (discussing pooling requirements as means “to discourage destabilizing competition among producers for the more desirable fluid milk sales”); United States v. Rock Royal Co-Op., Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 552, 83 L. Ed. 1446, 59 S. Ct. 993 (1939) (characterizing system of compensating payments under the settlement fund as “reasonably adapted” device “designed . . . to foster, protect and encourage interstate commerce by smoothing out the difficulties of the surplus and cut-throat competition which burdened” the fluid milk market). Given this driving concern over “ruinous and self-defeating” producer competition in the fluid milk market, Zuber, 396 U.S. at 180, it is not irrational for the Secretary to allow Class III de-pooling when market incentives are reversed and when sales to the manufacturing market become more attractive to producers.\footnote{This conclusion is not affected by the fact that price inversion itself may be perceived of as a “disorderly marketing situation.” Milk in the New England and Other Marketing Areas, Dep’t of Agric., 64 Fed. Reg. at 16,103.}

\footnote{Cf. Alto Dairy v. Veneman, 336 F.3d 560, 563 (7th Cir. 2003) (describing system of uniform pricing as “price discrimination” and noting that price discrimination increases profits, “thus counteracting the alleged (though almost certainly spurious) tendency of dairy farmers to destroy their business by competing over vigorously”).}
Lamers’ challenge to the exemption of Class III handlers from pooling requirements is essentially one to the breadth of the regulatory regime, i.e., the Secretary’s failure to require Class III handlers to make compensating payments to the settlement fund when price inversions occur. However, it is well-established that “reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind” without creating an equal protection violation. *Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc.*, 348 U.S. 483, 489, 99 L. Ed. 563, 75 S. Ct. 461 (1955). As such, “scope-of-coverage provisions” are “virtually unreviewable” because the government “must be allowed leeway to approach a perceived problem incrementally.” *Beach Communications*, 508 U.S. at 316.

Similarly, equal protection does not require a governmental entity to “choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all.” *Dandridge v. Williams*, 397 U.S. 471, 487, 25 L. Ed. 2d 491, 90 S. Ct. 1153 (1970). Indeed, “mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a law under the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection.” *SeaRiver Mar. Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Mineta*, 309 F.3d 662, 679 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation and citation omitted); see also *Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County*, 309 U.S. 270, 275, 84 L. Ed. 744, 60 S. Ct. 523 (1940) (“If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have been applied.” (internal quotation and citation omitted)). Furthermore, “broad legislative classification must be judged by reference to characteristics typical of the affected classes.” *Califano v. Jobst*, 434 U.S. 47, 55, 54 L. Ed. 2d 228, 98 S. Ct. 95 (1977).

In light of these governing principles, it is clear that Congress and the Secretary can regulate based upon typical milk-marketing conditions without thereby violating equal protection. Here, Congress and the Secretary have chosen to address the perceived problem of excess milk supply in the dairy industry by requiring Class I handlers to pool all their supply while exempting other handlers from that same requirement, based on an assumption that Class I milk carries the highest market value. They have chosen, in effect, to address the
usual situation while not addressing the abnormal, aberrant situation in which Class I milk does not carry the highest market price. Such incremental regulation does not violate equal protection. See Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 316; see also Brazil-Breashears v. Bilandic, 53 F.3d 789, 793 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that the Illinois Supreme Court could act incrementally in restricting judicial employees’ political activities, while exempting sitting judges from that restriction, “regardless of the probability that the government will ever address the rest of the problem”).

We recognize that the Secretary’s exemption of Class III handlers from pooling requirements effectively gives them a competitive advantage. They may participate in pooling when it is beneficial and withdraw when it is not. See Milk in the New England and Other Marketing Areas, Dep’t of Agric., 64 Fed. Reg. at 16,102. Thus, the Class III pooling exemption is economically harmful to Lamers and other Class I handlers (as well as to producers committed to dealing with them) who must suffer the effects of Class III de-pooling. That harm, however, does not rise to the level of “invidious discrimination.” Williamson, 348 U.S. at 489. Therefore, it is not a harm we can redress. See Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485 (noting that “in the area of economics and social welfare,” a governmental entity does not violate equal protection “merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect,” and further stating, “if the classification has some ‘reasonable basis,’ it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification ‘is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality’” (quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbone Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78, 55 L. Ed. 369, 31 S. Ct. 337 (1911)); see also Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319, 125 L. Ed. 2d 257, 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993) (“Rational-basis review in equal protection analysis ‘is not a license for courts to judge

11 We note further that what Lamers seeks is exemption from the pooling requirement. See R.1 at 7. Presumably, Lamers seeks to “de-pool” when the Class I price is higher than the blend price, which is most of the time. Lamers would thereby avoid compensating payments while taking advantage of the controlled market prices. To permit all Class I handlers to so act would vitiate the regulatory scheme devised by Congress.
the wisdom, fairness, or logic of legislative choices.” (quoting Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 313)).

In cases involving economic and social regulation, so long as distinctions are conceivably rational, the recourse of a disadvantaged entity lies in the democratic process. 12 See Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 314 (“The Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.’” (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97, 59 L. Ed. 2d 171, 99 S. Ct. 939 (1979) (footnote omitted)); see also Eby-Brown, 295 F.3d at 754 (noting that improvident decisions “should be rectified through the democratic process and not the courts”). Lamers’ equal protection claim based on the different pooling regulations governing Class I and Class III handlers must therefore fail.

We briefly address one additional issue under the rubric of equal protection analysis. Lamers submits that the failure of the regulations to account for certain out-of-pocket premiums it must pay to attract its supply violates its right to equal protection. Lamers’ equal protection claim based on these premiums is fundamentally flawed because Lamers presents no distinction for this court to review. Specifically, Lamers has demonstrated no difference between it and any other

12 By way of example, we note that, in 1999, the Secretary responded to industry complaints about price inversions by adjusting the Class I advanced pricing procedure in an attempt to limit the price-inversion phenomenon:

The advanced pricing procedure provided in this final decision results in a Class I price that is based on a more recent manufacturing use price, thus reducing (but not eliminating) the time lag that contributes to class price inversion . . . .

. . . . Reducing the time period for which Class I pricing is advanced should reduce the potential [of price inversions] considerably, allowing Class I handlers to compete more effectively with manufacturing plants for fluid milk. Milk in the New England and Other Marketing Areas, Dep’t of Agric., 64 Fed. Reg. at 16,103.
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handler as to the Secretary’s treatment of these out-of-pocket
premums; the regulations simply do not take them into account.\textsuperscript{13}

Even if we treat Lamers’ complaint as somehow raising an
equal protection claim, it fails. Although some handlers may be able to
attract supply without paying such premiums, the Secretary’s decision
not to give any handler credit for such competitive costs does not
thereby rise to an equal protection violation. \textit{Cf. Eby-Brown}, 295 F.3d
at 754-55 (determining that statute, which prohibited certain tobacco
wholesalers from deducting “trade discounts” from costs but
permitted other wholesalers to deduct such costs, did not violate equal
protection). It is conceivably rational that accounting for such extra-
regulatory costs of competition would hinder the objectives of the
regulatory scheme, in that it would reduce payments to the settlement
fund. Furthermore, as we have discussed, the Secretary is permitted to
engage in incremental regulation. \textit{See, e.g., Williamson}, 348 U.S. at
489 (“The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a
remedy there, neglecting the others. . . . The prohibition of the Equal
Protection Clause goes no further than the invidious discrimination.”
(citation omitted)). Thus, the Secretary’s treatment of premiums
survives scrutiny.

C. “Unfair Trade Practices” Claim

Lamers argues that four aspects of Order No. 30 constitute “unfair
trade practices” prohibited by 7 U.S.C. § 608c(7)(A): (1) the ability

\textsuperscript{13} Lamers argues distinction based on the AMAA requirement that “the \textit{total sums paid} by each handler shall equal the value of the milk purchased by him at the prices fixed.” 7 U.S.C. § 608c(5)(C) (emphasis added). Because the Secretary does not account for out-of-pocket premiums, the calculation of the “total sums paid” does not accurately reflect the cost of some handlers’ supplies. In the case of handlers not obligated by market realities to pay such premiums, the Secretary’s “total sums paid” calculation more accurately reflects the cost of their supply. This practical effect results: Handlers paying out-of-pocket premiums owe larger compensating payments to the settlement fund than they would owe if the Secretary took supply premiums into account.
of Class III handlers to de-pool; (2) the requirement that Class I handlers pay into the settlement fund when competing handlers dealing in both the fluid milk and the manufacturing markets may draw upon those funds; (3) the allowance of some manufacturing costs in the calculation of Class III and IV utilization prices; and (4) the ability of some processing plants to receive “kickbacks” for qualifying milk under the order.

Lamers’ claim of “unfair trade practices” warrants only brief discussion, however, because, as the district court concluded, Lamers attempts to proceed under a non-existent statutory right. Under 7 U.S.C. § 608c(7)(A), the prohibition of “unfair methods of competition and unfair trade practices in the handling of” agricultural commodities is one of several “terms and conditions” that the Secretary may incorporate in orders issued under the AMAA. 14 It is not an independent statutory prohibition, and the Secretary is not required to include it in any order. Furthermore, the Secretary did not include the prohibition in Order No. 30. Therefore, Lamers lacks a statutory basis upon which to bring this claim.

Were it possible to construe Lamers’ claim as an argument that the Secretary has advanced an unreasonable interpretation of the AMAA by enacting regulations that permit these allegedly “unfair trade practices,” we first would be required to determine the appropriate level of deference that must be accorded the Secretary’s interpretation of the AMAA, assuming that interpretation did not contravene statutory directives, and next would be required to determine whether the Secretary’s interpretation represented a permissible construction

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14 The relevant text of 7 U.S.C. § 608c(7) provides:

In the case of the agricultural commodities and the products thereof specified . . . orders shall contain one or more of the following terms and conditions:

(A) Prohibiting unfair methods of competition and unfair trade practices in the handling thereof.

...
under the appropriate level of deference.\textsuperscript{15} See *Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984). We need not decide this issue, however, because it is not possible to construe Lamers’ arguments as reaching beyond a claim that the Secretary has failed to enforce an AMAA prohibition on “unfair trade practices.”\textsuperscript{16} See Appellant’s Br. at 20 (“The USDA is not enforcing the specific prohibition contained in the AMAA as to unfair competition.”); Appellant’s Reply Br. at 14 (“The USDA is not administering the AMAA in such a manner as to avoid violating the specific prohibition contained in the AMAA as to unfair competition.”). As noted, no such prohibition exists.

**Conclusion**

\textsuperscript{15} The USDA submits that Lamers must establish that its actions are “so arbitrary or patently inconsistent with congressional purposes as to exceed [the] statutory delegation of legislative authority.” See Appellee’s Br. at 33. It further submits that none of the complained-of practices are arbitrary or patently inconsistent with congressional purposes because each is related to the objective of stabilizing competition among farmers for sales in the fluid market: First, because Congress was concerned about competition among farmers competing in the fluid milk market and not in the cheese market, it is permissible for cheese processors to de-pool. Second, marketwide pooling expressly is authorized by 7 U.S.C. § 608c(5) and cannot be an unfair trade practice under that statute even though some handlers competing in the fluid market are entitled to draw payments from the fund in relation to their manufacturing purchases. Third, the manufacturing allowance is simply a factor used to compute the utilization price of Class III and Class IV raw milk. See 7 C.F.R. § 1000.50. Fourth, the arrangements between large processors and other plants enable additional plants to qualify for the order and constitute efficient systems of supply in the market. For these reasons, the USDA contends that the Secretary’s decision to allow these practices withstands review. See Appellee’s Br. at 32-35. We need not and do not decide these issues although we note that significant deference would be accorded the Secretary’s interpretation of the statute it is charged with administering. See *Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837, 842-44, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1984).

\textsuperscript{16} We shall not make the argument for Lamers. Cf. *Franklin v. Gilmore*, 188 F.3d 877, 884 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that plaintiff failed to make an argument excusing procedural default and declining to “make it for him”); *Stagman v. Ryan*, 176 F.3d 986, 995 n.2 (7th Cir. 1999) (declining to make admissibility arguments for plaintiff when on appeal plaintiff relied on evidence found inadmissible by the district court).
Lamers has not established an equal protection violation and cannot bring an “unfair trade practices” claim. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

MICHAEL FULLENKAMP, ET AL. v USDA.

383 F.3d 478.
Filed September 2, 2004.

(Cite as: 383 F.3d 478).

The court favorably cited *Chevron* (467 U.S. 837) regarding government agency determinations involved in the implementation of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (FSRIA) holding that the *Chevron* deference is appropriate “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”

**United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit**


OPINION BY: MARTHA CRAIG DAUGHTREY

OPINION

The plaintiffs in this case are dairy farmers who annually produce over 2.4 million pounds of milk. They challenge the regulations promulgated by the defendant Secretary of Agriculture to implement
the federal Milk Income Loss Contract Program*, 7 U.S.C. § 7982. When a producer signs a contract to join the program, it begins receiving monthly payments on the eligible milk it produces and, under the statute’s transition rule, a lump-sum payment for eligible milk it produced between December 1, 2001, and the month before the contract was signed. The statute includes a limitation restricting the quantity of milk upon which payment can be made each fiscal year to 2.4 million pounds. The Department of Agriculture regulations under attack here apply the limitation to payments under the transition rule as well as to the monthly payments. The district court found that the statute did not unambiguously forbid the Secretary’s interpretation of the statute and, moreover, that the Secretary’s interpretation was reasonable. The court therefore denied the plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief and granted the Secretary’s motion to dismiss.

For the reasons set out below, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On May 13, 2002, President Bush signed into law the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, 116 Stat. 134 (2002), which, in § 1502, created an income support program for dairy farmers that provides for direct federal payments to milk producers when a specific statutorily-prescribed price index falls below a certain level. See Id. at § 1502, codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7982. In order to receive payments through the program, dairy farmers must enter into a contract with the Secretary of Agriculture. Once a dairy farmer has entered into a contract, the farmer is eligible for two categories of payments: (1) monthly payments on eligible production beginning the month the farmer enters into the contract and ending September 30, 2005, see 7 U.S.C. § 7982(g); and (2) a retroactive, lump-sum payment for production during the “transition” period

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*The Federal Milk Income Loss Contract Program (7 U.S.C. § 7982) and appeals therefrom are not within the jurisdiction of the JO and OALJ, however it is suggested that the court’s analysis regarding the Chevron deference is persuasive and relevant in consideration of USDA administrative determinations that are the within the jurisdiction of the JO and OALJ - Editor
between December 2001 and the month in which the farmer enters the contract. *See* § 7982(h). The statute does not specify a month in which dairy farmers must enter contracts, just that the Secretary must offer such contracts from July 2002 until September 2005. *See* 7 U.S.C. § 7982(f).

Section 7982 reads, in pertinent part:

(b) Payments. The Secretary shall offer to enter into contracts with producers on a dairy farm located in a participating State under which the producers receive payments on eligible production.

(d) Payment quantity.

(1) In general. Subject to paragraph (2), the payment quantity for a producer during the applicable month under this section shall be equal to the quantity of eligible production marketed by the producer during the month.

(2) Limitation. The payment quantity for all producers on a single dairy operation during the months of the applicable fiscal year for which the producers receive payments under subsection (b) shall not exceed 2,400,000 pounds.

(f) Signup. The Secretary shall offer to enter into contracts under this section during the period beginning on the date that is 60 days after the date of enactment of this Act [May 13, 2002], and ending on September 30, 2005.

(h) Transition rule. In addition to any payment that is otherwise available under this section, if the producers on a dairy farm enter into a contract under this section, the Secretary shall make a payment in accordance with the formula specified in subsection (c) on the
quantity of eligible production of the producer marketed during the period beginning on December 1, 2001, and ending on the last day of the month preceding the month the producers on the dairy farm entered into the contract.

In October 2002, the Secretary of Agriculture issued regulations implementing the dairy assistance program. Under the regulations, the cap in § 7982(d)(2) limiting payment quantity to 2.4 million pounds of milk per year was made applicable to transition period payments under § 7982(h), as well as to the monthly payments for milk produced after a contract has been signed. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 1430.207(b). In response, the plaintiffs filed this action, seeking a declaratory judgement that dairy producers who are entitled to payments during the transition period are entitled to a lump-sum payment on all the milk produced and marketed during the transition period, not just 2.4 million pounds a year. They requested an injunction compelling the Secretary to modify the regulations at 7 C.F.R. § 1430 to allow dairy producers uncapped transition payments.

The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief and granted the Secretary’s motion to dismiss the case.1 With respect to the cap on transition payments, the court found that § 7982 does not unambiguously forbid the regulations from making transition payments subject to the cap and that the Secretary’s regulation was permissible and reasonable. Applying Chevron deference, the court upheld the Secretary’s determination that the cap applies to transition payments as well as prospective payments under the contract. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467

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1The defendant’s motion was styled a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or, in the alternative, for summary judgment under Rule 56. The district court said it was granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss, but also made clear that it was considering the case on the merits and not dismissing based on subject matter jurisdiction. It therefore appears that it was either a dismissal for failure to state a claim or a grant of summary judgment rather than a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Even if the dismissal were considered a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we can affirm a district court’s judgment on any grounds supported by the record. See Peterson Novelties, Inc. v. City of Berkley, 305 F.3d 386, 394 (6th Cir. 2002).
ANALYSIS

I. Standard of Review

The parties agree that *Chevron*, 467 U.S. 837, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694, 104 S. Ct. 2778, governs this case. Under *Chevron*, in reviewing an agency's interpretation of a statute it administers, we must first ask “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” *Id.* at 842. If, after “employing traditional tools of statutory construction,” *Id.* at 843 n.9, we determine that Congress’s intent is clear, then “that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” *Id.* at 842-43. However, “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” *Id.* at 843; see also *Barnhart v. Thomas*, 540 U.S. 20, 124 S. Ct. 376, 380, 157 L. Ed. 2d 333 (2003) (applying *Chevron*)

II. The Application of the Cap to Transition Payments

Both the plaintiffs and the defendant in this case argue that Congress spoke directly to the issue of whether the payment cap in § 7982(d)(2) applies to transition payments. Obviously, however, they

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2 *Chevron* deference is appropriate “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” *United States v. Mead Corp.*, 533 U.S. 218, 226-27, 150 L. Ed. 2d 292, 121 S. Ct. 2164 (2001). In 7 U.S.C. § 7991(c), Congress authorized the Secretary and Commodity Credit Corporation to promulgate appropriate regulations necessary to implement the chapter. It specified that those regulations were to be made without regard to notice and comment rule-making procedures. The regulations at issue in this case, final regulations made without prior notice and comment, were promulgated under the authority given to the Secretary in § 7991(c). See 67 Fed. Reg. 64454 (Oct. 18, 2002).
do not agree on what Congress said. The plaintiffs argue that Congress clearly intended that the cap not apply to transition payments and that the Secretary’s regulations therefore violate the statute. The Secretary, on the other hand, contends that Congress clearly intended that all payments under § 7982 would be limited by the cap and that the Department’s regulations are consistent with the statute. Both parties argue that the plain language of the statute, legislative history, and the structure and purpose of the statute support their positions.

1. Statutory Language

In statutory construction cases, “the first step ‘is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case.’” Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 534 U.S. 438, 450, 151 L. Ed. 2d 908, 122 S. Ct. 941 (2002) (citation omitted). The plaintiffs argue that the plain language of § 7982 unambiguously requires the Secretary to make transition payments without limitation. They point out that subsection (h) requires payment on eligible production and note that Congress did not limit the definition of “eligible production” in either subsection (a) or (h). They argue that if Congress had intended the cap to apply to transitional payments, it could have written the statute to say so in subsection (h) itself. As the Secretary points out, however, subsection (h) provides that payments shall be made according to the formula in subsection (c), which incorporates the payment quantity in subsection (d), the subsection that includes the payment cap. Thus, according to this reading of the statute, the fact that subsection (h)
itself does not include a limitation on quantity is not determinative because the payment formula for which it provides incorporates the payment cap in subsection (d)(2).

By its terms, however, the payment cap in subsection (d)(2) applies only to “payments under subsection (b).” Thus, the central question in this case is whether transition payments are “payments under subsection (b),” the section of the statute that orders the Secretary to offer to enter into contracts with dairy farmers under which the farmers will receive payment for eligible milk production. The plaintiffs assert that transition payments are not payments under subsection (b). They maintain that § 7982 creates two similar but distinct programs that cover farmers during different periods - one, described in subsection (e), that covers farmers during the period after they sign contracts and another, described in subsection (h), that covers farmers for the period before they sign contracts - and that “payments under subsection (b)” refers to the payments under the first program, not the second. They argue that interpreting “payments under subsection (b)” to include both transition and monthly payments renders the phrase “subsection (b)” superfluous, since, under such an interpretation, the limitation could have been written to just read: “payments under this section.” As the plaintiffs point out, however, citing to Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, United States Department of Labor v. Goudy, 777 F.2d 1122, 1127 (6th Cir. 1985), statutes should be read to give every word and clause effect. Citing to other canons of statutory interpretation, the plaintiffs also assert that the statute is remedial and should be construed liberally in favor of the beneficiaries.

In response, the Secretary asserts that transition payments are “payments under subsection (b).” She points out that dairy farmers receive transitional payments only if they sign contracts, as authorized in subsection (b). She further notes that in excepting payments under subsection (h) from the payments that start on the first day of the month in which the contract is signed, subsection (g)4

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4 Subsection (g), entitled “duration of contract,” provides as follows:
(1) In general. Except as provided in paragraph (2) and subsection (h), any contract
contemplates that payments under subsection (h) are payments covered by the contract. She contends that if Congress had intended to limit the cap to the monthly contract payments, it would have made more sense to have the limit apply to “payments under subsections (e)-(g),” the subsections dealing with the monthly payments, rather than to “payments under subsection (b),” the subsection discussing the contracts in general. Furthermore, the Secretary questions whether the canons of statutory interpretation cited by the plaintiffs are relevant here, arguing that the program is not remedial and that the cap is an eligibility limitation rather than an exception. Finally, she contends that nothing in the structure or purpose of the statute suggests that Congress intended to create two separate programs or to distinguish between the retroactive transitional payments and the prospective monthly payments.

Focusing on the statutory language, we conclude that it is unclear whether the phrase “payments under subsection (b)” includes transition payments or not. As the defendant points out, transition payments are received only if the dairy farmers enter into contracts and, therefore, such payments can be seen to be payments under subsection (b). At the same time, as noted by the plaintiffs, this interpretation does render the phrase “subsection (b)” superfluous. Furthermore, when subsection (e) refers to “a payment under a contract under this section,” it is referring to the monthly payments, thereby implying that transition payments are not considered payments under § 7982 contracts. In short, we conclude that although Congress may have had an intent regarding whether transition payments were “under subsection (b),” that intent is not stated clearly in the language of the statute.

2. Legislative History, Structure, and Purpose

(...continued)
entered into by producers on a dairy farm under this section shall cover eligible production marketed by the producers on the dairy farm during the period starting with the first day of [the] month the producers on the dairy farm enter into the contract and ending on September 30, 2005....
Neither the legislative history of the statute nor the parties’ explanations of how their interpretations further the purpose of the statute sufficiently clarify the ambiguity in the statutory language. See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1094, 124 S. Ct. 1236, 1248 (2004) (looking to text, structure, purpose, and history of Act to find it unambiguous); United States v. Choice, 201 F.3d 837, 841 (6th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the plain language of the statute is the starting point for statutory interpretation, but that the structure and language of the statute as a whole can aid in interpreting the plain meaning and that legislative history can be looked to if the statutory language is unclear).

Both parties are able to explain how their position fits into the overall structure of the statute and furthers the statute’s purpose. The Secretary asserts that her interpretation of the statute gives the cap a meaningful role in the statute’s operation, whereas the plaintiffs’ interpretation would largely nullify the cap because large producers would be able to circumvent the cap by waiting until September 2005 to sign a contract and then receive “transitional payments” for the entire period between December 2001 and August 2005.

The plaintiffs object to this argument and to the district court’s acceptance of it, asserting that the district court and Secretary have usurped the role of Congress and injected their own political viewpoints into a carefully-crafted congressional compromise. Furthermore, they argue, Congress intended for large producers to be able to avoid the production caps. They assert that the overall purpose of the program was to assist dairy farmers and that Congress wanted to cover all eligible production, but that it carefully constructed the program in a way that would force large farmers to wait until the end of the covered period if they wanted to receive payments on all their eligible production in order to refrain from encouraging large farmers to further increase production and in order to push costs of the program to later fiscal years.

Similarly, both parties cite legislative history that supports their positions. The plaintiffs claim that the transition payments in § 7982 serve as a replacement for the Northeast Dairy Compact, which did not have production caps. As the Secretary points out, however, the
Northeast Dairy Compact was not a federal assistance program but an agreement among Northeastern states to regulate prices. See Organic Cow, LLC v. Ctr. for New England Dairy Compact Research, 335 F.3d 66, 67-68 (2d Cir. 2003) (describing the Compact). As the Secretary further notes, previous programs supporting dairy farmers included payment caps or gave discretion to the Secretary, who then capped the amount of milk eligible for assistance. See, e.g., Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999, Pub. L No. 105-277, § 1111(d), 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (providing $200 million to provide assistance to dairy producers “in a manner determined by the Secretary”); Dairy Market Loss Assistance Program, 64 Fed. Reg. 24933 (May 10, 1999) (capping payment to 2.6 million pounds). Similarly, both milk assistance programs that were in the Farm Bill before it went to conference included caps. See H.R. 2646, 107th Cong. § 132 (2002) (as amended and passed by Senate) (capping payment at lesser of average quantity of milk in which farmer had interest during each of a specified three-year period or 8 million pounds). In addition, the conference report does not mention a difference between monthly and transition payments with regard to the payment cap, simply noting, in its description of the program, that: “Producers, on an operation-by-operation basis, may receive payments on no more than 2.4 million pounds of milk marketed per year. Retroactive payments will be made covering market losses due to low prices since December 1, 2001.” H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 107-424 at 446 (2002), reprinted in 2002 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141, 171.

At the same time, the plaintiffs point out that some members of Congress, particularly Senators Leahy and Jeffords, indicated that they understood that the cap in § 7982 was to be applied to the monthly payments and not to transition payments. Senator Leahy, for example, in discussing the Farm Bill’s conference report, noted that:

The prospective “monthly” program which provides monthly payments . . . has a 2.4 million pound cap as set forth in (d). . . . This “limitations” language was inserted out of a concern that an uncapped program would lead to significant increases in production of milk. Also, there was a concern that
farmers would reorganize in the future just to get higher payments under the national program.

These concerns do not apply to the benefits paid out under subsection (h) because farmers would need time machines to go back in the past and increase their production or to change their legal structure retrospectively. Indeed, the amount of production covered by (h) is the amount of “eligible production” as defined in section [7982(a)(2)].


In sum, looking at the statutory language, legislative history, and overall structure and purpose of the statute, we find the intention of Congress with regard to the application of the subsection (d)(2) cap to transition payments unclear.

3. Reasonableness

Under Chevron, if Congress has not spoken directly to the question at issue, the Secretary’s interpretation of the statute will be upheld so long as it is reasonable. See Smiley v. Citibank (S.D), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 744-45, 135 L. Ed. 2d 25, 116 S. Ct. 1730 (1996) (“Since we have concluded that the Comptroller’s regulation deserves deference, the question before us is not whether it represents the best interpretation of the statute, but whether it represents a reasonable one.”); see also Barnhart v. Thomas, 124 S. Ct. at 382. In this instance, we conclude that the Secretary’s interpretation of the statute is eminently reasonable. As discussed above, transition payments pursuant to subsection (h) could rationally be considered payments under subsection (b), because they are contingent upon the recipients signing contracts authorized under subsection (b). Furthermore, capping the transition payments along with the monthly payments creates a consistency throughout the program and ensures that the cap has a meaningful role in the statute.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons set out above, we find that the Secretary’s construction of the statute was permissible, and we therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the district court in favor of the defendant.

R.J. REYNOLDS TOBACCO COMPANY; LORILLARD TOBACCO COMPANY; R. J. REYNOLDS SMOKE SHOP, INC., v. STATE OF CALIFORNIA.
No. 03-16535.

(Cite as 384 F.3d 1126).


Petitioners object to a surtax imposed by the State of California where the collected taxes are used to fund a public advertising campaign which not only delivers a public safety message about the dangers of the human consumption of tobacco, but includes a message that strongly suggests that tobacco company executives conspire and connive to “push” the use of tobacco onto a new generation of smokers and it also impugns the moral character of [the] industry, accusing it of hypocrisy, cynicism and duplicity. Petitioners seek relief from a state surtax on the sale of their product by requiring the state to have a close nexus between the excise tax and the means and methods of the state’s advertising program.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

*The California Department of Health services program to discourage youthful smokers and appeals therefrom is not within the jurisdiction of the JO and OALJ, however many of the legal issues covered in the head notes above have strong relationships to per capita assessments collected on agricultural produce and livestock under protest in the various USDA programs administered under the Agriculture Marketing Agreement Act - Editor

OPINION

We deal here with a novel First Amendment claim. The appellants, three tobacco companies, claim that California violated their First Amendment rights by imposing a surtax on cigarettes and then using some of the proceeds of that surtax to pay for advertisements that criticize the tobacco industry. The tobacco companies argue that this is a case of compelled subsidization of speech prohibited by the First Amendment, analogous to United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 150 L. Ed. 2d 438, 121 S. Ct. 2334 (2001). California counters that the advertisements are government speech entirely immune from First Amendment attack.

The tobacco companies concede that (1) the imposition of the tax itself is not unconstitutional and (2) the message produced by the government's advertisements creates no First Amendment problem apart from its method of funding. Rather, they argue for an independent First Amendment violation based on the close nexus between the government advertising and the excise tax that funds it. We reject this argument as unsupported by the Constitution and Supreme Court precedent, and as so unlimited in principle as to threaten a wide range of legitimate government activity. We also reject the tobacco companies' claim that the advertisements violated their rights under the Seventh Amendment or the Due Process Clause. We thus affirm the district court.¹

¹We note that the district court issued a particularly thoughtful, thorough and comprehensive opinion in this case, upon which we have substantially relied even though we do not adopt all of its reasoning.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 1988, California voters approved Proposition 99, a statewide ballot initiative also known as the "Tobacco Tax and Health Protection Act of 1988." Cal. Rev. & Tax Code §§ 30121-30130. The Act imposes the Cigarette and Tobacco Products Surtax ("the surtax"), a 25-cent per-pack surtax on all wholesale cigarette sales in California.

The revenue generated by the surtax is placed in the "Cigarette and Tobacco Products Surtax Fund." Twenty percent of taxes in the surtax fund is allocated to a "Health Education Account," funds from which are only "available for appropriation for programs for the prevention and reduction of tobacco use, primarily among children, through school and community health education programs." Id., § 30122(b)(1).

In order to implement Proposition 99, the California Legislature directed the California Department of Health Services ("DHS") to establish "a program on tobacco use and health to reduce tobacco use in California by conducting health education interventions and behavior change programs at the state level, in the community, and other nonschool settings." Cal. Health & Safety Code § 104375(a). As part of this program, called the "Tobacco Control Program," the DHS is required to develop a media campaign designed to raise public awareness of the deleterious effects of smoking and to effect a reduction in tobacco use. Id., §§ 104375(b), (c), (e)(1) & (j); 104385(a); 104400. The Tobacco Control Program is funded entirely with money from the Health Education Account -- and thus, ultimately, exclusively from the proceeds of the surtax.

This case concerns certain advertisements the DHS produced as part of its Tobacco Control Program. According to the tobacco

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2 Because this case comes before us on the state's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we accept as true all allegations in the tobacco companies' complaint.
companies, the DHS concluded soon after the establishment of the Tobacco Control Program that a media campaign focused solely on presenting the health risks of tobacco use would be of limited utility in reducing the incidence of smoking in California, because people tend to "tune out" advertising that simply explains the health risks involved with tobacco use. Thus, the DHS concluded that, in order to carry out its mandate to encourage Californians to modify and reduce their use of tobacco, it would be necessary to launch a campaign to "denormalize" smoking, by creating a climate in which smoking would seem less desirable and less socially acceptable.

One method used by the DHS in this campaign has been to portray the tobacco industry itself as deceptive and as an enemy of the public health, or, in the companies' words, to attack not "the desirability of a product but . . . the moral character of [the] industry, accusing it of hypocrisy, cynicism and duplicity." The district court described these advertisements as follows:

A recent round of television commercials features an actor playing a public relations executive for the fictional cigarette brand "Hampton," detailing for viewers his unseemly methods for getting people to start smoking. The ads end with the tagline, "Do You Smell Smoke?," implicitly referencing both cigarette smoke and a smoke-and-mirrors marketing strategy. Another ad portrays tobacco executives discussing how to replace a customer base that is dying at the rate of 1,100 users a day. Some of the ads end with images of mock warning labels such as: "WARNING: The tobacco industry is not your friend."; or "WARNING: Some people will say anything to sell cigarettes." Several spots suggest that tobacco companies aggressively market to children. In one particularly striking television ad entitled "Rain," children in a schoolyard are shown looking up while cigarettes rain down on them from the sky. A voice-over states "We have to sell cigarettes to your kids. We need half a million new smokers a year just to stay in business. So we advertise near schools, at candy counters. We
lower our prices. We have to. It's nothing personal. You understand." At the conclusion, the narrator says, "The tobacco industry: how low will they go to make a profit?"


The district court also noted that each of the challenged advertisements is "identified as 'Sponsored by the California Department of Health Services.' " *Id.* The tobacco companies do not claim that these advertisements contain any affirmatively false statements.

That California itself is interested in the outcome of the campaign is made clear by the Legislature's finding that "smoking is the single most important source of preventable disease and premature death in California" and that preventing tobacco use by children and young adults is the "highest priority in disease prevention for the state of California." Cal. Health & Safety Code § 104350(a). The district court explained that "there is substantial evidence, including published medical studies, indicating that the Proposition 99 programs, and the media campaign in particular, have been successful in achieving their goals." *Bonta*, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 1088 n.5 (noting the following articles describing the success of California's campaign in reducing the incidence of smoking: C. Fichtenberg and S. Glantz, *Association of the California Tobacco Control Program with Declines in Cigarette Consumption and Mortality from Heart Disease*, NEW ENG. J. MED. 343:24, 1772-1777 (2000); M. Siegel, *Mass Media Antismoking Campaigns: A Powerful Tool for Health Promotion*, ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED., 129:2, 128-132 (1998); J.P. Pierce, et al., *Has the California Tobacco Control Program Reduced Smoking?*, JAMA 280:10, 893-899 (1998)).

The appellant tobacco companies here are R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company; its wholly owned subsidiary R.J. Reynolds Smoke Shop, Inc.; and Lorillard Tobacco Company. R.J. Reynolds pays the surtax through sales from its smoke shop subsidiary; Lorillard pays the surtax in connection with certain of its research and marketing activities in California. These companies are not the most important
sources of revenue for the surtax, however. Because the surtax is imposed on distributors of cigarettes, most surtax payments are made not by cigarette manufacturers themselves, but by cigarette wholesalers. Nonetheless, because the tobacco companies sell or provide small quantities of cigarettes directly to smokers in California, they have paid and will in the future be required to pay the surtax. The tobacco companies here paid approximately $14,000 in surtax funds, thus contributing approximately $2,800 of the $25 million spent on the challenged ads. *Bonta*, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 1090.

The tobacco companies brought five causes of action against the state defendants ("the state" or "California") to the district court, seeking both injunctive and declaratory relief. They argued that the use of the surtax to fund the "anti-industry" advertisements violated the First Amendment, that the advertisements improperly stigmatized them in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, that the advertisements interfered with their right to a jury trial under the Seventh and Fourteenth Amendments and that the advertisements violated the California Constitution. The state moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court dismissed with prejudice all of the companies' federal constitutional claims, and the companies timely appealed.

**DISCUSSION**

**I. First Amendment**

We begin by addressing the scope of the First Amendment issue. The tobacco companies do not raise a First Amendment challenge to California's right to sponsor "anti-industry" advertisements. As their brief to this court puts it, "if the broadcasts were funded by general taxes rather than by a tax imposed exclusively on the tobacco industry, the anti-industry ads would raise no First Amendment issue." Nor do the companies argue that the surtax itself has interfered

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³This state law claim is not before us.
with their constitutional rights. See, e.g., Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 227-29, 95 L. Ed. 2d 209, 107 S. Ct. 1722 (1987) (invalidating a statute that granted a tax exemption for religious, professional, trade and sports journals that did not apply to other journals); Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 591-93, 75 L. Ed. 2d 295, 103 S. Ct. 1365 (1983) (invalidating a special tax on the press limited to only a few newspapers). Their claim is specific: they argue that using the money raised from an excise tax that targets the tobacco industry to pay for advertising that denigrates the industry violates their constitutional rights.

Before discussing the precedent upon which the tobacco companies rely, we note that this is a novel argument. At issue is neither the government's power to speak nor the government's power to tax. Chief Justice John Marshall famously stated that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819). According to the tobacco companies, however, this case involves neither an invalid exercise of the government's power to tax nor a claim that they have been destroyed by the government's speech. Rather, the companies claim a constitutional violation in the link between the excise tax and the government speech to which they object. By suggesting that certain taxpayers should be able to object to government speech whenever an excise tax is used to fund a message that particularly affects the group that pays the tax, the tobacco companies' argument would implicate a range of other programs. As we shall explain, we reject the "nexus" argument as applied to excise taxation. A mere link between an excise tax and a government-sponsored advertising campaign, absent a claim that either the tax or the advertising is unconstitutional, does not violate the First Amendment.

A. United Foods, the Compelled Speech Doctrine and Taxation

The tobacco companies rely in large part upon one case: United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 150 L. Ed. 2d 438, 121 S.
The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in *Livestock Mktg. Ass'n v. USDA*, 335 F.3d 711 (8th Cir. 2003), cert. granted sub nom. *Veneman v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n*, 158 L. Ed. 2d 962, 124 S. Ct. 2389, 72 U.S.L.W. 3725 (U.S. May 24, 2004) (No. 03-1164) and *Nebraska Cattlemen, Inc. v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n*, 158 L. Ed. 2d 962, 124 S. Ct. 2390, 72 U.S.L.W. 3725 (U.S. May 24, 2004), involving the interaction between the compelled speech and government speech doctrines.
"no." The Court held that by requiring the mushroom producer to contribute to generic advertisements for mushroom sales to which it objected, the government had put "First Amendment values . . . at serious risk" by "compelling a discrete group of citizens to pay special subsidies for speech on the side that [the government] favors." \textit{Id.} at 411.

Read broadly, and taken in isolation, this language might plausibly suggest that the tobacco companies have the right to object to the advertisements at issue here because they have paid "special subsidies" for the advertisements in the form of a tax that disproportionately affects them. Yet \textit{United Foods} also makes clear that not every case in which the government mandates support for speech from a particular group necessarily creates a First Amendment violation. Most importantly, the Court specifically declined to address whether the same First Amendment analysis would apply to cases in which the speech produced was "government speech" that derived from the state itself and not the Mushroom Council. \textit{See Id.} at 416 ("The Government argues the advertising here is government speech, and so immune from the scrutiny we would otherwise apply. As the government admits . . . however, this argument was not raised or addressed in the Court of Appeals.") (citations omitted). \textit{United Foods} also carefully relied on the teaching of previous compelled speech cases to reach its holding about the contributions to the Mushroom Council. \textit{Id.} In order to understand the impact of \textit{United Foods}, therefore, we examine the origins and the purpose of the compelled speech doctrine.

\[1\] It has long been established that the First Amendment prohibits the government from compelling citizens to express beliefs that they do not hold. "The right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all." \textit{Wooley v. Maynard}, 430 U.S. 705, 714, 51 L. Ed. 2d 752, 97 S. Ct. 1428 (1977) (forbidding a state government from compelling motorists to display the message "Live Free or Die" on their license plates); \textit{see also West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette}, 319 U.S. 624, 87 L. Ed. 1628,
63 S. Ct. 1178 (1943) (preventing a state government from forcing children to salute the American flag when the children's religious beliefs forbade such behavior). These cases are not directly applicable here because there is no claim that the tobacco companies have been forced into expressing any position.

The Court extended this fundamental principle of freedom of expression to situations "involving expression by groups which include persons who object to the speech, but who, nevertheless, must remain members of the group by law or necessity." United Foods, 533 U.S. at 413. The first such case, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 52 L. Ed. 2d 261, 97 S. Ct. 1782 (1977), involved a challenge by public school teachers to a collective bargaining agreement. The agreement required non-union members who were represented by the teachers union to pay a service fee equal to union dues. Some portions of this service fee were then used to pay "for political and ideological purposes unrelated to collective bargaining." Id. at 232. The Court held that this program violated the principle that "the freedom of an individual to associate for the purpose of advancing beliefs and ideas" is protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 233. Although the union could compel objectors to provide funds for purposes that were "germane" to "its duties as [a] collective-bargaining representative," it would violate basic principles of freedom of association to compel the financial support of objectors for ideological purposes unrelated to collective bargaining. Id. at 235. The Court revisited similar issues in Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1, 110 L. Ed. 2d 1, 110 S. Ct. 2228 (1990), in which it invalidated a program in which mandatory dues to the California State Bar were used, over member's objections, to advance political and ideological causes to which some bar members did not subscribe. The Court held that the state bar could use compulsory membership dues to finance activities "germane" to the purposes for which the "compelled association and integrated bar [were] justified . . . the State's interest in regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services." Id. at 13. It could not, however, order compulsory dues to be used to "fund activities of an ideological
nature which fell outside of those areas of activity." Id. at 14. *Abood* and *Keller* set forth the principles that were later applied -- with differing results -- in *Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott*, 521 U.S. 457, 138 L. Ed. 2d 585, 117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997), and in *United Foods* to programs in which the government compels agricultural producers to contribute to joint marketing programs. In *Glickman*, the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to a regulatory program that required tree fruit growers to fund marketing campaigns as part of a broader regulation of the industry. The crucial distinction between *Glickman* and *United Foods* is that the mandatory assessment in *Glickman* was "ancillary to a more comprehensive program restricting market autonomy." *United Foods*, 533 U.S. at 411. We have explained the distinction between the two cases as follows: "If the generic advertising assessment is part of a 'comprehensive program' that 'displaces many aspects of independent business activity,' exempts the firms within its scope from the antitrust laws, and makes them 'part of a broader collective enterprise,' the assessment does not violate the First Amendment." *Delano Farms v. Cal. Table Grape Comm'n*, 318 F.3d 895, 898-99 (9th Cir. 2003). The program in *United Foods*, on the other hand, raised a constitutional problem because "if the program is, in the main, simply an assessment of independent and competing firms to pay for generic advertising, it does violate the First Amendment." *United Foods* at 899. The *United Foods* rule protects against "making one entrepreneur finance advertising for the benefit of his competitors" when there is no broader regulatory interest at stake. 533 U.S. at 418 (Stevens, J., concurring).

Seen in this perspective, *United Foods* is a logical extension of a long line of cases that have protected both freedom of expression and freedom of association. See *United States v. Frame*, 885 F.2d 1119, 1132 (3d Cir. 1989) (describing the "underlying rationale of the right to be free from compelled speech or association" as guiding the *Abood* line of cases).

Under *Wooley* and *Barnette*, the First Amendment does not permit the government to force citizens to express beliefs that are not their own. As an extension of this principle, under *Abood*, *Keller* and
United Foods, the First Amendment also does not permit the government to force citizens to contribute to a private association when the funds are used primarily to support expression from a certain viewpoint. The First Amendment may, however, under Abood and Glickman, permit the government to compel contributions to an association's expression when that expression is germane to a broader regulatory scheme that compelled the association in the first place.

[2] Nothing in United Foods suggests that the compelled speech doctrine applies to situations where the government imposes an excise tax on private citizens and then uses the money to speak in the name of the government itself. No court has held otherwise. See NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1566 (11th Cir. 1990) ("Abood has never been applied to the government, however; if it were, taxation would become impossible."). An otherwise valid tax for an otherwise valid

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3Read in this context, it is clear that United Foods relied on harm to expressive and associational freedoms in order to support its conclusion. See 533 U.S. at 413 ("It is true that the party who protests the assessment here is required simply to support speech by others, not to utter the speech itself. We conclude, however, that the mandated support is contrary to the First Amendment principles set forth in cases involving expression by groups which include persons who object to the speech, but who, nevertheless, must remain members of the group by law or necessity.") (emphasis added). The Court emphasized that contributions to the Mushroom Council forced certain private parties to pay for the speech of other private parties -- a violation of both expressive and associative freedom. Id. at 416 (noting "the mandatory assessments imposed to require one group of private persons to pay for speech by others").

4Because United Foods is easily reconciled with previous Supreme Court precedent, we do not see a basis in United Foods for our dissenting colleague's view that, in distinguishing Glickman, the Court intended to untether the compelled speech doctrine from its expressive and associational moorings and create a new constitutional right to challenge all forms of targeted taxation. Nor does United Foods suggest that we should apply principles governing government suppression of private commercial speech, see Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564, 65 L. Ed. 2d 341, 100 S. Ct. 2343 (1980), to this case -- in which the government has neither suppressed nor compelled speech, but has merely used an excise tax to fund a governmental message. Surely if the Court in United Foods had intended to create such broadly sweeping principles, it would have said so.
purpose ordinarily must bind even those who object to the government's objective. In Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229, 146 L. Ed. 2d 193, 120 S. Ct. 1346 (2000), the Court explained that:

It is inevitable that government will adopt and pursue programs and policies within its constitutional powers but which nevertheless are contrary to the profound beliefs and sincere convictions of some of its citizens. The government, as a general rule, may support valid programs and policies by taxes or other exactions binding on protesting parties. Within this broader principle it seems inevitable that funds raised by the government will be spent for speech and other expression to advocate and defend its own policies.

[3] Put simply, the rationale of the Abood and Keller line of cases - protecting freedom of expression and association -- does not apply to government speech when the government acts as both a taxing authority and as a speaker. Paying a tax, even an excise tax, does not create a compelled form of association. When the government acts as a speaker it may espouse views that directly contradict those of taxpayers without interfering with taxpayers' freedom of expression. In a democracy based on majority rule, such a conclusion is inescapable. "Government officials are expected as a part of the democratic process to represent and to espouse the views of a majority of their constituents. . . . If every citizen were to have a right to insist that no one paid by public funds express a view with which he disagreed, debate over issues of great concern to the public would be limited to those in the private sector, and the process of government as we know it radically transformed." Keller, 496 U.S. at 12-13. As we have said before, "simply because the government opens its mouth to speak does not give every outside individual or group a First Amendment right to play ventriloquist." Downs v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1013 (9th Cir. 2000).

B. The California Regulation and Compelled Speech
The companies claim that their situation is unique because the DHS pays for its anti-industry ads exclusively from revenues raised ultimately through the surtax, which in turn is derived exclusively from sales of cigarette packages. They argue that imposing an excise tax on a particular industry and then earmarking the use of the tax funds for advertisements that criticize that industry suffices to make the companies similarly situated to the plaintiffs in the compelled speech cases.

There is a fundamental difference between the excise tax/spending regime at issue here and the compelled contributions to private associations that were at issue in *Abood*, *Keller* and *United Foods*. When a union, a state bar association or even a mushroom growers' association speaks, it represents only the interests of that particular entity. When California uses funds from the tobacco surtax to produce advertisements, it does so in the name of all of California's citizens. As the district court observed, "[The tobacco companies] are not seeking to prevent coerced participation in private association; rather, they are attempting to exercise a taxpayer's veto over speech by the government itself." *Bonta*, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 1100. That California has chosen to fund a valid public health message through a targeted excise tax does not mean that it is no longer speaking as the State of California.

The key issue is not the targeted nature of the tax but the degree of governmental control over the message. *See Livestock Mktg. Ass'n v. USDA*, 335 F.3d 711, 723 (8th Cir. 2003) (noting that "the greater the government's responsibility for, and control over, the speech in question, the greater the government's interest therein"). In the compelled speech cases cited by the companies, control over the content of the message produced had been delegated to an association "representative only of one segment of the population, with certain common interests." *Abood*, 431 U.S. at 259 n.13 (Powell, J., concurring). The problem with the government forcing private citizens to contribute funds in those cases was that the funds were being used to support the speech of such segmented, specific
interests. Here there can be no doubt that the tobacco companies' funds are being used to speak on behalf of the people of California as a whole. Any coercion -- that is, the collection of funds used to produce a particular message -- is performed not in the name of a segment of the public, but of the state.

Indeed, a wide range of First Amendment cases differentiate between the government controlling the expenditure of its own revenue and the government sharing control with private or quasi-private parties. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 197, 114 L. Ed. 2d 233, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (distinguishing situations where the government imposes a direct constraint on the use of its own money from situations "in which the Government has placed a condition on the recipient of the subsidy rather than on a particular program or service, thus effectively prohibiting the recipient from engaging in the protected conduct outside the scope of the federally funded program"); FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 399-400, 82 L. Ed. 2d 278, 104 S. Ct. 3106 (1984) (same); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268, 70 L. Ed. 2d 440, 102 S. Ct. 269 (1981) (establishing limited public forum doctrine and explaining that the First Amendment "forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally open to the public, even if it was not required to create the forum in the first place").

This is not to say that a state may avoid the limits of the First Amendment simply by labeling a compelled contribution a contribution to the government's own speech. As the Supreme Court has noted, a state law "determination that [an entity] is a 'government agency,' and therefore entitled to the treatment accorded a governor, a mayor, or a state tax commission, for instance, is not binding on us when such a determination is essential to the decision of a federal question." Keller, 496 U.S. at 11. The analysis may differ when the government nominally controls the production of advertisements, but as a practical matter has delegated control over the speech to a particular group that represents only one segment of the population. See Frame, 885 F.2d at 1133-34 (describing compelled contributions to a nominally government controlled "Cattleman's Board," where
the persons with actual control over the disbursement of funds were private individuals "whose primary or overriding purpose is to promote the welfare of the cattle producers" (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2905(b)(4))); see also Mich. Pork Producers Ass'n v. Veneman, 348 F.3d 157, 161 (6th Cir. 2003) ("We conclude that the pork industry's extensive control over the Pork Act's promotional activities prevents their attribution to the government."). But that situation is not present here. As the district court put it, "while in some cases the distinction between government speech and compelled allegiance may present 'difficult issues,' the analysis here is straightforward." Bonta, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 1100 (quoting United Foods, 533 U.S. at 417).

[4] In their complaint, the tobacco companies themselves allege that the director of the DHS, a government agency, is "ultimately responsible for the advertising challenged in this action." The DHS is acting expressly according to California law, which directs the DHS to implement a media campaign emphasizing "both preventing the initiation of tobacco use and quitting smoking . . . based on professional market research and surveys necessary to determine the most effective method of diminishing tobacco use among specified target populations." Cal. Health & Safety Code § 104375(e)(1). The

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7Thus, the dissent's claim that there is an "untenable distinction" between situations in which the government speaks for itself and situations where the government has effectively licensed control over speech to a private organization is misplaced. In similar cases, courts can (and often have) examined whether or not the government has delegated authority to a private body, such that a compelled subsidy is being used to support a private interest instead of a governmental one. See, e.g., Cochran v. Veneman, 359 F.3d 263, 278 (3d. Cir. 2003) (finding First Amendment concerns where an agricultural act "seemed to really be special interest legislation on behalf of the industry's interest more . . . than the government's"). Indeed, this was what was at issue in the language the dissent quotes from the Third Circuit's decision in Frame; that court identified an improper "coerced nexus between the individual and . . . specific expressive activity" in a case where "the Cattlemen's Board seems to be an entity 'representative of one segment of the population, with certain common interests.'" Frame, 885 F.2d at 1132, 1133 (citing Abood, 431 U.S. at 259 n.13 (Powell, J., concurring)).
As a point of comparison, it is worth citing those aspects of the organization of the State Bar of California upon which the Supreme Court relied to hold that its speech should not be classified as coming from the government itself: 

The State Bar of California is a good deal different from most other entities that would be regarded in common parlance as "governmental agencies." Its principal funding comes, not from appropriations made to it by the legislature, but from dues levied on its members by the board of governors. Only lawyers admitted to practice in the State of California are members of the State Bar, and all 122,000 lawyers admitted to practice in the State must be members. [The State Bar] undoubtedly performs important and valuable services for the State by way of governance of the profession, but those services are essentially advisory in nature. The State Bar does not admit anyone to the practice of law, it does not finally disbar or suspend anyone, and it does not ultimately establish ethical codes of conduct. All of those functions are reserved by California law to the State Supreme Court. . . . The State Bar of California was created, not to participate in the general government of the State, but to provide specialized professional advice to those with the ultimate responsibility of governing the legal profession. Its members and officers are such not because they are citizens or voters, but because they are lawyers. We think that these differences between the State Bar, on the one hand, and traditional government agencies and officials, on the other hand, render unavailing [the State Bar's] argument that it is not subject to the same constitutional rule with respect to the use of compulsory dues as are labor unions representing public and private employees.

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As a point of comparison, it is worth citing those aspects of the organization of the State Bar of California upon which the Supreme Court relied to hold that its speech should not be classified as coming from the government itself:

Keller, 496 U.S. at 11, 13 (footnotes and citations omitted). Here, by contrast, the contested advertisements are unquestionably part of the "general government of the state."
C. Excise Taxation, Government Speech and the First Amendment

In short, by being required to contribute to the DHS's advertisements, the tobacco companies have not been deprived of their freedom of expression or their freedom of association, which are the harms that the compelled speech cases protect against. The tobacco companies' claim goes to another kind of harm -- the harm caused by paying an excise tax used to fund government speech of which they understandably disapprove.

The tobacco companies concede that the state would not have violated the First Amendment had it imposed the same surtax on cigarette packs, commingled the proceeds of the surtax with the state's general fund and then used the general fund to produce precisely the same advertisements. Thus, the tobacco companies object only to the nexus between the excise tax and the advertisements. Federal courts have traditionally given great deference to a state's control over its financial affairs when faced with constitutional challenges. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16, 93 S. Ct. 1278 (1973) (noting, in a challenge under the Equal Protection Clause, that "this Court has often admonished against such interferences with the State's fiscal policies"); see also Welsch v. Likins, 550 F.2d 1122, 1131-32 (8th Cir. 1977) ("No right of a state is entitled to greater respect by the federal courts than the state's right to determine how revenues should be raised and how and for what purposes public funds should be expended."). The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that deference not warranted in other regulatory areas is warranted when it comes to the tax system. Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 547-548, 76 L. Ed. 2d 129, 103 S. Ct. 1997 (1983) ("Legislatures have especially broad latitude in creating classifications and distinctions in tax statutes. . . . 'In taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classification.' " (quoting Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 87-88, 84 L. Ed. 590, 60 S. Ct. 406 (1940))). The tobacco companies can point to no case in which, when the state has the right both to impose the relevant tax and to
promulgate the relevant speech, the First Amendment mandates that a state arrange its budgetary categories so as to make the link between a tax and speech less direct.

The implication of the tobacco companies' argument is that industries subject to an excise tax are entitled to a special veto over government speech funded by the tax. Such a right, in turn, would suggest that excise taxes, especially those that earmark funds for particular purposes, are so unusual or improper that they should allow payors of those taxes to avoid the political process and use the courts to control government speech. This suggestion fundamentally misunderstands the history of taxation in the United States, because excise taxation targeted at particular goods or industries is not only common but predates the income tax. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises") (emphasis added); THE FEDERALIST NO. 12 (Alexander Hamilton) ("In America, far the greatest part of the national revenue is derived from taxes of the indirect kind, from imposts, and from excises."). One of the earliest Supreme Court cases upheld a uniform national excise tax on carriages. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 1 L. Ed. 556, 3 Dall. 171 (1796). And excise taxes are hardly unusual today. According to the Office of Management and Budget, the federal government collected approximately 67 billion dollars in excise taxes in 2002. See Office of Management and Budget, Budget for Fiscal Year 2004, Summary Tables, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/summariytables.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2004).

[5] Nor is it a novel feature of American government to levy an excise tax on a particular industry and then use the proceeds of that tax in ways that regulate that industry. The nineteenth century Supreme Court upheld (albeit not against a First Amendment challenge) a federal tax statute that required distillers of alcohol to both pay an excise tax and pay the salaries of federal officers supervising the production of alcohol. United States v. Singer, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 111, 118-19, 122, 21 L. Ed. 49 (1872) (upholding an
act requiring distillers to "reimburse to the United States the expenses and salary of all storekeepers or other officers in charge of . . . warehouses"). Excise taxes levied in the name of public health have long been held constitutionally permissible, even when such taxation has put severe burdens on particular industries. See McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 63, 49 L. Ed. 78, 24 S. Ct. 769 (1904) (upholding, as an exercise of Congress's ability to protect public health, the constitutionality of an excise tax on artificially colored oleomargarine "although it be true that the effect of the tax in question is to repress the manufacture of artificially colored oleomargarine"); Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608, 623, 46 L. Ed. 713, 22 S. Ct. 493 (1902) (upholding an excise tax on tobacco and noting that "it is no part of the function of a court to inquire into the reasonableness of the excise either as respects the amount or the property upon which it is imposed").

Today, a tax on heavy trucks and trailers is dedicated to a fund intended to improve highways. See 26 U.S.C. § 9503 (establishing a "Highway Trust Fund"); 26 U.S.C. § 4051 (imposing a retail tax on heavy trucks and trailers dedicated to the Highway Trust Fund). A tax on fishing equipment is dedicated to government action to preserve fisheries. See 26 U.S.C. § 9504(a) (establishing an "Aquatic Resources Trust Fund"); 26 U.S.C. § 4161 (imposing an excise tax on sport fishing equipment dedicated to the Aquatic Resources Trust Fund). Yet we would not conclude that the manufacturers of large trucks have a First Amendment right to veto government speech on highway safety, or that the makers of sonar fish finders have a First Amendment right to direct government speech on fishery management.

[6] There is thus a long history of excise taxation directed at particular industries in the name of public health and welfare. Despite this history, not one court has upheld a right of an industry to block otherwise legitimate government activity simply because the industry pays an excise tax. The tobacco companies offer no reason why they should be entitled to such unique treatment here.
Significantly, the tobacco companies have not offered any principle that could limit the consequences of sustaining their objection. Although the companies claim that they object only to the denigratory advertisements at issue here, they offer no principled basis for limiting their "nexus" theory to such advertisements alone. For example, the tobacco companies do not explain why, if their First Amendment rights have been violated solely because of a nexus between the surtax and the challenged advertisements, they would not also have a right to challenge the use of surtax funds for anti-tobacco education in the public schools to the extent that they disagreed with the state's educational message.

[7] Thus, if the tobacco companies were permitted to object to government speech simply because they pay an excise tax used to fund speech contrary to their interests, the result could be not only to reduce government's ability to disseminate ideas but also an explosion of litigation that could allow private interests to control public messages. There are numerous taxpayers who contribute disproportionately through excise taxes to government speech with which they disagree. If each were to have a similar right to challenge what it may deem government "propaganda," the government's ability to perform crucial educational and public health activities in the interests of all citizens would be hampered. Cf. Downs, 228 F.3d at 1015 (noting that if a First Amendment violation applied to government speech, "[the plaintiff] would be able to do to the government what the government could not do to [the plaintiff]: compel it to embrace a viewpoint.")

D. Other Limitations on Government Speech and the Power to Tax

At the risk of repetition, we emphasize that the tobacco companies do not argue that the government's speech itself is constitutionally impermissible; nor do they argue that the government has burdened their First Amendment rights through the exercise of its power to tax. Were the tobacco companies challenging a California restriction on
their ability to express their views, our analysis would be different. As the district court noted, there are already several recognized instances of constitutional limitations on government speech and "government is no more free to disregard constitutional and other legal norms when it speaks than when it acts." Bonta, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 1110. For example, there may be instances in which the government speaks in such a way as to make private speech difficult or impossible, or to interfere with some other constitutional right, which could raise First Amendment concerns. See Warner Cable Communications, Inc. v. City of Niceville, 911 F.2d 634, 638 (11th Cir. 1990) ("The government may not speak so loudly as to make it impossible for other speakers to be heard by their audience. The government would then be preventing the speakers' access to that audience, and first amendment concerns would arise.").

Another limitation on government speech is found in the Establishment Clause. See Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250, 110 L. Ed. 2d 191, 110 S. Ct. 2356 (1990) ("There is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.") (emphasis in original). The dissent, quoting a passage often used by the tobacco companies in this litigation, invokes Thomas Jefferson's pronouncement that "to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical." P. Kurland & R. Lerner, eds., 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 77 (1987). As the district court carefully explained,

The quoted statement is taken from Jefferson's Virginia Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, a landmark anti-establishment measure declaring that 'no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever.' Id. It is perhaps significant that the statement arose in this context, since 'the Establishment Clause is a specific prohibition on forms of state intervention in religious affairs with no precise counterpart in the
speech provisions.\footnote{Jefferson's comment was directed to a situation in which the government speech itself was improper, not to valid taxation used to fund valid governmental speech.} Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 120 L. Ed. 2d 467, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992). Bonta, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 1107 n.25.

Jefferson's comment was directed to a situation in which the government speech itself was improper, not to valid taxation used to fund valid governmental speech.

There are also strict limits on the government’s ability to impose taxes that are "general law[s] singling out a disfavored group on the basis of speech content." Rust, 500 U.S. at 194; see also Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc., 481 U.S. at 228-29.¹⁹ A government tax designed to suppress the speech of a targeted group would raise serious First Amendment concerns.

[8] But these are issues not before us. On this record, we need not determine the metes and bounds of constitutionally permissible government speech; nor need we articulate abstract limits on the state's power to tax. We share our dissenting colleague's concern that the government not use its taxation power to suppress the free expression of disfavored groups, but the tobacco companies claim no suppression of ideas. The nexus between excise taxation and government speech is the only First Amendment argument they raise, and we limit ourselves to that issue alone. For the reasons set out above, we reject the companies' argument.

II. Seventh Amendment and Due Process Claims

¹⁹Concerns about forced expression, re impression of speech, improper taxation and interference with other constitutional rights could arise, for example, under the facts of Summit Medical Center v. Riley, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1350, 1353-54 (M.D. Ala. 2003), a case cited to us by the tobacco companies. In Summit Medical, it appears that the state of Alabama designed a program to suppress abortion clinics' ability to disseminate independent information, requiring the clinics to purchase from the state and then display information intended to dissuade women from obtaining abortions. The plaintiffs in Summit Medical challenged the burden this mandatory purchase-and-display program imposed upon their own expression, as well as its compulsory and discriminatory nature. Id. at 1354. We take no position on the correctness of the district court's decision in Summit Medical, but note that it confronted a factual situation very different from the one we consider here.
The tobacco companies also raise a novel claim under the Seventh Amendment. They note that they face litigation in state and federal courts. They argue that because the advertisements publicly disparage the reputation and character of the tobacco industry, their right to receive a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment has been infringed because potential future jurors in potential future trials could be biased by the advertising. They do not, however, allege that any actual trial in which they have participated was rendered unconstitutionally unfair by the challenged advertisements.

There are a number of problems with this argument. The companies cite only to cases involving a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to jury trial in criminal cases or to interpretations of the procedural rules governing the federal courts, and not to any case suggesting that they have an independent Seventh or Fourteenth Amendment right to be free of disparaging state speech before a civil trial. Moreover, as the district court noted, the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of the right to a civil trial by jury does not apply to the states and was not incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. See *Dohany v. Rogers*, 281 U.S. 362, 369, 74 L. Ed. 904, 50 S. Ct. 299 (1930); *Walker v. Sauvinet*, 92 U.S. 90, 92, 23 L. Ed. 678 (1875). Therefore, whether parties may raise claims against state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Seventh Amendment violations is questionable.

[9] We need not consider these issues, however. Even assuming that the tobacco companies may properly allege a violation of Seventh or Fourteenth Amendment rights due to juror bias created by these advertisements, the proper context for raising such issues is an actual jury trial where a court could consider whether real jurors actually have been biased. Allegations of juror bias are traditionally resolved by the court conducting the trial, not courts considering hypothetical future proceedings. See *Smith v. Phillips*, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 71 L. Ed. 2d 78, 102 S. Ct. 940 (1982) ("Due process means a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it, and a trial judge ever watchful to prevent prejudicial
occurrences and to determine the effect of such occurrences when they happen. Such determinations may properly be made at a hearing [conducted by the trial court].”). None of the cases cited by the companies supports their asserted right to be free from negative publicity because potential jurors may be prejudiced in potential cases, and we are aware of no case that supports their claim that this court should enjoin certain speech in order to protect the alleged injury occurring in another court.

The tobacco companies do not allege the elements of stigmatization that would violate their due process rights. Cf. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436, 27 L. Ed. 2d 515, 91 S. Ct. 507 (1971) (establishing that stigma can change a person's legal status and therefore constitute a violation of due process). The companies cannot meet the requirements of the "stigma-plus" test established in Paul v. Davis, where the Supreme Court explained that in addition to reputational harm, a due process stigma claim must assert that a recognized liberty or property right, as secured by the due process clauses, has been violated. 424 U.S. 693, 701, 47 L. Ed. 2d 405, 96 S. Ct. 1155 (1976); see also WMX Techs., Inc. v. Miller, 197 F.3d 367, 374 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Reputation, without more, is not a protected constitutional interest."). The companies assert that the alleged deprivation of their right to a fair jury trial is sufficient to meet the stigma-plus test. In essence, the companies are trying to bootstrap two arguments about reputational harm to create a single claim -- arguing that the reputational harm creates juror bias, and that the juror bias combined with reputational harm creates a constitutionally improper stigma. We reject such an attempt at bootstrapping. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 712 ("Petitioners' defamatory publications, however seriously they may have harmed respondent's reputation, did not deprive him of any 'liberty' or 'property' interests protected by the Due Process Clause.").

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED.

DISSENT: TROTT, Circuit Judge, Dissenting:

[10] To compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves is sinful and tyrannical.10

Thomas Jefferson

The atmospheric challenge in this case, which is one we often face, is to focus not on the overwhelming demerits of the underlying subject matter -- smoking -- but on the primary constitutional principle at issue: whether consistent with the First Amendment's right against government abridgement of freedom of speech -- which includes "the right to refrain from speaking at all"11 -- a state can compel reluctant individuals and private entities directly and exclusively to pay for and to support a public interest message with which the entities disagree and which subjects them public scorn, obloquy, and even hatred. It would be a mistake in this principled context to become overly distracted by the medical, physical, personal, financial, and addictive havoc knowingly inflicted for profit upon the public by the tobacco industry; or to be influenced by the hundreds of thousands of premature, preventable, and horrible smoking deaths caused by cancer, emphysema, heart and lung disease, and stroke. There is little doubt that government, in its role as steward of the public's general welfare, can mount a vigorous public campaign against smoking and the tobacco industry, and that it can do so with general tax revenues and by way of "government speech;" but can government do so using this particular compulsory funding

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10 See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 235 n. 31, 52 L. Ed. 2d 261, 97 S. Ct. 1782 (1977). In the original case, this was footnote 1 in the dissent. - Editor.

11 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714, 51 L. Ed. 2d 752, 97 S. Ct. 1428 (1977). In the original case, this was footnote 2 in the dissent. - Editor.
mechanism? Today the target of government dislike is smoking, but tomorrow it will be something else, such as Alabama's imposition, in it’s the Woman's Right to Know Act, of a fee applied to abortion providers for the production by the state of pro-childbirth materials which the providers did not wish to endorse, much less purchase. See Ala. Code §§ 26-23A-1 to 13; Summit Medical Center of Alabama, Inc. v. Riley, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1350 (M.D. Alabama 2003). Who knows whose disfavored ox or whose industry or business or lifestyle will be the next to be fatally gored in this manner by a well-intentioned government.

Moreover, hanging over this controversy like a blinking yellow light in the constitutional sky is Chief Justice Marshall's timeless admonition in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819), that "the power to tax is the power to destroy." This warning is not only memorable, but it reminds us that might, especially in the hands of government, does not always make right.

There appears no doubt that California's goal is to destroy the industry singled out for this targeted and exclusive tax. Although an earnest deputy attorney general denied this lethal purpose during oral argument, claiming that the Act's only purpose was to inform the public, her boss, the Attorney General of California William Lockyer, forthrightly said differently after the hearing. Attorney General Lockyer, who took the unusual step of attending the argument himself, is quoted by the Los Angeles Daily Journal as calling the tobacco companies "merchants of death" and agreed that the ad campaign aimed to put them out of business. He added that "the democratic process will provide a check on the use of taxes to fund such messages. Elected officials are responsible for appropriating the money . . . . If voters don't like the message, they can oust the messenger." 12 Query.

12Los Angeles Daily Journal, Tuesday, May 11, 2004, "Court revisits anti-smoking ad campaign." In the original case, this was footnote 3 in the dissent. - Editor.

(continued...)
So this is the issue: can government, consistent with the First Amendment's right against the abridgment of free speech, create a public information program against an industry funded by a targeted excise tax imposed solely upon that industry and which is segregated in a special state health education account? Not surprisingly, in our system which values not just good goals but also the right process, the question here is not ends, but means.

**DISCUSSION**

**First Amendment Claim**

1. *Government and Compelled Speech*

   The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . ." U.S. Const. amend. I. It is axiomatic that "just as the First Amendment may prevent the government from prohibiting speech, the Amendment may prevent the government from compelling individuals to express certain views . . . or from compelling certain individuals to pay subsidies for speech to which they object."\(^{13}\) *United States v. United Foods*, 533 U.S. 405, 410, 150 L. Ed. 2d 438, 121 S. Ct. 2334 (2003). In *United Foods*, the latest in a series of compelled assessments cases, the Supreme Court held that government's forced assessments of mushroom producers, which funded advertisements promoting mushroom sales, violated the First Amendment. Relying primarily upon *United Foods*, appellants assert that California's targeted tax, which funds anti-industry

(continued)

\(^{13}\) *W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. V. Barnette*, 319 U.S. 624, 87 L. Ed. 1628, 63 S. Ct. 1178 (1943) provides an often quoted passage regarding the extension of free speech protections to those who wish not to speak: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." *Id.* At 642. In the original case, this was footnote 4 in the dissent. - Editor.
advertisements, violates their right against compelled financing of speech.

By labeling the anti-tobacco advertisements "government speech," the majority concludes that the targeted tax is clear of First Amendment concerns. I respectfully disagree. Though the Supreme Court has embraced the existence of a "government speech" doctrine in this general context, United Foods, 533 U.S. at 417, the Court has not provided a clear explanation of the reach or proper application of the doctrine. The appellants assert that the central question is the source of the funding for the particular speech, contending that a targeted tax on a particular group to fund speech opposed to by that group constitutes unconstitutional compelled speech. Ultimately, the State's argument that the First Amendment's protections against compelled speech can be avoided by finding that the speech is spoken by the government is at odds with the force and logic of controlling authority.

2. Government Speech

Focusing on the Supreme Court's brief reference to the government speech inquiry in United Foods, and the Court's discussion of government speech in other contexts, see, e.g., Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 130 L. Ed. 2d 902, 115 S. Ct. 961 (1995), the State asserts that the government is free from First Amendment concerns "when the state is the speaker." Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 833, 132 L. Ed. 2d 700, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995). Specifically,

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14I note that the State also supports its position with general pronouncements made by the Court in its compelled assessments of speech cases indicating that the proper functioning of government requires the government to have control over the nature and content of its speech. See, e.g., Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1, 12-13, 110 L. Ed. 2d 1, 110 S. Ct. 2228 (1990) ("Government officials are expected as part of the democratic process to represent and espouse the views of a majority of their constituents. . . . If every citizen were to have a right to insist that no one paid by public funds to express a view with which he disagreed, debate over issues of great concern to (continued...)"
the State asserts that because the speech at issue is not explicitly attributed to appellants, the free speech concerns of traditional compelled speech cases, see, e.g., Wooley, 430 U.S. 705, 51 L. Ed. 2d 752, 97 S. Ct. 1428, are absent. Moreover, the state asserts that the source of the State's funding for its speech is irrelevant to the question of the constitutionality of the particular speech.

The State's arguments, however, are not consistent with the trajectory and force of the Supreme Court's recent compelled speech jurisprudence. Specifically, the State's framework ignores the central lesson of United Foods: in that case, the Supreme Court reigned in its previous pronouncements in Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, 521 U.S. 457, 476, 138 L. Ed. 2d 585, 117 S. Ct. 2130 (1997) that coerced government speech is akin to economic regulation and not entitled to First Amendment protection. See Glickman, 521 U.S. at 476. Instead, the United Foods Court propounded a broad constitutional protection against compelled contributions for commercial speech. See United Foods, 533 U.S. at 414. Indeed, applying United Foods, one court has held that the issue of government speech, which generally involves the state's power to control the content of its speech, is fundamentally different from the "government's authority to compel [plaintiffs] to support speech with which they personally disagree; such compulsion is a form of 'government interference with private speech.' " Livestock Marketing Ass'n v. USDA, 335 F.3d 711, 720 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding compelled contributions in beef promotion violated First Amendment) (certiorari granted in part by Veneman v. Livestock Marketing Ass'n, 158 L. Ed. 2d 962, 124 S. Ct. 2389 (U.S. May 24, 2004) and Nebraska Cattlemen, Inc. v. Livestock Marketing Ass'n, 158 L. Ed. 2d 962, 124 S. Ct. 2390 (U.S. May 24, 2004). As Justice Thomas stressed in concurrence, "any regulation that compels the funding of advertising

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14(...continued)
the public would be limited to those in the private sector, and the process of government as we know it would be radically transformed." in the original case, this was footnote 5 in the dissent. - Editor
must be subjected to the most stringent First Amendment scrutiny."
United Foods, 533 U.S. at 419 (Thomas, J., concurring). Finally, the
State's argument necessarily relies on an untenable distinction
between government speech activities paid directly from the
government treasury, or coordinated by traditional government
agencies, and those that are coordinated by more complex regulatory
organizations and schemes, even when such schemes are funded and
run by the government. As one commentator has noted, "government
speech cannot logically be made a function of the office of the person
making the allocation decision. That approach would elevate form
over substance and would enable the government to dictate the First
Amendment result simply by manipulating the agency in the
decision-making process." Randall P. Bezanson & William G. Buss,
The Many Faces of Government Speech, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 1377, 1430

Accordingly, recognizing the principle expressed in United Foods,
the appellants clearly have a First Amendment interest at stake that is
not erased by pigeonholing the ads as "government speech." The
question remains, however, whether the compelled speech does
indeed violate appellants' free speech rights, an analysis that is
governed by the Supreme Court's compelled speech line of cases,
including Abood, Keller, Glickman, and United Foods.

3. Compelled Speech

Appellants rely on the string of cases, beginning with Abood,
concerning compelled contributions to speech, and assert that there
exists the fundamental principle that, under the First Amendment, a
discrete group should not be specifically taxed to fund speech with
which they disagree. Indeed, this proffered principle provides a
coherent picture of the puzzle with which courts have been struggling.
See, e.g., Summit Medical Ctr. of Ala. v. Riley, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1350,
1360 (holding that state's imposition of "a direct fee assessment on a
limited class of citizens -- abortion providers -- and using the revenue
to advance speech in support of the State's favored policy position on
abortion" intruded on abortion provider's free speech rights)
(emphasis added); United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119 (3d Cir.
1989) ("Where the government requires a publicly identifiable group to contribute to a fund earmarked for the dissemination of a particular message associated with that group, the government has directly focused its coercive power for expressive purposes.") (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The United Foods Court announced that the "question is whether the government may underwrite and sponsor speech with a certain viewpoint using special subsidies exacted from a designated class of person, some of whom object to the idea being advanced." United Foods, 533 U.S. at 410. And in United Foods, the Court answered: No. Id. at 411.

In answering the question, however, the Court was forced to distinguish another recent compelled speech case, Glickman, which was factually similar to United Foods, but where the Court had found that no First Amendment issues were raised by the forced subsidies. 521 U.S. at 460. In Glickman, the Court determined that "criticisms of generic advertising provide no basis for concluding that factually accurate advertising constitutes an abridgement of anybody's right to speak freely." Id. at 474. The United Foods Court distinguished Glickman by asserting that the program in Glickman "mandated assessments for speech [which] were ancillary to a more comprehensive program restricting marketing autonomy." United Foods, 533 U.S. at 411-12.

Thus, after distinguishing Glickman, and finding that First Amendment interests were at stake, the Court proceeded to apply the tenets established in Abood and Keller, which established the "germaneness test." United Foods, 533 U.S. 405, 150 L. Ed. 2d 438, 121 S. Ct. 2334. That test requires any coerced subsidized speech be germane to the larger purpose of the association at issue. Abood, 431 U.S. at 235 (holding that union can only finance speech not germane to collective bargaining with non-objecting members' funds); Keller,
Guided by Glickman and United Foods, and looking at the statutory scheme provided in the Act, it is clear that the tobacco companies are not similarly situated to the tree growers in Glickman, as they are not "bound together and required by statute to market their products according to cooperative rules" for purposes other than advertising or speech. United Foods, 533 U.S. at 412. Nor is the statutory scheme directly congruous with that in United Foods, as the ads in this case are a part of a larger regulatory scheme, and thus not clearly "a program where the principal object is speech itself." Id. at 415. Thus, the Act is different from both the statute analyzed in United Foods and the statute in Glickman. Moreover, the fact that the speech at issue involves, not the promotion of the relevant group's product, but the disparagement of the entire industry, only increases the difficulty of resolving this case.

15I note that the district court's decision relied on the question of association and stressed the non-associational nature of the tobacco industry being taxed, thereby distinguishing the Abood line of cases. Those cases stressed that there exists "a First Amendment interest in not being compelled to contribute to an organization whose expressive activities conflict with one's 'freedom of belief.'" Glickman, 521 U.S. at 471 (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 235). The district court found that because the appellants subject to the surtax were not members of a particular association, their free speech rights were not undermined by any compelled financing of speech made on behalf of that association. This finding is also supported by some of the Court's language in United Foods, where it noted that there is "a threshold inquiry . . . whether there is some state imposed obligation which makes group membership less than voluntary; for it is only the overriding associational purpose which allows any compelled subsidy for speech in the first place." United Foods, 533 U.S. at 413. However, hinging the right to be free from compelled commercial speech on whether there is an associational interest at stake ignores the obvious fact of what the Court actually did in United Foods. Indeed, the Court not only found that the compelled subsidies constituted an unconstitutional infringement on the dissenting mushroom grower's speech rights, but it did so after expressly distinguishing Glickman on the grounds that there was no "regime of cooperation" as presented in Glickman. Id. at 415. Therefore, though the Court saves some of its associational rights rhetoric, the practical effect of its decision in United Foods is to unhinge its compelled speech analysis from the previously-pronounced requirement that there be an involuntary group membership. In the original case, this was footnote 6 in the dissent. - Editor
Given the unique nature of the question presented, proper review of the Act must acknowledge United Foods's obvious retreat from Glickman, and the Court's pronouncement of broadened protection against compelled speech. In this regard, as the appellants assert, United Foods and the Court's previous compelled speech case law can be reconciled and understood by applying what United Foods explicitly stated: the First Amendment forbids certain compelled assessments from "a particular citizen, or a discrete group of citizens, to pay special subsidies for speech." 533 U.S. at 411.

As the Third Circuit recently explained, however, though a case may be properly characterized as a compelled speech case, "the Supreme Court . . . has left unresolved the standard for determining the validity of laws compelling commercial speech . . ." Cochran v. Veneman, 359 F.3d 263, 277 (3rd Cir. 2004). In Cochran, the court also explained that there are several standards available which the courts may try to apply: 1) the lenient standard derived from commercial speech cases, see, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564, 65 L. Ed. 2d 341, 100 S. Ct. 2343 (1980), or some adaptation of that commercial speech standard, see, e.g., Livestock Marketing, 335 F.3d at 722-23; 2) the "germaneness test" of traditional compelled speech cases, see, e.g., Abood, 431 U.S. at 235-36, and 3) the stringent standard of associational cases, see, e.g., United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119 (3rd Cir. 1989).

The speech and the funding mechanism in this case is questionable under whatever standard one uses. In Central Hudson, the Court held that commercial speech is to be evaluated using intermediate scrutiny. That is, 1) the state must "assert a substantial government interest;" 2) "the regulatory technique must be in proportion to that interest;" and 3) the incursion on commercial speech "must be designed carefully to achieve the State's goal." 447 U.S. at 564. Under this standard, though
never before applied to *compelled* commercial speech cases,\(^\text{16}\) the speech regulation at issue, and the targeted tax placed on appellants, constitutes a disproportional and overly burdensome regulatory technique, thereby failing the second and third prongs of the *Central Hudson* test. Indeed, the speech in this case is exceptional in its difference from what the Court has previously encountered in its compelled commercial speech cases. Whereas previous cases generally involve promotional activity, see, e.g., *Glickman*, 521 U.S. at 474; *United Foods*, 533 U.S. at 413-14, here, California is specifically targeting one discrete and largely disfavored group, forcing that group to meet the State's regulatory goals by directly financing speech designed to undermine that group's status and reputation. Though the State's goals may be strong and laudatory, the methods used seriously undermine the particular group's speech rights and seem disproportional to the goals to be achieved. Accordingly, the Act cannot survive *Central Hudson's* intermediate scrutiny.

Moreover, as did the Sixth Circuit in *Michigan Pork Producers Ass'n, Inc. v. Veneman*, 348 F.3d 157 (6th Cir. 2003), I "find inapplicable to this case the relaxed scrutiny of commercial speech analysis . . . ." *Id.* at 163 (citing *Glickman*, 521 U.S. at 474 n.18 (questioning whether "the *Central Hudson* test, which involved commercial speech should govern a case involving the compelled funding of speech")). The speech in this case is materially different from the speech issuing from the private sector that we normally label as commercial.

Applying the "germaneness test" derived from *Abood* and its progeny, the compelled speech here would also fail. The Supreme

\(^{16}\)I note, in this regard, that the Supreme Court in *United Foods* refused to apply the *Central Hudson* test because the "Government itself [did] not rely upon *Central Hudson* to challenge the Court of Appeals' decision." 533 U.S. at 410. Accordingly, other courts have recognized that the *Central Hudson* test has never been applied by the Supreme Court to compelled assessment of commercial speech cases. See *Cochran*, 359 F.3d at 277. In the original case, this was footnote 7 in the dissent. - Editor
Court expressly applied this test in *United Foods*, and found that "the expression respondent [was] required to support [was] not germane to a purpose related to an association independent from the speech itself." *United Foods*, 533 U.S. at 415-16. Of course, as previously explained, there is no relevant association of tobacco companies for purposes of this analysis. As the Court stressed in *United Foods*, the question is not whether the State necessarily has a larger regulatory purpose justifying the speech, but whether there is a "cooperative marketing structure . . . to sustain an ancillary assessment" for speech. *Id.* Here, as in *United Foods*, there is no collective association to which the compelled assessments for speech is germane.

Finally, as in *Frame*, a pre-Glickman and pre-United Foods case, the Third Circuit applied the stringent associational rights standard of *Abood*, but upheld the constitutionality of the beef regulatory statute in question because of the compelling state interest involved. *Frame*, 885 F.2d at 1134. In refusing to extend *Frame*’s reach after *United Foods*, however, the same court held in *Cochran* that *United Foods* established that "promotional programs . . . seem really to be special interest legislation on behalf of the industry's interests more so than the government's[,]" and therefore constitute unconstitutional compelled speech for those dissenting from the promotions. 359 F.3d at 279.

What has survived from *Frame* is the principle that in the review of a compelled financing statute's intrusion into free speech rights, "it is relevant to consider 'the coerced nexus between the individual and the specific expressive activity.' " *Summit*, 284 F. Supp. 2d at 1360 (quoting *Frame*, 885 F.2d at 1119). Here, the nexus is vital: unlike a situation in which money is allocated from the general treasury fund, individuals who have specifically been targeted by the speech are forced to pay for the speech. *See Id.*

4. Conclusion
In sum, review under any of the available standards reveals that the compelled assessments in this case constitute an exceptional case of government intrusion on the right not to be compelled to finance speech. Indeed, the Act is designed to force one particularly disfavored group to fund speech directly undermining that group's reputation. Such state action offends the very essence of the First Amendment. See e.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Comm'r of the Va. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 305 F.3d 241, 242 (4th Cir. 2002) ("The First Amendment was not written for the vast majority... It belongs to the minority of one.") (Wilkinson, C.J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc).

Moreover, the State can provide no limiting principle, no logical reason why, if the government is free to tax and speak in this manner against this group, it cannot do so against any other disfavored group or individual. See Summit Medical Ctr. of Alabama, 284 F. Supp. 2d, at 1361 (refusing to apply the district court's analysis in this case, and finding that Alabama's statute forcing abortion providers to pay for the state's informational materials infringes plaintiffs' First Amendment rights). Contrary to the Attorney General's claim that the democratic process will provide a check on the use of taxes to fund such messages, by removing the burden of the cost of this program from every taxpayer except the ones targeted, this tax becomes the ultimate cheap shot, one not fully subject to the considerations that normally attend the decision to require the public at large to pay for something. See Board of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 229, 146 L. Ed. 2d 193, 120 S. Ct. 1346 (2000) (traditional political controls ensure responsible government).17 Furthermore, the approach I take does not hinder or unduly burden the State's right or power to

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17In Michigan Pork Producers Ass'n v. Veneman, 348 F.3d 157 (6th Cir. 2003), one significant factor in the court's determination that the speech involved was not government speech was that the funding did not come from general tax revenues. Id. at 162. See also Livestock Marketing Ass'n, 335 F.3d at 720 (the flaw in the government speech argument is that the plaintiff's funds were identifiable as the funds used to finance the speech to which they objected). In the original case, this was footnote 8 in the dissent. - Editor
speak, and it does not interfere with the imposition of excise or other taxes.] It simply requires the government when doing so to stay within normal channels and to avoid First Amendment violations. Under the reasoning and force of the Supreme Court's compelled speech cases, particularly the Court's recent pronouncements in *United Foods*, I respectfully believe the majority's argument, although well presented and articulated in their opinion, is without merit.
AGRICULTURAL MARKETING AGREEMENT ACT

DEPARTMENTAL DECISION

In re: UNIFIED WESTERN GROCERS, INC.; DEAN FOODS COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA, INC.; SAFEWAY, INC.; SWISS DAIRY; AND DAIRY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA.

AMA – Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act (AMAA) – Trade barrier – Secretary’s duty to suspend or terminate order – Equal protection – Trade association standing – Secretary’s authority to grant relief.

The Judicial Officer affirmed the decision by Administrative Law Judge Jill S. Clifton (ALJ) dismissing the Petition instituted under 7 U.S.C. § 608c(15)(A). The Judicial Officer concluded, since Dairy Institute of California was not a handler, it did not have standing to file a petition under 7 U.S.C. § 608c(15)(A). The Judicial Officer rejected the other Petitioners’ contentions that the failure to grant them the same exemption from the Arizona-Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order (7 C.F.R. pt. 1131) as Congress granted to a handler at a plant operating in Clark County, Nevada (7 U.S.C. § 608c(11)(C)), violates: (1) the prohibition on trade barriers in 7 U.S.C. § 608c(5)(G); (2) the Secretary of Agriculture’s duty in 7 U.S.C. § 608c(16)(A) to terminate provisions of marketing orders which obstruct or do not effectuate the declared policy of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937; and (3) the equal protection provisions of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Garrett B. Stevens and Nazima H. Razick, for Respondent.
Glen C. Hansen and Thomas S. Knox, Sacramento, California, for Petitioners and Interested Party to Which No Relief Can Be Granted.
Initial decision issued by Jill S. Clifton, Administrative Law Judge.
Decision and Order issued by William G. Jenson, Judicial Officer.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Unified Western Grocers, Inc.; Dean Foods Company of California, Inc.; Safeway, Inc.; and Swiss Dairy [hereinafter Petitioners] and Dairy Institute of California instituted this proceeding by filing a “Petition for Declaratory Relief, Restitution, Permanent
Injunction” [hereinafter Petition] on August 24, 2001. Petitioners and Dairy Institute of California instituted the proceeding under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, as amended [hereinafter the AMAA]; the federal order regulating the handling of milk in the Arizona-Las Vegas Marketing Area (7 C.F.R. pt. 1131) [hereinafter the Arizona-Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order]; and the Rules of Practice Governing Proceedings on Petitions To Modify or To Be Exempted From Marketing Orders (7 C.F.R. §§ 900.50-.71) [hereinafter the Rules of Practice].

Petitioners and Dairy Institute of California seek: (1) a declaration that compensatory payments imposed on California handlers that shipped milk and milk products into Clark County, Nevada, since October 1, 1999, violate section 8c(5)(A) and (G) of the AMAA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(5)(A), (G)) and the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States; (2) a declaration that California handlers that ship milk into Clark County, Nevada, are exempt from complying with the pricing provisions of any federal milk marketing order; (3) a refund, with interest, of compensatory payments made by Petitioners for milk shipped into Clark County, Nevada, since October 1, 1999; and (4) a permanent injunction prohibiting the enforcement of the Arizona-Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order against California handlers who ship milk into Clark County, Nevada (Pet. at 14-15).

On October 18, 2001, the Administrator, Agricultural Marketing Service, United States Department of Agriculture [hereinafter Respondent],1 filed “Respondent’s Answer”: (1) denying the material...

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1Petitioners and Dairy Institute of California instituted this proceeding against Ann M. Veneman, in her capacity as Secretary of Agriculture, and James R. Daugherty, in his capacity as Market Administrator for the Arizona-Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order, who Petitioners and Dairy Institute of California refer to as “Respondents.” However, this proceeding is an “in re” proceeding which does not formally include adverse parties. Black’s Law Dictionary 796 (7th ed. 1999). Instead, this proceeding involves the matter of Petitioners’ and Dairy Institute of California’s rights and duties under the AMAA and the Arizona-Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order. The Administrator, Agricultural Marketing Service, United States Department of Agriculture, is the United States Department of Agriculture official responsible for (continued...
allegations in the Petition; (2) stating the Petition fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and (3) stating there is no jurisdiction regarding allegations by Dairy Institute of California.


On December 12, 2002, the ALJ issued a “Decision” [hereinafter Initial Decision and Order] in which the ALJ denied the Petition (Initial Decision and Order at 15).


1(...continued)

responding to the Petition; hence, the Administrator, Agricultural Marketing Service, United States Department of Agriculture, is the Respondent in this proceeding. See section 900.52a of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 900.52a).

Dairy Institute of California filed “Petitioners’ Brief in Opposition to Respondents’ [sic] Cross-Appeal.” On April 2, 2003, the Hearing Clerk transmitted the record to the Judicial Officer for consideration and decision.

Based on a careful consideration of the record, I agree with the ALJ’s denial of the Petition. Therefore, with minor modifications, I adopt the ALJ’s Initial Decision and Order as the final Decision and Order.

Petitioners’ and Dairy Institute of California’s exhibits are designated by “PX.” Transcript references are designated by “Tr.”

APPLICABLE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS

7 U.S.C.:

TITLE 7—AGRICULTURE

CHAPTER 26—AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT

SUBCHAPTER I—DECLARATION OF CONDITIONS AND POLICY

§ 602. Declaration of policy; establishment of price basing period; marketing standards; orderly supply flow; circumstances for continued regulation

It is declared to be the policy of Congress—
(4) Through the exercise of the powers conferred upon the Secretary of Agriculture under this chapter, to establish and maintain such orderly marketing conditions for any agricultural commodity enumerated in section 608c(2) of this title as will provide, in the interests of producers and consumers, an orderly flow of the supply thereof to market throughout its normal marketing season to avoid unreasonable fluctuations in supplies and prices.

. . . .

SUBCHAPTER III—COMMODITY BENEFITS

. . . .

§ 608c. Orders regulating handling of commodity

. . . .

(5) Milk and its products; terms and conditions of orders

In the case of milk and its products, orders issued pursuant to this section shall contain one or more of the following terms and conditions, and (except as provided in subsection (7) of this section) no others:

(A) Classifying milk in accordance with the form in which or the purpose for which it is used, and fixing, or providing a method for fixing, minimum prices for each such use classification which all handlers shall pay, and the time when payments shall be made, for milk purchased from producers or associations of producers. Such prices shall be uniform as to all handlers, subject only to adjustments for (1) volume, market, and production differentials customarily applied by the handlers subject to such order, (2) the grade or quality of the milk purchased, and (3) the locations at which delivery of such milk, or any use classification thereof, is made to such handlers. . . .
(G) No marketing agreement or order applicable to milk and its products in any marketing area shall prohibit or in any manner limit, in the case of the products of milk, the marketing in that area of any milk or product thereof produced in any production area in the United States.

(11) Regional application

(C) All orders issued under this section which are applicable to the same commodity or product thereof shall, so far as practicable, prescribe such different terms, applicable to different production areas and marketing areas, as the Secretary finds necessary to give due recognition to the differences in production and marketing of such commodity or product in such areas.

The price of milk paid by a handler at a plant operating in Clark County, Nevada shall not be subject to any order issued under this section.

(15) Petition by handler for modification of order or exemption; court review of ruling of Secretary

(A) Any handler subject to an order may file a written petition with the Secretary of Agriculture, stating that any such order or any provision of any such order or any obligation imposed in connection therewith is not in accordance with law and praying for a modification thereof or to be exempted therefrom. He shall thereupon be given an opportunity for a hearing upon such petition, in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of Agriculture, with the approval of the
President. After such hearing, the Secretary shall make a ruling upon the prayer of such petition which shall be final, if in accordance with law.

(B) The District Courts of the United States in any district in which such handler is an inhabitant, or has his principal place of business, are vested with jurisdiction in equity to review such ruling, provided a bill in equity for that purpose is filed within twenty days from the date of the entry of such ruling. Service of process in such proceedings may be had upon the Secretary by delivering to him a copy of the bill of complaint. If the court determines that such ruling is not in accordance with law, it shall remand such proceedings to the Secretary with directions either (1) to make such ruling as the court shall determine to be in accordance with law, or (2) to take such further proceedings as, in its opinion, the law requires. The pendency of proceedings instituted pursuant to this subsection (15) shall not impede, hinder, or delay the United States or the Secretary of Agriculture from obtaining relief pursuant to section 608a(6) of this title. Any proceedings brought pursuant to section 608a(6) of this title (except where brought by way of counterclaim in proceedings instituted pursuant to this subsection (15)) shall abate whenever a final decree has been rendered in proceedings between the same parties, and covering the same subject matter, instituted pursuant to this subsection (15).

(16) Termination of orders and marketing agreements

(A)(i) Except as provided in clause (ii), the Secretary of Agriculture shall, whenever he finds that any order issued under this section, or any provision thereof, obstructs or does not tend to effectuate the declared policy of this chapter, terminate or suspend the operation of such order or such provision thereof.

(ii) The Secretary may not terminate any order issued under this section for a commodity for which there is no Federal program established to support the price of such commodity
unless the Secretary gives notice of, and a statement of the reasons relied upon by the Secretary for, the proposed termination of such order to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry of the Senate and the Committee on Agriculture of the House of Representatives not later than 60 days before the date such order will be terminated.


7 C.F.R.:

TITLE 7—AGRICULTURE

....

SUBTITLE B—REGULATIONS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

....

CHAPTER X—AGRICULTURAL MARKETING SERVICE (MARKETING AGREEMENTS AND ORDERS; MILK) DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

....

PART 1000—GENERAL PROVISIONS OF FEDERAL MILK MARKETING ORDERS

....

Subpart D—Rules Governing Order Provisions

§ 1000.26 Continuity and separability of provisions.
(b) **Suspension or termination.** The Secretary shall suspend or terminate any or all of the provisions of the order whenever he/she finds that such provision(s) obstructs or does not tend to effectuate the declared policy of the Act. The order shall terminate whenever the provisions of the Act authorizing it cease to be in effect.

7 C.F.R. § 1000.26(b).

**ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’S INITIAL DECISION AND ORDER (AS RESTATED)**

**Decision Summary**

Even though Congress exempted Anderson Dairy, the sole handler operating a plant in Clark County, Nevada, from the pricing requirements of Arizona-Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order,\(^3\) the decision not to likewise exempt Petitioners on packaged fluid milk shipped from their California plants into Clark County, Nevada, during each month of the years 2000 and 2001, was in accordance with law.

**Realignment of the Parties**

Dairy Institute of California is not a handler; it is a trade association. Dairy Institute of California cannot be granted relief under section 8c(15)(A) of the AMAA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(15)(A)). Nevertheless, Dairy Institute of California is not dismissed; instead, the parties are realigned to separate Dairy Institute of California from the four Petitioners to which relief could be granted under section 8c(15)(A) of the AMAA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(15)(A)).\(^4\) Dismissal of a trade association might be more appropriate in another case, and

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\(^3\)7 U.S.C. § 608c(11)(C).

\(^4\)See the ALJ’s “Order Amending Case Caption” filed December 12, 2002.
realignment of the parties in this proceeding should not be regarded as precedent. Dairy Institute of California seeks the identical outcome for Petitioners that Petitioners seek for themselves and Dairy Institute of California has contributed to the very capable, professional presentation in support of the Petition.

**Issue**

Did the Market Administrator for the Arizona-Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order [hereinafter the Market Administrator] unlawfully deny Petitioners, on packaged fluid milk shipped from their California plants into Clark County, Nevada, an exemption from the Arizona-Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order’s requirement to make payments to the producer-settlement fund and the administrative fund for each month of the years 2000 and 2001?

**Findings of Fact**

1. Effective January 1, 2000, Clark County, Nevada, was included in the Arizona-Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order (7 C.F.R. § 1131.2; 64 Fed. Reg. 70,867 (Dec. 17, 1999); Tr. 121-22).
2. Petitioners’ plants are located in Los Angeles County, California, Orange County, California, and Riverside County, California (Tr. 9, 34).
3. Under the Arizona-Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order, each Petitioner is a partially regulated distributing plant that is subject to marketwide pooling of producer returns under the California Department of Food and Agriculture’s milk classification and pricing program (7 C.F.R. § 1000.76; Tr. 27).
4. Each Petitioner is required to make payments to the Arizona-Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order producer-settlement fund (also called compensatory payments) on packaged fluid milk shipped into Clark County, Nevada, during only those months in which the California Department of Food and Agriculture’s Class 1 price at the Petitioner’s plant location is lower than the federal milk marketing
order Class I price at that same location (7 C.F.R. § 1000.76(c); Tr. 27, 29-30, 35-36). 5

5. In months when the California Department of Food and Agriculture’s Class I price at a Petitioner’s plant location is higher than the federal milk marketing order Class I price at that same location, that Petitioner is not required to make payments to the producer-settlement fund.

6. The administrative fund monthly payments are calculated at $0.025 per hundredweight of milk.

7. During 2000 and 2001, Unified Western Grocers, Inc., located in Los Angeles County, California, paid the Market Administrator $19,087.85 for milk shipped into Clark County, Nevada. Unified Western Grocers, Inc.’s payments were comprised of $17,079.43 paid into the producer-settlement fund and $2,008.42 paid into the administrative fund. (PX 13; Tr. 109-13.)

8. During 2000 and 2001, Dean Foods Company of California, Inc., located in Orange County, California, paid the Market Administrator $192,842.36 for milk shipped into Clark County, Nevada. Dean Foods Company of California, Inc.’s payments were comprised of $172,083.13 paid into the producer-settlement fund and $20,759.23 paid into the administrative fund. (PX 12; Tr. 89-93.)

9. During 2000 and 2001, Safeway, Inc., located in Los Angeles County, California, paid the Market Administrator $106,303.22 for milk shipped into Clark County, Nevada. Safeway, Inc.’s payments were comprised of $96,039.22 paid into the producer-settlement fund and $10,264 paid into the administrative fund. (PX 16; Tr. 156-61.)

10. During 2000 and 2001, Swiss Dairy, located in Riverside County, California, paid the Market Administrator $51,126.14 for milk shipped into Clark County, Nevada. Swiss Dairy’s payments

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5Federal milk marketing orders use the Roman numeral “I” when referring to Class I milk. The California Department of Food and Agriculture’s classification system uses the Arabic numeral “1” when referring to Class I milk.

6The total is 2 cents less than that shown on PX 12 because of one penny discrepancy in the February 2000 total and one penny discrepancy in the October 2001 total.
were comprised of $44,633.73 paid into the producer-settlement fund and $6,492.41 paid into the administrative fund. (PX 9; Tr. 79-83.)

11. Making payments to the Arizona-Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order producer-settlement fund and administrative fund impacts each Petitioner’s cost of purveying fluid milk to retail markets.

12. There are many variables in the cost of purveying fluid milk to retail markets, some of which are taken into account in federal milk marketing orders and some of which are not.

13. During 2000 and 2001, Anderson Dairy, the sole handler operating a plant in Clark County, Nevada, was exempt from the pricing requirements of the Arizona-Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order, including the requirement to make payments to the producer-settlement fund and the administrative fund, due to an Act of Congress (7 U.S.C. § 608c(11)(C); Tr. 38-41).

14. Anderson Dairy, the sole handler operating a plant in Clark County, Nevada, during 2000 and 2001, was, instead, regulated by the Nevada State Dairy Commission, as were handlers operating in some other parts of Nevada (Tr. 41).

15. Each Petitioner is in competition with Anderson Dairy in Clark County, Nevada, by virtue of selling in the same marketing area, although the extent to which that competition impacts any Petitioner is unclear (Tr. 144-45).

16. The Market Administrator’s decision not to exempt Petitioners from the requirement to make payments to the producer-settlement fund and the administrative fund on milk shipped into Clark County, Nevada, was reasonable and rational and applied uniformly and consistently.

Discussion

Dr. William Schiek, an expert economist in milk marketing employed by Dairy Institute of California, testified that the minimum price Anderson Dairy is required to pay, set by the Nevada State Dairy Commission, is typically lower than the minimum price Petitioners are required to pay. In Dr. Schiek’s opinion, that situation creates an unequal burden on Petitioners and constitutes an economic
barrier to Petitioners’ shipment of Class I milk into Clark County, Nevada. (PX 1-PX 6; Tr. 41-50.)

Dr. Schiek acknowledged on cross-examination that his information about the “actual” price Anderson Dairy paid was based solely on the Nevada State Dairy Commission’s minimum price requirement; that he had no knowledge whether Anderson Dairy paid higher than the minimum price, for example, paying an over-order premium (Tr. 60-61).

On cross-examination, Dr. Schiek acknowledged that, since January 2000, the payment obligations of partially regulated plants, such as those of Petitioners, are the same in all 11 federal milk marketing orders, not just the Arizona-Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order. Further, Dr. Schiek acknowledged there was a similar compensatory payment requirement under the prior federal milk marketing order that included Clark County, Nevada. Dr. Schiek also acknowledged that he understood the need to protect the integrity of milk marketing orders by having a provision for compensatory payments. (Tr. 52-59.) Dr. Schiek expanded his explanation on re-direct examination, saying that the purpose of the entire compensatory payment system “is to essentially protect the ability of the federal government to maintain the market order and the way that would chiefly be undermined is if somebody with a -- could come in and undercut competitors who are subject to federal order rules by bringing milk in at a much, much lower cost or a lower price and disrupt competition in the marketplace.” (Tr. 67.)

Dr. Schiek explained, given that Anderson Dairy is not required to pay the federal milk marketing order Class I price, there is an unequal playing field, and since the United States Department of Agriculture cannot regulate Anderson Dairy, the United States Department of Agriculture should not compel others to play on that field according to United States Department of Agriculture rules (Tr. 59).

Dr. Schiek explained on redirect examination that, on a level playing field, all handlers who are competing for Class I sales in the milk marketing area are subject to the same Class I pricing rules.

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7See the federal milk marketing order regulating the handling of milk in the Great Basin Marketing Area (7 C.F.R. pt. 1139 (1999)).
Since Anderson Dairy is exempt from the pricing provisions, the United States Department of Agriculture has no mechanism to enforce the pricing provisions on all the competitors who sell milk in Clark County, Nevada. Consequently, Dr. Schiek did not believe that enforcement of the compensatory payment system for shipments into Clark County, Nevada, from outside the marketing area served to level the playing field. (Tr. 67-68.)

Mr. William Alan Wise, an experienced milk market administrator who is expert in the field of milk marketing regulation, testified that the main purpose of milk marketing orders is to provide a framework for orderly marketing of milk products, principally through classified pricing and marketwide pooling. Classified pricing is pricing milk based on its ultimate use with different values for different uses. Normally, Class I milk, which is the subject of this proceeding, is higher-valued because it is fluid, more highly perishable. Mr. Wise explained that a partially regulated distributing plant (such as each of Petitioners’ plants) is a plant with packaged fluid milk sales in the milk marketing area but not to an extent that it meets the qualifications to be fully regulated. (Tr. 122-23, 127-28.)

Mr. Wise was asked to explain the purpose of compensatory payments, such as Petitioners have paid. Mr. Wise testified, without compensatory payments, if inexpensive milk were sold in the milk marketing area, those sales would tend to reduce sales by fully regulated handlers, which would diminish the total value of the pool (producer-settlement fund), thereby reducing returns to producers (dairy farmers). He added, also, “it’s a competitive equity issue with other fully regulated handlers.” (Tr. 128.) Compensatory payments may be required whether or not the partially regulated distributing plant is in an area with a classified pricing and marketwide pooling milk classification system. Payments by a handler operating a partially regulated distributing plant are treated uniformly under every federal milk marketing order. (7 C.F.R. § 1000.76; Tr. 128-30.)

Mr. Wise explained that Arizona handlers, including three Maricopa County, Arizona, handlers, Safeway, Kroger, and Shamrock, which are in the same marketing area as Clark County, Nevada, and are also regulated under the Arizona-Las Vegas Milk
Marketing Order, ship milk into Clark County, Nevada. Also, handlers with plants located in Salt Lake City, Utah, which is in the Western Milk Marketing Area,8 ship milk into Clark County, Nevada. These federal milk marketing order handlers pay the Class I price applicable at their plants regardless of where they sell their milk. The federal price at Maricopa County, Arizona, is higher than the federal price at Riverside County, California, and Los Angeles County, California. Thus, there would be potential economic disadvantage to the Maricopa County, Arizona, and Salt Lake City, Utah, handlers if Petitioners were somehow not required to pay compensatory payments when owed. (Tr. 131-32, 142-43.)

On cross-examination, Mr. Wise acknowledged that Petitioners face a unique situation in Clark County, Nevada, where a handler within a federal milk marketing area has been exempted from the pricing requirements of that federal milk marketing order. This exempt handler, Anderson Dairy, can be compared to handlers in milk marketing areas unregulated by a federal milk marketing order. (Tr. 138.) Anderson Dairy is regulated by the Nevada State Dairy Commission.

The Secretary of Agriculture is charged with implementing congressional policy to establish and maintain orderly marketing conditions for milk providing producers (dairy farmers) and consumers an orderly flow of milk to market, while avoiding unreasonable fluctuations in supplies and prices (7 U.S.C. § 602(4); Tr. 122-24). In order to implement congressional policy, the Secretary of Agriculture has established federal milk marketing orders which include pricing, payment, and pooling requirements. Compensatory payments help protect the integrity of the federal regulatory scheme. (Tr. 137-38.)

The Secretary of Agriculture cannot ensure a “level playing field” among competing handlers. There are too many constantly fluctuating variables, many of which are beyond the Secretary of Agriculture’s control. Examples mentioned by Mr. Wise and Dr. Schiek that impact Petitioners and their competitors in Clark

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8See 7 C.F.R. pt. 1135.
County, Nevada, include the minimum prices established by the California Department of Food and Agriculture, the minimum prices established by the Nevada State Dairy Commission, and whether an over-order premium must be paid to obtain milk. California has a statewide pool; Nevada does not. Freight costs vary considerably, and there may be back haul issues and issues of other products being shipped with the packaged fluid milk. Fuel and other energy costs that must be met to keep packaged fluid milk fresh and to transport it are variable, and the peculiar circumstances of statewide and local marketing areas, including the Act of Congress that exempted Anderson Dairy from the pricing requirements of the Arizona-Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order -- these myriad factors all affect the costs of purveying fluid milk to retail markets.

Pricing differentials are sometimes unfavorable to Petitioners but are sometimes favorable (7 C.F.R. § 1000.52). In months when the California Department of Food and Agriculture’s Class I price at a Petitioner’s plant location is higher than the federal milk marketing order Class I price at that same location, that Petitioner pays no compensatory payments. Federal milk marketing order prices vary by location. As shown by Respondent’s Brief, Petitioners benefit when they ship their packaged fluid milk into Arizona, because the federal milk marketing order price at Phoenix, Arizona, under the 1A pricing is $.25 higher than the federal milk marketing order price at Los Angeles County, California, and $.35 higher than the federal milk marketing order price at Riverside County, California. Hence, Petitioners can make the required compensatory payments and still have a price advantage over the competing federal milk marketing order handlers in Phoenix, Arizona. (7 C.F.R. § 1000.52; Tr. 131-32; Respondent’s Brief at 12-13.) Respondent argues this price advantage, even during months that Petitioners are required to make compensatory payments, demonstrates that the compensatory payment provisions are not the cause of Petitioners’ complaints, but rather, the federal milk marketing order prices under option 1A for pricing Class I milk at various locations (i.e., Las Vegas, Nevada, as compared to Los Angeles County, California, or Riverside County,
California) ordered by Congress are the cause of Petitioners’ complaints (7 U.S.C. § 7253(c) note; Respondent’s Brief at 5-7).

The Secretary of Agriculture has not chosen to match the congressionally established exemption for a handler located at a plant in Clark County, Nevada, by extending a similar exemption to handlers whose plants are located elsewhere and who ship milk into Clark County, Nevada. The Secretary of Agriculture has chosen instead to apply the regulatory scheme uniformly, without exception beyond one mandate by Congress (7 U.S.C. § 608c(11)(C)). I find the Secretary of Agriculture’s choice reasonable. The Arizona-Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order provides no exemption for handlers who ship milk into Clark County, Nevada, just as it provides no exemption for handlers who ship milk into any other part of the area covered by the Arizona-Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order.

Conclusions of Law

1. Petitioners have the burden of proof in any proceeding instituted pursuant to section 8c(15)(A) of the AMAA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(15)(A)). Petitioners have failed to meet the burden of proof in this proceeding.

2. The Secretary of Agriculture is charged with implementing congressional policy to establish and maintain orderly marketing conditions for milk providing producers (dairy farmers) and consumers an orderly flow of milk to market, while avoiding unreasonable fluctuations in supplies and prices (7 U.S.C. § 602(4); Tr. 122-24).

3. Payments by handlers operating partially regulated distributing plants are treated uniformly under every federal milk marketing order (7 C.F.R. § 1000.76; Tr. 130).

4. There are many constantly fluctuating variables affecting the costs of purveying fluid milk to retail markets. The Secretary of Agriculture has discretionary authority to choose inaction on any variable, and inaction is entirely reasonable when presented with Anderson Dairy’s exemption by Act of Congress.

5. The Secretary of Agriculture is required neither by section 8c(5)(G) of the AMAA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(5)(G)) nor by section
8c(16)(A) of the AMAA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(16)(A)) to grant the relief requested by Petitioners.

6. The Market Administrator’s decision not to exempt Petitioners from the requirement that they make payments to the producer-settlement fund (also called compensatory payments) on fluid milk shipped into Clark County, Nevada, was in accordance with law, had a rational basis, promoted uniform application of milk marketing order pricing requirements, was applied consistently, was reasonable, was neither arbitrary nor capricious, and is entitled to deference.

7. The Market Administrator’s decision not to exempt Petitioners from the requirement that they make payments to the administrative fund on fluid milk shipped into Clark County, Nevada, was in accordance with law, had a rational basis, promoted uniform application of milk marketing order pricing requirements, was applied consistently, was reasonable, was neither arbitrary nor capricious, and is entitled to deference.

8. Petitioners’ producer-settlement fund payments and administrative fund payments may be refunded only when collection of the payments is not in accordance with law.

9. The collection of producer-settlement fund payments and administrative fund payments from Petitioners was in accordance with law; thus, Petitioners’ request for refund of producer-settlement fund payments and administrative fund payments, and for interest on those payments, must be denied.

10. The collection of producer-settlement fund payments and administrative fund payments from Petitioners was in accordance with law; thus, Petitioners’ request for declaratory and injunctive relief must be denied.

ADDITIONAL CONCLUSIONS BY THE JUDICIAL OFFICER

Petitioners’ and Dairy Institute of California’s Appeal Petition

Petitioners and Dairy Institute of California raise five issues in their appeal petition. First, Petitioners and Dairy Institute of
California contend the ALJ erroneously concluded Respondent did not violate section 8c(5)(G) of the AAMA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(5)(G)). Petitioners and Dairy Institute of California assert the requirement that Petitioners make payments to the Arizona-Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order producer-settlement and administrative funds, while one local handler is exempt from making such payments, creates a trade barrier prohibited by section 8c(5)(G) of the AAMA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(5)(G)). (Petitioners’ and Dairy Institute of California’s Appeal Pet. at 4-5, 13-17.)

I find the ALJ correctly concluded Respondent did not violate section 8c(5)(G) the AAMA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(5)(G)). Section 8c(5)(G) of the AAMA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(5)(G)) provides that no marketing agreement or order applicable to milk or milk products in any marketing area shall prohibit or limit the marketing in that area of any milk or milk product produced in another area in the United States. Courts have held that section 8c(5)(G) of the AAMA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(5)(G)) is intended to prevent the Secretary of Agriculture from establishing trade barriers to the marketing in one area of milk or milk products produced in another area. The Secretary of Agriculture did not establish a trade barrier to the marketing of Petitioners’ milk in the area covered by the Arizona-Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order. The Secretary of Agriculture applies the regulatory scheme embodied in the Arizona-Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order uniformly without exception beyond one congressional mandate for Anderson Dairy. The Arizona-Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order provides no exemption for handlers who ship milk into Clark County, Nevada, or any other part of the area covered by the Arizona-Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order. Rather, Congress provided that the price of milk paid by a handler at a plant operating

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within Clark County, Nevada, shall not be subject to any marketing order issued under section 8c of the AMAA (7 U.S.C. § 608c).\(^\text{10}\)

Moreover, even if I were to find the requirement that Petitioners make payments to the Arizona-Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order producer-settlement and administrative funds, while one local handler is exempt from making such payments, is a trade barrier established by the Secretary of Agriculture (which I do not so find), I would conclude that section 8c(11)(C) of the AMAA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(11)(C)) constitutes an exception to the prohibition on the establishment of trade barriers.

Further still, I find the purported unequal playing field was not created by the congressional exemption of Anderson Dairy in section 8c(11)(C) of the AMAA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(11)(C)). Instead, the unequal playing field was caused by the congressionally-mandated 1A pricing, which Petitioners and Dairy Institute of California do not challenge.

While Congress exempted Anderson Dairy from federal milk marketing order pricing requirements effective October 1, 1999, the actual federal milk marketing order reform provisions and the new federal milk marketing order prices did not become effective until January 2000, because of an injunction against the Secretary of Agriculture. During October, November, and December 1999, the extant 32 federal milk marketing orders and the extant federal milk marketing order prices remained in effect. (Tr. 121.) The extant federal milk marketing order price at Las Vegas, Nevada, was $.45 more than the extant federal milk marketing order price at Los Angeles County, California (PX 1 at cols. 2, 4).\(^\text{11}\) Similarly, under the extant federal milk marketing order prices, the federal milk marketing order price at Las Vegas, Nevada, was $.35 more than the federal milk marketing order price at Riverside County, California (PX 3 at

\(^{10}\)7 U.S.C. § 608c(11)(C).

\(^{11}\)While the total price may change each month, the difference in prices between these two locations never changes because the differentials are constant numbers (Tr. 23).
cols. 2, 4). Beginning January 1, 2000, when the new 1A pricing of the federal milk marketing order reform became effective, the federal milk marketing order price at Las Vegas, Nevada, was $.10 less than the federal milk marketing order price at Los Angeles County, California, and the same as the federal milk marketing order price at Riverside County, California (PX 1 at cols. 2, 4, PX 3 at cols. 2, 4). Hence, the changes to pricing mandated by Congress created an immediate new $.55 price differential for a Los Angeles County, California, handler distributing milk into Clark County, Nevada, versus a federally-regulated handler operating a plant in Clark County, Nevada. Similarly, there was an immediate $.35 price differential for milk distributed in Clark County, Nevada, by handlers operating plants located in Riverside County, California (PX 3 at cols. 2, 4).

These price differentials for Petitioners had nothing to do with the congressional exemption of Anderson Dairy from federal milk marketing order pricing requirements in October 1999.\(^\text{12}\) The price disadvantages would have occurred even if Anderson Dairy had remained fully regulated under the extant federal milk marketing order. Similarly, these price differentials had nothing to do with the compensatory payment provisions, which did not change between the extant federal milk marketing order that included Clark County, Nevada,\(^\text{13}\) and those of the Arizona-Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order. In the 3 months prior to federal milk marketing order reform, the federal milk marketing order price at Los Angeles County, California, was significantly below the California Department of Food and Agriculture price at Los Angeles County, California (PX 1 at cols. 3, 4); thus, virtually eliminating the possibility of imposed compensatory payments. The new congressionally-mandated federal milk marketing order 1A prices approximated the California Department of Food and Agriculture prices; thus increasing the likelihood of imposed compensatory payments on California handlers.

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\(^{13}\) See the federal milk marketing order regulating the handling of milk in the Great Basin Marketing Area (7 C.F.R. pt. 1139 (1999)).
distributing milk in Clark County, Nevada (PX 1 at cols. 3, 4 (after January 1, 2000)). The same analysis holds true for Riverside County, California, handlers distributing milk in Clark County, Nevada (PX 3 at cols. 3, 4). Petitioners and Dairy Institute of California concede Congress mandated the new 1A pricing, which they do not challenge (Tr. 59-60) even though 1A pricing brings possibly-imposed compensatory payments. Hence, the compensatory payments, and a large portion of the price differentials, are caused by matters outside of the scope of this proceeding.

Second, Petitioners and Dairy Institute of California contend the ALJ applied section 8c(5)(G) of the AMAA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(5)(G)) erroneously when she analyzed whether the Secretary of Agriculture could ensure that all milk marketing costs were the same for all competing handlers in a specific market; but, then, erroneously concluded, since the Secretary of Agriculture cannot control all milk marketing cost variables, the Secretary of Agriculture is excused from eliminating trade barriers which violate section 8c(5)(G) of the AMAA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(5)(G)) (Petitioners’ and Dairy Institute of California’s Appeal Pet. at 5, 17-19).

The ALJ states the Secretary of Agriculture cannot ensure a level playing field among competing handlers because of constantly fluctuating factors beyond the Secretary of Agriculture’s control, that affect the cost of purveying milk to retail markets (Initial Decision and Order at 11-12). The ALJ states the Secretary of Agriculture may choose not to address the congressional exemption of Anderson Dairy from the pricing provisions of federal milk marketing orders, as follows:

Conclusions of Law

5. There are many variables, in constant flux, that affect the costs of getting fluid milk onto retail shelves. The Secretary may, in her discretion, choose not to address with any action a variable such as Anderson Dairy’s exemption by an Act of Congress, and it was reasonable for her to take no action.
However, the ALJ does not state, as Petitioners and Dairy Institute of California assert, that the Secretary of Agriculture’s inability to control all factors affecting the cost of purveying milk to retail markets excuses the Secretary of Agriculture from eliminating trade barriers which violate section 8c(5)(G) of the AMAA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(5)(G)).

I agree with the ALJ that the Secretary of Agriculture cannot control all the factors which affect the cost of purveying fluid milk to retail markets. I also agree with Petitioners’ and Dairy Institute of California’s argument that the Secretary of Agriculture’s inability to control all the factors that affect the cost of purveying fluid milk to retail markets does not somehow excuse the Secretary of Agriculture from eliminating trade barriers which violate section 8c(5)(G) of the AMAA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(5)(G)). However, for the reasons set forth in this Decision and Order, supra, I agree with the ALJ’s conclusion that the Secretary of Agriculture’s decision not to exempt Petitioners from the Arizona-Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order does not violate section 8c(5)(G) of the AMAA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(5)(G)).

Third, Petitioners and Dairy Institute of California contend the ALJ erroneously held Respondent did not violate section 8c(16)(A) of the AMAA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(16)(A)). Petitioners and Dairy Institute of California contend, under section 8c(16)(A) of the AMAA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(16)(A)) and 7 C.F.R. § 1000.26(b), the Secretary of Agriculture has a mandatory duty to terminate or suspend provisions of federal milk marketing orders that obstruct the declared purposes of the AMAA. Petitioners and Dairy Institute of California contend the Arizona-Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order obstructs the purposes of the AMAA because it creates a trade barrier to the shipment of milk into Clark County, Nevada, from California, in violation of section 8c(5)(G) of the AMAA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(5)(G)). (Petitioners’ and Dairy Institute of California’s Appeal Pet. at 5, 19-21.)

As an initial matter, for the reasons set forth in this Decision and Order, supra, I conclude that the Arizona-Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order does not violate section 8c(5)(G) of the AMAA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(5)(G)). Further, in October 1999, Congress specifically
amended section 8c(11)(C) of the AMAA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(11)(C)) to provide that the price of milk paid by a handler at a plant operating in Clark County, Nevada, shall not be subject to any federal milk marketing order. At the time of this amendment, all federal milk marketing orders included producer-settlement fund provisions. Nevertheless, while Congress exempted Anderson Dairy from the pricing provisions of federal milk marketing orders, Congress did not legislate any change or exception to the producer-settlement fund provisions in any federal milk marketing order. Congress’ failure to legislate any change to federal milk marketing orders, while at the same time exempting Anderson Dairy from pricing provisions of federal milk marketing orders, establishes that producer-settlement fund provisions do not obstruct the declared purposes of the AMAA.

Moreover, the final rule for federal milk marketing order reform, which included producer-settlement fund provisions, was published on September 1, 1999, to be effective October 1, 1999 (64 Fed. Reg. 47,897-48,201). However, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia enjoined the implementation of the final rule. (Tr. 121.) Effective November 29, 1999, Congress enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act\(^\text{14}\) precluding any challenge to producer-settlement fund provisions in the final rule, other than on constitutional grounds, and requiring the final milk marketing order rule, as published in the Federal Register (with exceptions not relevant to this proceeding), to become effective and to be implemented by the Secretary of Agriculture beginning January 1, 2000.

The Consolidated Appropriations Act leaves the Secretary of Agriculture no discretion concerning the imposition of the producer-settlement requirement. The final rule includes Clark County, Nevada, in the definition of the “Arizona-Las Vegas marketing area”\(^\text{15}\) and contains the producer-settlement fund

\(^{14}\)See 7 U.S.C. § 7253 note.

\(^{15}\)See 7 C.F.R. § 1131.2.
provisions which Petitioners and Dairy Institute of California now challenge.\textsuperscript{16}

Fourth, Petitioners and Dairy Institute of California contend the ALJ erroneously rejected their equal protection claim. Petitioners and Dairy Institute of California assert the Secretary of Agriculture’s refusal to grant Petitioners the same exemption as mandated by Congress for Anderson Dairy violates the equal protection provisions of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States (Petitioners’ and Dairy Institute of California’s Appeal Pet. at 6, 21-24).

Equal protection “ensures that all similarly situated persons are treated similarly under the law.”\textsuperscript{17} However, “[i]n areas of social and economic policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.”\textsuperscript{18} A regulatory classification “is accorded a strong presumption of validity” with the burden being “on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it.”\textsuperscript{19}

Petitioner has not met this burden. The Secretary of Agriculture applies the regulatory scheme embodied in the Arizona-Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order uniformly, without exception beyond one congressionally-mandated exception for Anderson Dairy. The Arizona-Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order provides no exemption for handlers, such as Petitioners, who ship milk into Clark County, Nevada, or any other part of the area covered by the Arizona-Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order. Moreover, as discussed in this

\textsuperscript{16}See 7 C.F.R. §§ 1131.70-.71.


Decision and Order, supra, the Consolidated Appropriations Act leaves the Secretary of Agriculture no discretion concerning the imposition of the producer-settlement requirement. The final rule, which the Consolidated Appropriations Act requires the Secretary of Agriculture to implement, includes Clark County, Nevada, in the definition of the “Arizona-Las Vegas marketing area” and contains the producer-settlement fund provisions which Petitioners and Dairy Institute of California now challenge.  

Congress provided that the price of milk paid by a handler at a plant operating within Clark County, Nevada, shall not be subject to any marketing order issued under section 8c of the AMAA (7 U.S.C. § 608c). When reviewing a statute under the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the test to be applied is whether the statute is rationally related to a legitimate government interest. In making this determination, the court must apply a standard that is extremely deferential to the statutory classifications enacted by Congress. The judge “may not sit as a super-legislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinations.” The party challenging the legislation “must convince the court that the legislative facts on which the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental decisionmaker.” “All that is needed for this court to uphold the . . . [classification] scheme is to find that there are ‘plausible,’ ‘arguable,’ or ‘conceivable’ reasons

20See note 15.

21See note 16.


which may have been the basis for the distinction.” 26  Moreover, it is “constitutionally irrelevant whether this reasoning in fact underlay the legislative decision.” 27  Hence, the statute passes constitutional muster under the equal protection clause, unless Petitioners and Dairy Institute of California prove there is no plausible reason Congress could have considered for excluding a plant operating in Clark County, Nevada, from the pricing requirements of federal milk marketing orders.

In the instant proceeding, the exemption in section 8c(11)(C) of the AMAA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(11)(C)) passes constitutional muster. Under the federal order reform package from the fall of 1999, the Class I federal milk marketing order price applicable to Clark County, Nevada, would rise significantly. Yet, the Secretary of Agriculture, at all times, chose to keep Clark County, Nevada, and any plants operating in Clark County, Nevada, in the new Arizona-Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order, regardless of whether the 1B milk pricing or the 1A milk pricing structure was adopted.

The House, Senate, and Conference Reports are silent as to the rationale for the exemption for Anderson Dairy, the only fluid milk processor in Clark County, Nevada (Tr. 133). Petitioners and Dairy Institute of California agree that Anderson Dairy procures its milk in Nevada and there is more milk available in Nevada than Anderson Dairy needs to supply to the Clark County, Nevada, market (Tr. 60-61). Since the ultimate purpose of federal milk marketing orders is the orderly marketing of milk to assure an adequate supply of fluid milk to market (7 U.S.C. § 602(4); Tr. 122), Congress might well have determined that no price increase was necessary for the plant operating in Clark County, Nevada, in order to continue to assure an adequate supply of fluid milk to Clark County, Nevada. Therefore, the exemption would be a rational solution clearly adequate to meet the applicable equal protection test. Hence, the exemption in section 8c(11)(C) of the AMAA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(11)(C)) does not violate

26 Brandwein v. California Bd. of Osteopathic Examiners, 708 F.2d 1466, 1472 (9th Cir. 1983).

the equal protection clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Fifth, Petitioners and Dairy Institute of California contend the ALJ erroneously denied standing to Dairy Institute of California (Petitioners’ and Dairy Institute of California’s Appeal Pet. at 6, 24-25).

The ALJ concluded, since Dairy Institute of California is not a handler, it cannot obtain relief under section 8c(15)(A) of the AMAA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(15)(A)). Consequently, the ALJ realigned the parties to separate Dairy Institute of California from the four Petitioners to which relief could be granted under section 8c(15)(A) of the AMAA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(15)(A)). (Initial Decision and Order at 2; Order Amending Case Caption.)

I agree with the ALJ. Dairy Institute of California is not a handler; it is a trade association representing dairy processors in California, including Petitioners (Tr. 6). Section 8c(15)(A) of the AMAA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(15)(A)) states any handler subject to an order may file a petition with the Secretary of Agriculture for modification of, or exemption from, the order. Moreover, section 900.52(a) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 900.52(a)) states any handler desiring to complain that a marketing order is not in accordance with law may file a petition. Section 900.51(i) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 900.51(i)) defines the term handler, as follows:

§ 900.51 Definitions.

(i) The term handler means any person who, by the terms of a marketing order, is subject thereto, or to whom a marketing order is sought to be made applicable[.]

7 C.F.R. § 900.51(i).

Neither the AMAA nor the Rules of Practice defines the term subject to or identifies the persons who are subject to an order and may therefore file a petition pursuant to section 8c(15)(A) of the
AMAA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(15)(A)). The term *subject to* has no well-defined meaning and the meaning of the term must be determined from the context in which it is used.28 Courts have found the common and ordinary meaning of the term *subject to* in various contexts includes “bound by”; “controlled by”; “governed or affected by”; “obligated in law”; “placed under the authority of”; “regulated by” and “under the control, power, or dominion of.”29


29*Shell Oil Co. v. Manley Oil*, 124 F.2d 714, 716 (7th Cir.) (in a deed made “subject to” coal rights, the term “subject to” was used in its ordinary sense; i.e., “subordinate to, servient to, or limited by”), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 690 (1942); *Texaco v. Pigott*, 235 F. Supp. 458, 463 (S.D. Miss. 1964) (in a deed which states that the purchaser takes property “subject to” the oil and gas lease thereon, the words “subject to” mean “subservient to” or “limited by”); *In re Estate of Kraft*, 186 N.W.2d 628, 631-32 (Iowa 1971) (in a will that states “subject to the foregoing,” the term “subject to” means “subordinate to”); *State v. Willburn*, 426 P.2d 626, 630 (Haw. 1967) (when construing the term “subject to” in a statute, it is well established that the term “subject to” may mean “limited by,” “subordinate to,” or “regulated by”); *Bulger v. McCourt*, 138 N.W.2d 18, 22 (Neb. 1965) (the term “subject to” is an expression of qualification and generally means “subordinate to, servient to, or affected by”); *Turner v. Kansas City*, 191 S.W.2d 612, 615 (Mo. 1946) (the term “subject to state constitution and laws” means “placed under authority and dominion of such constitution and laws”); *Homan v. Employers Reinsurance Corp.*, 136 S.W.2d 289, 298 (Mo. 1940) (in a reinsurance contract, the term “subject to” all general and special terms and conditions of policies and endorsements means “bound, obligated, or controlled by”); *State v. Tilley*, 288 N.W. 521, 523 (Neb. 1939) (the term “subject to” in a law authorizing sums to be expended by the Attorney General “subject to” the approval of the state engineer, the term “subject to” means “dependent upon; limited by; and under the control, power, or dominion of”); *Van Duyn v. H.S. Chase & Co.*, 128 N.W. 300, 301 (Iowa 1910) (the term “subject to” in a deed means “under the control, power, or dominion of; subordinate to”); *Eslinger v. Pratt*, 46 P. 763, 766 (Utah 1896) (in a statute which reads “the chiefs shall have power, under such rules as the board may establish,” the word “under” means “subject to”); *Lydig Construction, Inc. v. Rainier National Bank*, 697 P.2d 1019, 1022 (Ct. App. Wash. 1985) (the words “subject to” ordinarily denote “subordinate to, servient to, or limited by”); *State Revenue Comm n v. Columbus Bank & Trust Co.*, 178 S.E. 463, 464 (Ct. App. Ga. 1935) (the term “subject to” has been variously defined by courts and lexicographers as “made liable, subordinate, servient, subject to the evils of, regulated by, brought under the control or action of, limited by, or affected by”); (continued...
Dairy Institute of California is not bound by, controlled by, governed or affected by, obligated by, placed under the authority of, regulated by, or under the control, power, or dominion of the Arizona-Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order. Further, the record does not establish that Dairy Institute of California is a person to whom the Arizona-Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order is sought to be made applicable. Therefore, Dairy Institute of California is not a handler under the Arizona-Las Vegas Milk Marketing Order and does not have standing to file a petition under section 8c(15)(A) of the AMAA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(15)(A)).

Respondent’s Appeal Petition

Respondent raises one issue in his appeal petition. Respondent contends the ALJ erroneously concluded the Secretary of Agriculture has authority to grant the relief requested by Petitioners (Respondent’s Appeal Pet. at 12).

The ALJ concluded the Secretary of Agriculture could grant the relief requested by Petitioners, as follows:

Conclusions of Law

2. The Secretary of Agriculture has the authority to grant the relief requested by the Four Petitioners, despite Congress having enacted into positive law those portions of the federal

29(...continued)
Sanitary Appliance Co. v. French, 58 S.W.2d 159, 163 (Ct. Civ. App. Tx. 1933) (where a contract between principal and an agent prohibited the agent from selling competitor’s product and the contract between the agent and subagent was “subject to” the terms of the contract between the principal and agent, the term “subject to” means “bound by”).

order reform applicable to the Four Petitioners’ claims. 7 U.S.C. § 608c(15)(A).

Initial Decision and Order at 13.

Section 8c(15)(A) of the AMAA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(15)(A)) requires the Secretary of Agriculture to rule on petitions filed by handlers for exemption from or modification of an order. The Secretary of Agriculture may only grant relief requested by a handler when she finds that the order or any provision of the order or any obligation imposed in connection with the order is not in accordance with law.

In the instant proceeding, Congress exempted Anderson Dairy from the pricing provisions of federal milk marketing orders.\textsuperscript{31} Further, effective November 29, 1999, Congress enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act\textsuperscript{32} requiring the final milk marketing order rule, as published in the Federal Register (with exceptions not relevant to this proceeding), to become effective and to be implemented by the Secretary of Agriculture beginning January 1, 2000.

The Consolidated Appropriations Act leaves the Secretary of Agriculture no discretion concerning the imposition of the producer-settlement requirement. The final rule includes Clark County, Nevada, in the definition of the “Arizona-Las Vegas marketing area”\textsuperscript{33} and contains the producer-settlement fund provisions which Petitioners and Dairy Institute of California now challenge.\textsuperscript{34} Therefore, the Secretary of Agriculture cannot lawfully grant the relief requested by Petitioners and Dairy Institute of California, and I omit from this Decision and Order the ALJ’s conclusion of law that indicates otherwise.

\textsuperscript{31}7 U.S.C. § 608c(11)(C).

\textsuperscript{32}7 U.S.C. § 7253 note.

\textsuperscript{33}See note 15.

\textsuperscript{34}See note 16.
Petitioners’ and Dairy Institute of California’s Request
That the Judicial Officer Take Official Notice
of April 19, 2002, Hearing Transcript

On March 27, 2003, Petitioners and Dairy Institute of California requested that I take official notice of the transcript of an April 19, 2002, hearing in a rulemaking proceeding involving proposed amendments to the Pacific Northwest Marketing Area (7 C.F.R. pt. 1124) and the Western Marketing Area (7 C.F.R. pt. 1135) (Petitioners’ Brief in Opposition to Respondents’ Cross-Appeal at 6 n.5). Respondent did not file any response to Petitioners’ and Dairy Institute of California’s request. Therefore, pursuant to section 900.60(d)(7) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 900.60(d)(7)), I take official notice of the transcript of the April 19, 2002, hearing in a rulemaking proceeding involving proposed amendments to the Pacific Northwest Marketing Area (7 C.F.R. pt. 1124) and the Western Marketing Area (7 C.F.R. pt. 1135).

For the foregoing reasons, the following Order should be issued.

ORDER

1. Petitioners’ and Dairy Institute of California’s Petition is denied.
2. This Order shall become effective on the day after service of this Order on Petitioners and Dairy Institute of California.

RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

Petitioners and Dairy Institute of California have the right to obtain review of this Order in any district court of the United States in which Petitioners and Dairy Institute of California are inhabitants or have their principal places of business. A bill in equity for the purpose of review of this Order must be filed within 20 days from the date of entry of this Order. Service of process in any such proceeding may be had upon the Secretary of Agriculture by delivering a copy of
the bill of complaint to the Secretary of Agriculture. 7 U.S.C. § 608c(15)(B). The date of entry of this Order is September 20, 2004.
ANIMAL QUARANTINE ACT

DEPARTMENTAL DECISION

In re: EDDIE ROBINSON SQUIRES.
A.Q. Docket No. 02-0005.
Decision and Order.
Filed August 9, 2004.


The Judicial Officer affirmed Administrative Law Judge Jill S. Clifton’s Default Decision finding that Respondent violated 21 U.S.C. §§ 111 and 120 (repealed 2002) and 9 C.F.R. pts. 71 and 78 (1999) when he moved cattle and swine interstate without required identification and documents and failed to keep records. The Judicial Officer rejected Respondent’s contention that his lack of actual knowledge of 21 U.S.C. §§ 111 and 120 (repealed 2002) and 9 C.F.R. pts. 71 and 78 (1999) is a defense to the violations. The Judicial Officer stated Respondent is presumed to know the law and publication of the regulations in the Federal Register constructively notifies Respondent of the regulations. The Judicial Officer held that Respondent failed to prove that he was the target of selective enforcement. Citing the general savings statute (1 U.S.C. § 109), the Judicial Officer rejected Respondent’s contention that no action could be brought against him for his 1997 and 1998 violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 111 and 120 (repealed 2002) because those provisions of law were repealed by the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 effective May 13, 2002. The Judicial Officer also stated that Respondent’s cessation of activities resulting in his violations is not a defense to past violations. The Judicial Officer further rejected Respondent’s contention that his substantial familial responsibilities are a defense to his violations. Finally, the Judicial Officer found that, while the inability to pay a civil penalty is a mitigating circumstance in animal quarantine cases, the Respondent has the burden of proving an inability to pay and Respondent failed to meet his burden of proof.

James A. Booth for Complainant.
Respondent, Pro se.
Initial decision issued by Jill S. Clifton, Administrative Law Judge.
Decision and Order issued by William G. Jenson, Judicial Officer.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY


The Hearing Clerk served Respondent with the Complaint and a service letter on July 28, 2003.\(^3\) Respondent failed to answer the Complaint within 20 days after service as required by section 1.136(a) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)). The Hearing Clerk

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\(^1\) At all times material to this proceeding, the Act of February 2, 1903, as amended [hereinafter the Act of February 2, 1903], was in effect; however, effective May 13, 2002, the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 repealed section 2 of the Act of February 2, 1903 (Pub. L. No. 107-171, § 10418(a)(7), 116 Stat. 134, 507 (2002)).

\(^2\) At all times material to this proceeding, the Act of May 29, 1884, as amended [hereinafter the Act of May 29, 1884], was in effect; however, effective May 13, 2002, the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 repealed sections 4 and 5 of the Act of May 29, 1884 (Pub. L. No. 107-171, § 10418(a)(8), 116 Stat. 134, 508 (2002)).

\(^3\) United States Postal Service Domestic Return Receipt for Article Number 7001 0360 0000 0304 4770.
sent Respondent a letter dated August 19, 2003, informing him that an answer to the Complaint had not been received within the time required in the Rules of Practice.

On March 8, 2004, in accordance with section 1.139 of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.139), Complainant filed a “Motion for Adoption of Proposed Default Decision and Order” and a “Proposed Default Decision and Order.” The Hearing Clerk served Respondent with Complainant’s Motion for Adoption of Proposed Default Decision and Order and Complainant’s Proposed Default Decision and Order and a service letter on March 12, 2004. On March 29, 2004, Respondent filed objections to Complainant’s Motion for Adoption of Proposed Default Decision and Order and Complainant’s Proposed Default Decision and Order.


Based upon a careful consideration of the record, I agree with the ALJ’s Initial Decision and Order, except for the amount of the civil penalty the ALJ assessed against Respondent. Therefore, except for the amount of the civil penalty assessed against Respondent and

4United States Postal Service Domestic Return Receipt for Article Number 7001 0360 0000 0304 7764.
minor modifications, I adopt the ALJ’s Initial Decision and Order as the final Decision and Order. Additional conclusions by the Judicial Officer follow the ALJ’s conclusions of law, as restated.

**APPLICABLE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS**

21 U.S.C.:

**TITLE 21—FOOD AND DRUGS**

. . .

**CHAPTER 4—ANIMALS, MEATS, AND MEAT AND DAIRY PRODUCTS**

. . .

**SUBCHAPTER III—PREVENTION OF INTRODUCTION AND SPREAD OF CONTAGION**

§ 111. Regulations to prevent contagious diseases

The Secretary of Agriculture shall have authority to make such regulations and take such measures as he may deem proper to prevent the introduction or dissemination of the contagion of any contagious, infectious, or communicable disease of animals from a foreign country into the United States or from one State or Territory of the United States or the District of Columbia to another, and to seize, quarantine, and dispose of any hay, straw, forage, or similar material, or any meats, hides, or other animal products coming from an infected foreign country to the United States, or from one State or Territory or the District of Columbia in transit to another State or Territory or the District of Columbia whenever in his judgment such action is advisable in order to guard against the introduction or spread of such contagion.
§ 120. Regulation of exportation and transportation of infected livestock and live poultry

In order to enable the Secretary of Agriculture to effectually suppress and extirpate contagious pleuropneumonia, foot-and-mouth disease, and other dangerous contagious, infectious, and communicable diseases in cattle and other livestock and/or live poultry, and to prevent the spread of such diseases, he is authorized and directed from time to time to establish such rules and regulations concerning the exportation and transportation of livestock and/or live poultry from any place within the United States where he may have reason to believe such diseases may exist into and through any State or Territory, and into and through the District of Columbia and to foreign countries as he may deem necessary, and all such rules and regulations shall have the force of law.

§ 122. Offenses; penalty

Any person, company, or corporation knowingly violating the provisions of this Act or the orders or regulations made in pursuance thereof shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not more than one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment. Any person, company, or corporation violating such provisions, orders, or regulations may be assessed a civil penalty by the Secretary of Agriculture of not more than one thousand dollars. The Secretary may issue an order assessing such civil penalty only after notice and an opportunity for an agency hearing on the record. Such order shall be treated as a final order reviewable under chapter 158 of title 28. The validity of such order may not be reviewed in an action to collect such civil penalty.

28 U.S.C.:

TITLE 28—JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE

. . . .

PART VI—PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS

. . . .

CHAPTER 163—FINES, PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES

§ 2461. Mode of recovery

. . . .

FEDERAL CIVIL PENALTIES INFLATION ADJUSTMENT

SHORT TITLE

SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the “Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990”

FINDINGS AND PURPOSE

SEC. 2. (a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that—

(1) the power of Federal agencies to impose civil monetary penalties for violations of Federal law and regulations plays an important role in deterring violations and furthering the policy goals embodied in such laws and regulations;

(2) the impact of many civil monetary penalties has been and is diminished due to the effect of inflation;

(3) by reducing the impact of civil monetary penalties, inflation has weakened the deterrent effect of such penalties; and
(4) the Federal Government does not maintain comprehensive, detailed accounting of the efforts of Federal agencies to assess and collect civil monetary penalties.

(b) PURPOSE—The purpose of this Act is to establish a mechanism that shall—

(1) allow for regular adjustment for inflation of civil monetary penalties;

(2) maintain the deterrent effect of civil monetary penalties and promote compliance with the law; and

(3) improve the collection by the Federal Government of civil monetary penalties.

DEFINITIONS

SEC. 3. For purposes of this Act, the term—

(1) “agency” means an Executive agency as defined under section 105 of title 5, United States Code, and includes the United States Postal Service;

(2) “civil monetary penalty” means any penalty, fine, or other sanction that—

(A)(i) is for a specific monetary amount as provided by Federal law; or

(ii) has a maximum amount provided for by Federal law; and

(B) is assessed or enforced by an agency pursuant to Federal law; and

(C) is assessed or enforced pursuant to an administrative proceeding or a civil action in the Federal courts; and

(3) “Consumer Price Index” means the Consumer Price Index for all-urban consumers published by the Department of Labor.

CIVIL MONETARY PENALTY INFLATION ADJUSTMENT REPORTS
SEC. 4. The head of each agency shall, not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 [Apr. 26, 1996], and at least once every 4 years thereafter—

(1) by regulation adjust each civil monetary penalty provided by law within the jurisdiction of the Federal agency, except for any penalty (including any addition to tax and additional amount) under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 U.S.C. 1 et seq.], the Tariff Act of 1930 [19 U.S.C. 1202 et seq.], the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 [20 U.S.C. 651 et seq.], or the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. 301 et seq.], by the inflation adjustment described under section 5 of this Act [bracketed material in original]; and

(2) publish each such regulation in the Federal Register.

COST-OF-LIVING ADJUSTMENTS OF CIVIL MONETARY PENALTIES

SEC. 5. (a) ADJUSTMENT.—The inflation adjustment under section 4 shall be determined by increasing the maximum civil monetary penalty or the range of minimum and maximum civil monetary penalties, as applicable, for each civil monetary penalty by the cost-of-living adjustment. Any increase determined under this subsection shall be rounded to the nearest—

(1) multiple of $10 in the case of penalties less than or equal to $100;

(2) multiple of $100 in the case of penalties greater than $100 but less than or equal to $1,000;

(3) multiple of $1,000 in the case of penalties greater than $1,000 but less than or equal to $10,000;

(4) multiple of $5,000 in the case of penalties greater than $10,000 but less than or equal to $100,000;

(5) multiple of $10,000 in the case of penalties greater than $100,000 but less than or equal to $200,000; and
(6) multiple of $25,000 in the case of penalties greater than $200,000.

(b) Definition.—For purposes of subsection (a), the term “cost-of-living adjustment” means the percentage (if any) for each civil monetary penalty by which—

(1) the Consumer Price Index for the month of June of the calendar year preceding the adjustment, exceeds

(2) the Consumer Price Index for the month of June of the calendar year in which the amount of such civil monetary penalty was last set or adjusted pursuant to law.

ANNUAL REPORT

Sec. 6. Any increase under this Act in a civil monetary penalty shall apply only to violations which occur after the date the increase takes effect.

LIMITATION ON INITIAL ADJUSTMENT.—The first adjustment of a civil monetary penalty . . . may not exceed 10 percent of such penalty.


7 C.F.R.:

TITLE 7—AGRICULTURE

SUBTITLE A—OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE

. . . .

PART 3—DEBT MANAGEMENT

. . . .

Subpart E—Adjusted Civil Monetary Penalties
§ 3.91 Adjusted civil monetary penalties.

(a) In general. The Secretary will adjust the civil monetary penalties, listed in paragraph (b), to take account of inflation at least once every 4 years as required by the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990 (Pub. L. No. 101-410), as amended by the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 (Pub. L. No. 104-134).

(b) Penalties—.

. . . .

(2) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service . . .

. . . .

(xi) Civil penalty for a violation of the Act of February 2, 1903 (commonly known as the Cattle Contagious Disease Act), codified at 21 U.S.C. 122, has a maximum of $1,100.

7 C.F.R. § 3.91(a), (b)(2)(xi).

9 C.F.R.:

TITLE 9—ANIMALS AND ANIMAL PRODUCTS

CHAPTER I—ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

. . . .

SUBCHAPTER C—INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF ANIMALS (INCLUDING POULTRY) AND ANIMAL PRODUCTS

. . . .

PART 71—GENERAL PROVISIONS
§ 71.18 Individual identification of certain cattle 2 years of age or over for movement in interstate commerce.

(a) No cattle 2 years of age or over, except steers and spayed heifers and cattle of any age which are being moved interstate during the course of normal ranching operations without change of ownership to another premises owned, leased, or rented by the same individual as provided in §§ 78.9(a)(3)(ii), 78.9(b)(3)(iv), and 78.9(c)(3)(iv) of this chapter, shall be moved in interstate commerce other than in accordance with the requirements of this section. Any movement in interstate commerce of any cattle shall also comply with the other applicable provisions in this part and other parts of this subchapter.

(1) When permitted under such other provisions, cattle subject to this section:

(i) May be moved in interstate commerce from any point to any destination, if such cattle, when moved in interstate commerce, are identified by a Department-approved backtag affixed a few inches from the midline and just behind the shoulder of the animal, or by such other means approved by the Administrator, upon request in specific cases, and if except as provided in paragraph (a)(5) of this section such cattle when moved interstate are accompanied by a statement signed by the owner or shipper of the cattle, or other document stating: (A) The point from which the animals are moved interstate; (B) the destination of the animals; (C) the number of animals covered by the statement, or other document; (D) the name and address of the owner at the time of the movement; (E) the name and address of the previous owner if ownership changed within four months prior to the movement of the cattle; (F) the name and address of the shipper; and (G) the identifying numbers of the backtags or other approved identification applied: Provided, That identification numbers are not required to be recorded on such statement or document for cattle moved from a stockyard posted under the provisions of the Packers and Stockyard Act, 1921, as amended (7 U.S.C. 181 et seq.),
directly to a recognized slaughtering establishment as defined in § 78.1 of this chapter[.]

(3) Each person who ships, transports, or otherwise causes the cattle to be moved in interstate commerce is responsible for the identification of the cattle as required by this section.

§ 71.19 Identification of swine in interstate commerce.

(a)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (c) of this section, no swine may be sold, transported, received for transportation, or offered for sale or transportation, in interstate commerce, unless each swine is identified at whichever of the following comes first:

(i) The point of first commingling of the swine in interstate commerce with swine from any other source[.]

(3) Each person who buys or sells, for his or her own account or as the agent of the buyer or seller, transports, receives for transportation, offers for sale or transportation, or otherwise handles swine in interstate commerce, is responsible for the identification of swine as provided by this section.

(b) Means of swine identification approved by the Administrator are:

(1) Official ear tags, when used on any swine;

(2) United States Department of Agriculture backtags, when used on swine moving to slaughter;

(3) Official swine tattoos, when used on swine moving to slaughter, when the use of the official swine tattoo has been requested by a user or the State animal health official, and the Administrator authorizes its use in writing based on a determination that the tattoo will be retained and visible on the carcass of the swine after slaughter, so as to provide identification of the swine;

(4) Tattoos of at least 4-characters when used on swine moving to slaughter, except sows and boars as provided in § 78.33 of this chapter;
(5) Ear notching when used on any swine, if the ear notching has been recorded in the book of record of a purebred registry association;

(6) Tattoos on the ear or inner flank of any swine, if the tattoos have been recorded in the book of record of a swine registry association; and

(7) For slaughter swine and feeder swine, an ear tag or tattoo bearing the premises identification number assigned by the State animal health official to the premises on which the swine originated.

(e)(1) Each person who buys or sells, for his or her own account or as the agent of the buyer or seller, transports, receives for transportation, offers for sale or transportation, or otherwise handles swine in interstate commerce, must keep records relating to the transfer of ownership, shipment, or handling of the swine, such as yarding receipts, sale tickets, invoices, and waybills upon which is recorded:

(i) all serial numbers and other approved means of identification appearing on the swine that are necessary to identify it to the person from whom it was purchased or otherwise obtained; and

(ii) the street address, including city and state, or township, county, and state, and the telephone number, if available, of the person from whom the swine were purchased or otherwise obtained.

(2) Each person required to keep records under this paragraph must maintain the records at his/her or its place of business for at least 2 years after the person has sold or otherwise disposed of the swine to another person, and for such further period as the Administrator may require by written notice to the person, for the purposes of any investigation or action involving the swine identified in the records. The person shall make the records available for inspection and copying during ordinary business hours (8 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., Monday through Friday) by any authorized employee of the
United States Department of Agriculture, upon that employee’s request and presentation of his or her official credentials.

PART 78—BRUCELLOSIS

. . . .

SUBPART B—RESTRICTIONS ON INTERSTATE MOVEMENT OF CATTLE

BECAUSE OF BRUCELLOSIS

. . . .

§ 78.9 Cattle from herds not known to be affected.

Male cattle which are not test eligible and are from herds not known to be affected may be moved interstate without further restrictions. Female cattle which are not test eligible and are from herds not known to be affected may be moved interstate only in accordance with § 78.10 of this part and this section. Test-eligible cattle which are not brucellosis exposed and are from herds not known to be affected may be moved interstate only in accordance with § 78.10 and as follows:

(a) Class Free States/areas. Test-eligible cattle which originate in Class Free States or areas, are not brucellosis exposed, and are from a herd not known to be affected may be moved interstate from Class Free States or areas only as specified below:

. . . .

(3) Movement other than in accordance with paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) of this section. Such cattle may be moved interstate other than in accordance with paragraphs (a)(1) and (2) of this section only if:

. . . .

(iii) Such cattle are moved interstate accompanied by a certificate which states, in addition to the items specified in § 78.1, that the cattle originated in a Class Free State or area.
§ 78.30 General restrictions.

(b) Each person who causes the movement of swine in interstate commerce is responsible for the identification of the swine as required by this subpart. No such person shall remove or tamper with or cause the removal of or tampering with an identification tattoo or approved swine identification tag required in this subpart except at the time of slaughter, or as may be authorized by the Administrator upon request in specific cases and under such conditions as the Administrator may impose to ensure continuing identification.

§ 78.31 Brucellosis reactor swine.

(b) Identification. Brucellosis reactor swine shall be individually identified by attaching to the left ear a metal tag bearing a serial number and the inscription, “U.S. Reactor,” or a metal tag bearing a serial number designated by the State animal health official for identifying brucellosis reactors.

(c) Permit. Brucellosis reactor swine shall be accompanied to destination by a permit.

(e) Segregation en route. Brucellosis reactor swine shall not be moved interstate in any means of conveyance containing animals which are not brucellosis reactors unless all the animals in the shipment are for immediate slaughter, or unless the brucellosis reactor swine are kept separate from other animals by a partition securely affixed to the sides of the means of conveyance.

§ 78.33 Sows and boars.
(a) Sows and boars may be moved in interstate commerce for slaughter or for sale for slaughter if they are identified in accordance with § 71.19 of this chapter either:

(1) Before being moved in interstate commerce and before being mixed with swine from any other source; or

(2) After being moved in interstate commerce but before being mixed with swine from any other source only if they have been moved directly from their herd of origin to:

(i) A recognized slaughtering establishment; or

(ii) A stockyard, market agency, or dealer operating under the Packers and Stockyards Act, as amended (7 U.S.C. 181 et seq.).

(b) Sows and boars may be moved in interstate commerce for breeding only if they are identified in accordance with § 71.19 of this chapter before being moved in interstate commerce and before being mixed with swine from any other source, and the sows and boars either:

(1) Are from a validated brucellosis-free herd or a validated brucellosis-free State and are accompanied by a certificate that states, in addition to the items specified in § 78.1, that the swine originated in a validated brucellosis-free herd or a validated brucellosis-free State; or

(2) Have tested negative to an official test conducted within 30 days prior to interstate movement and are accompanied by a certificate that states, in addition to the items specified in § 78.1, the dates and results of the official tests.

(c) Sows and boars may be moved in interstate commerce for purposes other than slaughter or breeding without restriction under this subpart if they are identified in accordance with § 71.19 of this chapter.

9 C.F.R. § 71.18(a)(1)(i), (a)(3), .19(a)(1)(i), (a)(3), (b), (e)(1)-(2); 78.9(a)(3)(iii), .30(b), .31(b)-(c), (e), .33 (1999) (footnotes omitted).
Statement of the Case

Respondent failed to file an answer within the time prescribed in section 1.136(a) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)). Section 1.136(c) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.136(c)) provides that the failure to file an answer within the time provided in section 1.136(a) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)) and the failure to deny or otherwise respond to an allegation of the complaint shall be deemed, for purposes of the proceeding, an admission of the allegations in the complaint. Further, pursuant to section 1.139 of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.139), the failure to file an answer constitutes a waiver of hearing. Accordingly, the material allegations in the Complaint are adopted as Findings of Fact. This Decision and Order is issued pursuant to section 1.139 of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.139).

Findings of Fact

1. Respondent is an individual with a mailing address of 600 Raintree Drive, Matthews, North Carolina 28105.

2. On or about November 20, 1997, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. § 71.18(a)(1)(i) and (a)(3) (1999), moved approximately two cattle, 2 years of age or older, interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York, South Carolina, without such cattle being identified by a United States Department of Agriculture-approved backtag and accompanied by an owner/shipper statement or other required document, as required.

3. On or about November 20, 1997, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. § 78.9(a)(3)(iii) (1999), moved approximately two test-eligible cattle interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York, South Carolina, without such cattle being accompanied by a certificate, as required.

Carolina, without such swine being identified as approved by the Administrator as described in 9 C.F.R. § 71.19(b) (1999), as required.

5. On or about November 20, 1997, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. §§ 78.30(b) and 78.33 (1999), moved approximately 11 swine interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York, South Carolina, for slaughter or for sale for slaughter without such swine being identified in accordance with 9 C.F.R. § 71.19 (1999) before being moved interstate and before being mixed with swine from any other source.

6. On or about November 20, 1997, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. § 71.19(e)(1) and (e)(2) (1999), moved approximately 11 swine interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York, South Carolina, for sale without keeping records related to such swine.

7. On or about November 20, 1997, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. § 78.31(b), (c), and (e) (1999), moved one brucellosis reactor swine interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York, South Carolina.

8. On or about April 30, 1998, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. § 71.18(a)(1)(i) and (a)(3) (1999), moved approximately seven cattle, 2 years of age or older, interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York, South Carolina, without such cattle being identified by a United States Department of Agriculture-approved backtag and accompanied by an owner/shipper statement or other required document, as required.

9. On or about April 30, 1998, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. § 78.9(a)(3)(iii) (1999), moved approximately seven test-eligible cattle interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York, South Carolina, without such cattle being accompanied by a certificate, as required.

10. On or about June 4, 1998, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. § 71.18(a)(1)(i) and (a)(3) (1999), moved approximately nine cattle, 2 years of age or older, interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York, South Carolina, without such cattle being identified by a United States Department of Agriculture-approved backtag and accompanied by an owner/shipper statement or other required document, as required.
11. On or about June 4, 1998, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. § 78.9(a)(3)(iii) (1999), moved approximately nine test-eligible cattle interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York, South Carolina, without such cattle being accompanied by a certificate, as required.

12. On or about June 4, 1998, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. § 71.19(a)(1)(i) and (a)(3) (1999), moved approximately nine swine interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York, South Carolina, without such swine being identified as approved by the Administrator as described in 9 C.F.R. § 71.19(b) (1999), as required.

13. On or about June 4, 1998, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. §§ 78.30(b) and 78.33 (1999), moved approximately nine swine interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York, South Carolina, for slaughter or for sale for slaughter without such swine being identified in accordance with 9 C.F.R. § 71.19 (1999) before being moved interstate and before being mixed with swine from any other source.

14. On or about August 13, 1998, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. § 71.18(a)(1)(i) and (a)(3) (1999), moved approximately four cattle, 2 years of age or older, interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York, South Carolina, without such cattle being identified by a United States Department of Agriculture-approved backtag and accompanied by an owner/shipper statement or other required document, as required.

15. On or about August 13, 1998, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. § 78.9(a)(3)(iii) (1999), moved approximately four test-eligible cattle interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York, South Carolina, without such cattle being accompanied by a certificate, as required.

16. On or about August 13, 1998, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. § 71.19(a)(1)(i) and (a)(3) (1999), moved approximately 11 swine interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York, South Carolina, without such swine being identified as approved by the Administrator as described in 9 C.F.R. § 71.19(b) (1999), as required.

17. On or about August 13, 1998, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. §§ 78.30(b) and 78.33 (1999), moved approximately 11 swine interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York, South Carolina, for slaughter or for sale for slaughter without such swine being identified in accordance with 9 C.F.R. § 71.19 (1999) before
being moved interstate and before being mixed with swine from any other source.

18. On or about August 20, 1998, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. § 71.18(a)(1)(i) and (a)(3) (1999), moved approximately three cattle, 2 years of age or older, interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York, South Carolina, without such cattle being identified by a United States Department of Agriculture-approved backtag and accompanied by an owner/shipper statement or other required document, as required.

19. On or about August 20, 1998, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. § 78.9(a)(3)(iii) (1999), moved approximately three test-eligible cattle interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York, South Carolina, without such cattle being accompanied by a certificate, as required.

20. On or about August 20, 1998, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. § 71.19(a)(1)(i) and (a)(3) (1999), moved approximately five swine interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York, South Carolina, without such swine being identified as approved by the Administrator as described in 9 C.F.R. § 71.19(b) (1999), as required.

21. On or about August 20, 1998, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. §§ 78.30(b) and 78.33 (1999), moved approximately five swine interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York, South Carolina, for slaughter or for sale for slaughter without such swine being identified in accordance with 9 C.F.R. § 71.19 (1999) before being moved interstate and before being mixed with swine from any other source.

22. On or about August 24, 1998, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. § 71.18(a)(1)(i) and (a)(3) (1999), moved approximately five cattle, 2 years of age or older, interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York, South Carolina, without such cattle being identified by a United States Department of Agriculture-approved backtag and accompanied by an owner/shipper statement or other required document, as required.

23. On or about August 24, 1998, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. § 78.9(a)(3)(iii) (1999), moved approximately five test-eligible cattle interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York,
South Carolina, without such cattle being accompanied by a certificate, as required.

24. On or about August 24, 1998, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. § 71.19(a)(1)(i) and (a)(3) (1999), moved approximately five swine interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York, South Carolina, without such swine being identified as approved by the Administrator as described in 9 C.F.R. § 71.19(b) (1999), as required.

25. On or about August 24, 1998, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. §§ 78.30(b) and 78.33 (1999), moved approximately five swine interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York, South Carolina, for slaughter or for sale for slaughter without such swine being identified in accordance with 9 C.F.R. § 71.19 (1999) before being moved interstate and before being mixed with swine from any other source.

26. On or about August 27, 1998, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. § 71.18(a)(1)(i) and (a)(3) (1999), moved at least two cattle, 2 years of age or older, interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York, South Carolina, without such cattle being identified by a United States Department of Agriculture-approved backtag and accompanied by an owner/shipper statement or other required document, as required.

27. On or about August 27, 1998, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. § 78.9(a)(3)(iii) (1999), moved at least two test-eligible cattle interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York, South Carolina, without such cattle being accompanied by a certificate, as required.

28. On or about September 3, 1998, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. § 71.18(a)(1)(i) and (a)(3) (1999), moved at least three cattle, 2 years of age or older, interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York, South Carolina, without such cattle being identified by a United States Department of Agriculture-approved backtag and accompanied by an owner/shipper statement or other required document, as required.

Carolina, without such cattle being accompanied by a certificate, as required.

30. On or about September 10, 1998, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. § 71.18(a)(1)(i) and (a)(3) (1999), moved at least two cattle, 2 years of age or older, interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York, South Carolina, without such cattle being identified by a United States Department of Agriculture-approved backtag and accompanied by an owner/shipper statement or other required document, as required.

31. On or about September 10, 1998, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. § 78.9(a)(3)(iii) (1999), moved at least two test-eligible cattle interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York, South Carolina, without such cattle being accompanied by a certificate, as required.

32. On or about September 10, 1998, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. § 71.19(a)(1)(i) and (a)(3) (1999), moved at least five swine interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York, South Carolina, without such swine being identified as approved by the Administrator as described in 9 C.F.R. § 71.19(b) (1999), as required.

33. On or about September 10, 1998, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. §§ 78.30(b) and 78.33 (1999), moved at least five swine interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York, South Carolina, for slaughter or for sale for slaughter without such swine being identified in accordance with 9 C.F.R. § 71.19 (1999) before being moved interstate and before being mixed with swine from any other source.

34. On or about October 22, 1998, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. § 71.19(a)(1)(i) and (a)(3) (1999), moved at least five swine interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York, South Carolina, without such swine being identified as approved by the Administrator as described in 9 C.F.R. § 71.19(b) (1999), as required.

35. On or about October 22, 1998, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. §§ 78.30(b) and 78.33 (1999), moved at least five swine interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York, South Carolina, for slaughter or for sale for slaughter without such swine being identified in accordance with 9 C.F.R. § 71.19 (1999) before being moved interstate and before being mixed with swine from any other source.
36. On or about October 22, 1998, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. § 71.19(e)(1) and (e)(2) (1999), moved approximately seven swine interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York, South Carolina, for sale without keeping records related to such swine.

37. On or about November 12, 1998, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. § 71.18(a)(1)(i) and (a)(3) (1999), moved at least six cattle, 2 years of age or older, interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York, South Carolina, without such cattle being identified by a United States Department of Agriculture-approved backtag and accompanied by an owner/shipper statement or other required document, as required.

38. On or about November 12, 1998, Respondent, in violation of 9 C.F.R. § 78.9(a)(3)(iii) (1999), moved at least six test-eligible cattle interstate from Stallings, North Carolina, to York, South Carolina, without such cattle being accompanied by a certificate, as required.

Conclusions of Law

1. The Secretary of Agriculture has jurisdiction in this matter.


3. As shown in the Findings of Fact, during the approximately 1-year period from November 20, 1997, through November 12, 1998, Respondent’s violations occurred on approximately 11 days involving at least 43 cattle and at least 53 swine.

ADDITIONAL CONCLUSIONS BY THE JUDICIAL OFFICER

Respondent’s Appeal Petition

Respondent raises six issues in his appeal petition. First, Respondent asserts “[h]e did not know that [he] was doing anything wrong” (Respondent’s Appeal Pet. at 1).
Section 2 of the Act of February 2, 1903 (21 U.S.C. § 111 (repealed 2002)), and sections 4 and 5 of the Act of May 29, 1884 (21 U.S.C. § 120 (repealed 2002)), are published in the United States Statutes at Large, and Respondent is presumed to know the law. Moreover, the Regulations are published in the Federal Register; thereby, constructively notifying Respondent of the requirements for the interstate movement of cattle and swine. Therefore, Respondent’s lack of actual knowledge that “[he] was doing [something] wrong” is not a defense to Respondent’s violations of section 2 of the Act of February 2, 1903 (21 U.S.C. § 111 (repealed 2002)), sections 4 and 5 of the Act of May 29, 1884 (21 U.S.C. § 120 (repealed 2002)), and the Regulations.

Second, Respondent contends “[a]ll of the other local farmers were doing the same thing” (Respondent’s Appeal Pet. at 1). I infer Respondent contends that all of the other farmers in Stallings, North Carolina, were committing the same violations as Respondent and Complainant did not institute disciplinary administrative proceedings against these other violators.

Even if I found that all farmers in Stallings, North Carolina, committed the same violations as Respondent and disciplinary proceedings had not been instituted against them, I would not dismiss the Complaint. Agency officials have broad discretion in deciding

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6See FCIC v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 385 (1947); United States v. Pitney Bowes, Inc., 25 F.3d 66, 71 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Wilhoit, 920 F.2d 9, 10 (9th Cir. 1990); Jordan v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 892 F.2d 482, 487 (6th Cir. 1989); Kentucky ex rel. Cabinet for Human Resources v. Brock, 845 F.2d 117, 122 n.4 (6th Cir. 1988); Government of Guam v. United States, 744 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1984); Bennett v. Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, 717 F.2d 1167, 1169 (7th Cir. 1983); Diamond Ring Ranch, Inc. v. Morton, 531 F.2d 1397, 1405 (10th Cir. 1976); Wolfson v. United States, 492 F.2d 1386, 1392 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (per curiam); United States v. Tijerina, 407 F.2d 349, 354 n.12 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 867, and cert. denied, 396 U.S. 843 (1969); Ferry v. Udall, 336 F.2d 706, 710 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 904 (1965).
against whom to institute disciplinary proceedings. Even if Respondent could show that he was singled out for a disciplinary action, such selection would be lawful so long as the administrative determination to selectively enforce the Act of February 2, 1903, the Act of May 29, 1884, and the Regulations was not arbitrary. Respondent has no right to have the Act of February 2, 1903, the Act of May 29, 1884, and the Regulations go unenforced against him, even if Respondent can demonstrate that “all of the other local farmers” violated the Act of February 2, 1903, the Act of May 29, 1884, and the Regulations and no disciplinary proceedings have been instituted against them. The Act of February 2, 1903, the Act of May 29, 1884, and the Regulations do not need to be enforced everywhere to be enforced somewhere.

Sometimes enforcement of a valid law can be a means of violating constitutional rights by invidious discrimination and courts have, under the doctrine of selective enforcement, dismissed cases or taken other action if a defendant (Respondent in this proceeding) proves that the prosecutor (Complainant in this proceeding) singled out a respondent because of membership in a protected group or exercise of a constitutionally protected right.

The conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation. Respondent bears the burden of proving that he is the target of selective enforcement. One claiming selective enforcement must demonstrate that the enforcement policy had a discriminatory effect and that it was

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motivated by a discriminatory purpose. In order to prove a selective enforcement claim, Respondent must show one of two sets of circumstances. Respondent must show: (1) membership in a protected group; (2) prosecution; (3) that others in a similar situation, not members of the protected group, would not be prosecuted; and (4) that the prosecution was initiated with discriminatory intent. Respondent has not shown that he is a member of a protected group, that no disciplinary proceeding would be instituted against others in a similar situation that are not members of the protected group, or that the instant proceeding was initiated with discriminatory intent. In the alternative, Respondent must show: (1) he exercised a protected right; (2) Complainant’s stake in the exercise of that protected right; (3) the unreasonableness of Complainant’s conduct; and (4) that this disciplinary proceeding was initiated with intent to punish Respondent for exercise of the protected right. Respondent has not shown, or even alleged, any of these circumstances.

Third, Respondent asserts he cannot be found to have violated the Act of February 2, 1903, or the Act of May 29, 1884, because Congress repealed those acts in 2002 (Respondent’s Appeal Pet. at 1).


The general savings statute provides, as follows:

§ 109. Repeal of statutes as affecting existing liabilities

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12 Id.

13 See notes 1 and 2.
The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing Act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability. The expiration of a temporary statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the temporary statute shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability.


The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 does not expressly provide for release or extinguishment of liability for violations of the Act of February 2, 1903, or the Act of May 29, 1884. As a result, Respondent’s acts prior to the effective date of the repeal supports a conclusion that he violated section 2 of the Act of February 2, 1903, and sections 4 and 5 of the Act of May 29, 1884.14

Fourth, Respondent asserts, after he was informed of his violations of the Regulations, he stopped selling livestock (Respondent’s Appeal Pet. at 1).

As an initial matter, Respondent’s violations were not premised upon his sale of livestock, but, instead, upon his interstate movement of livestock. Nonetheless, I infer Respondent asserts that he has ceased the activities which gave rise to his violations of the Regulations. Respondent’s cessation of the activities resulting in his

violations of the Regulations is not a defense to his past violations of the Regulations.\footnote{See \textit{In re Mary Meyers}, 56 Agric. Dec. 322, 348 (1997) (stating neither the respondent’s disposal of animals nor the respondent’s intention to terminate her license is a defense to the respondent’s violations of the Animal Welfare Act, as amended, or the regulations and standards issued under the Animal Welfare Act, as amended); \textit{In re Dora Hampton}, 56 Agric. Dec. 301, 320 (1997) (stating the respondent’s intention to dispose of her animals is not a defense to the respondent’s violations of the Animal Welfare Act, as amended, or the regulations and standards issued under the Animal Welfare Act, as amended).}

Fifth, Respondent asserts 7 days a week from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m., he provides care to his daughter who has cerebral palsy and his mother who has lost a leg (Respondent’s Appeal Pet. at 1-2).

Respondent’s apparent dedication to his mother’s and daughter’s care is commendable, and I sympathize with the burden Respondent bears. However, even if I were to find that Respondent provides significant care to his disabled daughter and his disabled mother, Respondent’s familial responsibilities are neither defenses to his violations of the Act of February 2, 1903, the Act of May 29, 1884, and the Regulations, nor mitigating circumstances to be considered when determining the amount of the civil penalty to be assessed against Respondent.

Sixth, Respondent contends he cannot pay a civil penalty (Respondent’s Appeal Pet. at 2).

A violator’s inability to pay a civil penalty is a mitigating circumstance to be considered for the purpose of determining the amount of the civil penalty to be assessed in animal quarantine cases and plant quarantine cases; however, the burden is on the respondents in animal quarantine cases and plant quarantine cases to prove, by producing documentation, the lack of ability to pay the civil penalty.\footnote{\textit{In re Herminia Ruiz Cisneros}, 60 Agric. Dec. 610, 634-35 (2001); \textit{In re Rafael Dominguez}, 60 Agric. Dec. 199, 208-09 (2001); \textit{In re Cynthia Twum Boafo}, 60 Agric. Dec. 191, 197-98 (2001); \textit{In re Jerry Lynn Stokes}, 57 Agric. Dec. 914, 919 (1998); \textit{In re Garland E. Samuel}, 57 Agric. Dec. 905, 912-13 (1998); \textit{In re Barry Glick}, 55 Agric. Dec. 275, 283 (1996); \textit{In re Robert L. Heywood}, 52 Agric. Dec. 1323, 1324-25 (1993); \textit{In re Robert L. Heywood}, 52 Agric. Dec. 1315, 1321-22 (1993) (Decision and Order and (continued...))
Respondent has failed to produce any documentation supporting his assertion that he cannot pay a civil penalty, and Respondent’s undocumented assertion that he lacks the ability to pay the civil penalty falls far short of the proof necessary to establish an inability to pay the civil penalty.17

Complainant’s Cross-Appeal

Complainant raises one issue in Complainant’s Cross-Appeal. Complainant contends the ALJ’s assessment of a $3,175 civil penalty against Respondent is error and Respondent should be assessed an $18,500 civil penalty.

Respondent is deemed by his failure to file an answer to have admitted that, during the period November 20, 1997, through November 12, 1998, he moved at least 43 cattle and at least 53 swine...

17 (...continued)
Remand Order).

17 In re Herminia Ruiz Cisneros, 60 Agric. Dec. 610, 635 (2001) (holding the undocumented assertion by the respondent that she was unable to pay the civil penalty falls far short of the proof necessary to establish inability to pay); In re Rafael Dominguez, 60 Agric. Dec. 199, 209 (2001) (holding the undocumented assertion by the respondent that he was unable to pay the civil penalty falls far short of the proof necessary to establish inability to pay); In re Cynthia Twum Boafo, 60 Agric. Dec. 191, 198 (2001) (holding undocumented assertions by the respondent that she was unable to pay the civil penalty fall far short of the proof necessary to establish inability to pay); In re Jerry Lynn Stokes, 57 Agric. Dec. 914, 919-20 (1998) (holding undocumented assertions by the respondent that he was unable to pay the civil penalty fall far short of the proof necessary to establish inability to pay); In re Garland E. Samuel, 57 Agric. Dec. 905, 913 (1998) (holding undocumented assertions by the respondent that he was unable to pay the civil penalty fall far short of the proof necessary to establish inability to pay); In re Barry Glick, 55 Agric. Dec. 275, 283 (1996) (holding undocumented assertions by the respondent that he lacked the assets to pay the civil penalty are not sufficient to prove inability to pay the civil penalty); In re Don Tollefson, 54 Agric. Dec. 437, 439 (1995) (assessing the full civil penalty despite the respondent’s submission of some documentation of financial problems) (Order Denying Pet. for Recons.); In re Robert L. Heywood, 52 Agric. Dec. 1323, 1325 (1993) (assessing the full civil penalty because the respondent did not produce documentation establishing his inability to pay the civil penalty).
interstate, in violation of the Act of February 2, 1903, the Act of May 29, 1884, and the Regulations.

A sanction by an administrative agency must be warranted in law and justified in fact. The Secretary of Agriculture has authority to assess a civil penalty not exceeding $1,100 for each violation of the Regulations. I find Respondent committed at least 126 violations of the Regulations and Respondent could be assessed a $138,600 civil penalty.


20I find each animal that Respondent moved interstate without the required identification constitutes a separate violation of the Regulations. Respondent moved interstate at least 95 animals without required identification. I find each required (continued...)
Moreover, the assessment of an $18,500 civil penalty is justified by the facts. The United States Department of Agriculture’s current sanction policy is set forth in *In re S.S. Farms Linn County, Inc.* (Decision as to James Joseph Hickey and Shannon Hansen), 50 Agric. Dec. 476, 497 (1991), aff’d, 991 F.2d 803, 1993 WL 128889 (9th Cir. 1993) (not to be cited as precedent under 9th Circuit Rule 36-3):

[T]he sanction in each case will be determined by examining the nature of the violations in relation to the remedial purposes of the regulatory statute involved, along with all relevant circumstances, always giving appropriate weight to the recommendations of the administrative officials charged with the responsibility for achieving the congressional purpose.

The recommendations of administrative officials charged with the responsibility for achieving the congressional purpose of the regulatory statute are highly relevant to any sanction to be imposed and are entitled to great weight in view of the experience gained by administrative officials during their day-to-day supervision of the regulated industry.

The Act of February 2, 1903, the Act of May 29, 1884, and the Regulations are designed to prevent the interstate spread of animal diseases. The success of the program designed to protect United States agriculture by preventing the interstate spread of animal diseases is dependent upon compliance with the Regulations by

26(continued)
document Respondent failed to have accompany the interstate movement of cattle and swine constitutes a separate violation of the Regulations. Respondent failed to have 21 required documents accompany the interstate movement of cattle and swine. In addition: Respondent committed seven violations of 9 C.F.R. §§ 78.30(b) and 78.33 (1999) by moving swine interstate for slaughter or for sale for slaughter without the required identification; Respondent committed two violations of 9 C.F.R. § 71.19(c)(1) and (2) (1999) by failing to keep and maintain records related to the interstate movement of swine; and Respondent committed one violation of 9 C.F.R. § 78.31(c) (1999) by failing to segregate a brucellosis reactor swine moved interstate with animals that are not brucellosis reactor animals.
persons such as Respondent. Respondent’s violations of the Regulations directly thwart the remedial purposes of the Act of February 2, 1903, the Act of May 29, 1884, and the Regulations and could have caused losses of billions of dollars and eradication expenses of tens of millions of dollars.

Complainant could have sought the maximum civil penalty of $1,100 for each of Respondent’s violations. Instead, Complainant seeks a civil penalty of approximately $146.82 for each of Respondent’s violations of the Regulations. However, Complainant states that an $18,500 civil penalty will serve the remedial purposes of the Act of February 2, 1903, the Act of May 29, 1884, and the Regulations and deter Respondent and other similarly situated persons from future violations of the successor statute to the Act of February 2, 1903, and the Act of May 29, 1884, and the Regulations. Civil penalties assessed by the Secretary of Agriculture are not designed to punish persons who are found to have violated the Regulations. Instead, civil penalties are designed to deter future violations by persons found to have violated the Regulations and other potential violators.

For the foregoing reasons, the following Order should be issued.

ORDER

Respondent is assessed an $18,500 civil penalty. The civil penalty shall be paid by certified check or money order made payable to the Treasurer of the United States and sent to:

United States Department of Agriculture  
APHIS Field Servicing Office  
Accounting Section  
P.O. Box 3334


22Despite the repeal of section 2 of the Act of February 2, 1903, and sections 4 and 5 of the Act of May 29, 1884, the Regulations remain in effect (7 U.S.C.A. § 8317 (West Supp. 2004)).
Payment of the civil penalty shall be sent to, and received by, the United States Department of Agriculture, APHIS Field Servicing Office, Accounting Section, within 60 days after service of this Order on Respondent. Respondent shall state on the certified check or money order that payment is in reference to A.Q. Docket No. 02-0005.
ANIMAL WELFARE ACT

DEPARTMENTAL DECISIONS

In re: ERIC JOHN DROGOSCH, AN INDIVIDUAL, d/b/a ANIMAL ADVENTURES AMERICA.
AWA Docket No. 04-0014.
Decision and Order.

AWA – Animal Welfare Act – Failure to file answer – Waiver of right to hearing – Default – Correction of violations – Cease and desist order – License revocation.

The Judicial Officer affirmed the Default Decision issued by Administrative Law Judge Victor W. Palmer: (1) finding Respondent violated the regulations and standards issued under the Animal Welfare Act (Regulations and Standards) as alleged in the Complaint; (2) ordering Respondent to cease and desist from violating the Regulations and Standards; and (3) revoking Respondent’s Animal Welfare Act license. The Judicial Officer deemed Respondent’s failure to file a timely answer an admission of the allegations in the Complaint and a waiver of hearing (7 C.F.R. §§ 1.136(c), .139). The Judicial Officer held Respondent’s subsequent correction of his violations neither eliminated Respondent’s violations of the Regulations and Standards nor constituted a meritorious basis for denying Complainant’s Motion for Default Decision. The Judicial Officer agreed with Respondent’s contention that revocation of his Animal Welfare Act license is a severe sanction, but the Judicial Officer held revocation was warranted in law and justified in fact. The Judicial Officer rejected Complainant’s contention that Respondent’s appeal was late-filed and that the Judicial Officer had no jurisdiction to hear Respondent’s appeal.

Colleen A. Carroll, for Complainant.
Respondent, Pro se.
Initial decision issued by Victor W. Palmer, Administrative Law Judge.
Decision and Order issued by William G. Jenson, Judicial Officer.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Kevin Shea, Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, United States Department of Agriculture [hereinafter Complainant], instituted this disciplinary administrative proceeding

Complainant alleges Eric John Drogosch, an individual, d/b/a Animal Adventures America [hereinafter Respondent], willfully violated the Regulations and Standards (Compl. ¶¶ 7-20).

The Hearing Clerk served Respondent with the Complaint, the Rules of Practice, and a service letter on March 25, 2004. Respondent failed to file an answer to the Complaint within 20 days after service as required by section 1.136(a) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)). The Hearing Clerk sent Respondent a letter dated April 20, 2004, informing Respondent of his failure to file a timely answer to the Complaint.

On April 30, 2004, in accordance with section 1.139 of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.139), Complainant filed a “Motion for Adoption of Proposed Decision and Order” [hereinafter Motion for Default Decision] and a proposed “Decision and Order by Reason of Admission of Facts” [hereinafter Proposed Default Decision]. On May 6, 2004, the Hearing Clerk served Respondent with Complainant’s Motion for Default Decision and Complainant’s Proposed Default Decision. On May 27, 2004, Respondent filed objections to Complainant’s Motion for Default Decision and Complainant’s Proposed Default Decision.

On July 28, 2004, pursuant to section 1.139 of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.139), Administrative Law Judge Victor W.

1United States Postal Service Domestic Return Receipt for Article Number 7003 0500 0000 1056 0236.

2United States Postal Service Domestic Return Receipt for Article Number 7003 0500 0000 1056 0489.

3Letter from Eric Drogosch to the Secretary, United States Department Agriculture, dated May 21, 2004.
Palmer [hereinafter the ALJ] issued a “Decision and Order by Reason of Admission of Facts” [hereinafter Initial Decision and Order]: (1) concluding Respondent willfully violated the Regulations and Standards as alleged in the Complaint; (2) directing Respondent to cease and desist from violating the Animal Welfare Act and the Regulations and Standards; and (3) revoking Respondent’s Animal Welfare Act license (Initial Decision and Order at 6-10).

On October 8, 2004, Respondent appealed to, and requested oral argument before, the Judicial Officer. On October 19, 2004, Complainant filed “Complainant’s Response to Respondent’s Petition for Appeal.” On October 21, 2004, the Hearing Clerk transmitted the record to the Judicial Officer for consideration and decision.

Respondent’s request for oral argument before the Judicial Officer, which, pursuant to section 1.145(d) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.145(d)), the Judicial Officer may grant, refuse, or limit, is refused, because Complainant and Respondent have thoroughly addressed the issues and the issues are not complex. Thus, oral argument would appear to serve no useful purpose.

Based upon a careful review of the record, I agree with the ALJ’s Initial Decision and Order. Therefore, pursuant to section 1.145(i) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.145(i)), I adopt, with minor substantive changes, the ALJ’s Initial Decision and Order as the final Decision and Order. Additional conclusions by the Judicial Officer follow the ALJ’s conclusions of law, as restated.

APPLICABLE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS

7 U.S.C.:

TITLE 7—AGRICULTURE

. . . .

CHAPTER 54—TRANSPORTATION, SALE, AND HANDLING OF CERTAIN ANIMALS
§ 2131. Congressional statement of policy

The Congress finds that animals and activities which are regulated under this chapter are either in interstate or foreign commerce or substantially affect such commerce or the free flow thereof, and that regulation of animals and activities as provided in this chapter is necessary to prevent and eliminate burdens upon such commerce and to effectively regulate such commerce, in order—

(1) to insure that animals intended for use in research facilities or for exhibition purposes or for use as pets are provided humane care and treatment;

(2) to assure the humane treatment of animals during transportation in commerce; and

(3) to protect the owners of animals from the theft of their animals by preventing the sale or use of animals which have been stolen.

The Congress further finds that it is essential to regulate, as provided in this chapter, the transportation, purchase, sale, housing, care, handling, and treatment of animals by carriers or by persons or organizations engaged in using them for research or experimental purposes or for exhibition purposes or holding them for sale as pets or for any such purpose or use.

§ 2132. Definitions

When used in this chapter—

(h) The term “exhibitor” means any person (public or private) exhibiting any animals, which were purchased in commerce or the intended distribution of which affects commerce, or will affect commerce, to the public for compensation, as determined by the Secretary, and such term includes carnivals, circuses, and zoos exhibiting such animals whether operated for profit or not[.]
§ 2146. Administration and enforcement by Secretary

(a) Investigations and inspections

The Secretary shall make such investigations or inspections as he deems necessary to determine whether any dealer, exhibitor, intermediate handler, carrier, research facility, or operator of an auction sale subject to section 2142 of this title, has violated or is violating any provision of this chapter or any regulation or standard issued thereunder, and for such purposes, the Secretary shall, at all reasonable times, have access to the places of business and the facilities, animals, and those records required to be kept pursuant to section 2140 of this title of any such dealer, exhibitor, intermediate handler, carrier, research facility, or operator of an auction sale. The Secretary shall inspect each research facility at least once each year and, in the case of deficiencies or deviations from the standards promulgated under this chapter, shall conduct such follow-up inspections as may be necessary until all deficiencies or deviations from such standards are corrected. The Secretary shall promulgate such rules and regulations as he deems necessary to permit inspectors to confiscate or destroy in a humane manner any animal found to be suffering as a result of a failure to comply with any provision of this chapter or any regulation or standard issued thereunder if (1) such animal is held by a dealer, (2) such animal is held by an exhibitor, (3) such animal is held by a research facility and is no longer required by such research facility to carry out the research, test, or experiment for which such animal has been utilized, (4) such animal is held by an operator of an auction sale, or (5) such animal is held by an intermediate handler or a carrier.

§ 2149. Violations by licensees

(a) Temporary license suspension; notice and hearing; revocation
If the Secretary has reason to believe that any person licensed as a dealer, exhibitor, or operator of an auction sale subject to section 2142 of this title, has violated or is violating any provision of this chapter, or any of the rules or regulations or standards promulgated by the Secretary hereunder, he may suspend such person’s license temporarily, but not to exceed 21 days, and after notice and opportunity for hearing, may suspend for such additional period as he may specify, or revoke such license, if such violation is determined to have occurred.

(b) Civil penalties for violation of any section, etc.; separate offenses; notice and hearing; appeal; considerations in assessing penalty; compromise of penalty; civil action by Attorney General for failure to pay penalty; district court jurisdiction; failure to obey cease and desist order

Any dealer, exhibitor, research facility, intermediate handler, carrier, or operator of an auction sale subject to section 2142 of this title, that violates any provision of this chapter, or any rule, regulation, or standard promulgated by the Secretary thereunder, may be assessed a civil penalty by the Secretary of not more than $2,500 for each such violation, and the Secretary may also make an order that such person shall cease and desist from continuing such violation. Each violation and each day during which a violation continues shall be a separate offense. No penalty shall be assessed or cease and desist order issued unless such person is given notice and opportunity for a hearing with respect to the alleged violation, and the order of the Secretary assessing a penalty and making a cease and desist order shall be final and conclusive unless the affected person files an appeal from the Secretary’s order with the appropriate United States Court of Appeals. . . .

(c) Appeal of final order by aggrieved person; limitations; exclusive jurisdiction of United States Courts of Appeals
Any dealer, exhibitor, research facility, intermediate handler, carrier, or operator of an auction sale subject to section 2142 of this title, aggrieved by a final order of the Secretary issued pursuant to this section may, within 60 days after entry of such an order, seek review of such order in the appropriate United States Court of Appeals in accordance with the provisions of sections 2341, 2343 through 2350 of title 28, and such court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of the Secretary’s order.

§ 2151. Rules and regulations

The Secretary is authorized to promulgate such rules, regulations, and orders as he may deem necessary in order to effectuate the purposes of this chapter.

7 U.S.C. §§ 2131, 2132(h), 2146(a), 2149(a)-(c), 2151.

9 C.F.R.:

TITLE 9—ANIMALS AND ANIMAL PRODUCTS

CHAPTER I—ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

SUBCHAPTER A—ANIMAL WELFARE

PART 1—DEFINITION OF TERMS

§ 1.1 Definitions.

For the purposes of this subchapter, unless the context otherwise requires, the following terms shall have the meanings assigned to them in this section. The singular form shall also signify the plural and the masculine form shall also signify the
feminine. Words undefined in the following paragraphs shall have the meaning attributed to them in general usage as reflected by definitions in a standard dictionary.

Exhibitor means any person (public or private) exhibiting any animals, which were purchased in commerce or the intended distribution of which affects commerce, or will affect commerce, to the public for compensation, as determined by the Secretary. This term includes carnivals, circuses, animal acts, zoos, and educational exhibits, exhibiting such animals whether operated for profit or not.

PART 2—REGULATIONS

SUBPART D—ATTENDING VETERINARIAN AND ADEQUATE VETERINARY CARE

§ 2.40 Attending veterinarian and adequate veterinary care (dealers and exhibitors).

(a) Each dealer or exhibitor shall have an attending veterinarian who shall provide adequate veterinary care to its animals in compliance with this section.

(1) Each dealer and exhibitor shall employ an attending veterinarian under formal arrangements. In the case of a part-time attending veterinarian or consultant arrangements, the formal arrangements shall include a written program of veterinary care and regularly scheduled visits to the premises of the dealer or exhibitor[.]

(b) Each dealer or exhibitor shall establish and maintain programs of adequate veterinary care that include:

(1) The availability of appropriate facilities, personnel, equipment, and services to comply with the provisions of this subchapter[.]
§ 2.75 Records: Dealers and exhibitors.

(b)(1) Every dealer other than operators of auction sales and brokers to whom animals are consigned, and exhibitor shall make, keep, and maintain records or forms which fully and correctly disclose the following information concerning animals other than dogs and cats, purchased or otherwise acquired, owned, held, leased, or otherwise in his or her possession or under his or her control, or which is transported, sold, euthanized, or otherwise disposed of by that dealer or exhibitor. The records shall include any offspring born of any animal while in his or her possession or under his or her control.

(i) The name and address of the person from whom the animals were purchased or otherwise acquired;

(ii) The USDA license or registration number of the person if he or she is licensed or registered under the Act;

(iii) The vehicle license number and state, and the driver’s license number and state of the person, if he or she is not licensed or registered under the Act;

(iv) The name and address of the person to whom an animal was sold or given;

(v) The date of purchase, acquisition, sale, or disposal of the animal(s);

(vi) The species of the animal(s); and

(vii) The number of animals in the shipment.

SUBPART H—COMPLIANCE WITH STANDARDS AND HOLDING PERIOD

§ 2.100 Compliance with standards.

(a) Each dealer, exhibitor, operator of an auction sale, and intermediate handler shall comply in all respects with the
regulations set forth in part 2 and the standards set forth in part 3 of this subchapter for the humane handling, care, treatment, housing, and transportation of animals.

**SUBPART I—MISCELLANEOUS**

§ 2.126 Access and inspection of records and property.

(a) Each dealer, exhibitor, intermediate handler, or carrier, shall, during business hours, allow APHIS officials:

1. To enter its place of business;
2. To examine records required to be kept by the Act and the regulations in this part;
3. To make copies of the records;
4. To inspect and photograph the facilities, property and animals, as the APHIS officials consider necessary to enforce the provisions of the Act, the regulations and the standards in this subchapter; and
5. To document, by the taking of photographs and other means, conditions and areas of noncompliance.

§ 2.131 Handling of animals.

(a)(1) Handling of all animals shall be done as expeditiously and carefully as possible in a manner that does not cause trauma, overheating, excessive cooling, behavioral stress, physical harm, or unnecessary discomfort.

(b)(1) During public exhibition, any animal must be handled so there is minimal risk of harm to the animal and to the public, with sufficient distance and/or barriers between the animal and the general viewing public so as to assure the safety of animals and the public.
(c)(1) Animals shall be exhibited only for periods of time and under conditions consistent with their good health and well-being.

**PART 3—STANDARDS**

**SUBPART F—SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE HUMANE HANDLING, CARE, TREATMENT, AND TRANSPORTATION OF WARMBLOODED ANIMALS OTHER THAN DOGS, CATS, RABBITS, HAMSTERS, GUINEA PIGS, NONHUMAN PRIMATES, AND MARINE MAMMALS**

**FACILITIES AND OPERATING STANDARDS**

§ 3.125 Facilities, general.

(a) **Structural strength.** The facility must be constructed of such material and of such strength as appropriate for the animals involved. The indoor and outdoor housing facilities shall be structurally sound and shall be maintained in good repair to protect the animals from injury and to contain the animals.

§ 3.127 Facilities, outdoor.

(b) **Shelter from inclement weather.** Natural or artificial shelter appropriate to the local climatic conditions for the species concerned shall be provided for all animals kept outdoors to afford them protection and to prevent discomfort to such animals. Individual animals shall be acclimated before they are exposed to the extremes of the individual climate.
(c) **Drainage.** A suitable method shall be provided to rapidly eliminate excess water. The method of drainage shall comply with applicable Federal, State, and local laws and regulations relating to pollution control or the protection of the environment.

(d) **Perimeter fence.** On or after May 17, 2000, all outdoor housing facilities (*i.e.*, facilities not entirely indoors) must be enclosed by a perimeter fence that is of sufficient height to keep animals and unauthorized persons out. Fences less than 8 feet high for potentially dangerous animals, such as, but not limited to, large felines (*e.g.*, lions, tigers, leopards, cougars, etc.), bears, wolves, rhinoceros, and elephants, or less than 6 feet high for other animals must be approved in writing by the Administrator. The fence must be constructed so that it protects the animals in the facility by restricting animals and unauthorized persons from going through it or under it and having contact with the animals in the facility, and so that it can function as a secondary containment system for the animals in the facility. It must be of sufficient distance from the outside of the primary enclosure to prevent physical contact between animals inside the enclosure and animals or persons outside the perimeter fence. Such fences less than 3 feet in distance from the primary enclosure must be approved in writing by the Administrator. A perimeter fence is not required:

1. Where the outside walls of the primary enclosure are made of sturdy, durable material, which may include certain types of concrete, wood, plastic, metal, or glass, and are high enough and constructed in a manner that restricts entry by animals and unauthorized persons and the Administrator gives written approval; or

2. Where the outdoor housing facility is protected by an effective natural barrier that restricts the animals to the facility and restricts entry by animals and unauthorized persons and the Administrator gives written approval; or

3. Where appropriate alternative security measures are employed and the Administrator gives written approval; or
(4) For traveling facilities where appropriate alternative security measures are employed; or
(5) Where the outdoor housing facility houses only farm animals, such as, but not limited to, cows, sheep, goats, pigs, horses (for regulated purposes), or donkeys, and the facility has in place effective and customary containment and security measures.

ANIMAL HEALTH AND HUSBANDRY STANDARDS

§ 3.132 Employees.

A sufficient number of adequately trained employees shall be utilized to maintain the professionally acceptable level of husbandry practices set forth in this subpart. Such practices shall be under a supervisor who has a background in animal care.

9 C.F.R. §§ 1.1; 2.40(a)(1), (b)(1), .75(b)(1), .100(a), .126(a), .131(a)(1), (b)(1), (c)(1); 3.125(a), .127(b)-(d), .132.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE’S INITIAL DECISION AND ORDER (AS RESTATED)

Statement of Case

Respondent failed to file an answer within the time prescribed in section 1.136(a) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)). Section 1.136(c) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.136(c)) provides that the failure to file an answer within the prescribed time provided in section 1.136(a) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)) and the failure to deny or otherwise respond to an allegation in the complaint shall be deemed, for purposes of the proceeding, an admission of the allegations in the complaint. Further, pursuant to
ANIMAL WELFARE ACT

section 1.139 of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.139), the failure to file an answer constitutes a waiver of hearing. This Decision and Order is issued pursuant to section 1.139 of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.139).

Findings of Fact

1. Respondent Eric John Drogosch is an individual, doing business as Animal Adventures America, whose business mailing address is 8199 CR 310, Terrell, Texas 75160.

2. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent was an “exhibitor” as that term is defined in the Animal Welfare Act and the Regulations. Between November 2001 and November 9, 2003, Respondent held Animal Welfare Act license number 74-C-0536, which Animal Welfare Act license was cancelled and had not been reinstated as of the issuance of the Complaint.

3. Respondent has a small business, with approximately 10 exotic animals, including tigers, leopards, and lions. The gravity of the violations alleged in the Complaint is great. These violations include repeated instances in which Respondent: (a) failed to allow inspectors access to his animals, premises, and records; (b) failed to provide minimally adequate housing to animals; and (c) failed to handle tigers carefully and in compliance with the Regulations and Standards (which failure resulted in injuries to a child). Respondent has continually failed to comply with the Regulations and Standards, after having been repeatedly advised of deficiencies. Respondent was previously cited in June 2001 for exhibiting animals without a valid Animal Welfare Act license.

4. On September 30, 2003, Respondent failed to employ a full-time attending veterinarian or a part-time attending veterinarian under formal arrangements that include a written program of veterinary care.

5. On September 30, 2003, Respondent failed to establish and maintain a program of adequate veterinary care that included the availability of appropriate facilities, including adequate enclosures and a secure perimeter fence.
6. On September 30, 2003, Respondent failed to make, keep, and maintain records that fully and correctly disclose information concerning animals in Respondent’s possession or under Respondent’s control or disposed of by Respondent.

7. On February 2, 2002, Respondent failed to allow Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service officials, during business hours, to enter his place of business, to examine records, to make copies, to inspect and photograph animals, and to document conditions and areas of noncompliance.

8. On August 15, 2002, Respondent failed to allow Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service officials, during business hours, to enter his place of business, to examine records, to make copies, to inspect and photograph animals, and to document conditions and areas of noncompliance.

9. On August 16, 2002, Respondent failed to allow Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service officials, during business hours, to enter his place of business, to examine records, to make copies, to inspect and photograph animals, and to document conditions and areas of noncompliance.

10. On August 28, 2002, Respondent failed to allow Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service officials, during business hours, to enter his place of business, to examine records, to make copies, to inspect and photograph animals, and to document conditions and areas of noncompliance.

11. On June 8, 2002, Respondent failed to handle animals as expeditiously and carefully as possible in a manner that would not cause trauma, unnecessary discomfort, behavioral stress, or physical harm.

12. On June 8, 2002, Respondent failed to handle animals during public exhibition so there was minimal risk of harm to the animals and to the public, with sufficient distance and/or barriers between the animals and the general viewing public so as to assure the safety of animals and the public. Specifically, Respondent exhibited a tiger to four children without any barrier or distance.

13. On June 8, 2002, Respondent failed to handle animals during public exhibition so there was minimal risk of harm to the animals and to the public, with sufficient distance and/or barriers between the
animals and the general viewing public so as to assure the safety of
animals and the public. Specifically, Respondent exhibited a tiger to
a child without any barrier or distance.
14. On June 8, 2002, Respondent exhibited animals under
conditions that were inconsistent with the animals’ well-being.
Specifically, Respondent exhibited a tiger cub to the public outside of
any enclosures and allowed the public to excessively handle the
young animal.
15. Respondent failed to meet the minimum facilities and operating
standards for animals other than dogs, cats, rabbits, hamsters, guinea
pigs, nonhuman primates, and marine mammals (9 C.F.R. §§
3.125-.142), as follows:
a. On September 30, 2003, Respondent failed to construct a
perimeter fence so that it protects the animals in the facility by
restricting animals and unauthorized persons from going through it.
Specifically, Respondent failed to construct a perimeter fence around
the enclosure.
b. On August 28, 2002, Respondent failed to maintain
housing facilities structurally sound and in good repair to protect the
animals housed in the facilities from injury and to contain them.
Specifically, Respondent failed to repair damaged metal siding in the
lion enclosure.
c. On August 30, 2002, Respondent failed to maintain
housing facilities structurally sound and in good repair to protect the
animals housed in the facilities from injury and to contain them.
Specifically, Respondent failed to repair damaged metal siding in the
lion enclosure.
d. On August 28 and August 30, 2002, Respondent failed
to provide four adult tigers housed outdoors with appropriate natural
or artificial shelter.
e. On August 28 and August 30, 2002, Respondent failed
to have a sufficient number of adequately trained employees to carry
out the level of husbandry practices and care required by the
Regulations and Standards.
f. On February 12, 2002, Respondent failed to maintain
housing facilities structurally sound and in good repair to protect the
animals housed in the facilities from injury and to contain them.
Specifically, Respondent failed to repair and/or replace the siding and roof of the tiger enclosure so that it contained the four animals securely and safely.

  g. On February 12, 2002, Respondent failed to maintain housing facilities structurally sound and in good repair to protect the animals housed in the facilities from injury and to contain them. Specifically, Respondent failed to repair and/or replace the door and bottom of the lion enclosure.

  h. On February 12, 2002, Respondent failed to provide a suitable method to rapidly eliminate excess water. Specifically, Respondent failed to eliminate standing water in the tiger enclosure.

Conclusions of Law

  1. On September 30, 2003, Respondent failed to employ a full-time attending veterinarian or a part-time attending veterinarian under formal arrangements that include a written program of veterinary care, in willful violation of section 2.40(a)(1) of the Regulations and Standards (9 C.F.R. § 2.40(a)(1)).

  2. On September 30, 2003, Respondent failed to establish and maintain a program of adequate veterinary care that included the availability of appropriate facilities, including adequate enclosures and a secure perimeter fence, in willful violation of section 2.40(b)(1) of the Regulations and Standards (9 C.F.R. § 2.40(b)(1)).

  3. On September 30, 2003, Respondent failed to make, keep, and maintain records that fully and correctly disclose information concerning animals in Respondent’s possession or under Respondent’s control or disposed of by Respondent, in willful violation of section 2.75(b)(1) of the Regulations and Standards (9 C.F.R. § 2.75(b)(1)).

  4. On February 2, 2002, Respondent failed to allow Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service officials, during business hours, to enter his place of business, to examine records, to make copies, to inspect and photograph animals, and to document conditions and areas of noncompliance, in willful violation of section 2.126(a) of the Regulations and Standards (9 C.F.R. § 2.126(a)).
5. On August 15, 2002, Respondent failed to allow Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service officials, during business hours, to enter his place of business, to examine records, to make copies, to inspect and photograph animals, and to document conditions and areas of noncompliance, in willful violation of section 2.126(a) of the Regulations and Standards (9 C.F.R. § 2.126(a)).

6. On August 16, 2002, Respondent failed to allow Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service officials, during business hours, to enter his place of business, to examine records, to make copies, to inspect and photograph animals, and to document conditions and areas of noncompliance, in willful violation of section 2.126(a) of the Regulations and Standards (9 C.F.R. § 2.126(a)).

7. On August 28, 2002, Respondent failed to allow Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service officials, during business hours, to enter his place of business, to examine records, to make copies, to inspect and photograph animals, and to document conditions and areas of noncompliance, in willful violation of section 2.126(a) of the Regulations and Standards (9 C.F.R. § 2.126(a)).

8. On June 8, 2002, Respondent failed to handle animals as expeditiously and carefully as possible in a manner that would not cause trauma, unnecessary discomfort, behavioral stress, or physical harm, in willful violation of section 2.131(a)(1) of the Regulations and Standards (9 C.F.R. § 2.131(a)(1)).

9. On June 8, 2002, Respondent failed to handle animals during public exhibition so there was minimal risk of harm to the animals and to the public, with sufficient distance and/or barriers between the animals and the general viewing public so as to assure the safety of animals and the public. Specifically, Respondent exhibited a tiger to four children without any barrier or distance, in willful violation of section 2.131(b)(1) of the Regulations and Standards (9 C.F.R. § 2.131(b)(1)).

10. On June 8, 2002, Respondent failed to handle animals during public exhibition so there was minimal risk of harm to the animals and to the public, with sufficient distance and/or barriers between the animals and the general viewing public so as to assure the safety of animals and the public. Specifically, Respondent exhibited a tiger to a child without any barrier or distance, in willful violation of section
11. On June 8, 2002, Respondent exhibited animals under conditions that were inconsistent with the animals’ well-being. Specifically, Respondent exhibited a tiger cub to the public outside of any enclosures and allowed the public to excessively handle the young animal, in willful violation of section 2.131(c)(1) of the Regulations and Standards (9 C.F.R. § 2.131(c)(1)).

12. Respondent willfully violated section 2.100(a) of the Regulations and Standards (9 C.F.R. § 2.100(a)) by failing to meet the facilities and operating standards for animals other than dogs, cats, rabbits, hamsters, guinea pigs, nonhuman primates, and marine mammals (9 C.F.R. §§ 3.125-142), by failing to comply with the general facilities standards (9 C.F.R. § 3.125), as follows:

a. On August 28, 2002, Respondent failed to maintain housing facilities structurally sound and in good repair to protect the animals housed in the facilities from injury and to contain them. Specifically, Respondent failed to repair damaged metal siding in the lion enclosure, in willful violation of section 3.125(a) of the Regulations and Standards (9 C.F.R. § 3.125(a)).

b. On August 30, 2002, Respondent failed to maintain housing facilities structurally sound and in good repair to protect the animals housed in the facilities from injury and to contain them. Specifically, Respondent failed to repair damaged metal siding in the lion enclosure, in willful violation of section 3.125(a) of the Regulations and Standards (9 C.F.R. § 3.125(a)).

c. On February 12, 2002, Respondent failed to maintain housing facilities structurally sound and in good repair to protect the animals housed in the facilities from injury and to contain them. Specifically, Respondent failed to repair and/or replace the siding and roof of the tiger enclosure so that it contained the four animals securely and safely, in willful violation of section 3.125(a) of the Regulations and Standards (9 C.F.R. § 3.125(a)).

d. On February 12, 2002, Respondent failed to maintain housing facilities structurally sound and in good repair to protect the animals housed in the facilities from injury and to contain them. Specifically, Respondent failed to repair and/or replace the door and
bottom of the lion enclosure, in willful violation of section 3.125(a) of the Regulations and Standards (9 C.F.R. § 3.125(a)).

13. Respondent willfully violated section 2.100(a) of the Regulations and Standards (9 C.F.R. § 2.100(a)) by failing to meet the minimum facilities and operating standards for animals other than dogs, cats, rabbits, hamsters, guinea pigs, nonhuman primates, and marine mammals (9 C.F.R. §§ 3.125-.142), by failing to comply with the outdoor facilities standards (9 C.F.R. § 3.127), as follows:

   a. On August 28 and August 30, 2002, Respondent failed to provide four adult tigers housed outdoors with appropriate natural or artificial shelter, in willful violation of section 3.127(b) of the Regulations and Standards (9 C.F.R. § 3.127(b)).

   b. On February 12, 2002, Respondent failed to provide a suitable method to rapidly eliminate excess water. Specifically, Respondent failed to eliminate standing water in the tiger enclosure, in willful violation of section 3.127(c) of the Regulations and Standards (9 C.F.R. § 3.127(c)).

   c. On September 30, 2003, Respondent failed to construct a perimeter fence so that it protects the animals in the facility by restricting animals and unauthorized persons from going through it. Specifically, Respondent failed to construct a perimeter fence around the enclosure, in willful violation of section 3.127(d) of the Regulations and Standards (9 C.F.R. § 3.127(d)).

14. Respondent willfully violated section 2.100(a) of the Regulations and Standards (9 C.F.R. § 2.100(a)) by failing to meet the minimum facilities and operating standards for animals other than dogs, cats, rabbits, hamsters, guinea pigs, nonhuman primates, and marine mammals (9 C.F.R. §§ 3.125-.142), by failing to comply with the animal health and husbandry standards (9 C.F.R. § 3.132), as follows:

   a. On August 28 and August 30, 2002, Respondent failed to have a sufficient number of adequately trained employees to carry out the level of husbandry practices and care required by the Regulations and Standards, in willful violation of section 3.132 of the Regulations and Standards (9 C.F.R. § 3.132).

**ADDITIONAL CONCLUSIONS BY THE JUDICIAL OFFICER**
Respondent’s Appeal Petition

Respondent raises two issues in his Petition of Appeal [hereinafter Appeal Petition]. First, Respondent asserts the ALJ’s findings of fact relate to a facility that Respondent previously owned, and Respondent currently owns a facility which complies with the Animal Welfare Act and the Regulations and Standards (Appeal Pet. at first and second unnumbered pages).

Respondent, by his failure to file a timely answer to the Complaint, is deemed to have admitted the violations of the Regulations and Standards alleged in the Complaint. Respondent’s subsequent correction of those violations neither eliminates Respondent’s violations of the Regulations and Standards nor constitutes a meritorious basis for denying Complainant’s Motion for Default Decision. Therefore, even if I found that, subsequent to Respondent’s violations of the Regulations and Standards,

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4 7 C.F.R. § 1.136(c).


6 In re Dennis Hill, 63 Agric. Dec. ___, slip op. at 70-71 (Oct. 8, 2004).
Respondent corrected the violations, I would not find the ALJ’s Initial Decision and Order error.

Second, Respondent contends the revocation of his Animal Welfare Act license is a severe sanction (Appeal Pet. at second unnumbered page).

I agree with Respondent’s contention that revocation of his Animal Welfare Act license is a severe sanction. However, I do not find the ALJ’s revocation of Respondent’s Animal Welfare Act license error.

A sanction by an administrative agency must be warranted in law and justified in fact.\(^7\) The Animal Welfare Act explicitly authorizes

the Secretary of Agriculture to revoke an exhibitor’s Animal Welfare Act license if the exhibitor has violated or is violating the Animal Welfare Act.\(^8\) Respondent was licensed as an exhibitor at the time he violated the Regulations and Standards. Therefore, the ALJ’s revocation of Respondent’s Animal Welfare Act license is warranted in law.\(^9\)

Moreover, the ALJ’s revocation of Respondent’s Animal Welfare Act license is justified by the facts. Respondent is deemed to have admitted committing approximately 21 willful violations of the Regulations and Standards. Many of Respondent’s violations are serious violations that could have affected the health and well-being of Respondent’s animals. Moreover, an exhibitor’s failure to allow Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service officials to enter his place of business to conduct inspections, in willful violation of section 2.126(a) of the Regulations and Standards (9 C.F.R. § 2.126(a)), is extremely serious because it thwarts the Secretary of Agriculture’s ability to monitor the exhibitor’s compliance with the Animal Welfare Act and the Regulations and Standards and severely undermines the Secretary of Agriculture’s ability to enforce the Animal Welfare Act and the Regulations and Standards.

The United States Department of Agriculture’s sanction policy is set forth in In re S.S. Farms Linn County, Inc. (Decision as to James Joseph Hickey and Shannon Hansen), 50 Agric. Dec. 476, 497 (1991), aff’d, 991 F.2d 803, 1993 WL 128889 (9th Cir. 1993) (not to be cited as precedent under 9th Circuit Rule 36-3):

\[ \text{[T]he sanction in each case will be determined by examining the nature of the violations in relation to the remedial purposes of the regulatory statute involved, along with all relevant} \]

\(^{(c...continued)}\)

\(^87\text{U.S.C. } \S \text{ }2149(a)).\)

\(^9\text{The Secretary of Agriculture also has authority under section }21\text{ of the Animal Welfare Act (7 U.S.C. } \S \text{ }2151)\text{ to disqualify a person from becoming licensed. I discuss my reasons for affirming the ALJ’s revocation of Respondent’s Animal Welfare Act license, rather than imposing a disqualification, in this Decision and Order, }\text{infra}.\)
circumstances, always giving appropriate weight to the recommendations of the administrative officials charged with the responsibility for achieving the congressional purpose.

The recommendations of administrative officials charged with the responsibility for achieving the congressional purpose of the regulatory statute are highly relevant to any sanction to be imposed and are entitled to great weight in view of the experience gained by administrative officials during their day-to-day supervision of the regulated industry. *In re S.S. Farms Linn County, Inc.*, 50 Agric. Dec. at 497.

Complainant seeks revocation of Respondent’s Animal Welfare Act license and a cease and desist order (Complainant’s Motion for Default Decision at 1). After examining all the relevant circumstances, in light of the United States Department of Agriculture’s sanction policy, and taking into account the remedial purposes of the Animal Welfare Act and the recommendations of the administrative officials, I conclude that a cease and desist order and revocation of Respondent’s Animal Welfare Act license are appropriate and necessary to ensure Respondent’s compliance with the Animal Welfare Act and the Regulations and Standards in the future, to deter others from violating the Animal Welfare Act and the Regulations and Standards, and to fulfill the remedial purposes of the Animal Welfare Act.

**Complainant’s Response to Respondent’s Appeal Petition**

Complainant contends Respondent’s Appeal Petition was late-filed, the ALJ’s Initial Decision and Order became final on October 8, 2004, and the Judicial Officer has no jurisdiction to hear Respondent’s appeal (Complainant’s Response to Respondent’s Petition for Appeal at 2-3).

The Hearing Clerk served Respondent with the ALJ’s Initial Decision and Order on August 10, 2004. Complainant had 30 days

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10United States Postal Service Domestic Return Receipt for Article Number 7003 2260 0005 5721 4448.

(continued...)
after the date of service within which to file an appeal petition with
the Hearing Clerk.\textsuperscript{11} On September 3, 2004, before time for filing his
appeal petition had expired, Respondent requested an extension of
time within which to file an appeal petition.\textsuperscript{12} On September 8, 2004,
I extended the time for filing Respondent’s appeal petition to October
8, 2004.\textsuperscript{13} On October 8, 2004, at 4:29 p.m., Respondent filed a
timely appeal petition.\textsuperscript{14} Therefore, I reject Complainant’s
contentions that Respondent’s Appeal Petition was late-filed, that the
ALJ’s Initial Decision and Order became final on October 8, 2004,
and that I have no jurisdiction to hear Respondent’s appeal.

\textbf{Revocation of Respondent’s Animal Welfare Act License}

Complainant alleged, and Respondent is deemed to have admitted,
that he held Animal Welfare Act license number 74-C-0536 between
number 74-C-0536 was “cancelled” and, as of the date Complainant
issued the Complaint, March 12, 2004, Animal Welfare Act license
number 74-C-0536 had not been “reinstituted.” (Compl. \textsection 1.) Based
on the limited record before me, I infer that Animal Welfare Act
license number 74-C-0536 was valid during the period that
Respondent violated the Regulations and Standards, that sometime
after November 8, 2003, Respondent’s Animal Welfare Act license
number 74-C-0536 was cancelled but that it could have been
reinstituted, and that, at the time the ALJ issued the Initial Decision
and Order on July 28, 2004, Animal Welfare Act license number
74-C-0536 was not \textit{valid}.

\textsuperscript{10}(...continued)

\textsuperscript{11}7 C.F.R. \textsection 1.145(a).

\textsuperscript{12}Letter from Eric John Drogosch to Joyce Dawson, Hearing Clerk, filed

\textsuperscript{13}Informal Order filed by the Judicial Officer on September 8, 2004.

\textsuperscript{14}Respondent’s Appeal Petition at first unnumbered page.
In *In re David M. Zimmerman*, 57 Agric. Dec. 1038, 1067-71 (1998), I held the appropriate sanction to be imposed against a former licensee whose Animal Welfare Act license would be revoked for a violation of the Regulations and Standards but for the violator’s being unlicenced at the time the sanction is imposed, is disqualification from becoming licensed. I based this holding on a narrow reading of section 19(a) of the Animal Welfare Act (7 U.S.C. § 2149(a)) and the common meaning of the words *revoke* and *revocation*, which I fully explicated in *Zimmerman*. I overrule this holding in *Zimmerman* for two reasons. First, the licensing provisions of the Regulations and Standards explicitly provide for revocation of an Animal Welfare Act license, but I cannot locate any reference to disqualification of a current or former licensee from becoming licensed. Second, despite the common definitions of *revoke* and *revocation*, numerous courts have upheld revocation of licenses that are not valid at the time of revocation. Therefore, I conclude, if a person holds a valid Animal Welfare Act license at the time he or she violates the Animal Welfare Act or the Regulations and Standards, the Secretary of Agriculture is

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16 See 9 C.F.R. §§ 2.1-.12.


18 *Patel v. Kansas State Bd. of Healing Arts*, 920 P.2d 477, 480 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996) (stating cancellation of a license during the pendency of a disciplinary proceeding did not divest the board of jurisdiction to revoke the cancelled license); *Colorado State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Boyle*, 924 P.2d 1113, 1116 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996) (holding the board had jurisdiction to revoke a lapsed license to practice medicine), *cert. denied*, 520 U.S. 1104 (1997); *Nicoletti v. State Bd. of Vehicle Manufacturers, Dealers and Salespersons*, 706 A.2d 891, 894 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1998) (holding, since the licensee maintained a property interest in a lapsed salesperson’s license and a suspended dealer’s license, the board had jurisdiction to revoke the lapsed salesperson’s license and the suspended dealer’s license); *Marmorstein v. New York State Liquor Authority*, 144 N.Y.S.2d 275, 277-78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955) (stating the fact that a license had already been surrendered did not bar the board from revoking the license after a hearing); *American Employers’ Ins. Co. v. Radzeweluk*, 4 N.Y.S.2d 74, 75, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1938) (stating the fact that a license had already been surrendered did not exonerate defendants from a previous violation nor prevent the subsequent revocation of the license because of such previous violation).
authorized by section 19(a) of the Animal Welfare Act (7 U.S.C. § 2149(a)) to revoke that violator’s Animal Welfare Act license even if the violator’s Animal Welfare Act license is cancelled prior to revocation.

For the foregoing reasons, the following Order should be issued.

ORDER

1. Respondent, his agents and employees, successors and assigns, directly or indirectly through any corporate or other device, shall cease and desist from violating the Regulations and Standards.

   The cease and desist provisions of this Order shall become effective on the day after service of this Order on Respondent.

2. Respondent’s Animal Welfare Act license (Animal Welfare Act license number 74-C-0536) is revoked.

   The Animal Welfare Act license revocation provisions of this Order shall become effective on the 60th day after service of this Order on Respondent.

RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

Respondent has the right to seek judicial review of the Order in the appropriate United States Court of Appeals in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341, 2343-2350. Such court has exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, to set aside, to suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of the Order. Respondent must seek judicial review within 60 days after entry of the Order. The date of entry of the Order is October 28, 2004.

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197 U.S.C. § 2149(c).
FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE ACT

COURT DECISION

HARLAN ANDERSON v. USDA.
Case No. 04-2971 ADM/AJB.

(Cite as: 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23623).

FCIA – NAD -- APA – Quality loss payment – Final determination, lack of.

Farmer (Anderson) sought quality loss payments (QLP) on a partially failed alpha crop. A decision reached by the National Appeals Division (NAD) determined that the farmer was due compensation under the Federal crop insurance program (denying the Farm Service Agency’s interpretation of quality loss measurement techniques), but did not receive evidence on the total quantity of the loss. The court held that under APA, the agency had not rendered a final determination as to the quantity and remanded the matter to the agency as to the quantity issue. Citing Kleisser v. US [“]Agencies need to have the initial opportunity to resolve contested issues to: (1) avoid premature interruption of the agency process, (2) allow the agency to “develop the necessary factual backgrounds, (3) give the agency the first chance to exercise its discretion, (4) properly defer to the agency’s expertise, (5) provide the agency with an opportunity to discover and correct its own errors, and (6) deter the deliberate flouting of administrative processes . . . [”]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA

JUDGE: ANN D. MONTGOMERY, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

On November 10, 2004, oral argument before the undersigned United States District Judge was heard on the Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 10] of the Farm Service Agency of the United States Department of Agriculture (“FSA” or “Defendant”). In his Complaint [Docket No. 1], Harlan Anderson (“Anderson” or “Plaintiff”) alleges Defendant failed to comply with a National Appeals Division (NAD) Hearing Officer’s decision that Plaintiff is
Harlan Anderson v. USDA.
63 Agric. Dec. 650

entitled to $61,948.82 in Quality Loss Payments (QLP)* for his 2002 alfalfa crop. Defendant contends Plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed on summary judgment for lack of jurisdiction and failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Alternatively, Defendant argues the matter should be remanded to the NAD to determine the amount owed to Plaintiff. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant’s motion is granted in part and denied in part. This matter is remanded to the NAD Hearing Officer to resolve the disputed payment yield and payment rate issues and to determine the amount of QLP payments to which Plaintiff is entitled.

II. BACKGROUND

The Wright County Farm Service Agency Committee (“COC”) first considered Anderson’s application for QLP payments for his 2002 alfalfa crop on August 15, 2003. Administrative Record (“Record”) at 13 [Docket No. 13]. In an August 29, 2003 letter, the COC denied QLP payments based on a finding that “the [Relative Feed Value (RFV)] tests ... were not load specific and therefore could not be tied to specific quality.” Id. at 50. Anderson requested a review of this decision but the COC advised his claim was not reviewable. Id. at 14.

In a September 4, 2003 letter, Anderson wrote the NAD requesting a ruling on the appealability of his claim. Id. The NAD responded by letter dated October 23, 2003 granting Anderson a right to appeal. Id. at 78. The letter recited that Anderson was protesting the Agency’s method of determining quality, the per ton assigned losses and the yield determination, and confirmed that the FSA’s decision to deny him QLP benefits was appealable. Id.

*Cases involving appeals from farm service agency determinations of quality loss payments under the Federal Crop Insurance Program are not within the jurisdiction of the OALJ, however the court’s analysis of determination as to what portion of the agency’s determination is not ripe is relevant - Editor.

1For purposes of the instant Motion, the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the nonmovant. See Ludwig v. Anderson, 54 F.3d 465, 470 (8th Cir. 1995).
On October 28, 2003, Anderson filed a hearing request form appealing the FSA’s August 29, 2003 decision. *Id.* at 46. In preparation for the hearing, each party stated its position on the contested issue of whether Anderson was entitled to QLP payments. The FSA maintained that Anderson was precluded from receiving QLP payments because he failed to “submit approved lab analysis showing quality factors specific for the affected quality.” *Id.* at 3. Conversely, Anderson claimed the USDA information sheets indicate he was to use the crop insurance price election and need only test a portion of his crop, rather than each individual bail. *Id.* at 74.

In a January 6, 2004 decision, the NAD Hearing Officer determined “that FSA was in error in its method of assessing the scope of Appellant’s 2002 Alfalfa loss” and held that Anderson was entitled to QLP benefits. *Id.* at 58. The Hearing Officer found the FSA denied QLP benefits based on the erroneous belief that RFV testing results must be load specific so they could be tied to a specific quantity of alfalfa. *Id.* at 60-61. Although this procedure is required to determine QLP payments for grain, the NAD Hearing Officer noted that the quality of alfalfa may be determined by testing the aggregate cuttings of a crop rather than individual loads. *Id.* at 61. In concluding, the Hearing Officer found: “The Agency’s determination is erroneous to the extent that it is not based upon all of the pertinent information available. Equity demands a thorough vetting of this case.” *Id.*

On February 3, 2004, Anderson inquired by letter whether the NAD had adopted his calculations that he was entitled to $61,948.82 in QLP payments. *Id.* at 83, 133. Although he sought clarification of the amount owed to him, Anderson wrote he “was not requesting a review” of the hearing officer’s decision. *Id.* at 133. Nevertheless, the NAD construed the letter as an appeal to the NAD Director. *Id.* at 11. However, on February 9, 2004, the NAD corrected the notice, stating Anderson “has not requested a Director Review . . . .” *Id.* at 135.

In a February 12, 2004 letter to Anderson, the FSA Executive Director for Wright County explained how the FSA intended to implement the NAD Hearing Officer’s determination. (Ex. re. Mot. for Summ. J. by FSA [Docket No. 12] Ex. A). The letter acknowledged that, per NAD direction, Anderson was entitled to QLP
payments but it also stated that the NAD Hearing Officer’s ruling did not address how to determine the payment yield or payment rate. *Id.* As a result, these factors were determined according to State Office (STO) directive. *Id.* Using this methodology, the FSA calculated the QLP payment to be $14,169.58, which was paid to Anderson. *Id.* The letter also extended “standard appeal rights” to Anderson. *Id.* It is the FSA’s position that this payment determination is not part of the current case record, as the NAD hearing officer’s ruling only concerned whether Anderson was entitled to QLP benefits, not what amount was appropriate. The FSA asserts the amount owed to Anderson raises a separate appealable issue not raised in the context of this lawsuit.

Under 7 C.F.R. § 11.9(a), a claimant has 30 days and an agency has 15 days to appeal a NAD hearing officer’s determination to the director of the NAD. Neither party sought appeal at this stage. As part of a May 25, 2004 mediation with the FSA, Anderson sent a letter indicating that he saw no reason to appeal a judgment he believed to be in his favor and asked the FSA to pay him the contested QLP benefits. May 14, 2004 letter (Ex. re. Mot. for Summ. J. by FSA [Docket No. 12] Ex. B). He contends the NAD opinion is the Agency’s final determination. On June 7, 2004, NAD concluded the appeal. Record at 99. On June 16, 2004, Anderson filed the instant complaint.

### III. DISCUSSION

#### A. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment shall issue “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see *Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.*, 475 U.S. 574, 587, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986); *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 252, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986); *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 323,
On a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. *Ludwig v. Anderson*, 54 F.3d 465, 470 (8th Cir. 1995). The nonmoving party may not “rest on mere allegations or denials, but must demonstrate on the record the existence of specific facts which create a genuine issue for trial.” *Krenik v. County of Le Sueur*, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995).

Judicial review of an NAD Hearing Officer’s decision is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06. *See Lane v. United States Department of Agriculture*, 120 F.3d 106, 108-09 (8th Cir. 1997). The APA states that an agency’s decision, including its actions, findings and conclusions, should not be overturned unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence, or if it is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2); *United States v. Snoring Relief Labs, Inc.*, 210 F.3d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 2000). “The scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” *Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual*, 463 U.S. 29, 43, 77 L. Ed. 2d 443, 103 S. Ct. 2856 (1983).

**B. Amount of QLP Payments**

Under the APA, a plaintiff must exhaust his administrative remedies before appealing an adverse agency decision to a federal court. 7 U.S.C. § 6912(e). In the instant matter, both parties agree that an NAD Hearing Officer’s determination may constitute a final decision for the purposes of APA. 7 C.F.R. § 11.2(a). However, the FSA contends that Anderson initiated an optional appeal to the Director of the NAD when he sent his February 3, 2004 letter. The letter sought clarification as to whether the NAD Hearing Officer had adopted his proposed award of $61,948.82 as the amount of QLP owed to him. The FSA argues Anderson then failed to pursue this appeal and thereby failed to exhaust all available administrative remedies. Anderson claims that he had no intent to appeal a judgment in his favor and simply wanted clarification as to the amount of the award. A review of the record supports Anderson’s contention.
Anderson’s February 3, 2004 letter to the NAD explicitly states that “he was not requesting a review . . . .” Record at 133. Although NAD initially construed Anderson’s letter as a request for NAD Director review of the Hearing Officer’s determination, the agency quickly retracted this position, stating that Anderson “has not requested a Director Review . . . .” Id. at 135. Based on Anderson’s letter and NAD’s response, it cannot be said that Anderson initiated an optional, director-level review. As a result, the Hearing Officer’s determination is a final decision eligible for judicial review under the APA.

The FSA next contends this Court lacks jurisdiction to require the agency to pay $61,948.82 in QLP benefits to Anderson. The FSA argues that the APA is a limited waiver of sovereign immunity that excludes monetary relief and thus precludes Anderson’s requested remedy. Anderson claims he merely seeks judicial enforcement, rather than judicial review, of the Agency’s final decision.

A review of the record reveals it would be premature for the Court to consider this issue at the present time. Although the NAD Hearing Officer’s decision affirmatively resolved the threshold issue of whether Anderson was entitled to QLP payments, it did not determine the amount to which Anderson was entitled or set forth a methodology for calculating the award. The record indicates the Hearing Officer, as well as both the FSA and Anderson, was aware these integral issues were before him on appeal. In the decision, the Hearing Officer identified the purpose of Anderson’s appeal as follows:

[Anderson] takes issue with the Agency’s assessment of the scope of his 2002 CLP alfalfa loss . . . . He maintains that had he been afforded [an] opportunity, he would have been able to establish a linkage between specific quality-test results and specific quantities of alfalfa, thereby establishing quality losses. He indicates that the COC erroneously applied the standards of grain-quality measurement to the alfalfa-quality measurement in denying 2002 QLP benefits . . . . Moreover, he disagrees with the quantity assigned as the basis of his 2002 alfalfa loss.

Id. at 58. The Hearing Officer’s decision acknowledged that payment rate and payment yield, two disputed factors that are
necessary to calculate the amount of QLP payments owed Anderson, were before him on appeal.

Anderson argues that his calculations of $61,948.82 in QLP benefits owed to him were before the Hearing Officer and were implicitly adopted in the final order. The FSA’s position, espoused in its February 12, 2004 letter, is the Hearing Officer’s determination did not address the amount owed Anderson or the appropriate method for calculating payment yield or payment rate. A review of the Hearing Officer’s decision supports the FSA’s position. Rather than establishing payment yield, payment rate or the amount of QLP payments owed Anderson, the decision concludes by stating, “the Agency’s determination is erroneous to the extent that it is not based upon all of the pertinent information available. Equity demands a thorough vetting of this case.” Id. at 61. This language indicates the Hearing Officer did not decide the remaining contested issues.

It is axiomatic that judicial review is inappropriate in cases where the issue has not yet been addressed by the agency. Agencies need to have the initial opportunity to resolve contested issues to:

“(1) avoid premature interruption of the agency process,” (2) allow the agency to “develop the necessary factual backgrounds,” (3) give the agency the “first chance to exercise its discretion, (4) properly defer to the agency’s expertise, (5) provide the agency with an opportunity “to discover and correct its own errors,” and (6) deter the “deliberate flouting of administrative processes . . .

Kleisser v. United States Forest Serv., 183 F.3d 196, 200-01 (3rd Cir. 1999) (quoting McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194-95, 23 L. Ed. 2d 194, 89 S. Ct. 1657 (1969)). Determining the precise amount of QLP payments owed Anderson based on payment yield and payment rate calculations implicates policy questions and is an issue that requires the FSA’s agency expertise. The narrow role of judicial review under the APA is to examine the administrative record and determine whether the agency’s decision meets the “arbitrary and capricious” standard. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43. Until the agency has reached an issue and decided it, this Court lacks a
yardstick to measure whether the decision is arbitrary and capricious. As a result, this matter will be remanded to the NAD to determine payment yield and payment rate issues and to calculate the amount of QLP benefits to which Anderson is entitled.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, and all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket No. 10] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part,

2. The matter is REMANDED to the NAD Hearing Officer to determine payment yield and payment rate issues and to calculate the appropriate amount of QLP payments,

3. Plaintiff’s Complaint [Docket No. 1] is hereby DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY.
HORSE PROTECTION ACT

COURT DECISION

ROBERT McCLOY, JR. v. USDA.
No. 03-1485.
Filed October 4, 2004.

(Cite as: 125 S. Ct. 38)

HPA – Sored horse – “Allowing” the entry or showing – “Allowing - plus” distinguished.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

JUDGES: Rehnquist, Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer.

OPINION: Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied.
HORSE PROTECTION ACT

DEPARTMENTAL DECISIONS

In re: BEVERLY BURGESS, AN INDIVIDUAL, GROOVER STABLES, AN UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION; WINSTON T. GROOVER, JR., ALSO KNOWN AS WINKY GROOVER, AN INDIVIDUAL.

HPA Docket No. 01-0008.

Filed April 21, 2004.


Donald A. Tracy, Esq., for Complainant.
Brenda S. Bramlett, Esq. for Respondent

Decision and Order issued by Victor W. Palmer, Administrative Law Judge.

Decision and Order

This is an administrative disciplinary proceeding that the Administrator of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service initiated by filing a Complaint on November 6, 2000, that charges the Respondents with violating the Horse Protection Act (15 U.S.C.§1821-1831; “The Act”). Specifically, Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., also known as Winky Groover, a professional horse trainer who does business as Groover Stables is alleged to have violated the Act by transporting and exhibiting the Tennessee Walking Horse “Stocks Clutch FCR” while the horse was “sore” within the meaning of the Act. Respondent Beverly Burgess who owns Stocks Clutch FCR, is alleged to have violated the Act by allowing Respondent Groover to exhibit her horse at the horse show while it was sore.

Respondents filed their Answer to the Complaint on December 21, 2002, in which they denied violating the Act. An evidentiary hearing
was held on June 26-27, 2002, before Administrative Law Judge Dorothea A. Baker. Complainant was represented by Donald A. Tracy, Esq., Office of the General Counsel, United States Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C.. Respondents were represented by Brenda S. Bramlett, Esq., Bramlett and Durard, Shelbyville, TN. The hearing was recorded and exhibits were received in evidence from both Complainant and Respondent. Transcript references are designated by “Tr.”

Complainant’s Exhibits are designated by “CX”. Respondents’ Exhibits are designated by RX.”

Subsequent to the hearing, Judge Baker retired and is not available to issue the decision and order in this proceeding. It was initially reassigned to another Administrative Law Judge who is also presently unavailable. It was thereupon reassigned to me. When this case was first reassigned, Respondent filed a Motion for a New Trial that was considered and denied by Order entered on October 15, 2003. The denial of the Motion was based on Section 1.144(d) of the controlling Rules of Practice which provides that: A... (1) in case of the absence of the Judge or the Judge’s inability to act, the powers and duties to be performed by the Judge under these rules of practice in connection with any assigned proceeding may, without abatement of the proceeding unless otherwise directed by the Chief Judge, be assigned to any other Judge.”

Under the most recent briefing schedule, the time for filing briefs concluded on March 12, 2004. Upon consideration of the record evidence and the briefs and arguments by the parties, I have decided that Respondent Groover violated the Act by exhibiting a horse while the horse was sore and that a civil penalty should be assessed against him in the amount of $2,200.

Furthermore, Respondent Groover should be disqualified for one year from horse industry activities as provided in the Act. I have also decided that under the standard for determining whether a horse owner has “allowed” a sore horse to be exhibited that applies in the
Sixth Circuit where an appeal of this proceeding would lie, the charges against Respondent Burgess should be dismissed.

The findings of fact, conclusions and the discussion that follow specify and explain the reasons for the attached order. In reaching these findings and conclusions, I have fully considered the briefs, motions and arguments by the parties and, if not adopted or incorporated within these findings and conclusions, they have been rejected as not in accord with the relevant and material facts in evidence or controlling law.

**Finding of Facts**

1)Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., is the sole proprietor of Groover Stables, whose mailing address is Post Office Box 1435, Shelbyville, Tennessee 37162 (Answer, para 1).

2)Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., also known as Winky Groover, is an individual whose mailing address is Post Office Box 1435, Shelbyville, Tennessee 37162 (Answer, para 2).

3)Respondent Beverly Burgess is an individual whose mailing address is 351 Highway, 82 East, Bell Buckle, Tennessee 37020. At all times material herein, Respondent Beverly Burgess was the owner of the horse known as “Stocks Clutch FCR” (Answer, para 3).

4)On or about July 7, 2000, Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., transported Stocks Clutch FCR to the Cornersville Lions Club 54th Annual Horse Show for the purpose of showing and exhibiting the horse as entry number 43 in class number 20 (Answer, para 4).

5)The United States Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) assigned personnel to monitor the Cornersville Show. They included Dr. David Smith and Dr. Sylvia Taylor, employed by APHIS as Veterinary Medical Officers (VMOs); and Michael Nottingham, employed by APHIS as an Investigator (Tr. Vol. 1, pages 18-22 and 50).
6) The duties of the VMOs at the horse show were to look out for and “write up” “sored” horses and to make sure the “Designated Qualified Persons” (DQPs) employed by the organization certified by APHIS to manage the horse show, were doing an effective role of enforcing the Horse Protection Act. (Tr. Vol 1, page 44).

7) The VMOs followed the practice of asking to examine the second and third place horse post show. The DQPs examined all first place horses (Tr. Vol 1, page 44).

8) On July 7, 2000, Stocks Clutch FCR, upon being exhibited at the Cornersville Show, was designated by the Horse Show as the second place horse in its Class and for that reason was examined post show by Dr. David Smith (CX 5).

9) Dr. Smith did not have any present recollection of the horse or his examination of it on July 7, 2000, when he testified at the hearing on June 26, 2002. The horse show had taken place on the night of July 7, 2000, and Dr. Smith prepared his affidavit the next morning based on his notes and his memory from the night before. He no longer had the notes when he testified at the hearing and his reading of his affidavit did not refresh his recollection. His testimony about the horse’s condition when he examined it consists entirely of his affidavit (CX 5) and APHIS Form 7077 (CX 4), which he helped prepare (Tr. Vol. 1, pages 45-48).

10) Dr. Smith observed, as set forth in his affidavit, that:

A... the horse was slow to lead as the custodian walked it. When I examined the horse’s forefeet, I found an area painful to palpation along the lateral aspect of the left forefoot just above the coronary band. The pain was indicated as the horse tried to pull its foot away each time I applied gentle pressure with the ball of my thumb to this location. It was consistent and repeatable. I indicated the position of the painful area in the drawings at the bottom of APHIS Form 7077 corresponding to this case. The palmar aspect of the left fore pastern had many deep folds, corrugations and nodular areas consistent with a
scar rule violation. Although the skin in this area was pigmented, I could see reddening and swelling consistent with a scar rule violation. I found reddened, swollen corrugations on the palmar aspect of the right foot.”

11) After his examination of Stocks Clutch FCR, Dr. Smith asked Dr. Sylvia Taylor to examine the horse. Dr. Smith did not tell Dr. Taylor what he had found and did not observe her examination. (CX 5, page 2).

12) At the hearing on June 26, 2002, Dr. Sylvia Taylor also did not have a present memory nor could her recollection be refreshed respecting her examination of Stocks Clutch FCR on July 7, 2000. (Tr. Vol 1, pages 162-163).

13) Dr. Taylor prepared her affidavit at 11: 20 p.m. on July 7, 2000, shortly after the end of the show and her examination of Stocks Clutch FCR (CX 6, page 3 and Tr. Vol 1, page 164). Dr. Taylor also contemporaneously helped prepare APHIS Form 1077 (CX 4).

14) Dr. Taylor recorded in her affidavit that:
“On July 7, at approximately 8:50 p.m., Dr. Smith examined a black stallion, Stocks Clutch, entry 43, in Class 20, after placing 2nd. I observed that the horse walked and completed a turn around the cone normally, but as it went straight after the turn it was reluctant to go and the rein was pulled tight to continue leading it. I observed Dr. Smith approach the left side of the horse and lift the foot and palpate it in the customary manner.

I noticed that the horse flinched its shoulder and neck muscles and shifted its weight while he palpated the left pastern, but I did not observe whether this response was consistently localized to palpation of any particular part of the pastern, other than that it was not the posterior pastern. He then palpated the right pastern, and I did not see a similar response.
Dr. Smith then asked me to examine the horse. I observed the horse walk and turn again. It walked and turned around the corner normally, but as it left the turn it was reluctant to lead and the custodian had to pull the horse along on a tight rein. I approached the horse on the left, established contact and began palpating the left posterior pastern. I noticed that there was very pronounced, severe scarring of the skin of the posterior pastern. There were thickened ropes of hairless skin medial and lateral to the posterior midline, bulging into even thicker, hard corrugations and oval nodules along the medial-posterior aspect. This epithelial tissue was non-uniformly thickened and could not be flattened or smoothed out. Grooves and cracks on the lateral and midline area above the pocket were reddened. When I palpated the lateral and ante-rho-lateral pastern, the horse attempted to withdraw its foot and I could feel its shoulder and neck muscles tighten and pull away. I obtain(ed) this response consistently and repeatedly three times, always when palpating that same spot.”

When I palpated the right posterior pastern, I observed that it was also very scarred. There were non-uniformly thick cords of epithelial tissue with hairloss, that also could not be flattened or smoothed out, some of which were also reddened. I noticed the horse flinched and twitched several times while I palpated the posterior pastern over these scars, but the response was not localizable to a particular area. I then palpated the anterior right pastern and did not detect a pain response.”

15) In the professional opinions of both Dr. Smith and Dr. Taylor, the horse was both unilaterally sore and in violation of the scar rule. In the professional opinion of each of them, the horse was sore due to the use of chemical and/or mechanical means in violation of the Act and was in violation of the scar rule regulations then in effect. (CX 5 and CX 6)

16) Dr. Smith and Dr. Taylor wrote up the horse for being in violation and completed APHIS Form 7077, Summary of Alleged Violations (CX 4).
17) The VMOs testified they do not write up a horse as being in violation unless they both agree that the horse is sore and in violation of the Act (Tr. Vol 1, pages 136 & 168).

18) After the examination by the VMOs, the Horse Show’s “Designated Qualified Persons”, Charles Thomas and Andy Messick, examined the horse.

19) A Designated Qualified Person (DQP) is a “person meeting the requirements of paragraph 11.7 of the Horse Protection Regulations,” who is delegated authority under Section 4 of the Act to detect horses which are “sore” (Respondents’ Exhibit 7, RX 7, page 30). The National Horse Show Commissioner’s DQP program which employs Mr. Thomas and Mr. Messick as DQPs, is certified by the Department of Agriculture (Tr. Vol 1, pages 86 and 228). The training of DQPs is akin to that of VMOs in that they attend annual training programs together that are given by APHIS. (Tr. Vol 1, page 87). Mr. Thomas and Mr. Messick are both highly qualified and experienced DQPs, but neither is a veterinarian as are the likewise highly qualified and experienced VMOs. The duties of DQPs are not full time; Mr. Messick is principally employed as an attorney and Mr. Thomas is retired. (Tr. Vol 2, pages 3 & 29-30).

20) After the examinations by the VMOs, Mr. Messick was the first DQP to examine Stocks Clutch FCR. After reviewing his exam sheet, Mr. Messick had a present recollection of his examination of the horse some two years before the hearing (Tr. Vol 2, page 10). He was the same DQP who had passed the horse for exhibition and showing based on his pre-show inspection in which he found the horse met the industry standards. (Tr. Vol 2, pages 10-16). He did not watch the VMOs examine the horse post show (Tr. Vol 2, page 17).

Mr. Messick’s post show examination of the horse was about 5-10 minutes after its examination by the VMOs. He testified that as was the case pre-show, the horse still had soft, uniformly thickened tissue and he didn’t get any withdrawal response on his palpation on the left or right foot (Tr. Vol 2, page 19). He did not observe swelling or
redness of the posterior pastern of either foot. (Tr. Vol 2, pages 19-20).

21) Mr. Thomas next examined the horse. He and Mr. Messick were asked to do so by Respondent Groover who told them that the VMOs “had taken information on him in the scar rule.” Since Andy Messick was the first one to check the horse pre-show, he also checked him first post show. (Tr. Vol 2, page 37). Mr. Thomas’ predominant concern appeared to be whether the horse was in violation of the scar rule. He didn’t believe it was, “He did have some raised places... but they were soft and pliable. That’s what we were --- - in our training, what we were required ---- as long as they were soft, we could take our thumb and stretch them and flatten them out or press them and they flatten out, and they were only in the back. Nothing though, around the edge.” (Tr. Vol 2, page 39).

22) In Mr. Thomas’ opinion, the horse was not in violation of the scar rule and he did not find abnormal reactions when he palpated the horse’s front pasterns. (Tr. Vol 2, page 40).

23) At 10:40 a.m, DST, on July 7, 2000, apparently two hours subsequent to the examinations of Stocks Clutch FCR by the VMOs, the horse was examined by Dr. Randall T. Baker. Dr. Baker is a Veterinarian in private practice for 25 years who is licensed in Tennessee and is a member of the American Association of Equine Practitioners (RX 13 and Tr. Vol 1, pages 298 and 305-306). At the hearing, Dr. Baker had present recollection of his examination which was videotaped and requested by Respondents. (Tr. Vol 1, page 309). He did not find the horse’s front pasterns to be sore and believed the scars on the pasterns of each pastern did not violate the scar rule (Tr. Vol 1, pages 311- 321). Although he found some hair loss and thickened epithelial tissue on both posterior pasterns, Dr. Baker concluded that the scar rule was not violated because when he put his palm on the back of the horse’s foot, he didn’t have excess tissue coming out from there and the tissue was pliable and not real firm granulation type tissue; it would spread around and cleave under his thumb (Tr. Vol 1, pages 321-322). He saw no evidence of scarring or
redness on either the left or right posterior pasterns. (Tr. Vol 1, page 324).

24) Respondent Beverly Burgess testified, and Respondent Winston Groover corroborated, that prior to July 7, 2000, and on several occasions Ms. Burgess instructed the trainer of her horse, Stocks Clutch FCR, not to “sore” the horse or perform any act which would cause it to be noncompliant with the Horse Protection Act (Tr. Vol 2, pages 57-58 and 92). She further testified that she visited Groover’s Stable two or three times a week to assure herself that her horse was not sore or in violation of the scar rule (Tr. Vol 2, page 54).

Mrs. Burgess did not exhibit, assist in preparing for show, enter or transport Stocks Clutch FCR to the Cornerville Horse Show on July 7, 2000 (Tr. Vol 2, pages 50-51).

25) Respondent Beverly Burgess watched the VMOs inspect her horse and in her opinion Dr. Taylor “was not a horse person” because she appeared to have trouble picking up the horse’s foot and went at it in an awkward way (Tr. Vol 2, page 52). Respondents also presented testimony from Mr. Lonnie Messick, the Executive Vice-President and DQP coordinator for the National Horse Show Commission, and DQP Andy Messick’s father, that he had once seen Dr. Taylor hold a horse’s foot in an improper manner that caused it to jerk its foot away from her (Tr. Vol 1, pages 223, 227, 266 and 271-273). However, he further testified that he had been with Dr. Taylor at other horse shows and she seemed competent (Tr. Vol 1, page 273).

26) Respondent Winston Groover has been a professional horse trainer since 1975. He has attended DQP clinics and read various publications on determining whether a horse is in compliance with the Act. He testified that he transported, entered and showed Stocks Clutch FCR on July 7, 2000, at the Cornerville Horse Show where it was awarded 2nd place in Class 20 (Tr. Vol 2, pages 91-95). No evidence has been entered and no argument has been made to show any prior violations of the Act by Mr. Groover.
The Act and The Scar Rule

A. The Act

The Act defines the term “sore” as:

(A) an irritating or blistering agent has been applied, internally or externally, by a person to any limb of a horse,

(B) any burn, cut, or laceration has been inflicted by a person on any limb of a horse,

(C) any tack, nail, screw, or chemical agent has been injected by a person into or used by a person on any limb of a horse, or

(D) any other substance or devise has been used by a person on any limb of a horse or a person has engaged in a practice involving a horse, and, as a result of such application, infliction, injection, use, or practice, such horse suffers, or can reasonably be expected to suffer, physical pain or distress, inflammation, or lameness when walking, trotting or otherwise moving, except that such term does not include such an application, infliction, injection, use, or practice in connection with the therapeutic treatment of a horse by or under the supervision of a person licensed to practice veterinary medicine in the state in which such treatment was given.


The Act prohibits the following conduct respecting a “sore” horse:

... 

(2) The (A) showing or exhibiting, in any horse show or horse exhibition, of any horse which is “sore”, (B) entering for the purpose of showing or exhibiting in any horse show or horse exhibition, any horse which is “sore”, (C) selling,
auctioning or offering for sale, in any horse sale or auction, any horse which is “sore” and (D) allowing any activity described in clause (A), (B) or (C) respecting a horse which is “sore” by the owner of such horse,.....


The Act provides that a horse is presumed to be “sore” in the following circumstances:

... 

(d)...(5) In any civil or criminal action to enforce this “Act” or any regulation under this “Act” a horse shall be presumed to be a horse which is “sore” if it manifested abnormal sensitivity or inflammation in both of its forelimbs or both of its hindlimbs


The Act provides for civil penalties and disqualification from various horse industry activities as follows:

... 

(b) (1) Any person who violates section 1824 of this title shall be liable to the United States for a civil penalty of not more than $2,0001 for each violation. No penalty shall be assessed unless such person is given notice and opportunity for a hearing before the Secretary with respect to such violation. The amount of such civil penalty shall be assessed by the Secretary by written order. In determining the amount of such civil penalty, the Secretary shall take into account all factors relevant to such determination, including the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the prohibited conduct and, with respect to the person found to have engaged in such conduct, the degree of culpability, any history of prior offenses,
ability to pay, effect on ability to continue to do business, and such other matters as justice may require.

. . .

(e) In addition to any fine, imprisonment or civil penalty authorized

1 Pursuant to the Federal Civil Penalties Adjustment Act of 1990, the penalty has been adjusted for inflation to $2,200. 7 C.F.R § 3.91 (b) (2) vii. under this section, any person who was convicted under subsection (a) of this section or who paid a civil penalty assessed under subsection (b) of this section or is subject to final order under such subsection assessing a civil penalty for any violation of any provision of this chapter or any regulation issued under this chapter may be disqualified by order of the Secretary, after notice and an opportunity for a hearing before the Secretary, from showing or exhibiting any horse, judging or managing any horse show, horse exhibition or horse sale or auction for a period of not less than one year for the first violation and not less than five years for any subsequent violation.

15 U.S.C. 1825 (b)(1) and (e).

The Act authorizes the Secretary to issue rules and regulations as he deems necessary to carry out the provision of this chapter.

The Secretary is authorized to issue such rules and regulations as he deems necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter. 15 U.S.C. § 1828.

B. The Scar Rule

The Scar Rule as published by APHIS, on April 27, 1979, in 44 Fed. Reg. 25, 172, provides:
The scar rule applies to all horses born on or after October 1, 1975. Horses subject to this rule that do not meet the following scar rule criteria shall be considered to be “sore” and are subject to all prohibitions of section 5 of the Act. The scar rule criteria are as follows:

(a) The anterior and anterior-lateral surfaces of the fore pasterns (external surface) must be free of bilateral granulomas, other bilateral pathological evidence of inflammation, and other bilateral evidence of abuse indicative of soring including, but not limited to, excessive loss of hair.

(b) The posterior surfaces of the pasterns (flexor surface), including the sulcus or “pocket” may show bilateral areas of uniformly thickened epithelial tissue if such areas are free of proliferating granuloma tissue, irritation, moisture, edema, or other evidence of inflammation.

9 C.F.R. § 11.3.

Conclusions

1. The horse “Stocks Clutch FCR” was a “sore” horse when it was exhibited by Respondents Winston T. Groover, Jr. and Groover Stables, on July 7, 2000, as entry 43 in class number 20 in the Cornersville Horse Show.

2. Respondent Winston Groover should be assessed a civil penalty of $2,200 and made Subject to a one year disqualification from horse industry activities as provided in the Act.

3. Respondent Beverly Burgess, the owner of the horse “Stocks Clutch FCR”, is not found to have allowed the showing of the horse while it was sore under the standards specified by the Sixth Circuit where an appeal of the case would lie.

4. The case against Respondent Beverly Burgess should be dismissed.
Discussion

(1) The horse was sore when exhibited

Two competent, highly qualified veterinarians employed by the Department of Agriculture inspected Stocks Clutch FCR after it was awarded second place in its class at the Cornersville Horse Show on the night of July 7, 2000. The veterinarians each examined the horse separately and independently. Each independently concluded that the horse was sore. It was only because both agreed on their findings that the owner and trainer were charged with violating the Act. Neither VMO can be said to have any reason to have made a false or frivolous accusation. The accusation that one of them, Dr. Sylvia Taylor, “was not a horse person” and did not know how to handle a horse’s feet is patently absurd. Dr. Taylor has been a veterinarian since 1986 and for some ten years, her exclusive duties for APHIS concerned enforcement of the Horse Protection Act. The only witness offered in corroboration of the charge made by Respondent Beverly Burgess, admitted on cross examination that Dr. Taylor was indeed competent. Dr. Taylor and Dr. Smith, the other APHIS Veterinarian who found the horse to be sore, were in fact considered by APHIS to possess such special competence in this field that another veterinarian was with them at the horse show for their training.

Dr. Taylor and Dr. Smith found the horse to be sore on two separate bases.

First, they each found an area painful to palpation along the lateral aspect of the left forefoot. The horse pulled its foot away from the VMOs each time thumb pressure was applied to palpate this area. Each VMO palpated the area repeatedly and the horse’s pain response was constant.

Second, both VMOs observed scars on the posterior of both of the horse’s front pasterns which each VMO found to be in the violation of the Scar Rule. In an attempt to make the Scar Rule generally understandable to all who inspect Tennessee Walking Horses for evidence of soring, APHIS has issued various publications
illustrating its proper application. RX 2 is one of them. It was used as an aid in the cross examination of Drs. Smith and Taylor. Pages 16 and 17 of the exhibit show horse pasterns that have ridges and furrows present that do not appear to be “uniformly thickened” as required for a horse not to be considered “sore” under the Scar Rule.

However, the caption beneath Figure 11 A on page 16 of RX 2 states, “if these can be smoothed out with the thumbs (see fig. 8) these would not be violations.” And here lies the whole of Respondents’ defense.

Both of the DQPs and Dr. Baker who examined the horse subsequent to the VMOs, believed that the horse’s scars came within these exemptions. Each of them testified that the scars were pliable and could be flattened. But to be considered “flattened” and therefore the “uniformly thickened epithelial tissue” that may be allowed under the Scar Rule, all bumps, grooves, and ridges must, as shown in Figure 8 on page 13 of RX 2, completely disappear when outward pressure is being applied to the site by an examiner’s two thumbs. Apparently, the DQPs and the private veterinarian were using a less exacting standard.

Moreover, since the DQPs had not spoken to the VMOs before their examination, they erroneously thought the violation was confined to the Scar Rule. This probably led them to concentrate their examinations of the horse’s pasterns to the scarred posterior areas and to not fully palpate the horse’s left anterior pastern where the VMOs had elicited pain responses.

Additionally, when Dr. Randall examined the horse some two hours later, the pain in the left anterior pastern may have by then sufficiently subsided so as to be no longer detectable. It has repeatedly been found that DQP examinations have less probative value and are entitled to less credence than examinations by veterinarians employed by the United States Department of Agriculture. In re: Larry E. Edwards, et al, 49 Agric. Dec. 188, 200 (1990). So too, a later examination by a private veterinarian is not
given as much weight as the more immediate examination by two
USDA veterinarians. Id, at 200-201.

For these reasons, I have concluded that Stocks Clutch, FCR was a
sore horse when it was exhibited in the horse show.

(2) Respondent Groover should be assessed a $2,200.00 civil
penalty and disqualified for one year.

The act provides for the assessment of a civil penalty of up to
$2,200.00 for each violation of its provisions and authorizes
disqualification from participating in specified horse industry
activities for not less than one year for the first violation and not less
than five years for any subsequent violation. 15 U.S.C. §1825 (b) and
(e).

When determining the appropriate civil penalty and whether to
impose disqualification, the Act requires consideration of the
following factors (15 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(1)):

... all factors relevant to such determination, including the
nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the prohibited
conduct and, with respect to the person found to have engaged
in such conduct, the degree of culpability, any history of prior
offenses, ability to pay, effect on ability to continue to do
business and such other matters as justice may require.

As pointed out, In re: Bennett, 55 Agric Dec 176, 188 (1996): As a
result of the Scar Rule, the soring seen today... is far more subtle...

Therefore, even though the soring of Stocks Clutch FCR may
appear less severe than the sored horses described in past cases, it is
notable because it occurred while the horse was under the control of
an experienced, knowledgeable horse trainer. As such, Mr. Groover
was required to know the limitations the Act presently places on his
training practices for a horse he exhibits not to be found in violation
of the Act. Unless a professional horse trainer such as Mr. Groover is
held strictly accountable for any horse in his care that is found to have been exhibited while sore, the Act is without meaning.

A sanction must necessarily be assessed against Mr. Groover that will serve as a meaningful deterrent against his employment of excessive training techniques in the future. No one but Mr. Groover was responsible for the soring of the horse. Stocks Clutch FCR was in his care for about a year before the show. (Tr. Vol 2, page 54).

Respondents admit that it was Mr. Groover who entered and exhibited the horse and all responsibility for the condition was his alone and that Respondent Burgess was in no sense responsible (Respondents’ Brief, page 2, 1st sentence of 3rd paragraph). It is therefore found that all culpability for the horse being found “sore” rests with Mr. Groover.

For the reasons previously stated, whenever an experienced, knowledgeable, trainer exhibits a “sored” horse, it must be found that his conduct, absent a credible and meaningful excuse or explanation, is in every respect egregious. Respondent has not contested his ability to pay the $2,200.00 civil penalty authorized under Act for a horse soring violation and that is the appropriate civil penalty to be assessed in these circumstances.

The Act also authorizes the disqualification for a period of not less than one year for the first violation and not less than five years for any subsequent violation. Complainant seeks the imposition of a one year disqualification. This will affect Mr. Groover’s ability to engage in business. But again, in order to have a meaningful deterrent against employing excessive training techniques in the future, I have concluded that his disqualification for one year is needed and appropriate.

(3) and (4) The Complaint as against Respondent Beverly Burgess should be dismissed.
Any appeal of this case will lie in the Sixth Circuit. The controlling law in the Sixth Circuit on whether a horse owner can be held to have “allowed” a sore horse to be shown is set forth in *Baird v United States Department of Agriculture*, 39 F. 3d 131 (6th Cir. 1994). The Sixth Circuit in *Baird*, 39 F. 3d, at 136, reviewed the Eighth Circuit’s decision in *Burton v. United States Department of Agriculture*, 683 F. 2d 280 (8th Cir. 1982). Baird agreed with Burton that 15 U.S.C. § 1824 (2) (D) did not impose a strict liability standard on owners for the actions of their trainers. But instead of the hard-and-fast, three-prong test set forth in Burton for determining whether an owner “allowed” his or her horse to be exhibited or shown while “sore”, the Sixth Circuit elucidated a somewhat different standard for the determination, 39 F. 3d, at 137:

In our view, the government must, as an initial matter, make out a prima facie case of a § 1824 (2) (D) violation. It may do so by establishing (1) ownership; (2) showing, exhibition or entry; and (3) soreness. If the government establishes a prima facie case, the owner may then offer evidence that he took an affirmative step in an effort to prevent the soring that occurred. Assuming the owner presents such evidence and the evidence is justifiably credited, it is up to the government then to prove that the admonition the owner directed to his trainers concerning the soring of horses constituted merely a pretext or a self-serving ruse designed to mask what is actually conduct violative of § 1824.

In applying this standard, *Baird*, 39 F 3d, at 138, held that upon an owner testifying he directed his trainers not to sore his horses, the government must offer evidence to contradict him so as to establish pretext. It is not enough for the government to assert that the testimony was self-serving and less than truthful. At a minimum, Complainant must offer some evidence in contradiction of this testimony by the owner. In the instant case, no contradicting evidence was introduced by Complainant.

Complainant has also asked that instead of following *Baird*, we apply a contrary interpretation of an owner’s liability by the District of Columbia Circuit where an appeal could also lie. That Circuit has
held that an owner may be liable for the actions of her trainer irrespective of her testifying that she instructed the trainer not to “sore” her horse. *Crawford v. U.S. Department of Agriculture*, 50 F. 3d 46, 51 (DC Cir 1995).

However, only Respondents and not Complainant can appeal a final decision in this proceeding. It is absurd to suggest that Respondents would choose to file an appeal in the District of Columbia Circuit instead of the Sixth Circuit where they reside. What Complainant really suggests is that the Secretary follow a policy of non-acquiescence to the Sixth Circuit decision.

To do so, might well provoke that Circuit’s outrage upon the case’s appeal; the kind of outrage that ensued in the face of the HHS policy of non-acquiescence to Ninth Circuit precedents. *See*, Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Sidney A. Shapiro, and Paul R. Verkuil, *Administrative Law and Process*, 393-97 (3d ed. 1999)

For the various reasons discussed, Respondent Beverly Burgess cannot be found to have “allowed” her horse to be shown while sore under the standards applicable in the Sixth Circuit. The Complaint as against her should be dismissed. The following Order is therefore issued.

**ORDER**

On this 21st day of April 2004, the following ORDER is herewith issued:

1. Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., is assessed a civil penalty of $2,200. The civil monetary penalty shall be paid by cashier’s check(s) or money order(s), made payable to order of the Treasurer of the United States, marked with HPA Docket No. 01-0008, deposited with a commercial delivery service such as Fedex or UPS, for receipt by Donald A. Tracy, Esq., Office of the General Counsel, United States Department of Agriculture, 1400 Independence Avenue SW,
2. Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., is disqualified for one year from showing or exhibiting any horse, judging or managing any horse show, horse exhibition, or horse sale or auction.

3. The Complaint in respect to Respondent Beverly Burgess is dismissed with prejudice.

The deadline for receipt of the civil monetary penalty shall be, and the effective date of the disqualification shall be, and this Decision and Order shall become final and effective one day after the time for filing an appeal from this Decision and Order has expired without an appeal having been filed.

In re: BEVERLY BURGESS, AN INDIVIDUAL; GROOVER STABLES, AN UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION; AND WINSTON T. GROOVER, JR., a/k/a WINKY GROOVER, AN INDIVIDUAL.
HPA Docket No. 01-0008.
Decision and Order as to Winston T. Groover, Jr.
Filed November 15, 2004.


The Judicial Officer affirmed the decision by Administrative Law Judge Victor W. Palmer concluding that Winston T. Groover, Jr., exhibited Stocks Clutch FCR in a horse show while the horse was sore, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1824(2)(A). The Judicial Officer assessed Respondent a $2,200 civil penalty and disqualified Respondent from participating in horse shows, horse exhibitions, horse sales, and horse auctions for 1 year. The Judicial Officer rejected Respondent’s contention that Complainant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Stocks Clutch FCR was sore when exhibited. The Judicial Officer found past recollection recorded in the form of affidavits and APHS Form 7077 reliable, probative, and substantial evidence. The Judicial Officer further stated, while Respondent presented competent
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evidence in support of his position that Stocks Clutch FCR was not sore when exhibited, he gave more weight to Complainant’s evidence.

Donald A. Tracy, for Complainant.
Brenda S. Bramlett, for Respondents.

Initial decision issued by Victor W. Palmer, Administrative Law Judge.
Decision and Order issued by William G. Jenson, Judicial Officer.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY


Complainant alleges that: (1) on or about July 7, 2000, Respondent Groover Stables and Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., transported a horse known as “Stocks Clutch FCR” to the Cornersville Lions Club 54th Annual Horse Show, Cornersville, Tennessee, while the horse was sore, for the purpose of showing or exhibiting Stocks Clutch FCR in that show, in violation of section 5(1) of the Horse Protection Act (15 U.S.C. § 1824(1)); (2) on July 7, 2000, Respondent Groover Stables and Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., exhibited Stocks Clutch FCR as entry number 43 in class number 20 in the Cornersville Lions Club 54th Annual Horse Show, Cornersville, Tennessee, while Stocks Clutch FCR was sore, in violation of section 5(2)(A) of the Horse Protection Act (15 U.S.C. § 1824(2)(A)); and (3) on or about July 7, 2000, Respondent Beverly Burgess allowed Respondent Groover Stables and Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., to exhibit Stocks Clutch FCR as entry number 43 in class number 20 in the Cornersville Lions Club 54th Annual Horse Show, Cornersville, Tennessee, while Stocks Clutch
FCR was sore, in violation of section 5(2)(D) of the Horse Protection Act (15 U.S.C. § 1824(2)(D)) (Compl. ¶¶ 5-7).

On December 21, 2000, Beverly Burgess, Groover Stables, and Winston T. Groover, Jr. [hereinafter Respondents], filed an “Answer” denying the material allegations of the Complaint (Answer ¶¶ 6-8).


On April 21, 2004, Administrative Law Judge Victor W. Palmer1 [hereinafter the ALJ] issued a “Decision and Order” [hereinafter Initial Decision and Order]: (1) concluding that on July 7, 2000, Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., and Respondent Groover Stables exhibited Stocks Clutch FCR as entry number 43 in class number 20 in the Cornersville Lions Club 54th Annual Horse Show, Cornersville, Tennessee, while Stocks Clutch FCR was sore, in violation of section 5(2)(A) of the Horse Protection Act (15 U.S.C. § 1824(2)(A)); (2) dismissing the Complaint against Respondent Beverly Burgess; (3) assessing Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., a $2,200 civil penalty; and (4) disqualifying Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., from showing, exhibiting, or entering any horse and

from managing, judging, or otherwise participating in any horse show, horse exhibition, horse sale, or horse auction for 1 year (Initial Decision and Order at 12-13, 19).


Based upon a careful consideration of the record, I agree with the ALJ’s Initial Decision and Order. Therefore, pursuant to section 1.145(i) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.145(i)), I adopt, with minor modifications, the Initial Decision and Order as the final Decision and Order as to Winston T. Groover, Jr.2 Additional conclusions by the Judicial Officer follow the ALJ’s discussion as restated.

Complainant’s exhibits are designated by “CX.” Respondents’ exhibits are designated by “RX.” The transcript is divided into two volumes, one volume for each day of the 2-day hearing. Each volume begins with page 1 and is sequentially numbered. References to “Tr. Vol. I” are to the volume of the transcript that relates to the June 26, 2002, segment of the hearing. References to “Tr. Vol. II” are to the volume of the transcript that relates to the June 27, 2002, segment of the hearing.

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2 The Initial Decision and Order relates to Respondent Beverly Burgess, Respondent Groover Stables, and Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr. Only Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., appealed the ALJ’s Initial Decision and Order. Therefore, in accordance with section 1.142(c)(4) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.142(c)(4)), the ALJ’s Initial Decision and Order became final and effective as to Respondent Beverly Burgess and Respondent Groover Stables 35 days after the Hearing Clerk served them with the ALJ’s Initial Decision and Order. The Hearing Clerk served Respondent Beverly Burgess and Respondent Groover Stables with the Initial Decision and Order on April 26, 2004 (United States Postal Service Domestic Return Receipt for Article Number 7000 1670 0003 5453 1228), and the Initial Decision and Order became final as to Respondent Beverly Burgess and Respondent Groover Stables on May 31, 2004. Therefore, this decision and order only relates to Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr.
§ 1821. Definitions

As used in this chapter unless the context otherwise requires:

(3) The term “sore” when used to describe a horse means that—

(A) an irritating or blistering agent has been applied, internally or externally, by a person to any limb of a horse,

(B) any burn, cut, or laceration has been inflicted by a person on any limb of a horse,
(C) any tack, nail, screw, or chemical agent has been injected by a person into or used by a person on any limb of a horse, or

(D) any other substance or device has been used by a person on any limb of a horse or a person has engaged in a practice involving a horse,

and, as a result of such application, infliction, injection, use, or practice, such horse suffers, or can reasonably be expected to suffer, physical pain or distress, inflammation, or lameness when walking, trotting, or otherwise moving, except that such term does not include such an application, infliction, injection, use, or practice in connection with the therapeutic treatment of a horse by or under the supervision of a person licensed to practice veterinary medicine in the State in which such treatment was given.

§ 1822. Congressional statement of findings

The Congress finds and declares that–

(1) the soring of horses is cruel and inhumane;

(2) horses shown or exhibited which are sore, where such soreness improves the performance of such horse, compete unfairly with horses which are not sore;

(3) the movement, showing, exhibition, or sale of sore horses in intrastate commerce adversely affects and burdens interstate and foreign commerce;
(4) all horses which are subject to regulation under this chapter are either in interstate or foreign commerce or substantially affect such commerce; and

(5) regulation under this chapter by the Secretary is appropriate to prevent and eliminate burdens upon commerce and to effectively regulate commerce.

§ 1823. Horse shows and exhibitions

(a) Disqualification of horses

The management of any horse show or horse exhibition shall disqualify any horse from being shown or exhibited (1) which is sore or (2) if the management has been notified by a person appointed in accordance with regulations under subsection (c) of this section or by the Secretary that the horse is sore.

(c) Appointment of inspectors; manner of inspections

The Secretary shall prescribe by regulation requirements for the appointment by the management of any horse show, horse exhibition, or horse sale or auction of persons qualified to detect and diagnose a horse which is sore or to otherwise
inspect horses for the purposes of enforcing this chapter. Such requirements shall prohibit the appointment of persons who, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, have been disqualified by the Secretary to make such detection, diagnosis, or inspection. Appointment of a person in accordance with the requirements prescribed under this subsection shall not be construed as authorizing such person to conduct inspections in a manner other than that prescribed for inspections by the Secretary (or the Secretary’s representative) under subsection (e) of this section.

§ 1824. Unlawful acts

The following conduct is prohibited:

(1) The shipping, transporting, moving, delivering, or receiving of any horse which is sore with reason to believe that such horse while it is sore may be shown, exhibited, entered, sold, auctioned, or offered for sale, in any horse show, horse exhibition, horse sale, or auction; except that this paragraph does not apply to the shipping, transporting, moving, delivering, or receiving of any horse by a common or contract carrier or an employee thereof in the usual course of the carrier’s business or the employee’s employment unless the carrier or employee has reason to believe that such horse is sore.

(2) The (A) showing or exhibiting, in any horse show or horse exhibition, of any horse which is sore, (B) entering for the purpose of showing or exhibiting in any horse show or horse exhibition, any horse which is sore, (C) selling, auctioning, or offering for sale, in any horse sale or auction, any horse which is sore, and (D) allowing any activity
described in clause (A), (B), or (C) respecting a horse which is sore by the owner of such horse.

§ 1825. Violations and penalties

(b) Civil penalties; review and enforcement

(1) Any person who violates section 1824 of this title shall be liable to the United States for a civil penalty of not more than $2,000 for each violation. No penalty shall be assessed unless such person is given notice and opportunity for a hearing before the Secretary with respect to such violation. The amount of such civil penalty shall be assessed by the Secretary by written order. In determining the amount of such penalty, the Secretary shall take into account all factors relevant to such determination, including the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the prohibited conduct and, with respect to the person found to have engaged in such conduct, the degree of culpability, any history of prior offenses, ability to pay, effect on ability to continue to do business, and such other matters as justice may require.

(2) Any person against whom a violation is found and a civil penalty assessed under paragraph (1) of this subsection may obtain review in the court of appeals of the United States for the circuit in which such person resides or has his place of business or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit by filing a notice of appeal in such court within 30 days from the date of such order and by
simultaneously sending a copy of such notice by certified mail to the Secretary. The Secretary shall promptly file in such court a certified copy of the record upon which such violation was found and such penalty assessed, as provided in section 2112 of title 28. The findings of the Secretary shall be set aside if found to be unsupported by substantial evidence.

(c) Disqualification of offenders; orders; civil penalties applicable; enforcement procedures

In addition to any fine, imprisonment, or civil penalty authorized under this section, any person who was convicted under subsection (a) of this section or who paid a civil penalty assessed under subsection (b) of this section or is subject to a final order under such subsection assessing a civil penalty for any violation of any provision of this chapter or any regulation issued under this chapter may be disqualified by order of the Secretary, after notice and an opportunity for a hearing before the Secretary, from showing or exhibiting any horse, judging or managing any horse show, horse exhibition, or horse sale or auction for a period of not less than one year for the first violation and not less than five years for any subsequent violation. Any person who knowingly fails to obey an order of disqualification shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $3,000 for each violation. Any horse show, horse exhibition, or horse sale or auction, or the management thereof, collectively and severally, which knowingly allows any person who is under an order of disqualification to show or exhibit any horse, to enter for the purpose of showing or exhibiting any horse, to take part in managing or judging, or otherwise to participate in any horse show, horse exhibition, or horse sale or
auction in violation of an order shall be subject to a civil penalty of not more than $3,000 for each violation. The provisions of subsection (b) of this section respecting the assessment, review, collection, and compromise, modification, and remission of a civil penalty apply with respect to civil penalties under this subsection.

§ 1828. Rules and regulations

The Secretary is authorized to issue such rules and regulations as he deems necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1821(3), 1822, 1823(a), (c), 1824(1)-(2), 1825(b)(1)-(2), (c), 1828.

28 U.S.C.:

TITLE 28—JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE

. . . .

PART VI—PARTICULAR PROCEEDINGS
CHAPTER 163—FINES, PENALTIES AND FORFEITURES

§ 2461. Mode of recovery

FEDERAL CIVIL PENALTIES INFLATION ADJUSTMENT

SHORT TITLE

SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the “Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990”

FINDINGS AND PURPOSE

SEC. 2. (a) FINDINGS.—The Congress finds that—

(1) the power of Federal agencies to impose civil monetary penalties for violations of Federal law and regulations plays an important role in deterring violations
and furthering the policy goals embodied in such laws and regulations;

(2) the impact of many civil monetary penalties has been and is diminished due to the effect of inflation;

(3) by reducing the impact of civil monetary penalties, inflation has weakened the deterrent effect of such penalties; and

(4) the Federal Government does not maintain comprehensive, detailed accounting of the efforts of Federal agencies to assess and collect civil monetary penalties.

(b) PURPOSE—The purpose of this Act is to establish a mechanism that shall—

(1) allow for regular adjustment for inflation of civil monetary penalties;

(2) maintain the deterrent effect of civil monetary penalties and promote compliance with the law; and

(3) improve the collection by the Federal Government of civil monetary penalties.

DEFINITIONS

SEC. 3. For purposes of this Act, the term—

(1) “agency” means an Executive agency as defined under section 105 of title 5, United States Code, and includes the United States Postal Service;
(2) “civil monetary penalty” means any penalty, fine, or other sanction that—

(A)(i) is for a specific monetary amount as provided by Federal law; or

(ii) has a maximum amount provided for by Federal law; and

(B) is assessed or enforced by an agency pursuant to Federal law; and

(C) is assessed or enforced pursuant to an administrative proceeding or a civil action in the Federal courts; and

(3) “Consumer Price Index” means the Consumer Price Index for all-urban consumers published by the Department of Labor.

CIVIL MONETARY PENALTY INFLATION

ADJUSTMENT REPORTS

Sec. 4. The head of each agency shall, not later than 180 days after the date of enactment of the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 [Apr. 26, 1996], and at least once every 4 years thereafter—

(1) by regulation adjust each civil monetary penalty provided by law within the jurisdiction of the Federal agency, except for any penalty (including any addition to tax and additional amount) under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 [26 U.S.C. 1 et seq.], the Tariff Act of 1930
(2) publish each such regulation in the Federal Register.

COST-OF-LIVING ADJUSTMENTS OF CIVIL MONETARY PENALTIES

SEC. 5. (a) ADJUSTMENT.—The inflation adjustment under section 4 shall be determined by increasing the maximum civil monetary penalty or the range of minimum and maximum civil monetary penalties, as applicable, for each civil monetary penalty by the cost-of-living adjustment. Any increase determined under this subsection shall be rounded to the nearest—

(1) multiple of $10 in the case of penalties less than or equal to $100;

(2) multiple of $100 in the case of penalties greater than $100 but less than or equal to $1,000;

(3) multiple of $1,000 in the case of penalties greater than $1,000 but less than or equal to $10,000;

(4) multiple of $5,000 in the case of penalties greater than $10,000 but less than or equal to $100,000;

(5) multiple of $10,000 in the case of penalties greater than $100,000 but less than or equal to $200,000; and
(6) multiple of $25,000 in the case of penalties greater than $200,000.

(b) Definition.—For purposes of subsection (a), the term “cost-of-living adjustment” means the percentage (if any) for each civil monetary penalty by which—

(1) the Consumer Price Index for the month of June of the calendar year preceding the adjustment, exceeds

(2) the Consumer Price Index for the month of June of the calendar year in which the amount of such civil monetary penalty was last set or adjusted pursuant to law.

ANNUAL REPORT

SEC. 6. Any increase under this Act in a civil monetary penalty shall apply only to violations which occur after the date the increase takes effect.


7 C.F.R.:

TITLE 7—AGRICULTURE

SUBTITLE A—OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
PART 3—DEBT MANAGEMENT

§ 3.91 Adjusted civil monetary penalties.

(a) In general. The Secretary will adjust the civil monetary penalties, listed in paragraph (b), to take account of inflation at least once every 4 years as required by the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990 (Pub. L. No. 101-410), as amended by the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 (Pub. L. No. 104-134).

(b) Penalties—.

(2) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. . .

7 C.F.R. § 3.91(a), (b)(2)(vii).

9 C.F.R.:

TITLE 9—ANIMALS AND ANIMAL PRODUCTS

CHAPTER I—ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH

INSPECTION SERVICE,

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

SUBCHAPTER A—ANIMAL WELFARE

PART 11—HORSE PROTECTION REGULATIONS

§ 11.1 Definitions.

For the purpose of this part, unless the context otherwise requires, the following terms shall have the meanings assigned to them in this section. The singular form shall also impart the
plural and the masculine form shall also impart the feminine. Words of art undefined in the following paragraphs shall have the meaning attributed to them by trade usage or general usage as reflected in a standard dictionary, such as “Webster’s.”

Designated Qualified Person or DQP means a person meeting the requirements specified in § 11.7 of this part who has been licensed as a DQP by a horse industry organization or association having a DQP program certified by the Department and who may be appointed and delegated authority by the management of any horse show, horse exhibition, horse sale, or horse auction under section 4 of the Act to detect or diagnose horses which are sore or to otherwise inspect horses and any records pertaining to such horses for the purposes of enforcing the Act.

Sore when used to describe a horse means:

(1) An irritating or blistering agent has been applied, internally or externally, by a person to any limb of a horse,

(2) Any burn, cut, or laceration has been inflicted by a person on any limb of a horse,

(3) Any tack, nail, screw, or chemical agent has been injected by a person into or used by a person on any limb of a horse, or

(4) Any other substance or device has been used by a person on any limb of a horse or a person has engaged in a practice involving a horse, and, as a result of such application, infliction, injection, use, or practice, such horse suffers, or can reasonably be expected to suffer, physical pain or distress, inflammation, or lameness when walking, trotting, or otherwise
moving, except that such term does not include such an application, infliction, injection, use, or practice in connection with the therapeutic treatment of a horse by or under the supervision of a person licensed to practice veterinary medicine in the State in which such treatment was given.

§ 11.3 Scar rule.

The scar rule applies to all horses born on or after October 1, 1975. Horses subject to this rule that do not meet the following scar rule criteria shall be considered to be “sore” and are subject to all prohibitions of section 5 of the Act. The scar rule criteria are as follows:

(a) The anterior and anterior-lateral surfaces of the fore pasterns (extensor surface) must be free of bilateral granulomas, other bilateral pathological evidence of inflammation, and, other bilateral evidence of abuse indicative of soring including, but not limited to, excessive loss of hair.

(b) The posterior surfaces of the pasterns (flexor surface), including the sulcus or “pocket” may show bilateral areas of uniformly thickened epithelial tissue if such areas are free of proliferating granuloma tissue, irritation, moisture, edema, or other evidence of inflammation.

9 C.F.R. §§ 11.1, .3 (footnote omitted).
Decision Summary

Upon consideration of the record evidence and the briefs and arguments by the parties, I decide Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., violated the Horse Protection Act by exhibiting Stocks Clutch FCR while the horse was sore and that a $2,200 civil penalty should be assessed against him. Moreover, Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., should be disqualified for 1 year from horse industry activities as provided in the Horse Protection Act. The findings of fact, conclusions of law, and discussion that follow explain the reasons for the Order. In reaching these findings and conclusions, I have fully considered the briefs, motions, and arguments by the parties and, if not adopted or incorporated within the findings of fact and conclusions of law, they have been rejected as not in accord with the relevant and material facts in evidence or controlling law.

Findings of Fact

1. Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., also known as Winky Groover, is an individual whose mailing address is Post Office Box 1435, Shelbyville, Tennessee 37162. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., was the sole proprietor of Respondent Groover Stables. (Answer ¶ 1-2.)
2. Respondent Beverly Burgess is an individual whose mailing address is 351 Highway 82 East, Bell Buckle, Tennessee 37020. At all times material to this proceeding, Respondent Beverly Burgess was the owner of a horse known as “Stocks Clutch FCR.” (Answer ¶ 3.)

3. On or about July 7, 2000, Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., transported Stocks Clutch FCR to the Cornersville Lions Club 54th Annual Horse Show, in Cornersville, Tennessee, for the purpose of showing or exhibiting the horse as entry number 43 in class number 20 (Answer ¶ 4).

4. The United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, assigned personnel to monitor the Cornersville Lions Club 54th Annual Horse Show. They included Dr. David Smith and Dr. Sylvia Taylor, employed by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service as veterinary medical officers, and Michael Nottingham, employed by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service as an investigator. (Tr. Vol. I at 18-22, 50; CX 5 at 1, CX 6 at 1.)

5. The duties of the veterinary medical officers at the Cornersville Lions Club 54th Annual Horse Show were to detect sore horses, to document any findings of sore horses, and to ensure the Designated Qualified Persons employed by the organization certified by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service to manage the Cornersville Lions Club 54th Annual Horse Show, were effectively enforcing the Horse Protection Act (Tr. Vol. I at 44).

6. The veterinary medical officers examined the second and third place horses post show. The Designated Qualified Persons examined all first place horses. (Tr. Vol. I at 43-44.)

7. On July 7, 2000, Stocks Clutch FCR, after being exhibited at the Cornersville Lions Club 54th Annual Horse Show by Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., was designated by the horse
show as the second place horse in its class and for that reason was examined post show by Dr. David Smith (CX 5).

8. Dr. Smith did not have any present recollection of Stocks Clutch FCR or his examination of the horse on July 7, 2000, when he testified at the hearing on June 26, 2002. The Cornersville Lions Club 54th Annual Horse Show had taken place on the night of July 7, 2000, and Dr. Smith prepared his affidavit the next morning based on his notes and his memory from the night before. He no longer had the notes when he testified at the hearing and his reading of his affidavit did not refresh his recollection. Dr. Smith’s testimony about Stocks Clutch FCR’s condition when he examined the horse consists entirely of his affidavit (CX 5) and APHIS Form 7077 (CX 4), which he helped prepare. (Tr. Vol. I at 45-48.)

9. Dr. Smith observed, as set forth in his affidavit (CX 5 at 1), that:

. . . [T]he horse was slow to lead as the custodian walked it. When I examined the horse’s forefeet I found an area painful to palpation along the lateral aspect of the left forefoot just above the coronary band. The pain was indicated as the horse tried to pull its foot away each time I applied gentle pressure with the ball of my thumb to this location. It was consistent and repeatable. I indicated the position of the painful area in the drawings at the bottom of the APHIS Form 7077 corresponding to this case. The palmar aspect of the left fore pastern had many deep folds, corrugations, and nodular areas consistent with a scar rule violation. Although the skin in this area was pigmented, I could see reddening and swelling consistent with a scar rule violation. I found reddened, swollen corrugations on the palmar aspect of the right forefoot.
10. After his examination of Stocks Clutch FCR, Dr. Smith asked Dr. Taylor to examine the horse. Dr. Smith did not tell Dr. Taylor what he had found and did not observe her examination. (CX 5 at 2.)

11. At the hearing on June 26, 2002, Dr. Taylor did not have a present memory, and her recollection could not be refreshed, respecting her examination of Stocks Clutch FCR on July 7, 2000 (Tr. Vol. I at 162-63).

12. Dr. Taylor prepared her affidavit at 11:50 p.m., on July 7, 2000, shortly after the end of the Cornersville Lions Club 54th Annual Horse Show and her examination of Stocks Clutch FCR. Dr. Taylor also contemporaneously helped prepare APHIS Form 7077. (CX 4, CX 6 at 3; Tr. Vol. I at 164.)

13. Dr. Taylor recorded in her affidavit (CX 6 at 1-2) that:

   On July 7, at approximately 8:50 PM, Dr. Smith examined a black stallion, Stocks Clutch, entry 43, in Class 20, after placing 2nd. I observed that the horse walked and completed a turn around the cone normally, but as it went straight after the turn it was reluctant to go and the rein was pulled taut to continue leading it. I observed Dr. Smith approach the left side of the horse and lift the foot and palpate it in the customary manner. I noticed that the horse flinched its shoulder and neck muscles and shifted its weight while he palpated the left pastern, but I did not observe whether this response was consistently localized to palpation of any particular part of the pastern, other than that it was not the posterior pastern. He then palpated the right pastern, and I did not see a similar response. Dr. Smith then asked me to examine the horse.

   I observed the horse walk and turn again. It walked and turned around the cone normally, but as it left the turn it was
reluctant to lead and the custodian had to pull the horse along on a tight rein. I approached the horse on the left, established contact and began palpating the left posterior pastern. I noticed that there was very pronounced, severe scarring of the skin of the posterior pastern. There were thickened ropes of hairless skin medial and lateral to the posterior midline, bulging into even thicker, hard corrugations and oval nodules along the medial-posterior aspect. This epithelial tissue was non-uniformly thickened and could not be flattened or smoothed out. Grooves and cracks on the lateral and midline area above the pocket were reddened. When I palpated the lateral and anterio-lateral pastern, the horse attempted to withdraw its foot and I could feel its shoulder and neck muscles tighten and pull away. I obtain this response consistently and repeatedly three times, always when palpating that same spot.

When I palpated the right posterior pastern, I observed that it was also very scarred. There were non-uniformly thick cords of epithelial tissue with hairloss, that also could not be flattened or smoothed, some of which were also reddened. I noticed that the horse flinched and twitched several times while I palpated the posterior pastern over these scars, but the response was not consistently localizable to a particular area. I then palpated the anterior right pastern and did not detect a pain response.

14. In the professional opinions of both Dr. Smith and Dr. Taylor, Stocks Clutch FCR was both unilaterally sore and in violation of the scar rule. In the professional opinion of both Dr. Smith and Dr. Taylor, Stocks Clutch FCR was sore due to the use of chemical and/or mechanical means, in violation of the Horse Protection Act. (CX 5, CX 6.)
15. Dr. Smith and Dr. Taylor documented Stocks Clutch FCR as being in violation of the Horse Protection Act and completedAPHIS Form 7077, Summary of Alleged Violations (CX 4).

16. Dr. Smith and Dr. Taylor testified they do not document a horse as being in violation of the Horse Protection Act unless they both agree that the horse is sore and in violation of the Horse Protection Act (Tr. Vol. I at 136, 168).

17. After the examination by Dr. Smith and Dr. Taylor, the Horse Show’s Designated Qualified Persons, Charles Thomas and Andy Messick, examined Stocks Clutch FCR (Tr. Vol. II at 17-18, 36-38).

18. A Designated Qualified Person is a person meeting the requirements in section 11.7 of the Horse Protection Regulations (9 C.F.R. § 11.7), who is delegated authority under section 4 of the Horse Protection Act (15 U.S.C. § 1823) to detect horses which are sore (RX 7 at 30). The National Horse Show Commission’s Designated Qualified Person program, which employs Mr. Thomas and Mr. Messick as Designated Qualified Persons, is certified by the United States Department of Agriculture (Tr. Vol. I at 86, 228). The training of Designated Qualified Persons is akin to that of United States Department of Agriculture veterinary medical officers in that they attend annual training programs together that are given by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (Tr. Vol. I at 86-87). Mr. Thomas and Mr. Messick are both highly qualified and experienced Designated Qualified Persons, but neither is a veterinarian as are the likewise highly qualified and experienced Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service veterinary medical officers. The duties of Designated Qualified Persons are not full time; Mr. Messick is principally employed as an attorney and Mr. Thomas is retired (Tr. Vol. II at 3, 29-30).

19. After the examinations by the veterinary medical officers, Mr. Messick was the first Designated Qualified Person to examine Stocks Clutch FCR. After reviewing his examination sheet, Mr. Messick had a present recollection of his examination of Stocks
Clutch FCR some 2 years before the hearing. Mr. Messick was the same Designated Qualified Person who had passed Stocks Clutch FCR for exhibition and showing based on his pre-show inspection in which he found the horse met the industry standards. Mr. Messick did not watch the veterinary medical officers examine Stocks Clutch FCR post show. Mr. Messick’s post show examination of Stocks Clutch FCR occurred approximately 5 or 10 minutes after the examinations by Dr. Smith and Dr. Taylor. Mr. Messick testified that, as was the case pre-show, the horse still had soft, uniformly thickened tissue and he did not get any withdrawal response on his palpation on the left or right foot. Mr. Messick did not observe swelling or redness of the posterior pastern of either foot. (Tr. Vol. II at 8-20; RX 8, RX 12.)

20. Mr. Thomas next examined Stocks Clutch FCR. Mr. Thomas and Mr. Messick were asked to do so by Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., who told them that Dr. Smith and Dr. Taylor had “taken information on him on the scar rule.” Since Andy Messick was the first one to check Stocks Clutch FCR pre-show, he also checked the horse first post show. (Tr. Vol. II at 37.) Mr. Thomas’ predominant concern appeared to be whether Stocks Clutch FCR was in violation of the scar rule. He did not believe it was, “He did have some raised places... but they were soft and pliable. That’s what we were -- in our training, what we were required -- as long as they were soft, we could take our thumb and stretch them and flatten them out or press them and they flatten out, and they were only in the back. Nothing though, around the edge.” (Tr. Vol. II at 39.)

21. In Mr. Thomas’ opinion, Stocks Clutch FCR was not in violation of the scar rule and he did not find abnormal reactions when he palpated the horse’s front pasterns (Tr. Vol. II at 40; RX 10, RX 11).

22. At 10:40 p.m., on July 7, 2000, approximately 2 hours after the examinations of Stocks Clutch FCR by the veterinary medical officers, Dr. Randall T. Baker examined the horse. Dr. Baker is a veterinarian in private practice for 25 years who is licensed in Tennessee and is a member of the American Association of Equine
Practitioners. (RX 13; Tr. Vol. I at 297-98, 305-06.) At the hearing, Dr. Baker had present recollection of his examination of Stocks Clutch FCR which was videotaped and requested by Respondents. Dr. Baker did not find Stocks Clutch FCR’s front pasterns to be sore and believed the scars on the pasterns did not violate the scar rule. Although he found some hair loss and thickened epithelial tissue on both posterior pasterns, Dr. Baker concluded that the scar rule was not violated because when he put his palm on the back of Stocks Clutch FCR’s foot, he did not have excess tissue coming out from there and the tissue was pliable and not real firm granulation type tissue; it would spread around and cleave under his thumb. Dr. Baker saw no evidence of scarring or redness on either the left or right posterior pasterns. (Tr. Vol. I at 309-27.)

23. Respondent Beverly Burgess watched Dr. Smith and Dr. Taylor inspect Stocks Clutch FCR and in her opinion Dr. Taylor “was not ‘a horse person’” because she appeared to have trouble picking up the horse’s foot and went at it in an awkward way (Tr. Vol. II at 52). Respondents also presented testimony from Mr. Lonnie Messick, the executive vice president and Designated Qualified Person coordinator for the National Horse Show Commission, and Designated Qualified Person Andy Messick’s father, that he had once seen Dr. Taylor hold a horse’s foot in an improper manner that caused the horse to jerk its foot away from her. However, he further testified that he had been with Dr. Taylor at other horse shows and she seemed competent. (Tr. Vol. I at 223, 227, 265-66, 271-73.)

24. Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., has been a professional horse trainer since 1975. He has attended Designated Qualified Person clinics and read various publications on determining whether a horse is in compliance with the Horse Protection Act. Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., testified that on July 7, 2000, he transported Stocks Clutch FCR to the Cornersville Lions Club 54th Annual Horse Show, entered Stocks Clutch FCR in the Cornersville Lions Club 54th Annual Horse Show, and exhibited Stocks Clutch FCR at the Cornersville Lions Club 54th Annual Horse Show, where the horse
was awarded second place in class number 20. (Tr. Vol. II at 91-95.)
No evidence has been entered and no argument has been made to show any prior violations of the Horse Protection Act by Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr.

Conclusions of Law

1. Stocks Clutch FCR was a sore horse when exhibited by Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., on July 7, 2000, as entry number 43 in class number 20 in the Cornersville Lions Club 54th Annual Horse Show, Cornersville, Tennessee. On July 7, 2000, Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., violated section 5(2)(A) of the Horse Protection Act (15 U.S.C. § 1824(2)(A)) when he exhibited Stocks Clutch FCR as entry number 43 in class number 20 in the Cornersville Lions Club 54th Annual Horse Show, Cornersville, Tennessee.

2. Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., should be assessed a civil penalty of $2,200 and made subject to a 1-year disqualification from horse industry activities, as provided in the Horse Protection Act.

Discussion

Stocks Clutch FCR Was Sore When Exhibited

Two competent, experienced, highly qualified veterinary medical officers employed by the United States Department of Agriculture inspected Stocks Clutch FCR after the horse was awarded second place in class number 20 at the Cornersville Lions Club 54th Annual
Horse Show, Cornersville, Tennessee, on July 7, 2000. The veterinary medical officers each examined Stocks Clutch FCR separately and independently. Each independently concluded that Stocks Clutch FCR was sore. Only after the two veterinary medical officers agreed on their findings was Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., the trainer of Stocks Clutch FCR, charged with violating the Horse Protection Act. Neither veterinary medical officer can be said to have any reason to have made a false or frivolous accusation. The accusation that one of them, Dr. Taylor, was not “a horse person” and did not know how to handle a horse’s feet is not supported by the record. Dr. Taylor has been a veterinarian since 1986 and for some 12 years, her exclusive duties for the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service concerned enforcement of the Horse Protection Act. The only witness offered in corroboration of the charge made by Respondent Beverly Burgess, admitted on cross-examination that Dr. Taylor was indeed competent. Dr. Taylor and Dr. Smith, the other Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service veterinary medical officer who found Stocks Clutch FCR sore, were considered by the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service to possess such special competence in this field that another veterinarian was with them at the horse show for training.

Dr. Taylor and Dr. Smith found Stocks Clutch FCR to be sore on two separate bases. First, they each found an area painful to palpation along the lateral aspect of the left forefoot. Stocks Clutch FCR pulled his foot away from the veterinary medical officers each time thumb pressure was applied to palpate this area. Each veterinary medical officer palpated the area repeatedly and the horse’s pain response was consistent and repeatable.

Second, both veterinary medical officers observed scars on the posterior of both of Stocks Clutch FCR’s front pasterns which each veterinary medical officer found to be in the violation of the scar rule. In an attempt to make the scar rule generally understandable to all who inspect Tennessee Walking Horses for evidence of soring, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service has issued various publications illustrating its proper application. Respondents’ Exhibit
2 is one of those publications. It was used as an aid in the cross-examinations of Dr. Smith and Dr. Taylor. Pages 16 and 17 of Respondents’ Exhibit 2 show horse pasterns that have ridges and furrows present that do not appear to be “uniformly thickened” as required for a horse not to be considered sore under the scar rule. However, the caption beneath figure 11A on page 16 of Respondents’ Exhibit 2 states, “[i]f these can be smoothed out with the thumbs (see fig. 8), these would not be violations.” And here lies the whole of Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr.’s defense.

Both of the Designated Qualified Persons and Dr. Baker who examined Stocks Clutch FCR subsequent to the veterinary medical officers, believed the horse’s scars came within these exemptions. Each of them testified that the scars were pliable and could be flattened. But to be considered “flattened” and therefore the “uniformly thickened epithelial tissue” that may be allowed under the scar rule, all bumps, grooves, and ridges must, as shown in figure 8 on page 13 of Respondents’ Exhibit 2, completely disappear when outward pressure is being applied to the site by an examiner’s two thumbs. Apparently, the Designated Qualified Persons and the private veterinarian were using a less exacting standard.

Moreover, since the Designated Qualified Persons had not spoken to the veterinary medical officers before their examinations, they erroneously thought the violation was confined to the scar rule. This mistaken belief probably led the Designated Qualified Persons to concentrate their examinations of Stocks Clutch FCR’s pasterns to the scarred posterior areas and to not fully palpate the horse’s left anterior pastern where the veterinary medical officers had elicited pain responses.

Additionally, when Dr. Baker examined Stocks Clutch FCR some 2 hours later, the pain in the left anterior pastern may have by then sufficiently subsided so as to be no longer detectable.

Designated Qualified Person examinations generally have less probative value and are entitled to less credence than examinations by veterinary medical officers employed by the United States
Department of Agriculture. Similarly, a later examination by a private veterinarian is not given as much weight as the more immediate examination by two United States Department of Agriculture veterinarians.\(^3\)

For these reasons, I conclude Stocks Clutch FCR was sore when Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., exhibited the horse in the Cornersville Lions Club 54th Annual Horse Show, Cornersville, Tennessee, on July 7, 2000.

**Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., Should be Assessed**

**A $2,200 Civil Penalty and Disqualified for 1 Year**

The Horse Protection Act provides for the assessment of a civil penalty of up to $2,200 for each violation of its provisions and authorizes disqualification from participating in specified horse industry activities for not less than 1 year for the first violation and not less than 5 years for any subsequent violation.\(^4\)

When determining the appropriate civil penalty, the Horse Protection Act requires consideration of all factors relevant to such determination, including the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the prohibited conduct and, with respect to the person found to have engaged in such conduct, the degree of culpability, any history of prior offenses, ability to pay, effect on ability to continue to do business, and such other matters as justice may require.\(^5\)

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As pointed out in *In re Kim Bennett*, 55 Agric. Dec. 176, 188 (1996), “[a]s a result of the Scar Rule, the soring that is seen today . . . is far more subtle. . . .” Therefore, even though the soring of Stocks Clutch FCR may appear less severe than the sored horses described in past cases, it is notable because it occurred while the horse was under the control of an experienced, knowledgeable horse trainer. As such, Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., was required to know the limitations the Horse Protection Act presently places on his training practices for a horse he exhibits not to be found in violation of the Horse Protection Act. Unless a professional horse trainer, such as Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., is held strictly accountable for any horse in his care that is found to have been exhibited while sore, the Horse Protection Act is without meaning.

A sanction must necessarily be assessed against Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., that will serve as a meaningful deterrent against his employment of excessive training techniques in the future. No one but Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., was responsible for the soring of the horse. Stocks Clutch FCR was in his care for about a year before the show (Tr. Vol. II at 54). Respondents admit Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., entered and exhibited Stocks Clutch FCR and all responsibility for Stocks Clutch FCR’s condition was Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr.’s alone (Respondents’ Proposed Findings, Conclusions of Law, Brief and Order at 2). I therefore find all culpability for Stocks Clutch FCR being sore rests with Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr.

For the reasons previously stated, whenever an experienced, knowledgeable, trainer exhibits a sored horse, it must be found that his conduct, absent a credible and meaningful excuse or explanation, is in every respect egregious. Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., has not contested his ability to pay the $2,200 civil penalty authorized under the Horse Protection Act for a horse soring violation and that is the appropriate civil penalty to be assessed in these circumstances.

The Horse Protection Act also authorizes the disqualification for not less than 1 year for the first violation and not less than 5 years for any subsequent violation. Complainant seeks the imposition of a
1 year disqualification. In order to have a meaningful deterrent against employing excessive training techniques in the future, I conclude Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr.’s disqualification for 1 year is necessary and appropriate.

**ADDITIONAL CONCLUSIONS BY THE JUDICIAL OFFICER**

Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., raises five issues in “Respondent’s Appeal of Decision and Order; and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Respondent’s Appeal” [hereinafter Appeal Petition]. First, Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., asserts the ALJ erroneously concluded that “a presumption of soreness was created based upon a finding of unilateral soreness” (Appeal Pet. at 2).

Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., does not cite, and I cannot locate, any finding, conclusion, or statement in the Initial Decision and Order indicating that the ALJ concluded that “a presumption of soreness was created based upon a finding of unilateral soreness.” Therefore, I reject Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr.’s assertion that the ALJ erroneously concluded that “a presumption of soreness was created based upon a finding of unilateral soreness.”

Second, Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., contends Complainant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Stocks Clutch FCR was sore when Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., exhibited the horse as entry number 43 in class number 20 in the Cornersville Lions Club 54th Annual Horse Show, Cornersville, Tennessee, on July 7, 2000. Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., contends Complainant’s case is based solely on past recorded findings of Dr. Smith and Dr. Taylor neither of whom had any present recollection of their July 7, 2000, examinations of Stocks Clutch FCR during the hearing. Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., contends,
while past recollection recorded is admissible in administrative proceedings and can constitute substantial evidence to support factual findings, it must be reliable. Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., contends Dr. Smith’s and Dr. Taylor’s affidavits (CX 5, CX 6) are not reliable because they are not accurate and fresh and APHIS Form 7077 (CX 4) is not reliable because it is not accurate. (Appeal Pet. at 2-8.)

The proponent of an order has the burden of proof in proceedings conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act, and the standard of proof by which the burden of persuasion is met is the preponderance of the evidence standard. The standard of proof in administrative proceedings conducted under the Horse Protection Act is preponderance of the evidence. Dr. Smith and Dr. Taylor testified

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that, at the time of the hearing, they had no independent recollection of their examinations of Stocks Clutch FCR (Tr. Vol. I at 45-48, 162-63). Dr. Smith’s affidavit, Dr. Taylor’s affidavit, and APHIS Form 7077 (CX 4-CX 6) are Dr. Smith’s and Dr. Taylor’s past recorded recollections of their examinations of Stocks Clutch FCR.

Dr. Smith completed his affidavit approximately 12 hours after he examined Stocks Clutch FCR. Dr. Smith based his affidavit on notes he had taken the night of the examination and his memory of the examination. Dr. Smith testified that, when he wrote his affidavit, he had a fresh recollection of his examination of Stocks Clutch FCR. (Tr. Vol. I at 46-48; CX 5 at 2.) Dr. Taylor testified she completed her affidavit approximately 3 hours after her examination of Stocks Clutch FCR (Tr. Vol. I at 163-64; CX 6 at 3).

Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., asserts the time between Dr. Smith’s examination of Stocks Clutch FCR and the preparation of his affidavit and the time between Dr. Taylor’s examination of Stocks Clutch FCR and the preparation of her affidavit do not, by themselves, establish that Dr. Smith’s affidavit and Dr. Taylor’s affidavit lacked “freshness.” However, Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., also asserts the limited written information available to refresh Dr. Smith’s recollection and Dr. Taylor’s recollection when they prepared their affidavits and the numerous horses Dr. Smith and Dr. Taylor examined after they examined Stocks Clutch FCR and before they prepared their affidavits affected the “freshness” of their affidavits.

(...continued)

I agree with Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr.’s assertion that the 12 hours between Dr. Smith’s examination of Stocks Clutch FCR and the preparation of his affidavit and the 3 hours between Dr. Taylor’s examination of Stocks Clutch FCR and the preparation of her affidavit do not establish that Dr. Smith’s and Dr. Taylor’s affidavits lack “freshness.”

I find the time between Dr. Smith’s examination of Stocks Clutch FCR and the completion of his affidavit and the time between Dr. Taylor’s examination of Stocks Clutch FCR and the completion of her affidavit are short, and I presume many, if not most, affiants would have a fresh recollection of significant events that occurred 3 and even 12 hours prior to the preparation of an affidavit. The likelihood of a fresh recollection of events would be enhanced by an affiant’s access to writings prepared almost contemporaneously with the events that are the subject of an affidavit. When he prepared his affidavit, Dr. Smith had access to, and relied on, notes he prepared almost contemporaneously with his examination of Stocks Clutch FCR. Moreover, the likelihood of a fresh recollection of events would be enhanced by an affiant’s intense focus on the events that are the subject of an affidavit during the occurrence of those events. Here, the very purpose of Dr. Smith’s and Dr. Taylor’s presence at the Cornersville Lions Club 54th Annual Horse Show was to detect sore horses and to document any findings of sore horses. I find nothing in the record supporting Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr.’s contention that Dr. Smith did not have a fresh recollection of his examination of Stocks Clutch FCR when he prepared his affidavit, and I find nothing in the record supporting Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr.’s contention that Dr. Taylor did not have a fresh recollection of her examination of Stocks Clutch FCR when she prepared her affidavit.

The United States Department of Agriculture has long held that past recollection recorded is reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and fulfills the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 556(d)), if made while the events recorded
were fresh in the witness' mind. Affidavits and APHIS 7077 Forms, such as those prepared by Dr. Smith and Dr. Taylor, are regularly made as to all of the horses which are found to be sore and are kept in the ordinary course of the United States Department of Agriculture's business. There is no exclusionary rule applicable to proceedings conducted in accordance with the Rules of Practice which prevents their receipt as evidence, and they have been regularly received in Horse Protection Act cases. Dr. Smith's affidavit, Dr. Taylor's affidavit, and APHIS Form 7077 (CX 4-CX 6) were properly received as evidence. In fact, I would attach more weight to these affidavits and APHIS Form 7077, prepared on the day of the event and the day after the event, than to the testimony given almost 2 years after the event.

Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., also contends Dr. Smith's affidavit, Dr. Taylor's affidavit, and APHIS Form 7077 are unreliable because they are not accurate. Specifically, Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., contends Dr. Smith's affidavit is unreliable because it states he examined Stocks Clutch FCR “[a]t about 9:40 p.m.” (CX 5 at 1) (Appeal Pet. at 5). The record supports a finding that Dr. Smith examined Stocks Clutch FCR at approximately 8:40 or 8:50 p.m.

Dr. Smith testified that the reference in his affidavit to 9:40 p.m., is a typographical error and that he “should have typed an eight instead of a nine” (Tr. Vol. I at 50-51, 110-11). I disagree with Respondent

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Winston T. Groover, Jr.’s contention that Dr. Smith’s affidavit is unreliable based on a single typographical error regarding the time of Dr. Smith’s examination of Stocks Clutch FCR.

Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., suggests that APHIS Form 7077 (CX 4) is unreliable because neither Dr. Smith nor Dr. Taylor could identify which one of them marked item 29, indicating that Stocks Clutch FCR was sore, or which one of them marked item 30, indicating that Stocks Clutch FCR was not in compliance with the scar rule (Appeal Pet. at 5-6). I reject Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr.’s suggestion that APHIS Form 7077 (CX 4) is unreliable because Dr. Smith and Dr. Taylor did not remember which of them marked item 29 and item 30. Both Dr. Smith and Dr. Taylor signed APHIS Form 7077 (CX 4) indicating that the form accurately reflected their findings that Stocks Clutch FCR was sore and was not in compliance with the scar rule (Tr. Vol. I at 54-55, 165).

Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., also contends Dr. Smith’s affidavit, Dr. Taylor’s affidavit, and APHIS Form 7077 are unreliable because Dr. Smith’s affidavit and Dr. Taylor’s affidavit contain an abundance of information that is not contained on APHIS Form 7077 (CX 4), which was completed “more or less contemporaneously with [Stocks Clutch FCR’s] examination” (Appeal Pet. at 6-7).

I agree that Dr. Smith’s and Dr. Taylor’s affidavits contain detailed descriptions of their examinations of Stocks Clutch FCR, whereas APHIS Form 7077, item 31, mainly illustrates Dr. Smith’s and Dr. Taylor’s findings. However, I reject Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr.’s contention that this discrepancy establishes that Dr. Smith’s affidavit, Dr. Taylor’s affidavit, and APHIS Form 7077 are unreliable. I infer this discrepancy is the product of the nature of an affidavit, which is a declaration of facts, and the nature of item 31 on APHIS Form 7077, which commands the examiner to “illustrate where the horse is sore” (CX 4 at item 31). The only invitation to narrative on APHIS Form 7077 is a notation between item 21 and item 22, which states: “Note for narrative continuation of any item, use reverse side of form. Cite item number referred to.” Dr. Smith and Dr. Taylor were not required to, and did not, provide a narrative
description of their examinations of Stocks Clutch FCR on the reverse side of APHIS Form 7077 (CX 4).

Third, Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., contends Dr. Smith and Dr. Taylor did not establish the extent of their experience under the Horse Protection Act (Appeal Pet. at 7-8).

The ALJ found Dr. Smith and Dr. Taylor to be competent, experienced, highly qualified veterinary medical officers (Initial Decision and Order at 7, 13). The record supports the ALJ’s findings. Dr. Smith received a veterinary degree from Colorado State University in 1988. After graduation from veterinary medical school, Dr. Smith was a equine practitioner for approximately 6 months. In 1989, the United States Department of Agriculture hired Dr. Smith, but it was not until 1997, when he joined the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service’s Animal Care staff, that Dr. Smith began examining horses to determine compliance with the Horse Protection Act. During the period 1997 to July 7, 2000, Dr. Smith attended a 2-day Horse Protection Act training course every year, and, when he initially began working in the Horse Protection Act program, he worked with veterinarians who had Horse Protection Act program experience. During the period 1997 to July 7, 2000, Dr. Smith attended between 5 and 7 horse shows each year and in each show he examined between 15 and 30 horses to determine whether they were sore. During the period 1997 to July 7, 2000, approximately 5 to 10 percent of Dr. Smith’s time as a United States Department of Agriculture employee was related to the examination of horses for violations of the Horse Protection Act. (Tr. Vol. I at 35-38, 80.)

Dr. Taylor received a veterinary degree from the University of Georgia in 1986. After graduation from veterinary medical school, Dr. Taylor was in avian practice. She was subsequently employed by the United States Department of Agriculture and began examining horses to determine compliance with the Horse Protection Act in 1988. During the entire period 1988 to July 7, 2000, Dr. Taylor attended numerous Horse Protection Act training courses and workshops. During the period 1988 to July 7, 2000, Dr. Taylor
attended between 30 and 50 horse shows and examined approximately 1,000 horses to determine whether they were sore. (Tr. Vol. I at 159-62, 171-72.) Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., correctly points out that on cross-examination, Dr. Taylor was less certain about the number of horses she examined for compliance with the Horse Protection Act than she was on direct examination (Appeal Pet. at 8). However, I find Dr. Taylor’s uncertainty relates not to the approximate total number of horses she examined during the period 1988 to July 7, 2000, but to the year-by-year number of examinations, which were the subject of Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr.’s counsel’s questions (Tr. Vol. I at 177-81).

Based on the record before me, I agree with the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Smith and Dr. Taylor are experienced, competent, highly qualified veterinary medical officers.

I give Dr. Smith’s affidavit (CX 5), Dr. Taylor’s affidavit (CX 6), and APHIS Form 7077 (CX 4) great weight, and I conclude Complainant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that on July 7, 2000, Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., violated section 5(2)(A) of the Horse Protection Act (15 U.S.C. § 1824(2)(A)) when he exhibited Stocks Clutch FCR as entry number 43 in class number 20 in the Cornersville Lions Club 54th Annual Horse Show, Cornersville, Tennessee, while the horse was sore.

Fourth, Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., contends he presented credible, reliable, and probative evidence that establishes that Stocks Clutch FCR was not sore on July 7, 2000, when Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., exhibited the horse as entry number 43 in class number 20 in the Cornersville Lions Club 54th Annual Horse Show (Appeal Pet. at 8-10).

I find Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., presented competent evidence in support of his position that Stocks Clutch FCR was not sore when he exhibited Stocks Clutch FCR as entry number 43 in class number 20 in the Cornersville Lions Club 54th Annual Horse Show on July 7, 2000. However, based upon a careful consideration of the record, I agree with the ALJ that Charles Thomas’, Andy
Messick’s, and Dr. Baker’s results of examinations of Stocks Clutch FCR have less probative value, are less credible, are less reliable, and are entitled to less weight than Dr. Smith’s and Dr. Taylor’s results of examinations of Stocks Clutch FCR.  

Fifth, Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., asserts the ALJ erroneously based upon speculation his finding that Designated Qualified Person Charles Thomas’ predominant concern appeared to be whether Stocks Clutch FCR was in violation of the scar rule (Appeal Pet. at 9).

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10While the record in each case must be examined to determine the weight to be given examinations by Designated Qualified Persons, private veterinarians, and United States Department of Agriculture veterinary medical officers, generally little weight is given to examinations by Designated Qualified Persons and private veterinarians as compared to examinations by qualified, experienced, disinterested United States Department of Agriculture veterinary medical officers. See In re C.M. Oppenheimer, 54 Agric. Dec. 221, 268 (1995) (stating the Judicial Officer gives little weight to the examinations by Designated Qualified Persons, compared to the weight the Judicial Officer gives to the examinations by United States Department of Agriculture veterinarians because Designated Qualified Persons are generally laymen, their examinations are short and cursory, and they frequently do not understand the meaning of the term sore, as defined by the Horse Protection Act); In re William Dwaine Elliott (Decision as to William Dwaine Elliott), 51 Agric. Dec. 334, 340 (1992) (stating the opinion of laymen, even that of a Designated Qualified Person, is insufficient to outweigh the credible testimony of an Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service veterinarian), aff’d, 990 F.2d 140 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 867 (1993); In re Pat Sparkman, 50 Agric. Dec. 602, 610 (1991) (finding the testimony of two Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service veterinarians more credible, expert, and trustworthy than that given by the Designated Qualified Person, other owners, trainers, and a private veterinarian who examined the horse over an hour after it was shown); In re Larry E. Edwards, 49 Agric. Dec. 188, 200 (1990) (stating Designated Qualified Person examinations have repeatedly been found less probative than United States Department of Agriculture examinations and the Judicial Officer has accorded less credence to Designated Qualified Person examinations), aff’d per curiam, 943 F.2d 1318 (11th Cir. 1991) (unpublished), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 937 (1992).
An administrative law judge’s findings must be supported by substantial evidence—not mere speculation, intuition, or conjecture.11 “Substantial evidence” is generally defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.12

The ALJ found “Mr. Thomas’ predominant concern appeared to be whether the horse was in violation of the scar rule.”13 I carefully reviewed Charles Thomas’ testimony (Tr. Vol. II at 29-49) and Charles Thomas’ description of his July 7, 2000, examination of Stocks Clutch FCR (RX 10, RX 11). I find the record contains substantial evidence that Designated Qualified Person Charles Thomas’ predominate concern appears to be whether Stocks Clutch FCR was in violation of the scar rule. Therefore, I reject Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr.’s contention that the ALJ’s finding of fact regarding Charles Thomas’ predominant concern is based upon mere speculation.

For the foregoing reasons, the following Order should be issued.

ORDER


13Findings of Fact number 21 (Initial Decision and Order at 8).
1. Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., is assessed a $2,200 civil penalty. The civil penalty shall be paid by certified check or money order made payable to the “Treasurer of the United States” and sent to:

Donald A. Tracy  
United States Department of Agriculture  
Office of the General Counsel  
Marketing Division  
1400 Independence Avenue, SW  
Room 2343-South Building, Stop 1417  
Washington, DC 20250-1417

Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr.’s payment of the civil penalty shall be forwarded to, and received by, Mr. Tracy within 60 days after service of this Order on Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr. Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., shall indicate on the certified check or money order that payment is in reference to HPA Docket No. 01-0008.

2. Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., is disqualified for 1 year from showing, exhibiting, or entering any horse, directly or indirectly through any agent, employee, or device, and from managing, judging, or otherwise participating in any horse show, horse exhibition, horse sale, or horse auction. “Participating” means engaging in any activity beyond that of a spectator, and includes, without limitation: (a) transporting or arranging for the transportation of horses to or from any horse show, horse exhibition, horse sale, or horse auction; (b) personally giving instructions to exhibitors; (c) being present in the warm-up areas, inspection areas, or other areas where spectators are not allowed at any horse show, horse exhibition, horse sale, or
horse auction; and (d) financing the participation of others in any horse show, horse exhibition, horse sale, or horse auction.

The disqualification of Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., shall become effective on the 60th day after service of this Order on Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr.

RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., has the right to obtain review of the Order in the court of appeals of the United States for the circuit in which he resides or has his place of business or in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Respondent Winston T. Groover, Jr., must file a notice of appeal in such court within 30 days from the date of the Order and must simultaneously send a copy of such notice by certified mail to the Secretary of Agriculture.\(^\text{14}\) The date of the Order is November 15, 2004.

\[^{14}\text{15 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2), (c).}\]
SUGAR MARKETING ACT

COURT DECISION

HOLLY SUGAR CORPORATION, et al., USDA.
Civil Action No. 03-1739 (RBW).
Filed September 15, 2004.

(Cite as: 335 F. Supp. 2d 100).

SMA –FSRIA – Chevron deference – Sovereign immunity – Unjust enrichment, when not.

The court determined that the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) erred in its interpretation of the sugar loan program administered by CCC under the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act (FSRIA). The court outlined the two step analysis pursuant to Chevron, but concluded that the full Chevron analysis was unnecessary because Congress provided explicit guidance on the administration of the Fair Act.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DISPOSITION: Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ respective motions to dismiss both granted in part and denied in part.

JUDGES: REGGIE B. WALTON, United States District Judge

OPINION: MEMORANDUM OPINION

Restitution and Injunctive Relief (“Compl.”) PP 1-6. Currently before this Court are (1) the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (“Def.’s Mot.”) and (2) the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (“Pls.’ Opp’n”). For the following reasons, this Court grants in part and denies in part the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and grants in part and denies in part the defendants’ motion to dismiss.

I. Background.

Beginning in the 1940s and continuing to the present, Congress has provided loan assistance to farmers to “support” the prices of agriculture commodities. See Agricultural Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-439, 63 Stat. 1051; Defendant’s Statement of Points and Authorities in Support of Her Motion to Dismiss (“Def.’s Mem.”) at 2-3. The United States Department of Agriculture (“USDA”), through the CCC, makes these loans to, among others, sugar producers in order to support the price of sugar. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 7272, 7991(a). In 1988, the CCC promulgated a regulation that established a uniform policy for assessing interest on such loans. The regulation provided that the interest rate that the CCC would charge on agricultural loans would be the same rate the United States Treasury charged the CCC to borrow the funds to finance the loans, which was the formula in effect on October 1, 1995. See 7 C.F.R. § 1405.1 (1989). This regulation, which has since been amended, was promulgated based upon the CCC’s interpretation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 714b(l) and 714c(a), (d).
provisions which list the general and specific powers of the CCC.

Def.'s Mem. at 4-5. Under § 714b(l), the CCC “may make such loans and advances of its funds as are necessary in the conduct of its business.” And pursuant to § 714c, the CCC is required to “support the prices of agricultural commodities through loans, purchases, payments, and other operations” and “remove and dispose of or aid in the removal or disposition of surplus agricultural commodities.” 15 U.S.C. § 714c(a), (d).

However, in 1996, Congress passed the FAIR Act. Under this Act, Congress mandated that the CCC set interest rates for loans, including loans to sugar producers, at a rate equal to the rate it cost the CCC to borrow the funds from the United States Treasury, plus an additional 100 basis points, or one percent. 7 U.S.C. § 7283(a); § 163 of the 1996 Act. The provisions specifically stated: “Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the monthly Commodity Credit Corporation interest rate applicable to loans provided for agricultural commodities by the Corporation shall be 100 basis points greater than the rate determined under the applicable interest rate formula in effect on October 1, 1995.” 7 U.S.C. § 7283(a). The CCC amended its regulations to reflect this Congressionally mandated change. See 7 C.F.R. § 1405.1 (1997).

In 2002, Congress again amended the loan program with the adoption of the FSRI Act, Pub. L. No. 107-171, 116 Stat. 187 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7283) (“2002 Act”). The 2002 Act added the following subsection to 7 U.S.C. § 7283: “(b) Sugar -- For purposes of this section, raw cane sugar, refined beet sugar, and in-process sugar eligible for a loan under section 7272 of this title shall not be considered an agricultural commodity.” 7 U.S.C. § 7283(b) (emphasis added). The 2002 Act did not alter subsection (a) of § 7283, which requires that 100 basis points be added to the interest rate on the loans, nor did the 2002 Act alter the ability of sugar producers to secure agricultural commodity loans under 7 U.S.C. § 7272 (discussing loan program for sugar). The amendment simply exempted sugar from the 100 basis point requirement. The 2002 Act
also added the following, a no net cost provision, to 7 U.S.C. § 7272:

(g)(1) IN GENERAL - Subject to subsection (e)(3), to the maximum extent practicable, the Secretary shall operate the [loan] program established under this section at no cost to the Federal Government by avoiding the forfeiture of sugar to the Commodity Credit Corporation.

7 U.S.C. § 7272(g)(1).

Despite this more recent amendment of § 7283(b), the CCC and the USDA concluded that the legislation did not mandate a new interest formula for sugar, but merely lifted the requirement of the 100 basis point premium, and thus they could charge whatever interest rate they deemed appropriate. The CCC published its reasoning in the Federal Register:

The 2002 Act eliminates the requirement that CCC add 1 percentage point to the interest rate as calculated by the procedure in place in 1996 but does not establish a sugar loan interest rate. CCC has decided to use the rates required for other commodity loans.

67 Fed. Reg. 54,927 (Aug. 26, 2002). Based upon this reasoning, the CCC has continued to charge an additional one percent on sugar loans.

II. The Parties’ Arguments

The plaintiffs have filed a four count complaint challenging the defendants’ continued assessment of an additional one percent on sugar loans despite the 2002 Act. Specifically, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants’ actions (1) violate the express terms of the 2002 Act; (2) are arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); (3) result in unjust enrichment to the United States; and (4) amount to an unconstitutional tax. Compl. PP 48, 51, 61, 67. Thus, the plaintiffs seek (1) a declaratory judgment that the defendants’ actions violate
the 2002 Act and the Constitution; (2) an injunction prohibiting the defendants from continuing to charge the additional one percent on sugar loans; and (3) an order directing the defendants to pay restitution to the plaintiffs in an amount equal to the amount the defendants have been unjustly enriched through the collection of the additional one percent interest assessment. Compl. PP A., B., C.

The defendants have moved to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Specifically, the defendants argue that the plaintiffs’ APA claim must fail because there is no ambiguity in the statute at issue. Def.’s Mem. at 11. The defendants note that the 2002 Act removed sugar from the definition of “agricultural commodity,” which they opine left the CCC free of any requirement to use a particular formula for setting interest rates on sugar loans. Id. at 11-12. Thus, the defendants posit that the CCC has the authority to charge whatever interest rate it deems appropriate so long as the interest rate is consistent with the CCC’s general and specific powers listed in 15 U.S.C. §§ 714b(j), (k); 714c(a), (d). Id. Therefore, the defendants contend that this Court must give deference to the agency’s decision as required by Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694, 104 S. Ct. 2778 (1984). Id. at 14. The defendants further argue that the additional one percentage point interest fee is not a tax under the Constitution as the plaintiffs contend, but rather, is a permissible fee associated with the loan process. Id. at 14-17. Finally, the defendants assert that the plaintiffs’ claim of unjust enrichment cannot survive their motion to dismiss because (1) the plaintiffs do not assert that the loan agreement has been breached and (2) the government is shielded from recovery on this claim by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Id. at 17-18.

The plaintiffs have moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(a). Pls.’ Opp’n at . The plaintiffs contend that the CCC’s interpretation of the 2002 Act is contrary to the plain language of the Act and should, therefore, not be given Chevron deference. Id. at 25. The plaintiffs opine that Congress placed the sugar exemption in the same statutory provision that mandates the additional one percent
interest charge in order to specifically exempt sugar from that additional one percent requirement, thereby reducing the interest rate charged on sugar loans. *Id.* The plaintiffs argue that this reading is supported by the plain language of the statute and application of basic canons of statutory construction. *Id.* at 26. The plaintiffs further argue that the legislative history supports their reading of the statute. *Id.* at 26-27. They also state that the additional one percent interest charge is an unconstitutional tax because it is a payment that “is arbitrary and was created solely for a public purpose.” *Id.* at 37. Finally, the plaintiffs posit that the CCC is being unjustly enriched by the assessment because it has illegally collected payments from the plaintiffs. *Id.* at 39. Therefore, the plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to restitution in an amount equal to the amount the CCC has been unjustly enriched. *Id.* at 39-40.

III. Standards of Review

(A) Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1)

(B) Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)

On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), this Court must construe the allegations and facts in the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and must grant the plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80, 78 S. Ct. 99 (1957); Barr v. Clinton, 361 U.S. App. D.C. 472, 370 F.3d 1196, 1199 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (citing Kowal v. MCI Communications Corp., 305 U.S. App. D.C. 60, 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). However, the Court need not accept asserted inferences or conclusory allegations that are unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. Kowal, 16 F.3d at 1276. In deciding whether to dismiss a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court can only consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference into the complaint, and matters about which the Court may take judicial notice. St. Francis, 117 F.3d at 624-25. The Court will dismiss a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) only if the defendant can demonstrate “beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46.

(C) Motion for Summary Judgment Under Rule 56(a)

This Court will grant a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56(c) if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits or declarations, if any, demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Bayer v. United States Dep’t of Treasury, 294 U.S. App. D.C. 44, 956 F.2d 330, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1992).

(D) Chevron Deference
Under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), this Court may vacate a decision by the USDA only if the decision is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.” This standard is highly deferential to the agency. See Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 28 L. Ed. 2d 136, 91 S. Ct. 814 (1971). Chevron deference applies “when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27, 150 L. Ed. 2d 292, 121 S. Ct. 2164 (2001); see also Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp. v. Thompson, 297 F.3d 273, 281 (3d Cir. 2002). The Court is required to apply a two-step analysis pursuant to Chevron. First, “if the statute speaks clearly ‘to the precise question at issue,’[the Court] ‘must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’” Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 217-18, 152 L. Ed. 2d 330, 122 S. Ct. 1265 (2002) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43). Second, where the statute is “silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” courts must sustain the agency decision if it is based on a “permissible construction” of the statute. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. A court does not need to reach this second step, however, if “employing traditional tools of statutory construction, [it] ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue . . . .” Id. at 843 n.9.

III. Legal Analysis

(A) Is the USDA’s Decision Entitled to Chevron Deference?

This Court agrees with the parties’ position that the plain language of the statute clearly and unambiguously indicates Congress’ intent, therefore, this Court need not address Chevron’s second-prong. Def.’s Mem. at 11; Pls.’ Opp’n at 25. The defendants contend that the 2002 Act only removed sugar from the definition of “agricultural commodity” for the limited purpose of 7 U.S.C. § 7283. Def.’s Mem. at 11. Thus, by removing sugar from that section, the defendants opine that Congress’ intent was to give the CCC authority to utilize any formula it deemed appropriate in determining the loan rate for
sugar, so long as it was within the scope of the CCC’s general and specific powers. *Id.* at 12. The plaintiffs contend, however, that by removing sugar from the definition of “agricultural commodity,” Congress intended for sugar to be treated differently than other agricultural commodities. *Pls.’ Mem.* at 26. Thus, according to the plaintiffs, the additional one percent that the CCC continues to charge on sugar loans is clearly contrary to the current version of § 7283(b) as doing so renders the 2002 amendments meaningless. *Id.* Furthermore, the plaintiffs opine that it is clear from the legislative history of the amendments that Congress intended for the interest rate on sugar loans to be reduced. *Id.* at 26-27.

In determining whether *Chevron* deference should be accorded agency action, this Court must first determine, by “employing traditional tools of statutory construction,” whether “Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue . . . .” *Chevron*, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9. “The primary and general rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the lawmaker is to be found in the language that he has used.” *United States v. Goldenberg*, 168 U.S. 95, 102-03, 42 L. Ed. 394, 18 S. Ct. 3 (1897). “It is an elementary principle of statutory construction that, in construing a statute, [this Court] must give meaning to all the words in the statute.” *Lewis v. Barnhart*, 285 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). “When the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts--at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd--is to enforce it according to its terms.” *Lamie v. United States Trustee*, 157 L. Ed. 2d 1024, 540 U.S. 526, 124 S. Ct. 1023 (2004). Thus, in such situations, “resort to legislative history is not appropriate in construing the plain statutory language.” *United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp.*, 380 F.3d 488, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 18231, No. 03-7128, 2004 WL 1906880, at *4 (D.C. Cir. 2004). However, when examining the plain meaning of the statute, the Court must not interpret the statute in such a manner that renders another part of that statute or another statute superfluous. *Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.*, 539 U.S. 23, 35, 156 L. Ed. 2d 18, 123 S. Ct. 2041 (2003). Furthermore, when faced with both a specific and general provision, this Court should interpret
the provisions so that the specific statute controls. *Edmond v. United States*, 520 U.S. 651, 657, 137 L. Ed. 2d 917, 117 S. Ct. 1573 (1997). If the plain meaning of the statute leads to an “absurd or futile result[,] however, [the Supreme] Court has looked beyond the words to the purpose of the act.” *Perry v. Commerce Loan Co.*, 383 U.S. 392, 400, 15 L. Ed. 2d 827, 86 S. Ct. 852 (1966) (quoting *United States v. American Trucking Ass’ns.*, 310 U.S. 534, 543, 84 L. Ed. 1345, 60 S. Ct. 1059 (1940)). The District of Columbia Circuit has held that “literal interpretation need not rise to the level of ‘absurdity’ before recourse is taken to the legislative history, . . . [but] there must be evidence that Congress meant something other than what it literally said before a court can depart from plain meaning.” *Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA*, 319 U.S. App. D.C. 12, 88 F.3d 1075, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1996).

In this case, the Court need not reach the second *Chevron* question because it concludes, as both parties do, albeit from different perspectives, that the Congress’ intent is clear. Without question, 7 U.S.C. § 7283(a) limits the CCC’s authority to set interest rates for loans on agricultural commodities. This provision clearly requires that the interest rate on such loans be one percent greater than the rate charged to the CCC by the United States Treasury to borrow the funds to finance the loans. Thus, the section mandated a one percent increase above the rate that the CCC charges on all agricultural commodity loans pursuant to the pre-existing formula. Prior to the 2002 Act, this one percent add on undoubtedly applied also to loans for sugar commodities. However, pursuant to the 2002 Act, as codified in 7 U.S.C. § 7283(a)-(b), sugar loans are expressly exempted from the imposition of the one percentage point increase. The 2002 Act did not in any other way affect the ability of sugar producers to seek loan assistance through the CCC, the Act simply altered the interest rate for such assistance. By specifically mandating that the increase would no longer apply to sugar, Congress clearly intended for the interest rate for sugar loans to be decreased by one percent. To conclude otherwise would render meaningless Congress’ unambiguous amendment contained in the 2002 Act.
The CCC maintains, however, that because Congress did not specifically state what the interest rate for sugar should be, but rather only indicated what it should not be, Congress gave the CCC authorization to charge any rate it deemed appropriate so long as that rate is in line with the CCC’s general and specific powers codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 714b(l) and 714c(a), (d). Def.’s Mem. at 11-12. Thus, pursuant to these statutory powers, the CCC argues that it is permitted to charge the additional one percent over the rate charged to it by the United States Treasury. Id. Despite the CCC’s creative argument, Congress’ intent was clear—the interest rate on sugar is now exempt from the additional one percent interest rate increase and thus, the rate is decreased by one percent. Thus, when reduced by one percent, the net effect of the 2002 Amendment is that the interest loan rate for sugar is the amount calculated by using the interest rate formula in effect on October 1, 1995, or the same rate that the CCC pays to the United States Treasury to borrow the fund to finance the loans. If this Court were to conclude that the CCC could impose the additional one percent pursuant to its statutory powers set forth in 15 U.S.C. §§ 714b(l) and c(a), (d), despite Congress’ mandate otherwise, it would be interpreting the statute in such a way that would give no effect to 7 U.S.C. § 7283(b) as now drafted, thus making it superfluous, which this Court cannot do. See Dastar Corp., 539 U.S. at 35. Furthermore, even if this Court could conclude that the CCC’s statutory powers under 15 U.S.C. §§ 714b(l) and 714c(a), (d) permit the CCC to set interest rates, these powers are clearly not specific to the precise issue presented to the Court here, i.e., whether the CCC may charge an additional one percent where 7 U.S.C. § 7283 clearly indicates otherwise. Thus, this Court cannot read the general statutory provision governing the CCC’s powers as trumping the more specific

For the foregoing reasons, the CCC’s decision to charge an additional one percent on sugar loans is contrary to the clear language of the 2002 Act, as codified in 7 U.S.C. § 7283. Therefore, this Court affords no deference to the agency’s interpretation of the 2002 amendment and it must grant the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment with respect to counts one and two of the amendment complaint and deny the defendants’ motion to dismiss these two counts.4

(B) Can the Plaintiffs Maintain Their Claim for Unjust Enrichment Against the Government?

3The defendants also rely on the 2002 Act’s no net cost provision as support for its contention that the CCC has the ability to charge whatever interest rate it deems appropriate so long as the rate is within the scope of the CCC’s statutory powers codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 714b(l) and 714c(a), (d). Def.’s Mem. at 13. However, the defendants’ argument has no merit since it is clear that 7 U.S.C. § 7283 speaks directly and specifically to the issue in dispute—the rate which the CCC can charge to fund sugar loans—while the no net cost provision, 7 U.S.C. § 7272(g)(1), is merely a general provision requiring that the CCC strive to operate the loan existence program, “to the maximum extent practicable[,] . . . at no cost to the Federal Government.” See Edmond, 520 U.S. at 657.

4 While this Court need not engage in a review of the legislative history to reach this conclusion, the legislative history on point provides further support for this Court’s holding. See S. Rep. No. 107-117, at 100 (2001) (stating that the 2002 Act “reduces the CCC interest rate on sugar loans by 100 basis points”); H.R. Rep. No. 107-191, pt. I at 89 (2001) (noting that the 2002 Act “reduces the CCC interest rate on price support loans”); To Review the Implementation of the 2002 Farm Bill: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, 108th Cong. at 20 (2003) (statement of Senator Conrad) (discussing the repeal of the interest rate “surcharge” and concluding: “now why ever would we have repealed it if we did not intend for that to actually be implemented?”)

5 Because the Court concludes that the defendants’ actions were contrary to the plain language of the statute, it will not address the plaintiffs’ claim that the additional one percent was an unconstitutional tax.
In count three of the amended complaint, the plaintiffs contend that the additional one percent assessment has resulted in the defendants being unjustly enriched. Compl. P 58. Thus, the plaintiffs seek restitution in the amount equal to the amount the defendants have allegedly been unjustly enriched. Compl. P C. The defendants have moved to dismiss this count of the amended complaint because they claim that the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the claim. Def.’s Mem. at 18. Additionally, the defendants, by directing this Court to *Albrecht v. Comm. on Emple. Bens. of the Fed. Reserve Emple. Bens. Sys.*, 360 U.S. App. D.C. 47, 357 F.3d 62 (D.C. Cir. 2004), appear to argue that unjust enrichment is not an appropriate claim when there is an express contract, i.e., the loan agreements, that specifically addresses the question at issue, i.e., the interest rate payable on the loans. Defendants’ Notice of Supplemental Authority. Assuming, without deciding, that sovereign immunity has been waived, this Court is compelled to grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss.

“‘The doctrine of unjust enrichment has at all times been fundamentally equitable in nature, notwithstanding its long association with the law of contracts.’” *Health Care Serv. Corp. v. Mylan Labs, Inc. (In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig.),* 295 F. Supp. 2d 30, 50 (D.C. 2003) (quoting *BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) Societe Anonyme v. Khalil*, 56 F. Supp. 2d 14, 64 (D.D.C. 1999)). In order to state a claim for unjust enrichment, the plaintiffs “must establish that: (1) they conferred a legally cognizable benefit upon [the] defendants; (2) [the] defendants possessed an appreciation or knowledge of the benefit; and (3) [the] defendants accepted or retained the benefit under inequitable circumstances.” Id. (citing *International Brotherhood of Teamsters, etc. v. Association of Flight Attendants*, 274 U.S. App. D.C. 370, 864 F.2d 173, 177 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). “‘To qualify for an award of restitution under the theory of unjust enrichment, [the plaintiffs] must show that [they] conferred a benefit (usually money) on [the defendants] under circumstances in which it would be unjust or inequitable for [the defendants] to retain the benefit.’” Id. at 50-51 (quoting *BCCI Holdings (Luxembourg) Societe Anonyme v. Khalil*, 56 F. Supp. 2d 14, 64 (D.D.C. 2004)).
This result might seem harsh, since this Court has previously concluded that the interest rates designated in the loan agreements were greater than permitted by law. Had (continued...)


The District of Columbia Circuit discussed the implications of an existing contract on an unjust enrichment claim in Albrecht, 357 F.3d at 62. There, the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System had been unjustly enriched and sought “the return of [the] mandatory contributions that [the plaintiffs] made into a defined-benefit pension plan after actuaries determined the plan was well-funded.” Id. at 64. When discussing the unjust enrichment claim, the District of Columbia Circuit held, relying on Schiff, 697 A.2d at 1194, that “there can be no claim for unjust enrichment when an express contract exists between the parties.” Id. at 69 (citing Schiff, 697 A.2d at 1194). Thus, because the pension plan governed the various aspects of the relationship between the parties, and nothing in that contract required the defendants to make refunds to employees if the plan had a surplus, “any ‘enrichment’ the [defendants] would enjoy if the [plaintiffs] receives surplus funds could not possibly be unjust.” Id. at 69.

Here, the plaintiffs were under legal obligations, arising from the loan agreements, to pay the interest rates designated in those agreements. The plaintiffs do not allege that the contracts have been breached or should be voided or that some other “quasi-contract” existed. Thus, the plaintiffs in this case are in the same position as the plaintiffs in Albrecht. See Id. And accordingly, because an express contract exists, the plaintiffs claim for unjust enrichment has no legal foundation as there can be no such actionable claim since the controversy is covered by an express contract. See Albrecht, 357 F.3d at 62, 64-65.
at 69. Therefore, the defendants’ motion to dismiss count three of the amended complaint must be granted.7

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, this Court concludes that the defendants’ additional one percent interest rate assessment on the sugar loans made to the plaintiffs is contrary to the express language of the 2002 Act and is “arbitrary, capricious, . . . or otherwise not in accordance with law” and therefore a violation of the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Thus, the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on counts one and two of their amended complaint.8

(...continued)

the plaintiffs, for example, sought to void the loan agreements, see, e.g., American Airlines v. Austin, 75 F.3d 1535, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“generally, a provision in a government contract that violates or conflicts with a federal statute is invalid or void”), a quasi-contract might be implied to exist, which would provide a basis for an unjust enrichment claim. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Modern Elec., Inc. v. Ideal Elec. Sec. Co., 317 U.S. App. D.C. 145, 81 F.3d 240, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“unjust enrichment . . . rests on a contract implied in law, that is, on the principle of quasi-contract”). However, no such claim was made in this case. Furthermore, had the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief, they might have been relieved by the Court from making payments on the loans when the case was first filed. Finally, this Court notes that the plaintiffs’ claim for a refund of any overpayments under the loan agreements may still be actionable in the Court of Federal Claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); see, e.g., Aerolíneas Argentinas v. United States, 77 F.3d 1564, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“the Tucker Act provides jurisdiction to recover the sums exacted illegally by the [Immigration and Naturalization] Service due to its misinterpretation or misapplication of statutes . . .”); Unisys Corp. v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 451, 455 (Fed. Cl. 2001) (holding that the government was required to refund quarterly contingency payment to the plaintiff that were made in excess of the contracted amount).

Because this Court concludes that the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted with respect to the unjust enrichment claim, it will not address the defendants’ arguments that the claim is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.

As noted earlier, because this Court has concluded that the defendants’ actions violate both the express terms of the 2002 Act and the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), it need not reach the issue raised in Count Four of the amended complaint—whether the interest rate amounted to an unconstitutional tax.
Furthermore, because an express contract defined the terms of the sugar loans, including the payable interest rate, the third count of the amended complaint--their claim for unjust enrichment--must be rejected as a matter of law.

SO ORDERED this day of 15th day of September, 2004.⁹

ORDER

Upon consideration of the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and the Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and for the reasons set forth in the accompanying Memorandum Opinion, it is hereby

ORDERED that the defendants’ motion to dismiss counts one and two of the complaint is DENIED and the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on these counts is GRANTED. It is further

ORDERED that defendants’ motion to dismiss count three of the complaint is GRANTED and the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on this count is DENIED.

SO ORDERED this 15th day of September, 2004.

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⁹ An Order consistent with the Court’s ruling accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
SUGAR MARKETING ACT

DEPARTMENTAL DECISION

In re: SOUTHERN MINNESOTA BEET SUGAR COOPERATIVE.
SMA Docket No. 03-0001.

In this decision, I deny the Petition of Southern Minnesota Beet Sugar Cooperative (“SMBSC” or “Petitioner”) to overturn the decision of the Executive Vice-President of the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). I find that the actions of the CCC were totally in accord with the express language of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended by section 1403 of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 (Act)(7 U.S.C. §1359ii). I thus find that SMBSC is not entitled to an increase of 1.25 percent in their allocation for either opening a new sugar beet processing factory or for sustaining substantial quality losses on stored sugar beets during the 1999 crop year.

Procedural Background

This proceeding arose with SMBSC’s filing of a Petition for Review of several determinations made by the Executive Vice-President of the CCC on January 23, 2003. SMBSC sought review of...
the October 21, 2002 beet sugar marketing allotment allocations made by the CCC. After reconsideration of two requests for adjustments by the Petitioner, the CCC rejected both requests. The CCC filed its Answer on February 13, 2003, along with a certified copy of the record upon which the Executive Vice-President based his reconsidered determination, pursuant to the Sugar Marketing Allotment Program Rules of Practice (Rules), Rule 5. The CCC also submitted, with the Answer, a list of parties who would be “affected” by these proceedings.1

As per Rule 5(d), the Hearing Clerk served the petition and answer upon each of the identified affected parties. Seven affected parties—American Crystal Sugar Company, Imperial Sugars Corporation, Michigan Sugar Company, Minn-Dak Farmers Cooperative, Monitor Sugar Company, Western Sugar Cooperative, and Amalgamated Sugar Company--elected to intervene.

Since this was a case of first impression on this subject, then presiding Administrative Law Judge Jill Clifton2 ordered the submission of briefs concerning how the hearing should be conducted. Both the CCC and Intervenors contended that there should be no oral hearing at all, and that my review should be solely based on the administrative record, with no need for additional testimony or submissions of further documentary evidence. Petitioners, on the other hand, contended that the statute required a de novo hearing. While the absence of contested material facts would not have left me any reason to conduct an oral hearing, I concluded that a hearing would be appropriate to allow Petitioner to present facts concerning its positions as to whether it had “opened a new factory” and whether it had “sustained substantial quality losses on stored sugar beets” in crop year1999 as contemplated by the Act. I restricted the hearing to the development of these facts only, and announced

1As discussed in more detail, infra, beet sugar allotments are a “zero-sum” situation, in that any increase in allotment to any beet sugar processor means a corresponding reduction in allotments of all other processors.

2The case was subsequently assigned to me on July 31, 2003.
that I would not hear testimony on legislative intent and other non-factual issues.


Statutory and Regulatory Background

The federal government has regulated sugar beets, along with other commodities, for many years. The degree of regulation has varied widely over time, based on a variety of circumstances. Thus, in 1996, Congress enacted the Agricultural Marketing Transition Act, P.L. 104-127, also known as the “Freedom to Farm Act,” which removed the previous sugar marketing allotments that had limited the sale of beet sugar, and other commodities. Then, in 2002, Congress largely reversed itself by passing the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1359 et seq. This Act required the Secretary to once again establish allotments for the processing of beet sugar, based on the average weighted quantity of beet sugar produced by a given processor during the 1998 to 2000 crop years. At issue here are the provisions allowing for adjustments to these weighted averages. The Act provides for four basic types of adjustments:

CHAPTER 35 - AGRICULTURAL ADJUSTMENT ACT OF 1938

1359dd. Allocation of marketing allotments.
(D) Adjustments
(i) In general
   The Secretary shall adjust the weighted average quantity of beet sugar produced by a beet sugar processor during the 1998 through 2000 crop years under subparagraph (C) if the Secretary determines that the processor -
   (I) during the 1996 through 2000 crop years, opened a sugar beet processing factory;
   (II) during the 1998 through 2000 crop years, closed a sugar beet processing factory;
(III) during the 1998 through 2000 crop years, constructed a molasses desugarization facility; or
(IV) during the 1998 through 2000 crop years, suffered substantial quality losses on sugar beets stored during any such crop year.

(ii) Quantity
The quantity of beet sugar produced by a beet sugar processor under subparagraph (C) shall be -

(I) in the case of a processor that opened a sugar beet processing factory, increased by 1.25 percent of the total of the adjusted weighted average quantities of beet sugar produced by all processors during the 1998 through 2000 crop years (without consideration of any adjustment under this subparagraph) for each sugar beet processing factory that is opened by the processor;

(II) in the case of a processor that closed a sugar beet processing factory, decreased by 1.25 percent of the total of the adjusted weighted average quantities of beet sugar produced by all processors during the 1998 through 2000 crop years (without consideration of any adjustment under this subparagraph) for each sugar beet processing factory that is closed by the processor;

(III) in the case of a processor that constructed a molasses desugarization facility, increased by 0.25 percent of the total of the adjusted weighted average quantities of beet sugar produced by all processors during the 1998 through 2000 crop years (without consideration of any adjustment under this subparagraph) for each molasses desugarization facility that is constructed by the processor; and

(IV) in the case of a processor that suffered substantial quality losses on stored sugar beets, increased by 1.25 percent of the total of the adjusted weighted average quantities of beet sugar produced by all processors during the 1998 through 2000 crop years (without consideration of any adjustment under this subparagraph).

The CCC was directed to promulgate regulations implementing the statute under a very restrictive time frame. These regulations are not at issue here. Neither the statute nor the regulations define what is meant by “opened” or “closed” with respect to a beet sugar facility, nor is there any specific guidance in the statute or regulations on the implementation of the “substantial quality losses” provision.

Nor is there much in the way of legislative history. While I base my decision primarily on the unambiguous language of the statute, I also discuss below, in the alternative, the snippet of legislative history, in the form of a statement by Senator Conrad, which appears to be the sole discussion on the record by Congress respecting the beet sugar allocation adjustment provisions. Senator Conrad, who cosponsored this provision, stated:

The purpose of this amendment is to provide a predictable, transparent, and equitable formula for the Department of Agriculture to use in establishing beet sugar marketing allotments in the future. This is an amendment that enjoys widespread support within the sugar beet industry. Producers in that industry recall, as I do, the very difficult and contentious period just a few years ago when the Department of Agriculture last attempted to establish beet sugar allotments with very little direction in the law.

That experience left us all believing that there must be a better way, that we should seek a method for establishing allotments that is fair and open and provides some certainty and predictability to the industry. On that basis, I urged members of the industry to work together to see if they could agree on a reasonable formula.

I am pleased to say the amendment I am offering today with the Senator from Idaho reflects producers’ efforts to forge that consensus. It provides that any future allotments will be based
on each processor’s weighted-average production during the years 1998 through 2000 with authority for the Secretary of Agriculture to make adjustments in the formula if an individual processor experienced disaster related losses during that period or opened or closed a processing facility or increased processing capacity through improved technology to extract more sugar from beets.


The Facts

Petitioner is a beet sugar processing cooperative that was formed in 1972. It currently consists of 585 farmer/shareholders in Minnesota. The cooperative is located in Renville, Minnesota and currently employs approximately 275 year-round and 450 seasonal workers. Tr. I, 319-320.3

In 1999, Petitioner borrowed approximately $100,000,000 and engaged in extensive renovations of its beet sugar processing facilities. Tr. I, 193-195. At the hearing, SMBSC detailed the scope and magnitude of the construction project, which it termed Vision 2000. Tr. I, 32-86, CX 1, 5, 8, 9, 10, 12-22, 25, 41.4 SMBSC states that substantial portions of the old facility were demolished, and that in effect, the extensive nature of renovations is equivalent to the opening of a new facility, as referred to in the Act. As a result of all this construction, SMBSC states that its design capacity for processing sugar beets into sugar is more than double the capacity of the factory as it previously existed on the same site. See, SMBSC Reply Brief at 22. SMBSC undoubtedly significantly modernized and increased the capacity of its Renville facility. Likewise, there was considerable testimony that many of the other intervenor beet sugar entities also undertook significant and highly costly—though not as

3Tr. I refers to the transcript for the first day of the hearing, and Tr. II and Tr. III refer to the transcripts for the second and third days of the hearing.

4Petitioner’s exhibits are designated by CX, Intervenors by IX, and CCC’s by GX.
costly over as short a period as Petitioner—modifications and improvements to their processing plants. Thus, Kevin Price of American Crystal—the largest beet sugar processor—testified to two major expansions totaling over $130,000,000 during the period from 1996-2000. Tr. II, 32-46. Inder Mathur, President of Western Sugar Corporation testified to a $22.5 million expansion project. Tr. II, 120-123. Victor Krabbenhoft, the Chairman of the Board of Minn-Dak, testified to a $93,000,000 expansion. Tr. II, 170-1, 179. The process of extracting sugar from the sugar beet is complicated, time-consuming and expensive. It presents difficult material handling problems in a harsh climate. It is complicated by a perishable raw material that is delivered in the fall of the year (usually after a frost to enhance sugar content) to begin what is called the “beet slicing campaign.” The raw as-received sugar beets degrade if not processed by the time the springtime warm weather arrives. Once the sugar beets are converted to an intermediate product of thick, syrupy liquid (“thick juice” or “in-process sugar”), the time constraints on further processing are less intense, other than to finish the process before the next year’s crop of sugar beets start arriving again. The beet end of the factory is normally shut down for lack of raw product between slicing campaigns. The sugar end of the overall process consists of a year-round concentration and crystallization process. With the aid of intermediate product storage tanks, processing of the thick juice may proceed at a slower daily rate than operations at the beet end part of the factory.

Shortly after regulations were issued implementing the 2002 Act, the CCC sent out a survey to all sugar beet processors. This Beet Processor Allotment Production History Adjustment Survey (Certified Administrative Record of the Commodity Credit Corporation (CR) 004-005) contained four questions concerning the four adjustments that were available under the Act. While Petitioner did state that it had suffered a loss more than 20% above normal on stored sugar beets during the 1999 and 2000 crop years, it answered “No” to the question
Did your company start processing sugar beets at a new processing facility in the period, October 1, 1996, through September 30, 2001? Petitioner testified that they did not realize that this was an official survey, since it was not on a printed form or on letterhead, and that they simply made a mistake in filling out this form. John Richmond, the President and CEO of Petitioner testified that the fact that the survey’s wording did not exactly track the regulations made them “unsure of what to do.” Tr. I at 135.

Mr. Richmond also testified that the sugar beet processing portion of the factory was rebuilt in essentially one off-season, between March and September of 1999. By reconstructing a plant “. . . so that it was now two or three times bigger than it was before, I believe means that we reopened the plant and we constructed a new plant simultaneously.” Id. at 140. “[W]hat we did was demolish the beet end of a factory, and rebuild that factory and add another factory at the same time. We did not permanently terminate the operation at that factory. We essentially rebuilt that factory and right with it, built another factory at the same time.” Id. at 142. Shortly after this statement that Petitioner essentially had two factories on the same site where it previously had one, apparently as a result of the degree of expansion in processing capability, Mr. Richmond engaged in this short colloquy with government counsel:

MR. KAHN: And you have never had more than one factory, have you, on that site?

MR. RICHMOND: There has only ever been one sugar factory.

Id. at 143.

Petitioner also introduced evidence, for comparison purposes, of the reopening of a facility that had been idle for two decades in Moses Lake, Washington. Tr. I, 95-99. This Pacific Northwest, or PNW, facility did receive an adjustment for opening a sugar factory. While there was some testimony indicating that portions of the infrastructure from the factory that had sat idle for twenty years still existed in a usable condition, other testimony showed that a significant portion of the facility’s equipment had been cannibalized, Tr. II at 236-7.
There was no dispute that the CCC had found that Petitioner had incurred a quality loss on stored sugar beets in crop year 2000 that entitled them to a favorable 1.25% adjustment in their allotment. At the hearing, there was a good deal of evidence presented as to whether Petitioner was entitled to a second such adjustment for substantial losses on stored sugar beets allegedly suffered during crop year 1999. Petitioner testified that it suffered substantial quality losses on stored sugar beets because of a major boiler failure, which resulted in the work at the factory slowing down. The boiler failure, combined with abnormally warm weather, caused the quality of the beets, and the resulting output of sugar, to significantly deteriorate. Tr. I at 144-5. There was considerable testimony as to whether losses that were triggered by an equipment failure even qualified as “substantial quality losses” under the statute. The term has not been defined by the CCC either through regulation or other guidance.

Mr. Richmond testified that the “straight house” recovery method was an appropriate approach to determining the relative performance of beet sugar factories, and that a 20 percent loss in sugar production calculated according to this method was an appropriate measure of substantiality. E.g., Tr. I at 117-8. He further testified that in order to establish a baseline to determine the extent of the loss, it was appropriate to use a standard of recovering a minimum of 75 percent of the sugar in the harvested sugar beets. He stated that, applying this methodology, the recovery average for 1999 was well below the ten-year average recovery percentage.

Intervenors strongly contested Petitioner’s methodology and results. They argued that the 75 percent standard for evaluating straight house recovery was inappropriate and unsubstantiated, and testified that if it was the appropriate standard, then a number of other companies would have been similarly entitled to an allocation adjustment. Tr. II at 22-26, 124, 157, 204, 237, IX 29. They also contended that the statutory term “quality losses” was not meant to cover every type of loss that could occur in the processing of sugar beets, and that equipment problems such as boiler failure constitute a
“non-quality” loss not intended to be covered by the statutory adjustment of allocation.

All parties acknowledge, as they must, that the beet sugar allotment program is a “zero-sum” game—that is, any increase in one processor’s allotment results in a decrease in the amount of the allotments of the other beet sugar processors. Every year the Secretary estimates the amount of sugar that will be consumed in the United States, along with projected domestic production and imports, and establishes an overall allotment quantity, which is allocated according to a statutory formula between sugar derived from sugar beets and sugar derived from sugar cane. Thus, the total amount of sugar to be processed by the beet sugar industry is a fixed amount, subject to some periodic interim adjustments. Thus, an allotment increase of 1.25% for one processor would result in a reduction of a total of 1.25% in the cumulative allocations of the other processors, resulting in zero net gain or loss to all the processors combined.

DISCUSSION

I. Petitioner is Not Entitled to an Adjustment for Opening a Sugar Beet Processing Factory

I affirm the Commodity Credit Corporation’s denial of Petitioner’s request for an adjustment of 1.25% in their sugar beet allocation for opening a sugar beet processing factory. I find that the language in the Act is clear and unambiguous that substantial expansions, modifications and/or modernizations of a factory are not equivalent to the opening of a factory. Further, the legislative history supports the interpretation of the statute made by the CCC. And to the extent there is any ambiguity as to the meaning of “opened” I find that the CCC’s interpretation is both reasonable and entitled to deference. I also find that the CCC’s actions in granting Pacific Northwest an adjustment for opening a factory in Moses Lake, Washington are not inconsistent with their actions regarding Petitioner in this matter.
In its Request for Reconsideration of Allocation of Sugar Marketing Allotments by the Executive Vice President of CCC, dated October 9, 2002, SMSBC states:

“Beginning in crop year 1998, SMSBC substantially re-built and expanded it processing facility, resulting in what is essentially a new sugar beet processing factory on the same site and partially using existing buildings. Nearly every major unit operation in the facility was replaced or substantially modified.”

(C.R. 010)

SMSBC then refers to this re-building and/or expansion as an “essentially new factory.” *Id.* In the Brief of SMSBC Concerning Suggested Procedural Matters, Petitioner states that it:

“reconstructed and reconfigured its Renville, Minnesota sugar beet processing factory thus creating a new sugar beet processing factory on the same site. The new factory increased production capacity and enhanced efficiency and productivity thereby driving down the costs of production.”

Brief of SMSBC Concerning Suggested Procedural Matters, p. 4. Petitioner is thus essentially arguing that by significantly improving efficiency and expanding its capacity, it has “opened” a new factory.

Congress obviously could have chosen to reward a beet sugar processor for expanding significantly in size. By limiting the 1.25% allocation increase to companies that “opened” a factory, however, Congress did not make the choice urged by Petitioner. That choice being made, it is not the role of the CCC nor the undersigned to second guess Congress. That Congress chose a different course after earlier passing the Freedom to Farm Act, and that Petitioner might have made business decisions in reliance on the earlier Act does not give the CCC any ground to implement the current Act in a manner contrary to its express terms. Moreover, the record indicates that
farm bills have a limited life and that those regulated by these bills have learned to expect periodic changes of greater or lesser significance. As I read it, the statute simply does not make any provision for adjusting a beet sugar processor’s allotment simply because it has increased its processing capacity, even if the increase was substantial. Indeed, granting allocation adjustments for increasing capacity would, based on the evidence presented by several of the intervenors, potentially result in a number of adjustments in allocation, which would all have to come out of the same total allotment. And imposing a rule that arguably doubling capacity is the equivalent of opening a factory, while any lesser number would not get such an allocation would likely be viewed as arbitrary, particularly given the clear meaning of “opened” in this context. Congress was certainly familiar with the potential for a processing facility to expand, and they appear to have decided to limit the granting of the 1.25% increase in allotment to processors who “opened” a factory rather than include those who expanded a presently existing one.

Alternatively, Petitioner has contended that it effectively demolished its old factory—although the company never ceased operating other than in the normal off-season for this industry—and built two new factories in its place. Tr. I at 139, 162. On the other hand, Petitioner seems to recognize, as Mr. Richmond testified, that there really is just one beet sugar processing factory in Renville, albeit a significantly larger and probably more efficient one than the pre-expansion factory. The legal argument that Petitioner effectively demolished its old factory and opened two new ones on the same location is less than compelling. Petitioner argues in its Post-Hearing Brief that “The entire beet end of the facility was demolished and reconstructed . . . “ (p. 17) and that the beet end of a facility is the “factory.” Id., at 21. Yet Petitioner also goes on to argue in its Reply Brief that it should not suffer the downward adjustment of 1.25% that the statute mandates for a beet sugar processor who has “closed” a sugar beet processing factory. Yet if a factory is demolished, it is difficult to conceive of it not being closed. In fact, Petitioner’s approach would logically mandate that the CCC deem a factory “closed” if it reduced capacity by 50%, since that would appear to be
the converse of accepting the argument that the doubling of capacity is “opening” an additional factory. And contending that the “beet end” and the “sugar end” are two different factories, and that therefore there are now two factories where there once was one seems little more than a bootstrap approach to arguing that allegedly doubling the potential capacity to process sugar beets is the same as opening a new factory.

I also find it significant, but not controlling, that in response to a survey conducted by the CCC, Petitioner indicated that it had not opened a new beet sugar processing facility during the time period that would trigger the increased allotment. Although Petitioner through testimony and argument indicates that this was a mistake, and that the form was confusing because it did not track the language of the statute and that it did not appear to be an official survey, it is apparent that at the time of the survey Petitioner considered its extensive renovation of its facility just that, and not the opening of a new facility.

Even if I were to find that the statutory language was ambiguous, which I do not, the legislative history would be of no help to Petitioner. Senator Conrad pointed out that the 2002 Act was designed to create “... a method for establishing allotments that is fair and open and provides some certainty and predictability to the industry.” The amorphous standard suggested by Petitioner which would require the CCC to determine that “opening” a facility includes expanding a facility’s capacity more than an unspecified amount (and suggests that a facility must be found to have “closed” if capacity has diminished by a likewise unspecified amount) provides neither certainty nor predictability and does not seem to comport with the objectives mentioned by Senator Conrad.

Petitioner also contends that “[a] conservative and common sense reading” (Opening Brief, p. 23) of Senator Conrad’s statement that the Secretary of Agriculture had the authority to make adjustments to allotments “... if an individual processor experienced disaster-related losses during that period or opened or closed a processing
facility or increased processing capacity through improved technology to extract more sugar from beets” means that a processor who increases processing capacity through improved technology is entitled to an adjustment to its allocation. However, reading Senator Conrad’s statement in conjunction with the four bases for allowing allocation adjustments provided in the Act, it is evident that the phrase concerning “increased processing capacity through improved technology to extract more sugar from beets” refers not to an increase in beet slicing capacity or a modernization of technology but rather to the allotment increase for molasses desugarization. Looking at Senator Conrad’s comments in context, it is apparent he is making a reference to each of the four types of adjustments—opening a facility, closing a facility, disaster-related losses and construction of a molasses desugarization facility. Further, the phrase in question refers to technologies to “extract more sugar from beets.” Increasing the capacity of a factory, as Petitioner did with the Renville facility, does not increase the amount of sugar they can extract from beets, but primarily allows them to process more beets. Thus, Senator Conrad’s statement, which basically constitutes the legislative history for these provisions, does not support Petitioner’s position.

I find that even if the language concerning whether a factory was “opened” was subject to multiple interpretations and the legislative history was not dispositive, the CCC would be entitled to some deference in its interpretation of these provisions. While the Act provides for a hearing as to whether the provisions on the adjusting of allotments have been correctly applied, it could not have intended to have the administrative law judge interpret the statute as if the CCC had never acted. While the hearing in this type of case may be de novo with respect to adducing material facts that are at issue, the judge is not supposed to substitute his expertise for the CCC, which is charged with administering the Act, including the promulgation of regulations. While I will not go so far as to say that I must give the CCC the full deference accorded in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), because that holding specifically seems to apply to federal judicial review of final agency actions while this matter is obviously still before the USDA, I find that some deference must be given to the Executive Vice-
President of CCC’s Initial Determination of Petitioner’s appeal [Reconsidered on December 12, 2000] as the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration.” Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). This is the

“... contemporaneous construction of a statute by the men charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion; of making the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new.” Power Reactor Development Co. v. International Union of Electricians, 367 U.S. 396, 408. . . When the construction of an administrative regulation rather than a statute is in issue, deference is even more clearly in order.

Udall, 380 U.S. at 17.

Here, the CCC’s interpretation of the “opened” provision is reasonable and consistent with the Act, and would be entitled to deference had I needed to reach that issue.

Finally, the CCC’s handling of the Pacific Northwest allocation is not inconsistent with the Act and with their handling of Petitioner’s allocation. The Renville facility was never closed during the period of its expansion, other than during the normal off-season for the beet end of the facility. The Moses Lake facility for which Pacific Northwest was awarded an allocation for “opening” a sugar beet processing facility had been closed for a full twenty years. That it was a closed facility for twenty years is manifest—most of the old equipment had been removed from the site. There had been no sugar beet processing at that location from 1978 until Pacific Northwest opened a processing facility at the same site in 1998. Tr. I at 95-98. The two situations are simply not analogous.

2. **Petitioner is Not Entitled to a Second Adjustment for Substantial Quality Losses on Stored Sugar Beets**
I affirm the CCC’s denial of a 1.25% adjustment for quality losses on stored sugar beets for the 1999 crop year. I find that the clear, unambiguous language of the Act only allows a single quality loss adjustment for sugar beets during the three crop years (1998-2000) that are used to calculate the base allotment, and that the CCC had already allowed such an adjustment for the 2000 crop year. Further, the legislative history offers no help to Petitioner’s interpretation. To the extent that there is any ambiguity in the statute, the interpretation of the CCC is reasonable and would be entitled to deference.

Section 359d(b)(2)(D)(i)(IV) of the Act provides for an adjustment if the Secretary determines that the processor, “during the 1998 through 2000 crop years, suffered substantial quality losses on sugar beets stored during any such crop year.” (Emphasis added.) (7 U.S.C. § 1359dd(b)(2)(D)(i)(IV).) Petitioner contends that it is entitled to a second adjustment for the 1999 crop year, in addition to the quality loss adjustment that it received for the 2000 crop year, while CCC contended that it was immaterial and irrelevant whether SMSBC suffered a second substantial quality loss in the 1999 crop year. The CCC and Intervenors contend that in order to properly apply the statutory provision, CCC never had to decide the issue of whether SMSBC had suffered substantial loss in the 1999 crop year since the substantial quality loss during the 2000 crop year was a sufficient basis for CCC to make the single adjustment permitted under the statute.

The CCC interpretation is in accord with the clear and unambiguous language of the Act. There are four different adjustments allowed under the Act, and three of them—for opening or closing a factory, and for constructing a molasses desugarization facility, apply to each opening, closing, or construction. In contrast, the adjustment for substantial quality losses on sugar beets stored during any such crop year from 1998 to 2000 does not specify that the adjustment applies to each such loss. The rules of statutory construction require the presumption that Congress’ word choices are intentional, and that where Congress uses one word—each—in describing three of the adjustments, while not using that word to apply to the fourth adjustment, then it must have had a purpose in so
doing. Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute, but omits it in another, “it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” *Bates v. United States*, 522 U.S. 23, 25 (1997). Where Congress provided that an adjustment be made for each opening, closing or construction in subparagraphs (D)(ii)(I), (II), and (III) and chose a different approach to (D)(ii)(IV), the only proper conclusion is that Congress did not want the same standard to apply.

Once again, even if I found that I needed to look to the legislative history, I see nothing that would support Petitioner’s interpretation. The legislative history does not address whether Congress intended there to be one, two or three adjustments based on sustaining quality losses. While all parties agree that the purpose of the Act’s adjustment provisions were “to provide a predictable, transparent, and equitable formula,” Senator Conrad’s statements shed no light, one way or the other, as to how this particular adjustment is to be applied. Thus, if I needed to look to the legislative history, I would next determine whether the CCC’s position was reasonable, under the deference standard that I discussed above.

The CCC’s position that a processor would only be entitled to a single adjustment for quality losses, even it could show quality losses for more than one of the covered crop years, is reasonable and would be entitled to deference. Since I have already held that this interpretation is the proper reading of the clear terms of the statute, and the only one that gives meaning to each of the terms used by Congress in the adjustment provisions, there is little more to say on the matter.

A considerable portion of the hearing was devoted to testimony and exhibits as to what Congress meant by “substantial quality losses on stored sugar beets.” Because I affirm the CCC’s determination that the Act only allows for one quality loss adjustment, and because the CCC has already awarded Petitioner such an adjustment for the 2000 crop year, I do not find it necessary to make any determination as to whether Petitioner showed that it has suffered such losses during
the 1999 crop year, and what standards would apply to make such a
determination. Whether the loss must be directly related to the beets
themselves, or whether such a loss can be the result of equipment
failure, whether the straight house method is the appropriate method
to determine the extent of losses, etc., are not for me to initially
determine. If the Act made provision for more than one quality loss
adjustment, I would have to remand the matter to the CCC for an
initial determination as to what standards would apply in making such
a determination.

3. Petitioner’s Due Process, Regulatory Taking and Significant
Impact Claims Provide No Basis for Overturning the CCC’s
Decision

Petitioner has alleged (Opening Brief, pp. 13-14) that its due
process rights were violated by the CCC’s lack of a “thorough and
proper investigation” of Petitioner’s request that the CCC reconsider
its initial allotment allocation decision; that denying it the requested
allocation adjustments would amount to a regulatory taking; and that
the impact of a denial of the requested allocations would be
significant and discriminatory.

An administrative law judge’s jurisdiction to rule on constitutional
claims is limited. We clearly cannot declare an Act of Congress
unconstitutional, nor can we invalidate an Agency regulation.
“[G]enerally an administrative tribunal has no authority to declare
unconstitutional a statute that it administers.” In re Jerry Goetz, 61
Agric. Dec. 282, 287 (2002). However, we are charged with assuring
that parties receive due process in their hearings.

Petitioner has received ample due process. The principal due
process contention raised by Petitioner appears to be that on
reconsideration, the Executive Vice President of the CCC did not
conduct a hearing. Aside from the lack of requirement in the Act or
the regulations that a reconsideration request entitles Petitioner to a
hearing before the CCC, the fact is that Petitioner received an
in-person hearing before me and had a full opportunity to adduce the
facts that would support its claim for additional allotments.
Petitioner’s regulatory taking and unfair impact arguments are essentially disagreements with Congress’ legislative decisions in crafting the Act. Since I have sustained the CCC’s interpretations as totally consistent with the statute, and since I have no authority to alter or overrule the statutory scheme authorized by Congress, I find no basis for reversing the determination of the CCC.

Findings and Conclusions

1. Petitioner, during the years 1996-2000, engaged in a significant modernization and expansion of the beet sugar processing facility in Renville, Minnesota.

2. Petitioner’s significant modernization and expansion did not constitute opening a new beet sugar processing factory.

3. Petitioner was not entitled to a 1.25% increase in its allocation for opening a sugar beet processing factory.

4. Petitioner received a 1.25% increase in its allocation as a result of suffering substantial quality losses on stored sugar beets during the 2000 crop year.

5. Under the Act, no processor is entitled to more than one adjustment for substantial quality losses on stored sugar beets during the 1998 through 2000 crop years.

6. Petitioner was not entitled to a 1.25% increase in its allocation for suffering substantial quality losses on stored beets during the 1999 crop year.

7. Petitioner was not denied due process during the course of these proceedings.

Conclusion and Order

The determinations made by the Executive Vice-President of the CCC on January 23, 2003 denying Petitioner’s request for additional
allotments under the Act are sustained. The Petition for Review is DENIED.

This decision shall become final 25 days after service on the Executive Vice-President of the CCC, unless a party or an intervenor files an appeal petition to the Judicial Officer pursuant to Rule 11.
Copies hereof shall be served upon the parties.
GENERAL

MISCELLANEOUS ORDERS

In re: DARVIN WILKES.
AMAA Docket No. 02-0007.
Order Dismissing Case.

Robert Ertman, for Complainant.
Respondent, Pro se.
Order Dismissing Case issued by Marc R. Hillson, Chief Administrative Law Judge.

Complainant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Accordingly, this case is DISMISSED.

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In re: LION RAISINS, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, AND BOGHOSIAN RAISIN PACKING CO., INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION.
Order Granting Petition for Reconsideration.
Filed December 7, 2004.

AMAA – Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act – Raisin order – Terms and conditions in marketing orders – Dismissal with prejudice.

The Judicial Officer granted Respondent’s petition to reconsider one sentence in In re Lion Raisins, Inc., 63 Agric. Dec. ___ (Oct. 19, 2004). The Judicial Officer concluded that the sentence erroneously states that the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, as amended, requires that each agricultural commodity marketing order contain an inspection requirement. The Judicial Officer amended the sentence to reflect that 7 U.S.C. § 608c(6) provides that each agricultural commodity marketing order, other than milk marketing orders, contain one or more
of the terms and conditions in 7 U.S.C. § 608c(6)(A)-(J), and that one of the terms and conditions, which is set forth in 7 U.S.C. § 608c(6)(F), is an inspection requirement.

Colleen A. Carroll, for Respondent.
Brian C. Leighton, and Howard A. Sagaser, for Petitioners.
Order issued by William G. Jenson, Judicial Officer.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Lion Raisins, Inc., a California corporation, and Boghosian Raisin Packing Co., Inc., a California corporation [hereinafter Petitioners], instituted this proceeding by filing a petition on September 10, 2003. Petitioners instituted the proceeding under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, as amended [hereinafter the AMAA]; the federal marketing order regulating the handling of “Raisins Produced From Grapes Grown In California” (7 C.F.R. pt. 989) [hereinafter the Raisin Order]; and the “Rules of Practice Governing Proceedings on Petitions To Modify or To Be Exempted From Marketing Orders” (7 C.F.R. §§ 900.50-.71) [hereinafter the Rules of Practice]. Petitioners request modification of the Raisin Order.

On October 10, 2003, the Administrator, Agricultural Marketing Service, United States Department of Agriculture [hereinafter Respondent], filed a “Motion to Dismiss Petition.” Respondent contends the petition should be dismissed with prejudice because the Petition does not meet the requirements in section 900.52(b)(1)-(4) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 900.52(b)(1)-(4)) (Mot. to Dismiss Pet.). On November 7, 2003, Petitioner Lion Raisins, Inc., filed “Petitioner Lion Raisins, Inc.’s Opposition to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Petition,” and on December 3, 2003, Petitioner Boghosian

1Petitioners entitle their Petition “Petition to Enforce and/or Modify Raisin Marketing Order Provisions/Regulations and/or Petition to the Secretary of Agriculture to Eliminate as Mandatory the Use of the USDA’s Processed Products Inspection Branch Services for All Incoming and Outgoing Raisins, as Currently Required by 7 C.F.R. §§ 989.58 & 989.59, and to Exempt Petitioner from the Mandatory Inspection Services by USDA for Incoming and Outgoing Raisins and/or any Obligations Imposed in Connection Therewith That Are Not in Accordance with Law” [hereinafter Petition].
Raisin Packing Co., Inc., filed “Petitioner Boghosian Raisin Packing Co., Inc.’s Opposition to Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Petition.”


APPLICABLE STATUTORY PROVISIONS

7 U.S.C.:

§ 608c. Orders regulating handling of commodity

(6) Other commodities; terms and conditions of orders

In the case of agricultural commodities and the products thereof, other than milk and its products, specified in subsection (2) of this section orders issued pursuant to this section shall contain one or more of the following terms and conditions, and (except as provided in subsection (7) of this section), no others:
(F) Requiring or providing for the requirement of inspection of any such commodity or product produced during specified periods and marketed by handlers.

(15) Petition by handler for modification of order or exemption; court review of ruling of Secretary

(A) Any handler subject to an order may file a written petition with the Secretary of Agriculture, stating that any such order or any provision of any such order or any obligation imposed in connection therewith is not in accordance with law and praying for a modification thereof or to be exempted therefrom. He shall thereupon be given an opportunity for a hearing upon such petition, in accordance with regulations made by the Secretary of Agriculture, with the approval of the President. After such hearing, the Secretary shall make a ruling upon the prayer of such petition which shall be final, if in accordance with law.

(B) The District Courts of the United States in any district in which such handler is an inhabitant, or has his principal place of business, are vested with jurisdiction in equity to review such ruling, provided a bill in equity for that purpose is filed within twenty days from the date of the entry of such ruling. Service of process in such proceedings may be had upon the Secretary by delivering to him a copy of the bill of complaint. If the court determines that such ruling is not in accordance with law, it shall remand such proceedings to the
Secretary with directions either (1) to make such ruling as the court shall determine to be in accordance with law, or (2) to take such further proceedings as, in its opinion, the law requires. The pendency of proceedings instituted pursuant to this subsection (15) shall not impede, hinder, or delay the United States or the Secretary of Agriculture from obtaining relief pursuant to section 608a(6) of this title. Any proceedings brought pursuant to section 608a(6) of this title (except where brought by way of counterclaim in proceedings instituted pursuant to this subsection (15)) shall abate whenever a final decree has been rendered in proceedings between the same parties, and covering the same subject matter, instituted pursuant to this subsection (15).


CONCLUSION BY THE JUDICIAL OFFICER ON RECONSIDERATION

Respondent seeks reconsideration of the following sentence in the October 19, 2004, Decision and Order because, Respondent contends, the sentence erroneously conveys that the AMAA mandates that marketing orders contain an inspection requirement:

However, section 8c(6)(F) of the AMAA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(6)(F)) requires that each agricultural commodity marketing order, other than milk marketing orders, contain a term requiring the inspection of the agricultural commodity subject to the marketing order.

Although Petitioner Lion Raisins, Inc., opposes Respondent’s Petition for Reconsideration, Petitioner Lion Raisins, Inc., agrees with Respondent’s contention that the AMAA does not require that each agricultural commodity marketing order contain an inspection requirement.\(^3\) I agree with Respondent and Petitioner Lion Raisins, Inc., that section 8c(6) of the AMAA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(6)) does not require that each agricultural commodity marketing order contain a term requiring the inspection of the agricultural commodity that is the subject of the marketing order. Therefore, I conclude the above-quoted sentence in \textit{In re Lion Raisins, Inc.}, 63 Agric. Dec. \text{____}, slip op. at 15 (Oct. 19, 2004), is error, and I hereby amend the sentence to read, as follows:

However, section 8c(6) of the AMAA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(6)) provides that each agricultural commodity marketing order, other than milk marketing orders, contain one or more of the terms and conditions set forth in section 8c(6)(A)-(J) of the AMAA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(6)(A)-(J)). One of the terms or conditions in section 8c(6) of the AMAA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(6)) is an inspection requirement, which is set forth in section 8c(6)(F) of the AMAA (7 U.S.C. § 608c(6)(F)).

This amendment of the October 19, 2004, Decision and Order does not affect the disposition of the proceeding; except that, the effective date of the Order is the date stated in the Order in this Order Granting Petition for Reconsideration. Therefore, for the foregoing reason and the reasons set forth in \textit{In re Lion Raisins, Inc.}, 63 Agric. Dec. \text{____} (Oct. 19, 2004), the following Order should be issued.

\textbf{ORDER}

1. Petitioners’ Petition, filed September 10, 2003, is dismissed with prejudice.

\(^3\)Petitioner Lion Raisins, Inc., states “Petitioner Lion recognizes that a marketing order is \textit{not required} to have an inspection requirement.” (Petitioner Lion Raisins’ Opposition to Complainant’s [sic] Petition for Reconsideration of Decision of the Judicial Officer at 2 (emphasis in original)).
2. This Order shall become effective on the day after service on Petitioners.

RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

Petitioners have the right to obtain review of this Order in any district court of the United States in which district Petitioners are inhabitants or have their principal places of business. A bill in equity for the purpose of review of this Order must be filed within 20 days from the date of entry of this Order. Service of process in any such proceeding may be had upon the Secretary of Agriculture by delivering a copy of the bill of complaint to the Secretary of Agriculture.\(^4\) The date of entry of this Order is December 7, 2004.

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In re: VEGA NUNEZ.
A.Q. Docket No. 03-0002.
Order Denying Late Appeal filed September 8, 2004.

AQ – Animal Health Protection Act – Late appeal.

The Judicial Officer denied Respondent’s late-filed appeal. The Judicial Officer concluded he had no jurisdiction to hear Respondent’s appeal filed on the day Administrative Law Judge Jill S. Clifton’s decision became final.

James A. Booth for Complainant.
Respondent, Pro se.
Decision and Order by Reason of Admission of Facts issued by Jill S. Clifton, Administrative Law Judge.
Order issued by William G. Jenson, Judicial Officer.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, United States Department of Agriculture [hereinafter Complainant], instituted this disciplinary administrative proceeding by filing a


Complainant alleges that on or about January 17, 2001, Vega Nunez [hereinafter Respondent] imported approximately 4 pounds of meat sausage from Germany into the United States at Chicago, Illinois, in violation of 9 C.F.R. § 94.11(a), (b), and (c) because the meat product did not comply with the requirements necessary for such meat to be imported into the United States (Compl. ¶ II).

The Hearing Clerk served Respondent with the Complaint, the Rules of Practice, and a service letter on November 14, 2002.1 Respondent filed an answer to the Complaint on December 9, 2002.

On March 23, 2004, in accordance with section 1.139 of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.139 (2002)), Complainant filed a “Motion for Adoption of Proposed Default Decision and Order” and a “Proposed Default Decision and Order.” The Hearing Clerk served Respondent with Complainant’s Motion for Adoption of Proposed Default Decision and Order and Complainant’s Proposed Default Decision and Order and a service letter on April 3, 2004.2 On April 13, 2004, Respondent filed objections to Complainant’s Motion for Adoption of Proposed Default Decision and Order and Complainant’s Proposed Default Decision and Order.

On May 10, 2004, pursuant to section 1.139 of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.139 (2002)), Administrative Law Judge Jill S. Clifton [hereinafter the ALJ] issued a “Decision and Order by Reason of Admission of Facts”: (1) concluding that Respondent violated the

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1United States Postal Service Domestic Return Receipt for Article Number 7001 0360 0000 0304 2905.

2United States Postal Service Domestic Return Receipt for Article Number 7001 0360 0000 0304 7849.
Animal Health Protection Act and the Regulations, as alleged in the Complaint; and (2) assessing Respondent a $50 civil penalty (Decision and Order by Reason of Admission of Facts at 4).

On May 24, 2004, the Hearing Clerk served Respondent with the ALJ’s Decision and Order by Reason of Admission of Facts. On June 28, 2004, Respondent appealed to the Judicial Officer. Complainant failed to file a response to Respondent’s appeal petition, and on September 2, 2004, the Hearing Clerk transmitted the record to the Judicial Officer for consideration and decision.

CONCLUSION BY THE JUDICIAL OFFICER

The record establishes that the Hearing Clerk served Respondent with the ALJ’s Decision and Order by Reason of Admission of Facts on May 24, 2004. Section 1.145(a) of the Rules of Practice provides that an administrative law judge’s decision must be appealed to the Judicial Officer within 30 days after service, as follows:

§ 1.145 Appeal to Judicial Officer.

(a) Filing of petition. Within 30 days after receiving service of the Judge’s decision, a party who disagrees with the decision, or any part thereof, or any ruling by the Judge or any alleged deprivation of rights, may appeal such decision to the Judicial Officer by filing an appeal petition with the Hearing Clerk.

7 C.F.R. § 1.145(a) (2002).

Therefore, Respondent was required to file her appeal petition with the Hearing Clerk no later than June 23, 2004. Respondent did
not file her appeal petition with the Hearing Clerk until June 28, 2004.

The Judicial Officer has continuously and consistently held under the Rules of Practice that the Judicial Officer has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal that is filed after an administrative law judge’s decision becomes final. The ALJ’s Decision and Order by Reason of

5In re Ross Blackstock, 63 Agric. Dec. ___ (July 13, 2004) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 2 days after the administrative law judge’s decision became final); In re David McCauley, 63 Agric. Dec. ___ (July 12, 2004) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 1 month 26 days after the administrative law judge’s decision became final); In re Belinda Atherton, 62 Agric. Dec. ___ (Oct. 20, 2003) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed the day the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final); In re Samuel K. Angel, 61 Agric. Dec. 275 (2002) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 3 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final); In re Paul Eugenio, 60 Agric. Dec. 676 (2001) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 1 day after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final); In re Harold P. Kafka, 58 Agric. Dec. 357 (1999) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 15 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final), aff’d per curiam, 259 F.3d 716 (3d Cir. 2001) (Table); In re Kevin Ackerman, 58 Agric. Dec. 340 (1999) (dismissing Kevin Ackerman’s appeal petition filed 1 day after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final); In re Severin Peterson, 57 Agric. Dec. 1304 (1998) (dismissing the applicants’ appeal petition filed 23 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final); In re Queen City Farms, Inc., 57 Agric. Dec. 813 (1998) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 58 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final); In re Gail Davis, 56 Agric. Dec. 373 (1997) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 41 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final); In re Field Market Produce, Inc., 55 Agric. Dec. 1418 (1996) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 8 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became effective); In re Ow Duk Kwon, 55 Agric. Dec. 78 (1996) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 35 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became effective); In re New York Primate Center, Inc., 53 Agric. Dec. 529 (1994) (dismissing the respondents’ appeal petition filed 2 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final); In re K. Lester, 52 Agric. Dec. 332 (1993) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 14 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final and effective); In re Amiril L. Carrington, 52 Agric. Dec. 331 (1993) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 7 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final and effective); In re Teofilo Benicta, 52 Agric. Dec. 321 (1993) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 6 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final and effective); In re Newark Produce (continued...)
In re Laura May Kurjan, 51 Agric. Dec. 438 (1992) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final); In re Kermit Breed, 50 Agric. Dec. 675 (1991) (dismissing the respondent’s late-filed appeal petition); In re Bihari Lall, 49 Agric. Dec. 896 (1990) (stating the respondent’s appeal petition, filed after the administrative law judge’s decision became final, must be dismissed because it was not timely filed); In re Dale Haley, 48 Agric. Dec. 1072 (1989) (stating the respondents’ appeal petition, filed after the administrative law judge’s decision became final and effective, must be dismissed because it was not timely filed); In re Mary Fran Hamilton, 45 Agric. Dec. 896 (1990) (stating the respondent’s appeal petition filed with the Hearing Clerk on the day the administrative law judge’s decision and order had become final and effective); In re Bushelle Cattle Co., 45 Agric. Dec. 1131 (1986) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 2 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final and effective); In re William T. Powell, 44 Agric. Dec. 1220 (1985) (stating it has consistently been held that, under the Rules of Practice, the Judicial Officer has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal after the administrative law judge’s decision and order becomes final); In re Toscony Provision Co., 43 Agric. Dec. 1106 (1984) (stating the Judicial Officer has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal that is filed after the administrative law judge’s decision becomes final), aff’d, No. 81-1729 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 1985) (court reviewed merits notwithstanding late administrative appeal), aff’d, 782 F.2d 1031 (3d Cir. 1986) (unpublished); In re Dock Case Brokerage Co., 42 Agric. Dec. 1950 (1983) (dismissing the respondents’ appeal petition filed 5 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final); In re Veg-Pro Distributors, 42 Agric. Dec. 1173 (1983) (denying the respondent’s appeal petition filed 1 day after the default decision and order became final); In re Samuel Simin Petro, 42 Agric. Dec. 921 (1983) (stating the Judicial Officer has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal that is filed after the administrative law judge’s decision and order becomes final and effective); In re Yankee Brokerage, Inc., 42 Agric. Dec. 427 (1983) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed on the day the administrative law judge’s decision became effective); In re Charles Brink, 41 Agric. Dec. 2146 (1982) (stating the Judicial Officer has no jurisdiction to consider the respondent’s appeal dated before the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final, but not filed until 4 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final and effective), reconsideration denied, 41 Agric. Dec. 2147 (1982); In re Mel’s Produce, Inc., 40 Agric. Dec. 792 (1981) (stating since the respondent’s petition for reconsideration was not filed within 35 days after service of the default decision, the default decision became final and neither the administrative law judge nor the Judicial Officer has jurisdiction to consider the respondent’s petition); In re Animal Research Center of Massachusetts, Inc., 38 Agric. Dec. 379 (1978) (stating failure to file an appeal petition before the effective date of the administrative law judge’s decision is jurisdictional); In re Willie Cook, 39 Agric. Dec. 116 (1978) (stating (continued...)
Admission of Facts became final on June 28, 2004, the day Respondent filed an appeal petition. Therefore, I have no jurisdiction to hear Respondent’s appeal.

The United States Department of Agriculture’s construction of the Rules of Practice is, in this respect, consistent with the construction of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 4(a)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides, as follows:

Rule 4. Appeal as of Right—When Taken

(a) Appeal in a Civil Case.

(1) Time for Filing a Notice of Appeal.

(A) In a civil case . . . the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 must be filed with the district clerk within 30 days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered.

As stated in Eaton v. Jamrog, 984 F.2d 760, 762 (6th Cir. 1993):

We have repeatedly held that compliance with Rule 4(a)(1) is a mandatory and jurisdictional prerequisite which this court may neither waive nor extend. See, e.g., Baker v. Raulie, 879 F.2d 1396, 1398 (6th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); Myers v. Ace Hardware, Inc., 777 F.2d 1099, 1102 (6th Cir. 1985). So strictly has this rule been applied, that even a notice of appeal filed five minutes late has been deemed untimely. Baker, 879 F.2d at 1398.\(^7\)

\(^3\)(...continued) it is the consistent policy of the United States Department of Agriculture not to consider appeals filed more than 35 days after service of the administrative law judge’s decision).

\(^7\) C.F.R. § 1.139 (2002); Decision and Order by Reason of Admission of Facts at 5.

\(^7\)Accord Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 203 (1988) (stating since the court of appeals properly held petitioner’s notice of appeal from the decision
The Rules of Practice do not provide for an extension of time (for good cause or excusable neglect) for filing a notice of appeal after an administrative law judge’s decision has become final. Under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the district court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time to file a notice of appeal upon a motion filed no later than 30 days after the expiration of the time otherwise provided in the rules for the filing of a notice of appeal. The absence of such a rule in the Rules of Practice emphasizes that no such jurisdiction has been granted to the Judicial Officer to extend the time for filing an appeal after an administrative law judge’s decision has become final. Therefore, under the Rules of Practice, I cannot extend the time for Respondent’s

\[\text{\footnote{...continued}}\]

on the merits to be untimely filed, and since the time of an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional, the court of appeals was without jurisdiction to review the decision on the merits; Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corr. of Illinois, 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (stating under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 2107, a notice of appeal in a civil case must be filed within 30 days of entry of the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken; this 30-day time limit is mandatory and jurisdictional), rehearing denied, 434 U.S. 1089 (1978); Martinez v. Hoke, 38 F.3d 655, 656 (2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (stating under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the time for filing an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional and the court of appeals has no authority to extend time for filing); Price v. Seydel, 961 F.2d 1470, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating the filing of notice of appeal within the 30-day period specified in Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) is mandatory and jurisdictional, and unless appellant’s notice is timely, the appeal must be dismissed); In re Eichelberger, 943 F.2d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that a notice of appeal be filed with the clerk of the district court within 30 days after entry of the judgment; Rule 4(a)’s provisions are mandatory and jurisdictional); Washington v. Bumgarner, 882 F.2d 899, 900 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating the time limit in Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) is mandatory and jurisdictional; failure to comply with Rule 4(a) requires dismissal of the appeal and the fact that appellant is incarcerated and proceeding pro se does not change the clear language of the Rule), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1060 (1990); Jerningham v. Humphreys, 868 F.2d 846 (6th Cir. 1989) (Order) (stating the failure of an appellant to timely file a notice of appeal deprives an appellate court of jurisdiction; compliance with Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure is a mandatory and jurisdictional prerequisite which this court can neither waive nor extend).
filing an appeal petition after the ALJ’s Decision and Order by Reason of Admission of Facts became final.

Moreover, the jurisdictional bar under the Rules of Practice, which precludes the Judicial Officer from hearing an appeal that is filed after an administrative law judge’s decision becomes final, is consistent with the judicial construction of the Administrative Orders Review Act (“Hobbs Act”). As stated in Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. v. ICC, 720 F.2d 958, 960 (7th Cir. 1983) (footnote omitted):

The Administrative Orders Review Act (“Hobbs Act”) requires a petition to review a final order of an administrative agency to be brought within sixty days of the entry of the order. 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (1976). This sixty-day time limit is jurisdictional in nature and may not be enlarged by the courts. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 666 F.2d 595, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The purpose of the time limit is to impart finality into the administrative process, thereby conserving administrative resources and protecting the reliance interests of those who might conform their conduct to the administrative regulations. Id. at 602.[9]

Accordingly, Respondent’s appeal petition must be denied, since it is too late for the matter to be further considered. Moreover, the matter should not be considered by a reviewing court since, under section 1.139 of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.139 (2002)), “no decision shall be final for purposes of judicial review except a final decision of the Judicial Officer upon appeal.”

For the foregoing reasons, the following Order should be issued.

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[9] Accord Jem Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 22 F.3d 320, 324-26 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating the court’s baseline standard long has been that statutory limitations on petitions for review are jurisdictional in nature and appellant’s petition filed after the 60-day limitation in the Hobbs Act will not be entertained); Friends of Sierra R.R. v. ICC, 881 F.2d 663, 666 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating the time limit in 28 U.S.C. § 2344 is jurisdictional), cert. denied sub nom. Tuolumne Park & Recreation Dist. v. ICC, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990).
ORDER

Respondent’s appeal petition, filed June 28, 2004, is denied. Administrative Law Judge Jill S. Clifton’s Decision and Order by Reason of Admission of Facts, filed May 10, 2004, is the final decision in this proceeding.

In re: PENINSULA LABORATORIES, INC.
A.Q. Docket No. 05-0003.
Order Dismissing Case.

Krishna Ramaraju, for Complainant.
Respondent, Pro se.
Order Dismissing Case issued by Marc R. Hillson, Administrative Law Judge.

Complainant’s Motion to Withdraw Complaint is GRANTED. Accordingly, this case is DISMISSED.

In re: ROBERT FRANZEN.
AWA Docket No. 04-0003.
Dismissal.
Filed August 6, 2004.

Donald Brittenham, Jr., for Complainant.
Respondent, Pro se.
Order issued by Marc R. Hillson, Chief Administrative Law Judge.

As the parties have reached a settlement in this matter, Complainant’s Request for Dismissal is GRANTED.
In re: JOHN F. CUNEIO, JR., THE HAWTHORN CORPORATION, THOMAS M. THOMPSON, JAMES G. ZAJICEK, JOHN N. CAUDILL, III, JOHN N. CAUDILL, JR., WALKER BROTHER’S CIRCUS, INC., AND DAVID A. CREECH.
AWA Docket No. 03-0023.
Ruling Extending Deadline.

Bernadette Juarez for Complainant.
Ruling by Chief Administrative Law Judge, Marc R. Hillson.

Ruling Extending Compliance Deadline in Consent Decision Pending Rulings on Emergency Motion to Compel Enforcement and Motion to Vacate The Consent Decision and Order

On March 12, 2004, I signed a consent decision resolving litigation between Complainant and Respondents Cuneo and The Hawthorn Corporation. The Decision imposed a number of obligations on both Respondents and the Complainant, principally including the payment of a $200,000 civil penalty, and an agreement for the parties to “work cooperatively” to effectuate the donation, by Respondents, of all sixteen of their elephants, by August 15, 2004. The Consent Decision provided that if Respondents failed to donate their elephants by the August 15 deadline, their license under the Animal Welfare Act “shall be revoked immediately, without further procedure.”

On July 22, Respondents filed an Emergency Motion seeking to compel enforcement of the consent decision, and/or to stay or otherwise extend the August 15 deadline for donation. In this motion, Respondents contended that Complainant was not living up to its obligations under the Consent Decision. Respondent contended, among other things, that Complainant had obstructed the donation process rather than working cooperatively to effectuate the donations,
that Complainant had delayed responding to numerous phone calls and letters regarding elephant placement, that Complainant disapproved a number of potential donation recipients without giving timely or adequate reason for the disapprovals, that Complainant was trying to steer the donations to two organizations that Respondent did not want to utilize, even though Complainant had earlier indicated there were 29 potential donees, and that Complainant after signing the Consent Decision essentially changed the rules for donee qualification.

On August 6, Complainant filed a response which contended that I lacked jurisdiction to grant Respondents’ Motion, which it treated as a unilateral motion to modify the consent decision. Complainant did not address any of Respondent’s contentions concerning its conduct during the period between (and to some extent before) the signing of the Consent Decision and the filing of the Emergency Motion. Complainant principally cited In re Far West Meats, 55 Agric. Dec. 1033 (1996), where the Judicial Officer indicated that an administrative law judge had no jurisdiction to modify a consent decision unless all parties to the decision so requested. The response did not address the authority of an administrative law judge to take measures to enforce the terms of a consent decision.

On August 10, Respondents filed a Motion to Vacate the Consent Decision and Order, contending that the Consent Decision was fraudulently induced, was predicated upon a unilateral mistake, and was based on an illusory promise by Complainant.

Recognizing that prompt action was necessary, I conducted a conference call on the afternoon of August 12 with counsel for all three parties to the Consent Decision. During this call, in addition to expanding on the legal arguments made in the motions and response, counsel for Complainant indicated that Complainant had significant disputes concerning the numerous factual allegations made by Respondents in the Emergency Motion, many of which were discussed in greater detail during the conference call.
I conclude that an administrative law judge does have the jurisdiction to determine whether the parties to a consent decision are performing their duties under the decision, and to take actions to assure that the obligations agreed to by the parties to a decision are in fact being honored. If a party to such a decision contends that another party is not complying with the terms of the agreement, the allegedly compliant party must have some recourse. In this case, if Respondent had no means of assuring compliance by Complainant with the obligations imposed upon it by the Consent Decision, it must, according to Complainant, submit to an immediate revocation of its exhibitor’s license, which could only be reviewed in Federal district court. While this portion of the Consent Decision raises a question of whether the parties are by contract attempting to impose jurisdiction on the Federal courts rather than exhausting administrative remedies, the fact is that Respondent filed the Emergency Motion over three weeks before the August 15 compliance date in the Consent Decision, before the Federal courts would have jurisdiction in an event. At the time of filing, and continuing through the date of this Ruling, there is no one other than a USDA administrative law judge who would appear to have any jurisdiction concerning issues of compliance with the Decision.

This holding is not inconsistent with Far West Meats. In holding that an ajl could not modify a Consent Decision unless both parties to the decision agreed, the Judicial Officer did not speak to whether an ajl had jurisdiction to resolve issues as to whether one or more of the parties to such a decision were complying with the obligations imposed on it by the decision, or whether the ajl could compel a party to comply with the obligations to which it agreed. While the Emergency Motion does seek modification of the August 15 compliance date, it is only in the context of the request to compel enforcement of obligations under the Decision that Complainant has allegedly not complied with. If I have jurisdiction to grant the Emergency Motion, then it stands to reason that I can stay the August 15 compliance date to hold a hearing or review other written evidence to allow me to determine if the Motion should be granted. Staying a portion of the Decision to allow determination of these issues is not a
“modification” of the Decision, just a necessary delay while I hear the evidence and make my ruling.

Similarly, it is within my jurisdiction to take evidence to determine whether I should grant Respondents’ Motion to Vacate the Consent Judgment and Order. At this point, Complainant has not filed a response to this Motion, which was only filed three days ago. The Judicial Officer in Far West Meats specifically ruled that an administrative law judge has the authority to vacate a consent decision under “extraordinary circumstances” which would include “an examination of circumstances under which the Consent Decision was entered,” and whether there was no “genuine assent” to the agreement due to such factors as fraud or duress. Id., at 1054-6. Respondents contend that these extraordinary circumstances are present here. Since Complainant is entitled to respond to these contentions and since I have to possibly hold a hearing or otherwise take evidence to determine whether or not vacation of the Decision is appropriate, I have an independent basis to stay the August 15 compliance date until I can make my determination.

Next steps—Complainant is directed to file a response to Respondents’ Motion to Vacate by August 25. I will schedule a conference call with the parties in the next two weeks to determine what further proceedings, including an evidentiary hearing, would be appropriate to resolve the issues presented by these two motions, and to schedule such a hearing, if necessary. Until I rule on the two pending motions, I am staying the August 15 compliance date in paragraph 3 of the Order contained in the Consent Decision.

I direct the Hearing Clerk to serve this Ruling by facsimile.

In re: SANDRA RIVERS AND DARRELL RIVERS, d/b/a CHI CHI PUPPY PALACE.
AWA Docket No. 02-0011.
Order Dismissing Case.

Robert Ertman, for Complainant.
Respondent, Pro se.
Order Dismissing Case by Marc R. Hillson, Chief Administrative Law Judge.

Complainant’s Motion to Dismiss the above-captioned matter is GRANTED.

Accordingly, this case is DISMISSED.

In re: HONEY CREEK, INC., d/b/a ARBUCKLE WIDERNES.
AWA Docket No. 00-0009.
Order Dismissing Case.

Robert Ertman, for Complainant.
Respondent, Pro se.
Order issued by Marc R. Hillson, Chief, Administrative Law Judge.

Complainant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Accordingly, this case is DISMISSED.

In re: LLOYD WARREN, JR., d/b/a QUALITY CARE KENNEL.
AWA Docket No. 04-0019.
Order Dismissing Case.
Filed October 26, 2004.

Brian T. Hill, for Complainant.
Respondent, Pro se.
Order issued by Marc R. Hillson, Chief Administrative Law Judge.
Complainant’s Motion to Withdraw the Complaint is **GRANTED**. It is hereby ordered that the Complaint, filed herein on June 29, 2004, be withdrawn.

Accordingly, this case is **DISMISSED**.

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**In re: MARTINE COLETTE, WILDLIFE WAYSTATION, AND ROBERT H. LORSCH.**  
AWA Docket No. 03-0034.  
Ruling Denying Motion.  
Filed November 9, 2004.

Colleen Carroll for Complainant.  
David S. Krantz, Marilyn Barrett, Rosemarie Lewis, Matt Yeager for Respondent.  
*Ruling by Chief Administrative Law Judge, Marc R. Hillson.*

**Ruling Denying Motion For More Definite Statement of the Second Amended Complaint and Denying Motion to Strike Six Paragraphs of the Amended Complaint; Ruling Denying Motion to Strike Reply**

Following my granting of an earlier Motion for a More Definite Statement on February 12, 2004, Complainant filed a Second Amended Complaint on March 15, 2004. On April 19, 2004, Respondents filed Answers to the Second Amended Complaint, a Motion for a More Definite Statement of the Second Amended Complaint, and a Motion to Strike Portions of Complainant’s Second Amended Complaint. After Complainant responded to these motions, the Hearing Clerk invited Respondents to file a Reply, even though a reply is not authorized under the Rules of Procedure. Respondents filed a Reply, Complainant moved to strike the Reply, and Respondents filed a Response to Complainant’s Motion to Strike. Respondents also requested that I hold a hearing on their Motions.
I have reviewed the Second Amended Complaint and am satisfied that it contains a level of detail that was not present in the initial Complaint. While certain individual paragraphs could have been crafted to provide more detail as to particular alleged violations, Respondents have been put on notice, consistent with the Rules of Practice, as to the nature and circumstances of the violations alleged by Complainant. Combined with the prehearing exchange that I normally order in the months preceding the hearing, which would require Complainant to provide Respondents with copies of all proposed witnesses, a list of anticipated witnesses, and a summary of witness testimony, I am satisfied that there is no need for a further More Definite Statement.

In moving that I strike portions of Complainant’s Second Amended Complaint, Respondents are asking me to look beyond the plain language of an earlier agreement between the parties, contending that an unwritten agreement between the parties bars Complainant from proceeding with prosecution of alleged violations that occurred before the Consent Decision and Order was signed by Judge Clifton. Nothing on the face of the Consent Decision and Order indicates that possible violations occurring before the date of signing are barred. If the parties mutually agreed to bar such actions, they were perfectly capable of negotiating a clause in their agreement to reflect this. Both parties submitted documentation justifying their understanding, or lack thereof, as to the resolution of possible claims predating the initial agreement, but I have no need to examine these documents. Examination of these documents would only be necessary if there was some ambiguity in the agreement at issue. Here, the agreement simply does not address the issue of uncited alleged violations that occurred before the agreement’s execution, and I see no need to look any further. The Motion to Strike is denied. Although the Hearing Clerk’s office was in error in inviting the filing of a Reply, I deny the Motion to Strike as no harm was done, and there was no prejudice to any party caused by the additional filing.
In re: JOHN F. CUNEO, JR., AN INDIVIDUAL; THE HAWTHORN CORPORATION, AN ILLINOIS CORPORATION; THOMAS M. THOMPSON, AN INDIVIDUAL; JAMES G. ZAJICEK, AN INDIVIDUAL; JOHN N. CAUDILL, III, AN INDIVIDUAL; JOHN N. CAUDILL, JR., AN INDIVIDUAL; WALKER BROTHER'S CIRCUS, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION; AND DAVID A. CREECH, AN INDIVIDUAL.
AWA Docket No. 03-0023.
Order Dismissing Complainant’s Appeal Petition as to John F. Cuneo, Jr., and The Hawthorn Corporation.
Filed November 22, 2004.

AWA – Animal Welfare Act – Interlocutory appeal.
The Judicial Officer dismissed Complainant’s interlocutory appeal from a ruling by Chief Administrative Law Judge Marc R. Hillson on the ground that interlocutory appeals are not permitted under the Rules of Practice.

Colleen A. Carroll and Bernadette R. Juarez, for Complainant.
Vincent J. Colatriano, Derek L. Shaffer, and Michael Weitzner, for Respondents.
Ruling Extending Compliance Deadline in Consent Decision Pending Rulings on Emergency Motion to Compel Enforcement and Motion to Vacate the Consent Decision and Order issued by Marc R. Hillson, Chief Administrative Law Judge.
Order issued by William G. Jenson, Judicial Officer.


¹In re John F. Cuneo, Jr. (Consent Decision as to John F. Cuneo, Jr., and The Hawthorn Corporation), 63 Agric. Dec. ___ (Mar. 12, 2004).
Respondents filed a motion to compel enforcement of the Consent Decision and on August 10, 2004, Respondents filed a motion to vacate the Consent Decision.

On August 13, 2004, Chief Administrative Law Judge Marc R. Hillson [hereinafter the Chief ALJ] issued a “Ruling Extending Compliance Deadline in Consent Decision Pending Rulings on Emergency Motion to Compel Enforcement and Motion to Vacate the Consent Decision and Order” [hereinafter Ruling Extending Compliance Deadline].

On August 26, 2004, Complainant appealed to the Judicial Officer seeking an order vacating the Chief ALJ’s Ruling Extending Compliance Deadline. On September 21, 2004, Respondents filed a response to Complainant’s appeal petition and requested oral argument before the Judicial Officer. On October 8, 2004, Complainant filed a response to Respondents’ request for oral argument before the Judicial Officer. On October 18, 2004, Complainant filed a “Notice of Correction to Complainant’s Appeal Petition.” On November 8, 2004, the Hearing Clerk transmitted the record to the Judicial Officer for consideration and decision.

Respondents’ request for oral argument before the Judicial Officer, which, pursuant to the Rules of Practice Governing Formal Adjudicatory Proceedings Instituted by the Secretary Under Various Statutes (7 C.F.R. §§ 1.130-.151) [hereinafter the Rules of Practice], the Judicial Officer may grant, refuse, or limit, is refused because Complainant and Respondents have thoroughly addressed the issues and the issues are not complex. Thus, oral argument would appear to serve no useful purpose.

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2See 7 C.F.R. § 1.145(d).
Based upon a careful consideration of the record, I find the Chief ALJ’s Ruling Extending Compliance Deadline is not a decision as defined in the Rules of Practice, which provides for appeal of an administrative law judge’s decision to the Judicial Officer. Therefore, the Chief ALJ’s Ruling Extending Compliance Deadline cannot be appealed to the Judicial Officer.

Section 1.145(a) of the Rules of Practice limits the time during which a party may file an appeal to a 30-day period after receiving service of an administrative law judge’s written decision, as follows:

§ 1.145 Appeal to Judicial Officer.

(a) Filing of petition. Within 30 days after receiving service of the Judge’s decision, if the decision is a written decision, or within 30 days after the issuance of the Judge’s decision, if the decision is an oral decision, a party who disagrees with the decision, any part of the decision, or any ruling by the Judge or who alleges any deprivation of rights, may appeal the decision to the Judicial Officer by filing an appeal petition with the Hearing Clerk.

7 C.F.R. § 1.145(a).

The Rules of Practice define the word decision as follows:

1.132 Definitions.

As used in this subpart, the terms as defined in the statute under which the proceeding is conducted and in the regulations, standards, instructions, or orders issued thereunder, shall apply with equal force and effect. In addition and except as may be provided otherwise in this subpart:

...
Decision means: (1) The Judge’s initial decision made in accordance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 556 and 557, and includes the Judge’s (i) findings and conclusions and the reasons or basis therefor on all material issues of fact, law or discretion, (ii) order, and (iii) rulings on proposed findings, conclusions and orders submitted by the parties; and

(2) The decision and order by the Judicial Officer upon appeal of the Judge’s decision.

7 C.F.R. § 1.132.

The Chief ALJ’s Ruling Extending Compliance Deadline is not an initial decision in the instant proceeding in accordance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. §§ 556 and 557, and the Rules of Practice do not permit interlocutory appeals. Therefore, Complainant’s appeal of the Chief ALJ’s Ruling Extending Compliance Deadline must be rejected as premature.

Complainant acknowledges that, under section 1.145(a) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.145(a)), a party may appeal an administrative law judge’s decision to the Judicial Officer and that the Chief ALJ’s Ruling Extending Compliance Deadline is not a decision as that term is defined in section 1.132 of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.132). Nonetheless, Complainant states he filed the appeal petition because he disagrees with the Chief ALJ’s Ruling Extending Compliance Deadline and the Chief ALJ’s Ruling

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Extending Compliance Deadline deprives Complainant of rights. (Complainant’s Appeal Pet. at first unnumbered page n.1.) However, neither Complainant’s disagreement with the Chief ALJ’s Ruling Extending Compliance Deadline nor the alleged deprivation of Complainant’s rights constitutes a basis for my consideration of Complainant’s appeal petition filed prior to Complainant’s having received service of the Chief ALJ’s decision. Section 1.145(a) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.145(a)) provides that a party who disagrees with a ruling or who alleges deprivation of rights may appeal to the Judicial Officer after receiving service of the administrative law judge’s decision.

The United States Department of Agriculture’s construction of the Rules of Practice is, in this respect, consistent with the construction of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 4(a)(1)(A) and (B) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides, as follows:

**Rule 4. Appeal as of Right—When Taken**

(a) Appeal in a Civil Case.

(1) Time for Filing a Notice of Appeal.

(A) In a civil case, . . . the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 must be filed with the district clerk within 30 days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered.

(B) When the United States or its officer or agency is a party, the notice of appeal may be filed by any party within 60 days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered.

The notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules regarding a 1979 amendment to Rule 4(a)(1) make clear that Rule 4(a)(1) is specifically designed to prevent premature as well as late appeals, as follows:

. . . .

The phrases “within 30 days of such entry” and “within 60 days of such entry” have been changed to read “after” instead of “o[f].” The change is for clarity only, since the word “of” in the present rule appears to be used to mean “after.” Since the proposed amended rule deals directly with the premature filing of a notice of appeal, it was thought useful to emphasize the fact that except as provided, the period during which a notice of appeal may be filed is the 30 days, or 60 days as the case may be, following the entry of the judgment or order appealed from. . . . [4]

Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—1979 Amendment.

Accordingly, Complainant’s appeal of the Chief ALJ’s Ruling Extending Compliance Deadline must be dismissed, since the Rules of Practice do not permit interlocutory appeals.

For the foregoing reasons, the following Order should be issued.

ORDER

[4] Accord Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982) (per curiam) (notice of appeal filed while timely motion to alter or amend judgment was pending in district court was absolute nullity and could not confer jurisdiction on court of appeals); Willhauck v. Halpin, 919 F.2d 788, 792 (1st Cir. 1990) (premature notice of appeal is a complete nullity); Mondrow v. Fountain House, 867 F.2d 798, 799-800 (3d Cir. 1989) (appellate court had no jurisdiction to hear appeal during pendency of motion for new trial timely filed in trial court).
Complainant’s interlocutory appeal filed August 26, 2004, is dismissed. The proceeding is remanded to the Chief ALJ for further proceedings in accordance with the Rules of Practice.

In re: DENNIS HILL, AN INDIVIDUAL, d/b/a WHITE TIGER FOUNDATION; AND WILLOW HILL CENTER FOR RARE & ENDANGERED SPECIES, LLC, AN INDIANA DOMESTIC LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, d/b/a HILL’S EXOTICS.
AWA Docket No. 04-0012.
Order Denying Petition for Reconsideration.
Filed November 30, 2004.


The Judicial Officer rejected Respondents’ contention that only an administrative law judge has authority under 7 C.F.R. § 1.139 to determine whether a respondent has filed meritorious objections to a complainant’s motion for adoption of a proposed default decision. The Judicial Officer also rejected Respondents’ contentions that the Judicial Officer erroneously defaulted Respondents, erroneously held that Respondents’ reliance on the Hearing Clerk’s letter dated April 27, 2004, was misplaced, and erroneously used formalities and clerical errors to default Respondents.

Bernadette R. Juarez, for Complainant.
M. Michael Stephenson, for Respondents.
Order issued by William G. Jenson, Judicial Officer.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Kevin Shea, the Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, United States Department of Agriculture [hereinafter Complainant], instituted this disciplinary administrative proceeding by filing a “Complaint” on March 4, 2004. Complainant

Complainant alleges Dennis Hill, d/b/a White Tiger Foundation, and Willow Hill Center for Rare & Endangered Species, LLC, d/b/a Hill’s Exotics [hereinafter Respondents], willfully violated the Animal Welfare Act and the Regulations and Standards. ¹

The Hearing Clerk served Respondents with the Complaint, the Rules of Practice, and a service letter on March 15, 2004. ² Respondents were required by section 1.136(a) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)) to answer the Complaint within 20 days after service. On March 26, 2004, Respondents requested an additional 30 days within which to file an answer. ³ On March 30, 2004, Chief Administrative Law Judge Marc R. Hillson extended the time for filing Respondents’ answer to May 5, 2004. ⁴

On April 23, 2004, Complainant filed an “Amended Complaint.” On April 27, 2004, Respondents filed an “Answer” in which Respondents deny the material allegations of the Complaint. The

¹Complaint.

²United States Postal Service Domestic Return Receipts for Article Number 7003 0500 0000 1056 0083 and Article Number 7003 0500 0000 1056 0090.

³Request for Extension of Time to Respond to Complaint.

⁴Extension of Time.
Hearing Clerk sent Respondents a letter dated April 27, 2004, stating “Respondents’ Amended Answer To Amended Complaint, has been received and filed in the above-captioned proceeding.” On April 30, 2004, the Hearing Clerk served Respondents with the Amended Complaint. Respondents failed to file a response to the Amended Complaint within 20 days after service, as required by section 1.136(a) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)).

On June 3, 2004, in accordance with section 1.139 of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.139), Complainant filed a “Motion for Adoption of Proposed Decision and Order” [hereinafter Motion for Default Decision] and a proposed “Decision and Order as to Dennis Hill and Willow Hill Center for Rare & Endangered Species, LLC, By Reason of Admission of Facts” [hereinafter Proposed Default Decision]. On June 7, 2004, the Hearing Clerk served Respondents with Complainant’s Motion for Default Decision and Complainant’s Proposed Default Decision. On June 15, 2004, and June 23, 2004, Respondents filed objections to Complainant’s Motion for Default Decision and Complainant’s Proposed Default Decision.

On July 13, 2004, during a teleconference with counsel for Respondents and counsel for Complainant, Administrative Law Judge Victor W. Palmer [hereinafter the ALJ] denied Complainant’s Motion for Default Decision and provided Respondents until August 2, 2004,

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1United States Postal Service Domestic Return Receipt for Article Number 7003 0500 0000 1056 0458.

2United States Postal Service Domestic Return Receipt for Article Number 7003 0500 0000 1056 0656.

to file a response to the Amended Complaint.\textsuperscript{8} On August 3, 2004, Respondents filed “Answer to Amended Complaint.”

On August 27, 2004, Complainant appealed the ALJ’s denial of Complainant’s Motion for Default Decision to the Judicial Officer.\textsuperscript{9} On September 15, 2004, Respondents filed “Response in Opposition to Complainant’s Appeal Petition.” On September 22, 2004, the Hearing Clerk transmitted the record to the Judicial Officer for consideration and decision.

On October 8, 2004, I issued a Decision and Order reversing the ALJ’s July 13, 2004, denial of Complainant’s Motion for Default Decision and concluding Respondents violated the Animal Welfare Act and the Regulations and Standards as alleged in the Amended Complaint.\textsuperscript{10}

On October 27, 2004, Respondents filed “Respondents’ Motion to Reconsider” the October 8, 2004, Decision and Order and a request for oral argument before the Judicial Officer. On November 16, 2004, Complainant filed “Complainant’s Response to Respondents’ Motion to Reconsider” and “Complainant’s Response to Respondents’ Request for Oral Argument.” On November 19, 2004, the Hearing Clerk transmitted the record to the Judicial Officer for rulings on Respondents’ Motion to Reconsider and Respondents’ request for oral argument before the Judicial Officer.

\textbf{CONCLUSIONS BY THE JUDICIAL OFFICER ON RECONSIDERATION}

\textit{Respondents’ Request for Oral Argument}

\textsuperscript{8}Notice of Hearing and Exchange Deadlines at 1, filed by the ALJ on July 14, 2004.

\textsuperscript{9}Complainant’s Appeal Petition.

\textsuperscript{10}\textit{In re Dennis Hill}, 63 Agric. Dec. ____ (Oct. 8, 2004).
Respondents’ request for oral argument before the Judicial Officer, which, pursuant to section 1.145(d) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.145(d)), the Judicial Officer may grant, refuse, or limit, is refused because Complainant and Respondents have thoroughly addressed the issues and the issues are not complex. Thus, oral argument would appear to serve no useful purpose.

Respondents’ Motion to Reconsider

Respondents raise five issues in Respondents’ Motion to Reconsider the October 8, 2004, Decision and Order. First, Respondents contend only an administrative law judge has authority under section 1.139 of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.139) to determine whether a respondent has filed meritorious objections to a complainant’s motion for adoption of a proposed default decision; therefore, the October 8, 2004, Decision and Order reversing the ALJ’s July 13, 2004, denial of Complainant’s Motion for Default Decision,11 is error (Respondents’ Motion to Reconsider at 2-4).

I disagree with Respondents’ contention that only an administrative law judge has authority under section 1.139 of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.139) to determine whether a respondent has filed meritorious objections to a complainant’s motion for adoption of a proposed default decision. Pursuant to the Act of April 4, 1940, as amended (7 U.S.C. §§ 450c-450g), and Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1953 (5 U.S.C. app. at 126 (2000)), the Secretary of Agriculture delegated authority to the Judicial Officer to act as final deciding officer in adjudicatory proceedings instituted pursuant to the Rules of Practice.12 Section 1.139 of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.139) explicitly provides that a party may appeal

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11 In re Dennis Hill, 63 Agric. Dec. ___, slip op. at 4, 64 (Oct. 8, 2004).
12 See 7 C.F.R. § 2.35(a)(2).
an administrative law judge’s ruling denying a complainant’s motion for a default decision to the Judicial Officer in accordance with section 1.145 of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.145), and section 1.145(i) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.145(i)) requires the Judicial Officer to rule on any such appeal.

Second, Respondents contend the Judicial Officer erroneously inferred “that Respondents received the Amended Complaint after receiving the Hearing Clerk’s April 27, 2004, correspondence.” Respondents assert they received the Hearing Clerk’s letter dated April 27, 2004, after the Hearing Clerk served them with the Amended Complaint justifying their reliance on the Hearing Clerk’s letter which states Respondents’ Answer to the Amended Complaint “has been received and filed.” (Respondents’ Motion to Reconsider at 2, 4-6.)

Respondents do not cite, and I cannot locate, any part of the October 8, 2004, Decision and Order, in which I infer the Hearing Clerk served Respondents with the Amended Complaint after Respondents received the Hearing Clerk’s April 27, 2004, correspondence. The Hearing Clerk served Respondents with the Amended Complaint on April 30, 2004.13 The Hearing Clerk sent Respondents the April 27, 2004, correspondence and Respondents assert they received the April 27, 2004, correspondence; however, the record does not establish the date on which Respondents received the Hearing Clerk’s correspondence. I have no reason to doubt Respondents’ assertion that Amended Complaint” (Respondents’ Motion to Reconsider at 5). However, the timing of Respondents’ receipt of the Hearing Clerk’s letter mischaracterizing Respondents’ April 27, 2004, filing as an “Amended Answer To Amended Complaint” is not relevant to this proceeding. My reasons for finding

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13See note 5.
Respondents’ reliance on the Hearing Clerk’s April 27, 2004, correspondence misplaced, are fully explicated in *In re Dennis Hill*, 63 Agric. Dec. ___, slip op. at 65-70 (Oct. 8, 2004), and addressed in this Order Denying Petition for Reconsideration, infra.

Third, Respondents contend the Judicial Officer erroneously defaulted Respondents when Respondents’ Answer clearly placed Complainant, the ALJ, and the Judicial Officer on notice that Respondents disputed or denied the majority of the allegations in the Complaint (Respondents’ Motion to Reconsider at 2, 6-7).

Respondents’ April 27, 2004, filing denies the material allegations of the Complaint. However, Complainant’s operative pleading is the Amended Complaint. Respondents are deemed, for purposes of this proceeding, to have admitted the allegations in the Amended Complaint because they failed to file an answer to the Amended Complaint within 20 days after the Hearing Clerk served them with the Amended Complaint. The Hearing Clerk served Respondents with the Amended Complaint and the Hearing Clerk’s April 23, 2004, service letter on April 30, 2004.\(^{14}\) Sections 1.136(a), 1.136(c), 1.139, and 1.141(a) of the Rules of Practice state the time within which an answer must be filed and the consequences of failing to file a timely answer, as follows:

\[\text{§ 1.136 Answer.}\]

(a) *Filing and service.* Within 20 days after the service of the complaint . . . , the respondent shall file with the Hearing Clerk an answer signed by the respondent or the attorney of record in the proceeding . . . .

\[\ldots\]

\(^{14}\text{See note 5.}\]
(c) Default. Failure to file an answer within the time provided under paragraph (a) of this section shall be deemed, for purposes of the proceeding, an admission of the allegations in the Complaint, and failure to deny or otherwise respond to an allegation of the Complaint shall be deemed, for purposes of the proceeding, an admission of said allegation, unless the parties have agreed to a consent decision pursuant to § 1.138.

§ 1.139 Procedure upon failure to file an answer or admission of facts.

The failure to file an answer, or the admission by the answer of all the material allegations of fact contained in the complaint, shall constitute a waiver of hearing. Upon such admission or failure to file, complainant shall file a proposed decision, along with a motion for the adoption thereof, both of which shall be served upon the respondent by the Hearing Clerk. Within 20 days after service of such motion and proposed decision, the respondent may file with the Hearing Clerk objections thereto. If the Judge finds that meritorious objections have been filed, complainant’s Motion shall be denied with supporting reasons. If meritorious objections are not filed, the Judge shall issue a decision without further procedure or hearing.

§ 1.141 Procedure for hearing.

(a) Request for hearing. Any party may request a hearing on the facts by including such request in the complaint or answer, or by a separate request, in writing, filed with the Hearing Clerk within the time in which an answer may be filed . . . . Failure to request a hearing within the time allowed for the filing of the answer shall constitute a waiver of such hearing.
7 C.F.R. §§ 1.136(a), (c), .139, .141(a).

Moreover, the Amended Complaint informs Respondents of the consequences of failing to file a timely answer, as follows:

The respondents shall file an answer with the Hearing Clerk, United States Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. 20250-9200, in accordance with the Rules of Practice governing proceedings under the Act (7 C.F.R. § 1.130 et seq.). Failure to file an answer shall constitute an admission of all the material allegations of this amended complaint.

Amended Compl. at 29.

Similarly, the Hearing Clerk informed Respondents in the April 23, 2004, service letter that a timely answer must be filed pursuant to the Rules of Practice and that failure to file a timely answer to any allegation in the Amended Complaint would constitute an admission of that allegation, as follows:

April 23, 2004

Mr. Michael Stephenson, Esq.
McNeely, Stephenson, Thopy & Harrold
30 East Washington Street, Suite 400
Shelbyville, Indiana 46176

Dear Mr. Stephenson:

Subject: In re: Dennis Hill, an individual d/b/a White Tiger Foundation and Willow Hill Center for Rare & Endangered Species, LLC, an Indiana domestic limited liability company d/b/a Hill’s Exotics

AWA Docket No. 04-0012
Enclosed is a copy of Complainant’s Amended Complaint, which has been filed with this office in the above-captioned proceeding.

Inasmuch as Complainant has filed the Amended Complaint prior to the filing of a motion for hearing, the amendment is effective upon filing.

You will have 20 days from service of this letter in which to file an answer to the amended complaint. Failure to file a timely Answer to or plead specifically to any allegation of the Amended Complaint shall constitute an admission of such allegation.

Your answer, as well as any motion or requests that you may wish to file hereafter in this proceeding, should be submitted to the Hearing Clerk, Room 1081, South Building, United States Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. 20250. An original and 3 copies are required for each document submitted.

Sincerely,

/s/
Joyce A. Dawson
Hearing Clerk

Respondents’ answer to the Amended Complaint was required to be filed no later than May 20, 2004. Respondents filed an Answer to Amended Complaint on August 3, 2004, 3 months 4 days after the
Hearing Clerk served Respondents with the Amended Complaint. Respondents’ failure to file a timely answer to the Amended Complaint is deemed, for purposes of this proceeding, an admission of the allegations in the Amended Complaint and constitutes a waiver of hearing.

Fourth, Respondents contend the Judicial Officer erroneously held Respondents’ reliance on the Hearing Clerk’s April 27, 2004, letter was misplaced. Respondents point out that I state the Hearing Clerk’s April 23, 2004, letter clearly informs Respondents of the requirement for a timely response to the Amended Complaint, but that I dismiss the Hearing Clerk’s April 27, 2004, letter, which mischaracterizes Respondents’ April 27, 2004, filing, claiming Respondents should not have relied on the Hearing Clerk’s mischaracterization. (Respondents’ Motion to Reconsider at 2, 7-8.)

I disagree with Respondents’ contention that I erroneously held that Respondents’ reliance on the Hearing Clerk’s April 27, 2004, letter was misplaced. The Rules of Practice state the time within which an answer must be filed and the consequences of failing to file a timely answer, the Amended Complaint informs Respondents of the consequences of failing to file a timely answer, and the Hearing Clerk’s April 23, 2004, letter, which accompanied the Amended Complaint, states the time within which an answer must be filed and the consequences of failing to file a timely answer. Juxtaposed to all these warnings, Respondents rely on the Hearing Clerk’s letter dated April 27, 2004, wherein the Hearing Clerk erroneously mischaracterizes Respondents’ April 27, 2004, filing as an “Amended Answer To Amended Complaint” and erroneously states Respondents’ Amended Answer has been received and filed.

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15See 7 C.F.R. §§ 1.136(a), (c), .139, .141(a).

16See Amended Complaint at 29.
Notwithstanding the Hearing Clerk’s April 27, 2004, letter, the record establishes that Respondents’ April 27, 2004, filing was neither an amended answer nor a response to the Amended Complaint. As an initial matter, the Hearing Clerk did not serve Respondents with the Amended Complaint until April 30, 2004,\textsuperscript{17} 3 days after Respondents filed their April 27, 2004, filing. Moreover, Respondents entitle their April 27, 2004, filing “Answer.” Further still, Respondents state in the April 27, 2004, filing that the filing is a response to the “Complaint” and pray that the ALJ deny the “Complaint.” In addition, Respondents’ letter transmitting the April 27, 2004, filing is dated April 22, 2004, the April 27, 2004, filing contains a certificate of service stating counsel for Respondents placed the filing “in the United States Mail, first class, postage prepaid, this 22nd day of April, 2004\textsuperscript{18}” and the envelope containing the April 27, 2004, filing is postmarked April 22, 2004, 1 day prior to the date Complainant filed the Amended Complaint and 8 days prior to the date the Hearing Clerk served Respondents with the Amended Complaint. Based on the record before me, I find Respondents’ April 27, 2004, filing is an answer filed in response to the Complaint and Complainant’s operative pleading is the Amended Complaint. Therefore, I find Respondents’ reliance on the Hearing Clerk’s April 27, 2004, mischaracterization of Respondents’ April 27, 2004, filing, misplaced.


\textsuperscript{17}See note 5.

\textsuperscript{18}Answer at second unnumbered page.
and clerical errors to default Respondents, which practice is contrary to United States Department of Agriculture “case law” (Respondents’ Motion to Reconsider at 2, 8-9).

I disagree with Respondents’ contention that filing a timely response to an amended complaint is a mere formality. The Rules of Practice state the time within which an answer must be filed and provide the failure to file a timely answer shall be deemed an admission of the allegations in the complaint and a waiver of hearing. Moreover, I disagree with Respondents’ contention that the practice of issuing default decisions is contrary to United States Department of Agriculture “case law.” Although, on rare occasions, default decisions have been set aside for good cause shown or where the complainant states that the complainant does not object to setting aside the default decision, generally there is no basis for setting

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19 See note 15.

20 See In re Dale Goodale, 60 Agric. Dec. 670 (2001) (Remand Order) (setting aside the default decision because the administrative law judge adopted apparently inconsistent findings of a dispositive fact in the default decision, and the order in the default decision was not clear); In re Deora Sewanan, 60 Agric. Dec. 688 (2001) (setting aside the default decision because the respondent was not served with the complaint); In re H. Schnell & Co., 57 Agric. Dec. 1722 (1998) (Remand Order) (setting aside the default decision, which was based upon the respondent’s statements during two telephone conference calls with the administrative law judge and the complainant’s counsel, because the respondent’s statements did not constitute a clear admission of the material allegations in the complaint and concluding that the default decision deprived the respondent of its right to due process under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States); In re Arizona Livestock Auction, Inc., 55 Agric. Dec. 1121 (1996) (setting aside the default decision because facts alleged in the complaint and deemed admitted by failure to answer were not sufficient to find a violation of the Packers and Stockyards Act or jurisdiction over the matter by the Secretary of Agriculture); In re Veg-Pro Distributors, 42 Agric. Dec. 273 (1983) (Remand Order) (setting aside the default decision because service of the complaint by registered and regular mail was returned as undeliverable, and the respondent’s license under the PACA had lapsed before service was attempted), final decision, 42 Agric. Dec. 1173 (1983); In re Vaughn (continued...)
aside a default decision that is based upon a respondent’s failure to file a timely answer.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{20}(...continued)

\textit{Gallop}, 40 Agric. Dec. 217 (1981) (Order Vacating Default Decision and Remanding Proceeding) (vacating the default decision and remanding the case to the administrative law judge to determine whether just cause exists for permitting late answer), \textit{final decision}, 40 Agric. Dec. 1254 (1981); \textit{In re J. Fleishman & Co.}, 38 Agric. Dec. 789 (1978) (Remand Order) (remanding the proceeding to the administrative law judge for the purpose of receiving evidence because the complainant had no objection to the respondent’s motion for remand), \textit{final decision}, 37 Agric. Dec. 1175 (1978); \textit{In re Richard Cain}, 17 Agric. Dec. 985 (1958) (Order Reopening After Default) (setting aside a default decision and accepting a late-filed answer because the complainant did not object to the respondent’s motion to reopen after default).

\textsuperscript{21}\textit{See generally In re Wanda McQuary} (Decision as to Wanda McQuary and Randall Jones), 62 Agric. Dec. 452 (2003) (holding the default decision was properly issued where respondent Wanda McQuary filed her answer 6 months 20 days after she was served with the complaint and respondent Randall Jones filed his answer 6 months 5 days after he was served with the complaint and holding the respondents are deemed, by their failures to file timely answers, to have admitted the violations of the Animal Welfare Act and the Regulations and Standards alleged in the complaint); \textit{In re David Finch}, 61 Agric. Dec. 567 (2002) (holding the default decision was properly issued where the respondent filed his answer 3 months 18 days after he was served with the complaint and holding the respondent is deemed, by his failure to file a timely answer, to have admitted the violations of the Animal Welfare Act and the Regulations and Standards alleged in the complaint); \textit{In re Heartland Kennels, Inc.}, 61 Agric. Dec. 492 (2002) (holding the default decision was properly issued where the respondents filed their answer 3 months 9 days after they were served with the complaint and holding the respondents are deemed, by their failure to file a timely answer, to have admitted the violations of the Animal Welfare Act and the Regulations and Standards alleged in the complaint); \textit{In re Steven Bourk} (Decision as to Steven Bourk and Carmella Bourk), 61 Agric. Dec. 25 (2002) (holding the default decision was properly issued where respondent Steven Bourk’s first and only filing was 10 months 9 days after he was served with the complaint and respondent Carmella Bourk’s first filing was 5 months 5 days after she was served with the complaint; stating both respondents are deemed, by their failures to file timely answers, to have admitted the violations of the Animal Welfare Act and the Regulations and Standards alleged in the complaint); \textit{In re J. Wayne Shaffer}, 60 Agric. Dec. 444 (2001) (holding the default decision was properly issued where the (continued...)}
respondents’ first filing was 5 months 13 days after they were served with the complaint and 4 months 24 days after the respondents’ answer was due and holding the respondents are deemed, by their failure to file a timely answer, to have admitted the violations of the Animal Welfare Act and the Regulations alleged in the complaint; In re Beth Lutz, 60 Agric. Dec. 53 (2001) (holding the default decision was properly issued where the respondent filed her answer 23 days after she was served with the complaint and 3 days after the respondent’s answer was due and holding the respondent is deemed, by her failure to file a timely answer, to have admitted the violations of the Regulations alleged in the complaint); In re Curtis G. Foley, 59 Agric. Dec. 581 (2000) (holding the default decision was properly issued where the respondents filed their answer 6 months 5 days after they were served with the complaint and 5 months 16 days after the respondents’ answer was due and holding the respondents are deemed, by their failure to file a timely answer, to have admitted the violations of the Animal Welfare Act and the Regulations and Standards alleged in the complaint); In re Nancy M. Kutz (Decision as to Nancy M. Kutz), 58 Agric. Dec. 744 (1999) (holding the default decision was properly issued where the respondent’s first filing in the proceeding was 28 days after service of the complaint on the respondent and the filing did not respond to the allegations of the complaint and holding the respondent is deemed, by her failure to file a timely answer and by her failure to deny the allegations of the complaint, to have admitted the violations of the Animal Welfare Act and the Regulations alleged in the complaint); In re Anna Mae Noell, 58 Agric. Dec. 130 (1999) (holding the default decision was properly issued where the respondents filed an answer 49 days after service of the complaint on the respondents and holding the respondents are deemed, by their failure to file a timely answer, to have admitted the violations of the Animal Welfare Act and the Regulations and Standards alleged in the complaint), appeal dismissed sub nom. The Chimp Farm, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Agric., No. 00-10608-A (11th Cir. July 20, 2000); In re Jack D. Stowers, 57 Agric. Dec. 944 (1998) (holding the default decision was properly issued where the respondent filed his answer 1 year 12 days after service of the complaint on the respondent and holding the respondent is deemed, by his failure to file a timely answer, to have admitted the violations of the Animal Welfare Act and the Regulations alleged in the complaint); In re James J. Everhart, 56 Agric. Dec. 1400 (1997) (holding the default decision was properly issued where the respondent’s first filing was more than 8 months after service of the complaint on the respondent and holding the respondent is deemed, by his failure to file a timely answer, to have admitted the violations of the Animal Welfare Act and the Regulations alleged in the complaint); In re John Walker, 56 Agric. Dec. 350 (1997) (holding the default decision was properly issued where the respondent’s first filing was 126 days after service of the complaint on the respondent and holding the respondent is deemed, (continued...)
by his failure to file a timely answer, to have admitted the violations of the Animal Welfare Act and the Regulations and Standards alleged in the complaint); In re Mary Meyers, 56 Agric. Dec. 322 (1997) (holding the default decision was properly issued where the respondent’s first filing was 117 days after the respondent’s answer was due and holding the respondent is deemed, by her failure to file a timely answer, to have admitted the violations of the Animal Welfare Act and the Regulations and Standards alleged in the complaint); In re Dora Hampton, 56 Agric. Dec. 301 (1997) (holding the default decision was properly issued where the respondent’s first filing was 135 days after the respondent’s answer was due and holding the respondent is deemed, by her failure to file a timely answer, to have admitted the violations of the Regulations and Standards alleged in the complaint); In re City of Orange, 55 Agric. Dec. 1081 (1996) (holding the default decision was properly issued where the respondent’s first filing was 70 days after the respondent’s answer was due and holding the respondent is deemed, by its failure to file a timely answer, to have admitted the violations of the Regulations and Standards alleged in the complaint); In re Ronald DeBruin, 54 Agric. Dec. 876 (1995) (holding the default decision was properly issued where the respondent failed to file an answer and holding the respondent is deemed, by his failure to file an answer, to have admitted the violations of the Animal Welfare Act and the Regulations and Standards alleged in the complaint); In re James Joseph Hickey, Jr., 53 Agric. Dec. 1087 (1994) (holding the default decision was properly issued where the respondent failed to file an answer and holding the respondent is deemed, by his failure to file an answer, to have admitted the violations of the Animal Welfare Act and the Regulations and Standards alleged in the complaint); In re Ron Morrow, 53 Agric. Dec. 144 (1994) (holding the default decision was properly issued where the respondent was given an extension of time until March 22, 1994, to file an answer, but the answer was not received until March 25, 1994, and holding the respondent is deemed, by his failure to file a timely answer, to have admitted the violations of the Animal Welfare Act and the Regulations and Standards alleged in the complaint), aff’d per curiam, 65 F.3d 168 (Table), 1995 WL 523336 (6th Cir. 1995), printed in 54 Agric. Dec. 870 (1995); In re Dean Daul, 45 Agric. Dec. 556 (1986) (holding the default decision was properly issued where the respondent failed to file a timely answer and, in his late answer, did not deny the material allegations of the complaint and holding the respondent is deemed, by his failure to file a timely answer and by his failure to deny the allegations in the complaint in his late answer, to have admitted the violations of the Animal Welfare Act and the Regulations alleged in the complaint); In re Ronald Jacobson, 43 Agric. Dec. 780 (1984) (holding the default decision was properly issued where the respondents failed to file a timely answer and holding the respondents are deemed, by their failure to file a timely answer, to have admitted the violations of the Standards alleged in the (continued...)
Further still, I find *Kreider Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Glickman* and *In re Jerald Brown* inapposite, and I find *In re Karl Mitchell* and *In re Spring Valley Meats, Inc.*, do not support Respondents’ contention that filing a timely response to an amended complaint is a mere formality.

Respondents, relying on *Kreider Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Glickman*, 1998 WL 481926 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 1998), suggest that my conclusion that Respondents’ Answer does not operate as response to Complainant’s Amended Complaint elevates form over substance. In *Kreider Dairy Farms*, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found the Judicial Officer’s determination that the word *postmark* does not include a Federal Express label, elevates form over substance and was erroneous. The district court reasoned: (1) the word *postmark* was not defined in the applicable United States Department of Agriculture rules of practice; (2) the purpose of the postmark is to ensure there is reliable evidence of the date a party sends a document to the Hearing Clerk; and (3) the purpose is met whether a party uses Federal Express or the United States Postal Service.

As initial matter, I note that, on appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit vacated *Kreider Dairy Farms, Inc. v.*

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(...continued)

21(...continued)

*In re Willard Lambert*, 43 Agric. Dec. 46 (1984) (holding the default decision was properly issued where the respondent failed to file an answer and holding the respondent is deemed, by his failure to file an answer, to have admitted the violations of the Animal Welfare Act and the Regulations and Standards alleged in the complaint); *In re Randy & Mary Berhow*, 42 Agric. Dec. 764 (1983) (holding the default decision was properly issued where the respondents failed to file an answer and holding the respondents are deemed, by their failure to file an answer, to have admitted the violations of the Standards alleged in the complaint).
Moreover, the requirement that a respondent file a timely answer and the consequences of failing to file a timely answer, unlike the district court found with respect to the postmark requirement in *Kreider Dairy Farms*, are clearly stated in the Rules of Practice.

Respondents, relying on *In re Karl Mitchell*, 60 Agric. Dec. 91 (2001); *In re Spring Valley Meats, Inc.* (Decision as to Charles Contris), 56 Agric. Dec. 1731 (1997); and *In re Jerald Brown*, 54 Agric. Dec. 537 (1995), contend filing a timely response to an amended complaint is a mere formality. In *In re Jerald Brown*, the respondent filed a timely response to the complaint. *In re Jerald Brown* does not address a respondent’s failure to file a timely response to a complaint. In *In re Karl Mitchell*, the respondents failed to file a timely answer to the complaint, but the Judicial Officer found, based on the failure to file a timely answer, the respondents were deemed to have admitted the allegations in the complaint. In *In re Spring Valley Meats, Inc.*, the Judicial Officer rejected the respondents’ contention that their December 13, 1996, filing constituted a response to the complaint and stated, even if it constituted an answer, the default decision would not be set aside because the purported answer was not timely filed.

For the foregoing reasons and the reasons set forth in *In re Dennis Hill*, 63 Agric. Dec. ___ (Oct. 8, 2004), Respondents’ Motion to Reconsider is denied.

Section 1.146(b) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.146(b)) provides that the decision of the Judicial Officer shall automatically be stayed pending the determination to grant or deny a timely-filed petition for reconsideration. Respondents’ Motion to Reconsider was timely filed and automatically stayed the October 8, 2004, Decision and Order. Therefore, since Respondents’ Motion to Reconsider is

\[22\text{See Kreider Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Glickman, 190 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 1999).}\]
denied, I hereby lift the automatic stay, and the Order in In re Dennis Hill, 63 Agric. Dec. ___ (Oct. 8, 2004), is reinstated; except that the effective date of the Order is the date indicated in the Order in this Order Denying Petition for Reconsideration.

For the foregoing reasons, the following Order should be issued.

ORDER

1. Respondents, their agents and employees, successors and assigns, directly or indirectly through any corporate or other device, shall cease and desist from violating the Animal Welfare Act and the Regulations and Standards.

   The cease and desist provisions of this Order shall become effective on the day after service of this Order on Respondents.

2. Respondents are jointly and severally assessed a $20,000 civil penalty. The civil penalty shall be paid by certified check or money order made payable to the Treasurer of the United States and sent to:

   Bernadette R. Juarez  
   United States Department of Agriculture  
   Office of the General Counsel  
   Marketing Division  
   1400 Independence Avenue, SW  
   Room 2343-South Building  
   Washington, DC 20250-1417

   Payment of the civil penalty shall be sent to, and received by, Bernadette R. Juarez within 60 days after service of this Order on Respondents. Respondents shall state on the certified check or money order that payment is in reference to AWA Docket No. 04-0012.

The Animal Welfare Act license revocation provisions of this Order shall become effective on the 60th day after service of this Order on Respondent Dennis Hill.

RIGHT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

Respondents have the right to seek judicial review of this Order in the appropriate United States Court of Appeals in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341, 2343-2350. Such court has exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, to set aside, to suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of this Order. Respondents must seek judicial review within 60 days after entry of this Order. 7 U.S.C. § 2149(c). The date of entry of this Order is November 30, 2004.

In re: DAVID GILBERT, AN INDIVIDUAL d/b/a GILBERT’S EDUCATIONAL PETTING ZOO AND SAFARI LAND ZOO.
AWA Docket No. 04-0001.
Order Denying Late Appeal.
Filed November 30, 2004.

AWA – Late appeal.

The Judicial Officer denied Respondent’s late-filed appeal. The Judicial Officer concluded he had no jurisdiction to hear Respondent’s appeal filed 1 day after Chief Administrative Law Judge Marc R. Hillson’s decision became final.

Colleen A. Carroll, for Complainant.
Respondent, Pro se.
Decision issued by Marc R. Hillson, Chief Administrative Law Judge.
Order issued by William G. Jensen, Judicial Officer.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY


The Hearing Clerk served Respondent with the Complaint, the Rules of Practice, and a service letter on October 29, 2003. Respondent failed to answer the Complaint within 20 days after service as required by section 1.136(a) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)). The Hearing Clerk sent Respondent a letter dated December 16, 2003, informing Respondent that an answer to the Complaint had not been filed within the time required in the Rules of Practice. Respondent did not respond to the Hearing Clerk’s December 16, 2003, letter.

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1United States Postal Service Domestic Return Receipt for Article Number 7001 0360 0000 0310 3743.
On January 28, 2004, in accordance with section 1.139 of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.139), Complainant filed a “Motion for Adoption of Proposed Decision and Order” [hereinafter Motion for Default Decision] and a proposed “Decision and Order by Reason of Admission of Facts” [hereinafter Proposed Default Decision]. The Hearing Clerk served Respondent with Complainant’s Motion for Default Decision, Complainant’s Proposed Default Decision, and a service letter on February 4, 2004. On August 23, 2004, pursuant to section 1.139 of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.139), Chief Administrative Law Judge Marc R. Hillson [hereinafter the Chief ALJ] filed a “Decision and Order by Reason of Admission of Facts” [hereinafter Decision and Order]: (1) finding Respondent’s objections to Complainant’s Motion for Default Decision and Complainant’s Proposed Default Decision are not meritorious; (2) concluding Respondent willfully violated the Animal Welfare Act and the Regulations and Standards as alleged in the Complaint; (3) directing Respondent to cease and desist from violating the Animal Welfare Act and the Regulations and Standards; and (3) assessing Respondent an $8,800 civil penalty (Decision and Order at 2, 6-9).

On August 27, 2004, the Hearing Clerk served Respondent with the Chief ALJ’s Decision and Order and a service letter. On September 9, 2004, Respondent requested, and I granted, an extension of time for filing Respondent’s appeal petition to

CONCLUSION BY THE JUDICIAL OFFICER

The record establishes that the Hearing Clerk served Respondent with the Chief ALJ’s Decision and Order on August 27, 2004. Section 1.145(a) of the Rules of Practice provides that an administrative law judge’s written decision must be appealed to the Judicial Officer within 30 days after service, as follows:

§ 1.145 Appeal to Judicial Officer.

(a) Filing of petition. Within 30 days after receiving service of the Judge’s decision, if the decision is a written decision, or within 30 days after the issuance of the Judge’s decision, if the decision is an oral decision, a party who disagrees with the decision, any part of the decision, or any ruling by the Judge or who alleges any deprivation of rights, may appeal the decision to the Judicial Officer by filing an appeal petition with the Hearing Clerk.

7 C.F.R. § 1.145(a).

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5See note 3.
Section 1.145(a) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.145(a)) provides that an appeal petition must be filed within 30 days after service of the administrative law judge's decision. Thirty days after August 27, 2004, was September 26, 2004. However, September 26, 2004, was a Sunday, and section 1.147(h) of the Rules of Practice provides that when the time for filing expires on a Sunday, the time for filing shall be extended to include the next following business day, as follows:

§ 1.147 Filing; service; extensions of time; and computation of time.

(b) Computation of time. Saturdays, Sundays and Federal holidays shall be included in computing the time allowed for the filing of any document or paper. Provided, That, when such time expires on a Saturday, Sunday, or Federal holiday, such period shall be extended to include the next following business day.

7 C.F.R. § 1.147(h).

The next business day after Sunday, September 26, 2004, was Monday, September 27, 2004. Therefore, Respondent was required to file his appeal petition on or before September 27, 2004.

Therefore, Respondent was required to file his appeal petition with the Hearing Clerk no later than September 27, 2004. However, Respondent timely requested an extension of time within which to file an appeal petition. On September 9, 2004, I granted Respondent’s request and extended the time for Respondent’s filing an appeal petition to November 1, 2004. Respondent did not file his appeal petition with the Hearing Clerk until November 2, 2004.

The Judicial Officer has continuously and consistently held under the Rules of Practice that the Judicial Officer has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal that is filed after an administrative law judge’s decision.

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6Section 1.145(a) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.145(a)) provides that an appeal petition must be filed within 30 days after service of the administrative law judge’s decision. Thirty days after August 27, 2004, was September 26, 2004. However, September 26, 2004, was a Sunday, and section 1.147(h) of the Rules of Practice provides that when the time for filing expires on a Sunday, the time for filing shall be extended to the next business day, as follows:

§ 1.147 Filing; service; extensions of time; and computation of time.

(b) Computation of time. Saturdays, Sundays and Federal holidays shall be included in computing the time allowed for the filing of any document or paper. Provided, That, when such time expires on a Saturday, Sunday, or Federal holiday, such period shall be extended to include the next following business day.

7 C.F.R. § 1.147(h).

The next business day after Sunday, September 26, 2004, was Monday, September 27, 2004. Therefore, Respondent was required to file his appeal petition no later than September 27, 2004.

7See note 4.
In re Vega Nunez, 63 Agric. Dec. ___ (Sept. 8, 2004) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed on the day the administrative law judge’s decision became final); 
In re Ross Blackstock, 63 Agric. Dec. ___ (July 13, 2004) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 2 days after the administrative law judge’s decision became final); 
In re David McCauley, 63 Agric. Dec. ___ (July 12, 2004) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 1 month 26 days after the administrative law judge’s decision became final); 
In re Belinda Atherton, 62 Agric. Dec. 683 (2003) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed the day the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final); 
In re Samuel K. Angel, 61 Agric. Dec. 275 (2002) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 3 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final); 
In re Paul Eugenio, 60 Agric. Dec. 676 (2001) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 1 day after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final); 
In re Harold P. Kafka, 58 Agric. Dec. 357 (1999) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 15 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final); 
In re Kevin Ackerman, 58 Agric. Dec. 340 (1999) (dismissing Kevin Ackerman’s appeal petition filed 1 day after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final); 
In re Severin Peterson, 57 Agric. Dec. 1304 (1998) (dismissing the applicants’ appeal petition filed 23 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final); 
In re Queen City Farms, Inc., 57 Agric. Dec. 813 (1998) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 58 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final); 
In re Gail Davis, 56 Agric. Dec. 373 (1997) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 41 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final); 
In re Field Market Produce, Inc., 55 Agric. Dec. 1418 (1996) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 8 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became effective); 
In re Ov Duk Kwon, 55 Agric. Dec. 78 (1996) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 35 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became effective); 
In re New York Primate Center, Inc., 53 Agric. Dec. 529 (1994) (dismissing the respondents’ appeal petition filed 2 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final); 
In re K. Lester, 52 Agric. Dec. 332 (1993) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 14 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final and effective); 
In re Amril L. Carrington, 52 Agric. Dec. 331 (1993) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 7 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final and effective); 
In re Teofilo Benica, 52 Agric. Dec. 321 (1993) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 6 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final and effective); 
In re Newark Produce Distributors, Inc., 51 Agric. Dec. 955 (1992) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed after the (continued...)
administrative law judge’s decision and order became final and effective); In re Laura May Kurjan, 51 Agric. Dec. 438 (1992) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final); In re Kermit Breed, 50 Agric. Dec. 675 (1991) (dismissing the respondent’s late-filed appeal petition); In re Bihari Lalli, 49 Agric. Dec. 896 (1990) (stating the respondent’s appeal petition, filed after the administrative law judge’s decision became final, must be dismissed because it was not timely filed); In re Dale Haley, 48 Agric. Dec. 1072 (1989) (stating the respondents’ appeal petition, filed after the administrative law judge’s decision became final and effective, must be dismissed because it was not timely filed); In re Mary Fran Hamilton, 45 Agric. Dec. 2395 (1986) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed with the Hearing Clerk on the day the administrative law judge’s decision and order had become final and effective); In re Bushelle Cattle Co., 45 Agric. Dec. 1111 (1986) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 2 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final and effective); In re William T. Powell, 44 Agric. Dec. 1220 (1985) (stating it has consistently been held that, under the Rules of Practice, the Judicial Officer has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal after the administrative law judge’s decision and order becomes final); In re Toscony Provision Co., 43 Agric. Dec. 1106 (1984) (stating the Judicial Officer has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal that is filed after the administrative law judge’s decision becomes final), aff’d, No. 81-1729 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 1985) (court reviewed merits notwithstanding late administrative appeal), aff’d, 782 F.2d 1031 (3d Cir. 1986) (unpublished); In re Dock Case Brokerage Co., 42 Agric. Dec. 427 (1983) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed on the day the administrative law judge’s decision became effective); In re Charles Brink, 41 Agric. Dec. 2146 (1982) (stating the Judicial Officer has no jurisdiction to consider the respondent’s appeal dated before the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final, but not filed until 4 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final and effective), reconsideration denied, 41 Agric. Dec. 2147 (1982); In re Mel’s Produce, Inc., 40 Agric. Dec. 792 (1981) (stating since the respondent’s petition for reconsideration was not filed within 35 days after service of the default decision, the default decision became final and neither the administrative law judge nor the Judicial Officer has jurisdiction to consider the respondent’s petition); In re Animal (continued...)
Order became final on November 1, 2004. Respondent filed an appeal petition with the Hearing Clerk on November 2, 2004, 1 day after the Chief ALJ’s Decision and Order became final. Therefore, I have no jurisdiction to hear Respondent’s appeal.

The United States Department of Agriculture’s construction of the Rules of Practice is, in this respect, consistent with the construction of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 4(a)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides, as follows:

Rule 4. Appeal as of Right—When Taken

(a) Appeal in a Civil Case.

(1) Time for Filing a Notice of Appeal.

(A) In a civil case . . . the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 must be filed with the district clerk within 30 days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered.

As stated in Eaton v. Jamrog, 984 F.2d 760, 762 (6th Cir. 1993):

We have repeatedly held that compliance with Rule 4(a)(1) is a mandatory and jurisdictional prerequisite which this court may neither waive nor extend. See, e.g., Baker v. Raulie, 879 F.2d 1396, 1398 (6th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); Myers v. Ace Hardware, Inc., 777 F.2d 1099, 1102 (6th Cir. 1985). So strictly has this rule been applied, that even a notice of appeal filed five minutes late has been deemed untimely. Baker, 879

*(...continued)*

Research Center of Massachusetts, Inc., 38 Agric. Dec. 379 (1978) (stating failure to file an appeal petition before the effective date of the administrative law judge’s decision is jurisdictional); In re Willie Cook, 39 Agric. Dec. 116 (1978) (stating it is the consistent policy of the United States Department of Agriculture not to consider appeals filed more than 35 days after service of the administrative law judge’s decision).
F.2d at 1398.\textsuperscript{[9]}

The Rules of Practice do not provide for an extension of time (for good cause or excusable neglect) for filing a notice of appeal after an

\textsuperscript{[9]}\textit{Accord Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co.}, 486 U.S. 196, 203 (1988) (stating since the court of appeals properly held petitioner’s notice of appeal from the decision on the merits to be untimely filed, and since the time of an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional, the court of appeals was without jurisdiction to review the decision on the merits); \textit{Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corr. of Illinois}, 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (stating under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 2107, a notice of appeal in a civil case must be filed within 30 days of entry of the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken; this 30-day time limit is mandatory and jurisdictional), \textit{rehearing denied}, 434 U.S. 1089 (1978); \textit{Martinez v. Hoke}, 38 F.3d 655, 656 (2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (stating under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the time for filing an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional and the court of appeals has no authority to extend time for filing); \textit{Price v. Seydel}, 961 F.2d 1470, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating the filing of notice of appeal within the 30-day period specified in Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) is mandatory and jurisdictional, and unless appellant’s notice is timely, the appeal must be dismissed); \textit{In re Eichelberger}, 943 F.2d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that a notice of appeal be filed with the clerk of the district court within 30 days after entry of the judgment; Rule 4(a)’s provisions are mandatory and jurisdictional); \textit{Washington v. Bumgarner}, 882 F.2d 899, 900 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating the time limit in Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) is mandatory and jurisdictional; failure to comply with Rule 4(a) requires dismissal of the appeal and the fact that appellant is incarcerated and proceeding pro se does not change the clear language of the Rule), \textit{cert. denied}, 493 U.S. 1060 (1990); \textit{Jerningham v. Humphreys}, 868 F.2d 846 (6th Cir. 1989) (Order) (stating the failure of an appellant to timely file a notice of appeal deprives an appellate court of jurisdiction; compliance with Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure is a mandatory and jurisdictional prerequisite which this court can neither waive nor extend).
administrative law judge’s decision has become final. Under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the district court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time to file a notice of appeal upon a motion filed no later than 30 days after the expiration of the time otherwise provided in the rules for the filing of a notice of appeal. The absence of such a rule in the Rules of Practice emphasizes that no such jurisdiction has been granted to the Judicial Officer to extend the time for filing an appeal after an administrative law judge’s decision has become final. Therefore, under the Rules of Practice, I cannot extend the time for Respondent’s filing an appeal petition after the Chief ALJ’s Decision and Order became final.

Moreover, the jurisdictional bar under the Rules of Practice, which precludes the Judicial Officer from hearing an appeal that is filed after an administrative law judge’s decision becomes final, is consistent with the judicial construction of the Administrative Orders Review Act (“Hobbs Act”). As stated in *Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. v. ICC*, 720 F.2d 958, 960 (7th Cir. 1983) (footnote omitted):

The Administrative Orders Review Act (“Hobbs Act”) requires a petition to review a final order of an administrative agency to be brought within sixty days of the entry of the order. 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (1976). This sixty-day time limit is jurisdictional in nature and may not be enlarged by the courts. *Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission*, 666 F.2d 595, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The purpose of the time limit is to impart finality into the administrative process, thereby conserving administrative resources and

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protecting the reliance interests of those who might conform their conduct to the administrative regulations. \textit{Id.} at 602.\textsuperscript{[11]}

Accordingly, Respondent’s appeal petition must be denied, since it is too late for the matter to be further considered. Moreover, the matter should not be considered by a reviewing court since, under section 1.139 of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. \S 1.139), “no decision shall be final for purposes of judicial review except a final decision of the Judicial Officer upon appeal.”

For the foregoing reasons, the following Order should be issued.

\textbf{ORDER}

Respondent’s appeal petition, filed November 2, 2004, is denied. Chief Administrative Law Judge Marc R. Hillson’s Decision and Order, filed August 23, 2004, is the final decision in this proceeding.

\textit{In re: DAVID GILBERT, AN INDIVIDUAL d/b/a GILBERT’S EDUCATIONAL PETTING ZOO AND SAFARI LAND ZOO. AWA Docket No. 04-0001.}

\textit{Errata.}

\textit{Filed December 14, 2004.}

\textsuperscript{[11]}\textit{Accord Jem Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 22 F.3d 320, 324-26 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating the court’s baseline standard long has been that statutory limitations on petitions for review are jurisdictional in nature and appellant’s petition filed after the 60-day limitation in the Hobbs Act will not be entertained); Friends of Sierra R.R. v. ICC, 881 F.2d 663, 666 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating the time limit in 28 U.S.C. \S 2344 is jurisdictional), cert. denied sub nom. Tuolumne Park & Recreation Dist. v. ICC, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990).}
AWA – Errata.

Colleen A. Carroll, for Complainant.
Respondent, Pro se.
Errata issued by William G. Jenson, Judicial Officer.

In the Order Denying Late Appeal filed November 30, 2004, the following correction is made:

On page 1 change “AWA Docket No. 04-0004” to “AWA Docket No. 04-0001.”

In re: DOUGLAS HOLIDAY.
FCIA Docket No. 03-0006.
Order Dismissing Case.
Filed July 6, 2004.

Donald Brittenham, Jr., for Complainant.
Respondent, Michael P. Malleny.
Order Dismissing Case issued by Marc R. Hillson, Chief Administrative Law Judge.

The parties Mutual Request for Dismissal as a result of settlement, filed on July 1, 2004, is GRANTED.
The case is DISMISSED with prejudice.

In re: ROSS BLACKSTOCK.
FCIA Docket No. 02-0007.
Order Denying Late Appeal.

FCIA – Late appeal.
Ross Blackstock  
63 Agric. Dec. 818

The Judicial Officer, on July 13, 2004, denied Respondent’s late-filed appeal. The Judicial Officer concluded that he had no jurisdiction to hear Respondent’s appeal filed after Chief Administrative Law Judge Marc R. Hillson’s decision became final.

Donald A. Brittenham, Jr., for Complainant.  
Lynn French, Colorado Springs, CO, for Respondent.  
Initial decision issued by Marc R. Hillson, Chief Administrative Law Judge.  
Order issued by William G. Jenson, Judicial Officer.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY


Complainant alleges that Ross Blackstock [hereinafter Respondent] willfully and intentionally provided false information to IGF Insurance Company regarding Blackstock Orchards, Inc.’s insurable interest in three orchards identified as unit 0101, unit 0102, and unit 0103 (Compl. ¶ III). On August 19, 2002, Respondent filed an answer denying the material allegations of the Complaint.

On October 28, 2003, Chief Administrative Law Judge Marc R. Hillson [hereinafter the Chief ALJ] conducted a hearing in Grand Junction, Colorado. Donald A. Brittenham, Jr., Office of the General Counsel, United States Department of Agriculture, represented

On January 22, 2004, Respondent filed “Closing Brief” and “Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order.” On January 23, 2004, Complainant filed “Post-Hearing Brief” and a “Proposed Order.” On May 17, 2004, the Chief ALJ filed a “Decision”: (1) concluding that Respondent repeatedly and intentionally provided false and misleading information as alleged in the Complaint; (2) assessing Respondent a $10,000 civil penalty; (3) disqualifying Respondent from purchasing catastrophic risk protection or receiving non-insured assistance for a period of 2 years; and (4) disqualifying Respondent from receiving any other benefit under the Federal Crop Insurance Act for a period of 10 years (Decision at 9, 17).


1United States Postal Service Domestic Return Receipt for Article Number 7001 0360 0000 0304 8426.

“Complainant’s Response to Respondent’s Motion to Reconsider Civil Fine.” On July 2, 2004, the Hearing Clerk transmitted the record to the Judicial Officer for consideration and decision.

**CONCLUSION BY THE JUDICIAL OFFICER**

The record establishes that the Hearing Clerk served Respondent with the Chief ALJ’s Decision on May 22, 2004. Section 1.145(a) of the Rules of Practice provides that an administrative law judge’s written decision must be appealed to the Judicial Officer within 30 days after service, as follows:

§ 1.145 Appeal to Judicial Officer.

(a) Filing of petition. Within 30 days after receiving service of the Judge’s decision, if the decision is a written decision, or within 30 days after the issuance of the Judge’s decision, if the decision is an oral decision, a party who disagrees with the decision, any part of the decision, or any ruling by the Judge or who alleges any deprivation of rights, may appeal the decision to the Judicial Officer by filing an appeal petition with the Hearing Clerk.

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3(continued)

WL 1941189 (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2002); In re Field Market Produce, Inc., 55 Agric. Dec. 1418, 1435 (1996) (Order Denying Late Appeal). Section 1.145(a) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.145(a)) provides for the appeal of an administrative law judge’s decision to the Judicial Officer. Therefore, I infer that Respondent’s Motion to Reconsider Civil Fine is Respondent’s appeal of the Chief ALJ’s Decision pursuant to section 1.145(a) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.145(a)).

3See note 1.
7 C.F.R. § 1.145(a).

Therefore, Respondent was required to file his appeal petition with the Hearing Clerk no later than June 21, 2004. Respondent did not file his appeal petition with the Hearing Clerk until June 28, 2004.

The Judicial Officer has continuously and consistently held under the Rules of Practice that the Judicial Officer has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal that is filed after an administrative law judge’s decision becomes final.4 The Chief ALJ’s Decision became final on

4In re David McCauley, 63 Agric. Dec. ___ (July 12, 2004) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 1 month 26 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final); In re Belinda Atherton, 62 Agric. Dec. ___ (Oct. 20, 2003) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed the day the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final); In re Samuel K. Angel, 61 Agric. Dec. 275 (2002) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 3 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final); In re Paul Eugenio, 60 Agric. Dec. 676 (2001) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 1 day after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final); In re Harold P. Kafka, 58 Agric. Dec. 357 (1999) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 15 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final), aff’d per curiam, 259 F.3d 716 (3d Cir. 2001) (Table); In re Kevin Ackerman, 58 Agric. Dec. 340 (1999) (dismissing Kevin Ackerman’s appeal petition filed 1 day after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final); In re Severin Peterson, 57 Agric. Dec. 1304 (1998) (dismissing the applicants’ appeal petition filed 23 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final); In re Queen City Farms, Inc., 57 Agric. Dec. 813 (1998) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 58 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final); In re Gail Davis, 56 Agric. Dec. 373 (1997) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 41 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final); In re Field Market Produce, Inc., 55 Agric. Dec. 1418 (1996) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 8 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became effective); In re Ov DuK Kwon, 55 Agric. Dec. 78 (1996) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 35 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became effective); In re New York Primate Center, Inc., 53 Agric. Dec. 529 (1994) (dismissing the respondents’ appeal petition filed 2 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final); In re K. Lester, 52 Agric. Dec. 332 (1993) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 14 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final).
final and effective); *In re Amril L. Carrington*, 52 Agric. Dec. 331 (1993) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 7 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final and effective); *In re Teofilo Benicu*, 52 Agric. Dec. 321 (1993) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 6 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final and effective); *In re Newark Produce Distributors, Inc.*, 51 Agric. Dec. 955 (1992) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final and effective); *In re Laura May Kurjan*, 51 Agric. Dec. 438 (1992) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final); *In re Kermit Breed*, 50 Agric. Dec. 675 (1991) (dismissing the respondent’s late-filed appeal petition); *In re Bihari Lall*, 49 Agric. Dec. 896 (1990) (stating the respondent’s appeal petition, filed after the administrative law judge’s decision became final, must be dismissed because it was not timely filed); *In re Dale Haley*, 48 Agric. Dec. 1072 (1989) (stating the respondents’ appeal petition, filed after the administrative law judge’s decision became final and effective, must be dismissed because it was not timely filed); *In re Mary Fran Hamilton*, 45 Agric. Dec. 2395 (1986) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed with the Hearing Clerk on the day the administrative law judge’s decision and order had become final and effective); *In re Bushelle Cattle Co.*, 45 Agric. Dec. 1131 (1986) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed 2 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final and effective); *In re William T. Powell*, 44 Agric. Dec. 1220 (1985) (stating it has consistently been held that, under the Rules of Practice, the Judicial Officer has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal after the administrative law judge’s decision and order becomes final); *In re Toscony Provision Co.*, 43 Agric. Dec. 1106 (1984) (stating the Judicial Officer has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal that is filed after the administrative law judge’s decision becomes final), aff’d, No. 81-1729 (D.N.J. Mar. 11, 1985) (court reviewed merits notwithstanding late administrative appeal), aff’d, 782 F.2d 1031 (3d Cir. 1986) (unpublished); *In re Dock Case Brokerage Co.*, 42 Agric. Dec. 1950 (1983) (dismissing the respondents’ appeal petition filed 5 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final); *In re Veg-Pro Distributors*, 42 Agric. Dec. 1173 (1983) (denying the respondent’s appeal petition filed 1 day after the default decision and order became final); *In re Samuel Simon Petro*, 42 Agric. Dec. 921 (1983) (stating the Judicial Officer has no jurisdiction to hear an appeal that is filed after the administrative law judge’s decision and order becomes final and effective); *In re Yankee Brokerage, Inc.*, 42 Agric. Dec. 427 (1983) (dismissing the respondent’s appeal petition filed on the day the administrative law judge’s decision became effective); *In re Charles Brink*, 41 Agric. Dec. 2146 (1982) (stating the Judicial Officer has no jurisdiction to consider the respondent’s appeal dated before the administrative law judge’s decision (continued...)}
June 26, 2004. Respondent filed an appeal petition with the Hearing Clerk on June 28, 2004, 2 days after the Chief ALJ’s Decision became final. Therefore, I have no jurisdiction to hear Respondent’s appeal.

The United States Department of Agriculture’s construction of the Rules of Practice is, in this respect, consistent with the construction of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 4(a)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides, as follows:

Rule 4. Appeal as of Right—When Taken

(a) Appeal in a Civil Case.

(1) Time for Filing a Notice of Appeal.

(A) In a civil case . . . the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 must be filed with the district clerk within 30 days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered.

4(...continued)
and order became final, but not filed until 4 days after the administrative law judge’s decision and order became final and effective), reconsideration denied, 41 Agric. Dec. 2147 (1982); In re Mel’s Produce, Inc., 40 Agric. Dec. 792 (1981) (stating since the respondent’s petition for reconsideration was not filed within 35 days after service of the default decision, the default decision became final and neither the administrative law judge nor the Judicial Officer has jurisdiction to consider the respondent’s petition); In re Animal Research Center of Massachusetts, Inc., 38 Agric. Dec. 379 (1978) (stating failure to file an appeal petition before the effective date of the administrative law judge’s decision is jurisdictional); In re Willie Cook, 39 Agric. Dec. 116 (1978) (stating it is the consistent policy of the United States Department of Agriculture not to consider appeals filed more than 35 days after service of the administrative law judge’s decision).

7 C.F.R. § 1.142(c)(4); Decision at 18.
As stated in Eaton v. Jamrog, 984 F.2d 760, 762 (6th Cir. 1993):

We have repeatedly held that compliance with Rule 4(a)(1) is a mandatory and jurisdictional prerequisite which this court may neither waive nor extend. See, e.g., Baker v. Raubie, 879 F.2d 1396, 1398 (6th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); Myers v. Ace Hardware, Inc., 777 F.2d 1099, 1102 (6th Cir. 1985). So strictly has this rule been applied, that even a notice of appeal filed five minutes late has been deemed untimely. Baker, 879 F.2d at 1398.6

6Accord Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196, 203 (1988) (stating since the court of appeals properly held petitioner’s notice of appeal from the decision on the merits to be untimely filed, and since the time of an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional, the court of appeals was without jurisdiction to review the decision on the merits); Browder v. Director, Dep’t of Corr. of Illinois, 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (stating under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 2107, a notice of appeal in a civil case must be filed within 30 days of entry of the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken; this 30-day time limit is mandatory and jurisdictional), rehearing denied, 434 U.S. 1089 (1978); Martinez v. Hoke, 38 F.3d 655, 656 (2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (stating under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the time for filing an appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional and the court of appeals has no authority to extend time for filing); Price v. Seydel, 961 F.2d 1470, 1473 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating the filing of notice of appeal within the 30-day period specified in Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) is mandatory and jurisdictional, and unless appellant’s notice is timely, the appeal must be dismissed); In re Eichelberger, 943 F.2d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that a notice of appeal be filed with the clerk of the district court within 30 days after entry of the judgment; Rule 4(a)’s provisions are mandatory and jurisdictional); Washington v. Bumgarner, 882 F.2d 899, 900 (4th Cir. 1989) (stating the time limit in Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1) is mandatory and jurisdictional; failure to comply with Rule 4(a) requires dismissal of the appeal and the fact that appellant is incarcerated and proceeding pro se does not change the clear language of the Rule), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1060 (1990); Jerningham v. Humphreys, 868 F.2d 846 (6th Cir. 1989) (Order) (stating the failure of an appellant to timely file a notice of appeal deprives an appellate court of jurisdiction; compliance with Rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure is a mandatory and jurisdictional prerequisite which this court can neither waive nor extend).
The Rules of Practice do not provide for an extension of time (for good cause or excusable neglect) for filing a notice of appeal after an administrative law judge’s decision has become final. Under the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, the district court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time to file a notice of appeal upon a motion filed no later than 30 days after the expiration of the time otherwise provided in the rules for the filing of a notice of appeal. The absence of such a rule in the Rules of Practice emphasizes that no such jurisdiction has been granted to the Judicial Officer to extend the time for filing an appeal after an administrative law judge’s decision has become final. Therefore, under the Rules of Practice, I cannot extend the time for Respondent’s filing an appeal petition after the Chief ALJ’s Decision became final.

Moreover, the jurisdictional bar under the Rules of Practice, which precludes the Judicial Officer from hearing an appeal that is filed after an administrative law judge’s decision becomes final, is consistent with the judicial construction of the Administrative Orders Review Act (“Hobbs Act”). As stated in Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. v. ICC, 720 F.2d 958, 960 (7th Cir. 1983) (footnote omitted):

The Administrative Orders Review Act (“Hobbs Act”) requires a petition to review a final order of an administrative agency to be brought within sixty days of the entry of the order. 28 U.S.C. § 2344 (1976). This sixty-day time limit is jurisdictional in nature and may not be enlarged by the courts. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 666 F.2d 595, 602 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The purpose of the time limit is to impart finality into the administrative process, thereby conserving administrative resources and

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protecting the reliance interests of those who might conform their conduct to the administrative regulations. *Id.* at 602.[8]

Accordingly, Respondent’s appeal petition must be denied, since it is too late for the matter to be further considered. Moreover, the matter should not be considered by a reviewing court since, under section 1.142(c)(4) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.142(c)(4)), “no decision shall be final for purposes of judicial review except a final decision of the Judicial Officer upon appeal.”

For the foregoing reasons, the following Order should be issued.

**ORDER**

Respondent’s appeal petition, filed June 28, 2004, is denied. Chief Administrative Law Judge Marc R. Hillson’s Decision, filed May 17, 2004, is the final decision in this proceeding.

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[8] *Accord Jem Broadcasting Co. v. FCC*, 22 F.3d 320, 324-26 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating the court’s baseline standard long has been that statutory limitations on petitions for review are jurisdictional in nature and appellant’s petition filed after the 60-day limitation in the Hobbs Act will not be entertained); *Friends of Sierra R.R. v. ICC*, 881 F.2d 663, 666 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating the time limit in 28 U.S.C. § 2344 is jurisdictional), *cert. denied sub nom. Tuolumne Park & Recreation Dist. v. ICC*, 493 U.S. 1093 (1990).
In re: BETSY H. EDWARDS, MARY ANN HINKLE & CECIL M. HINKLE, JR.

HPA Docket No. 03-0004.

Order Dismissing Complaint as to Respondent Mary Ann Hinkle.

Filed November 15, 2004.

Bernadette Juarez, for Complainant.

Respondent, Robert B. Allen.

Order issued by William B. Moran, Administrative Law Judge.

On September 30, 2004, the undersigned signed a Consent Decision and Order as to Betsy H. Edwards and Cecil M. Hinkle, Jr. The Complainant has filed a Notice of Withdrawal of the Complaint as to Respondent Mary Ann Hinkle. In that Notice, the Administrator of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (“APHIS”) “unilaterally withdrew its amended complaint as to respondent Mary Ann Hinkle... concluding that pursuit of this matter would not further the goals of the Act.” September 15, 2004 Notice.

Accordingly, the Complaint is dismissed with prejudice as to Respondent Mary Ann Hinkle. The effect of the Notice as to Respondent Mary Ann Hinkle is that this matter has now been completely resolved.

In re: LION RAISINS, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION FORMERLY KNOWN AS LION ENTERPRISES, INC.; LION RAISIN COMPANY, A PARTNERSHIP OR UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION; LION PACKING COMPANY, A PARTNERSHIP OR UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION; AL LION, JR., AN INDIVIDUAL; DAN LION, AN INDIVIDUAL; JEFF LION, AN INDIVIDUAL; and BRUCE LION, AN INDIVIDUAL.
Ruling Dismissing Motion for Expedited Response to Certified Questions.
Filed July 12, 2004.

I&G – Motions entertained by Judicial Officer.

Colleen A. Carroll, for Complainant.
Brian C. Leighton, Clovis, California, for Respondents.
Ruling issued by William G. Jenson, Judicial Officer.

On February 20, 2004, Administrative Law Judge Jill S. Clifton [hereinafter the ALJ] certified two questions to the Judicial Officer. On June 23, 2004, Lion Raisins, Inc.; Lion Raisin Company; Lion Packing Company; Al Lion, Jr.; Dan Lion; Jeff Lion; and Bruce Lion [hereinafter Respondents] filed a motion requesting that the Judicial Officer promptly address the ALJ’s certified questions. On June 25, 2004, the Administrator, Agricultural Marketing Service, United States Department of Agriculture [hereinafter Complainant], filed “Complainant’s Response to ‘Motion to the Judicial Officer.’” On June 29, 2004, the Hearing Clerk transmitted the record to the Judicial Officer for a ruling on Respondents’ Motion for Expedited Response to Certified Questions.

Section 1.143(a) of the Rules of Practice provides that motions filed or made prior to the filing of an appeal of an administrative law judge’s decision, except motions which relate directly to an appeal, shall be ruled on by the administrative law judge, as follows:

§ 1.143 Motions and requests.

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1“Respondents’ Motion to the Judicial Officer to Promptly Rule on ALJ Clifton’s Notice of Intent and Amended Notice of Intention of December 23, 2003 and Later Certified Issues Re Same” [hereinafter Motion for Expedited Response to Certified Questions].
(a) General. All motions and requests shall be filed with the Hearing Clerk, and served upon all the parties, except (1) requests for extensions of time pursuant to § 1.147, (2) requests for subpoenas pursuant to § 1.149, and (3) motions and requests made on the record during the oral hearing. The Judge shall rule upon all motions and requests filed or made prior to the filing of an appeal of the Judge’s decision pursuant to § 1.145, except motions directly relating to the appeal. Thereafter, the Judicial Officer will rule on any motions and requests, as well as the motions directly relating to the appeal.

7 C.F.R. § 1.143(a).

No appeal from an administrative law judge’s decision has been filed in this proceeding. Moreover, Respondents’ Motion for Expedited Response to Certified Questions does not relate to an appeal from an administrative law judge’s decision in this proceeding. Therefore, the Judicial Officer cannot entertain Respondents’ Motion for Expedited Response to Certified Questions and Respondents’ Motion for Expedited Response to Certified Questions must be dismissed.

For the foregoing reasons, the following Ruling should be issued.

RULING

Respondents’ Motion for Expedited Response to Certified Questions, filed June 23, 2004, is dismissed.

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In re: LION RAISINS, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION FORMERLY KNOWN AS LION ENTERPRISES, INC.; LION RAISIN COMPANY, A PARTNERSHIP OR
UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION; LION PACKING COMPANY; A PARTNERSHIP OR UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION; AL LION, JR., AN INDIVIDUAL; DAN LION, AN INDIVIDUAL; JEFF LION, AN INDIVIDUAL; and BRUCE LION, AN INDIVIDUAL.
I & G Docket No. 01-0001.
Order Dismissing Appeal as to Al Lion, Jr., Dan Lion, and Jeff Lion.

I&G – Interlocutory appeal.

The Judicial Officer dismissed an interlocutory appeal from a ruling by Administrative Law Judge Jill S. Clifton on the ground that interlocutory appeals are not permitted under the Rules of Practice.

Colleen A. Carroll, for Complainant.
Brian C. Leighton, for Respondents.
Ruling issued by Jill S. Clifton, Administrative Law Judge.
Order issued by William G. Jenson, Judicial Officer.


1“Complainant’s Response to ‘Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Summary Disposition and/or Directed Verdict’ Filed on Behalf of Respondent Dan Lion” filed February 4, 2004; “Complainant’s Response to ‘Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Summary Disposition and/or Directed Verdict’ Filed By Respondents Al Lion, Jr., and Jeff Lion” filed February 10, 2004.

(continued...)
to Complainant’s responses to Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment.²


Based upon a careful consideration of the record, I find the ALJ’s Ruling Denying Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment is not a “decision” as defined in the rules of practice applicable to this proceeding.⁵ The Rules of Practice provide for appeal solely of an

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¹(...continued)

²“Respondents’ Joint Reply to Complainant’s Response to Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Summary Disposition and/or Directed Verdict Filed By Respondents Al Lion, Jr., Jeff Lion and Dan Lion” filed April 5, 2004.

³“Respondents Al Lion, Jr., Dan Lion and Jeff Lion’s Appeal From the ALJ Ruling Denying Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment and/or Summary Disposition and/or Directed Verdict Rules of Practice, Rule 1.145(a)” filed July 13, 2004.


⁵“Rules of Practice Governing Formal Adjudicatory Proceedings Instituted by the Secretary Under Various Statutes” (7 C.F.R. §§ 1.130-.151) [hereinafter the Rules of Practice].
administrative law judge’s decision to the Judicial Officer. Therefore, the ALJ’s Ruling Denying Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment cannot be appealed to the Judicial Officer.

Section 1.145(a) of the Rules of Practice limits the time during which a party may file an appeal to a 30-day period after receiving service of an administrative law judge’s written decision, as follows:

§ 1.145 Appeal to Judicial Officer.

(a) Filing of petition. Within 30 days after receiving service of the Judge’s decision, if the decision is a written decision, or within 30 days after the issuance of the Judge’s decision, if the decision is an oral decision, a party who disagrees with the decision, any part of the decision, or any ruling by the Judge or who alleges any deprivation of rights, may appeal the decision to the Judicial Officer by filing an appeal petition with the Hearing Clerk.

7 C.F.R. § 1.145(a).

The Rules of Practice define the word “decision” as follows:

1.132 Definitions.

As used in this subpart, the terms as defined in the statute under which the proceeding is conducted and in the regulations, standards, instructions, or orders issued thereunder,
shall apply with equal force and effect. In addition and except as may be provided otherwise in this subpart:

... 

**Decision** means: (1) The Judge’s initial decision made in accordance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 556 and 557, and includes the Judge’s (i) findings and conclusions and the reasons or basis therefor on all material issues of fact, law or discretion, (ii) order, and (iii) rulings on proposed findings, conclusions and orders submitted by the parties; and

(2) The decision and order by the Judicial Officer upon appeal of the Judge’s decision.

7 C.F.R. § 1.132.

The ALJ has not issued an initial decision in the instant proceeding in accordance with the provisions of 5 U.S.C. §§ 556 and 557, and the Rules of Practice do not permit interlocutory appeals. Therefore, Respondents’ appeal of the ALJ’s Ruling Denying Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment must be rejected as premature.

The United States Department of Agriculture’s construction of the Rules of Practice is, in this respect, consistent with the construction of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 4(a)(1)(A) and (B) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides, as follows:

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Rule 4. Appeal as of Right—When Taken

(a) Appeal in a Civil Case.

(1) Time for Filing a Notice of Appeal.

(A) In a civil case, . . . the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 must be filed with the district clerk within 30 days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered.

(B) When the United States or its officer or agency is a party, the notice of appeal may be filed by any party within 60 days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered.


The notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules regarding a 1979 amendment to Rule 4(a)(1) make clear that Rule 4(a)(1) is specifically designed to prevent premature as well as late appeals, as follows:

The phrases “within 30 days of such entry” and “within 60 days of such entry” have been changed to read “after” instead of “of[.]” The change is for clarity only, since the word “of” in the present rule appears to be used to mean “after.” Since the proposed amended rule deals directly with the premature filing of a notice of appeal, it was thought useful to emphasize the fact that except as provided, the period during which a notice of appeal may be filed is the 30 days, or 60 days as the case
may be, following the entry of the judgment or order appealed from...[7]

Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules—1979 Amendment.

Accordingly, Respondents’ appeal of the ALJ’s Ruling Denying Respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment must be dismissed, since the Rules of Practice do not permit interlocutory appeals.

For the foregoing reasons, the following Order should be issued.

ORDER

Respondents’ interlocutory appeal filed July 13, 2004, is dismissed.

In re: LION RAISINS, INC., A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION FORMERLY KNOWN AS LION ENTERPRISES, INC.; LION RAISIN COMPANY, A PARTNERSHIP OR UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION; LION PACKING COMPANY, A PARTNERSHIP OR UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATION; AL LION, JR., AN INDIVIDUAL; DAN LION, AN INDIVIDUAL; JEFF LION, AN INDIVIDUAL; and BRUCE LION, AN INDIVIDUAL.
I & G Docket No. 01-0001.
Ruling on Certified Questions.

1 Accord Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982) (per curiam) (notice of appeal filed while timely motion to alter or amend judgment was pending in district court was absolute nullity and could not confer jurisdiction on court of appeals); Willhauck v. Halpin, 919 F.2d 788, 792 (1st Cir. 1990) (premature notice of appeal is a complete nullity); Mondrow v. Fountain House, 867 F.2d 798, 799-800 (3d Cir. 1989) (appellate court had no jurisdiction to hear appeal during pendency of motion for new trial timely filed in trial court).


The Judicial Officer ruled, in response to questions certified by Administrative Law Judge Jill S. Clifton: (1) the Secretary of Agriculture’s authority to prescribe regulations for the inspection, certification, and identification of the class, quality, quantity, and condition of agricultural products and to issue regulations and orders to carry out the purposes of the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946, as amended (7 U.S.C. §§ 1621-1631) (Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946), includes authority to issue debarment regulations and to debar persons from benefits under the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946; and (2) the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 does not authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to issue subpoenas.

Colleen A. Carroll, for Complainant.
Brian C. Leighton, and James A. Moody, for Respondents.
Certification to Judicial Officer issued by Jill S. Clifton, Administrative Law Judge.
Ruling issued by William G. Jenson, Judicial Officer.

On February 20, 2004, Administrative Law Judge Jill S. Clifton [the ALJ] certified two questions to the Judicial Officer. Each of the ALJ’s questions is followed by “subparts.”

Debarment Authority Under the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946

First, the ALJ asks whether the Secretary of Agriculture has authority to debar persons from benefits under the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946, as amended (7 U.S.C. §§ 1621-1631) [hereinafter the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946], as follows:

Question:

Does the Secretary of Agriculture have the authority under the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946, as amended (7 U.S.C. §§1621-1631), to impose debarment of a person from any or all
of the benefits of said Act for a specified period, pursuant to 7 C.F.R. § 52.54?

**Subparts:**

1. Does it make a difference if Respondents failed to assert in Respondents’ Answer to the Second Amended Complaint filed July 29, 2002, that the Secretary lacks such authority?

2. Does it make a difference that the criminal penalties pursuant to 7 U.S.C. § 1622 can be imposed upon only knowing participants in the wrongdoing, while the sanction pursuant to 7 C.F.R. § 52.54 can be imposed upon any person who commits or causes the wrongful act(s) or practice(s) including any agents, officers, subsidiaries, or affiliates of such person?

3. Does it make a difference whether the purpose of 7 C.F.R. § 52.54 is (a) remedial or (b) punitive or penal? Which is it?

4. Does it make a difference if a Respondent is a handler required to obtain inspection and certification in order to market the bulk of the produce it handles, under a different statute, the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1937, as amended (7 U.S.C. §§ 601-674) and Marketing Order 989 (7 C.F.R. part 989)?

5. Does it make a difference if the Secretary of Agriculture has no authority to issue subpoenas or subpoenas duces tecum, when timely requested by Complainant or Respondents and deemed appropriate by
the administrative law judge, for use in a debarment action pursuant to 7 C.F.R. § 52.54?

Certification to Judicial Officer at 1-2 (emphasis in original).

**Answer:**

The Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to issue regulations and orders, as follows:

**§ 1622. Duties of Secretary relating to agricultural products**

The Secretary of Agriculture is directed and authorized:

. . . . .

(h) Inspection and certification of products in interstate commerce; credit and future availability of funds; investment; certificates as evidence; penalties

To inspect, certify, and identify the class, quality, quantity, and condition of agricultural products when shipped or received in interstate commerce, under such rules and regulations as the Secretary of Agriculture may prescribe.[.]

**§ 1624. Cooperation with Government and State agencies, private research organizations, etc.; rules and regulations**

. . . . .

(b) The Secretary of Agriculture shall promulgate such orders, rules, and regulations as he deems necessary to carry out the provisions of this chapter.
7 U.S.C. §§ 1622(h), 1624(b).

The Secretary of Agriculture’s authority to prescribe regulations for the inspection, certification, and identification of the class, quality, quantity, and condition of agricultural products and to issue regulations and orders to carry out the purposes of the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 includes authority to issue debarment regulations and to debar persons from benefits under the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946.1 Moreover, the Secretary of Agriculture has long exercised debarment authority under the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946.2 I do not find the Secretary of Agriculture’s debarment

1American Raisin Packers, Inc. v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 66 Fed. Appx. 706, 2003 WL 21259771 (9th Cir. 2003) (stating section 203(h) of the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 (7 U.S.C. § 1622(h)) provides ample authority for the promulgation of 7 C.F.R. § 52.54 (a debarment regulation); and affirming the Judicial Officer’s debarment of American Raisin Packers, Inc., from receiving inspection services under the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946) (not to be cited except pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3); West v. Bergland, 611 F.2d 710 (8th Cir. 1979) (stating regulations which permit the Secretary of Agriculture to withdraw meat grading services under the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 are authorized by the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946; and affirming the district court’s denial of a request to enjoin the Secretary of Agriculture from holding an administrative hearing to determine whether meat grading and acceptance services under the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 should be withdrawn), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 821 (1980).

authority under the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 affected by any of the issues raised in the five subparts to the ALJ’s question regarding the Secretary of Agriculture’s debarment authority under the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946.

Subpoena Authority Under the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946

Second, the ALJ asks whether the Secretary of Agriculture is authorized by the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 to issue subpoenas, as follows:

Question:

Does the Secretary of Agriculture have the authority under the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946, as amended (7 U.S.C. §§ 1621-1631), to issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum when timely requested by Complainant or Respondent and deemed appropriate by the Administrative Law Judge, for use in a debarment action pursuant to 7 C.F.R. § 52.54?

Subparts:

(1) Does it make a difference if a Respondent is a handler required to obtain inspection and certification in order to market the bulk of the produce it handles,

\(^{1}(...continued)

under a different statute, the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1937, as amended (7 U.S.C. §§ 601-674) and Marketing Order 989 (7 C.F.R. part 989)?

(2) Does it make a difference if the debarment action and resulting administrative hearing are not explicit in the statute?

Certification to Judicial Officer at 3-4 (emphasis in original).

Answer:

This proceeding is conducted under the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 and the Rules of Practice Governing Formal Adjudicatory Proceedings Instituted by the Secretary Under Various Statutes (7 C.F.R. §§ 1.130-.151) and the Rules of Practice Governing Withdrawal of Inspection and Grading Services (7 C.F.R. pt. 50) [hereinafter the Rules of Practice]. The Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 does not authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to issue subpoenas. The Rules of Practice explicitly limit the issuance of subpoenas to those authorized by the statute under which the proceeding is conducted, as follows:

§ 1.144 Judges.

. . . .

(c) Powers. Subject to review as provided in this subpart, the Judge, in any assigned proceeding, shall have power to:

. . . .

\[In re Mirman Bros., Inc., 40 Agric. Dec. 201 (1981) (stating the Agricultural Marketing Act of 1946 does not grant subpoena powers).\]
(4) Issue subpoenas as authorized by the statute under which the proceeding is conducted, requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of books, contracts, papers, and other documentary evidence at the hearing[.]

§ 1.149 Subpoenas.

(a) Issuance of subpoenas. The attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of documentary evidence from any place in the United States on behalf of any party to the proceeding may be required by subpoena at any designated place of hearing if authorized by the statute under which the proceeding is conducted.

7 C.F.R. §§ 1.144(c)(4), .149(a) (footnote omitted).

Moreover, the Judicial Officer has consistently held that, under the Rules of Practice, an administrative law judge may only issue a subpoena as authorized by the statute under which the proceeding is conducted. The Rules of Practice neither provide an exception for actions that are not explicit in the statute under which the proceeding is conducted nor provide an exception for actions that may affect a respondent under another statute.

In re: CHRIS BURKE.
P.Q. Docket No. 05-0005.
Order Withdrawing Complaint and Dismissing Case.

Complainant’s November 30, 2004, Motion to Withdraw Complaint is granted. It is hereby ordered that the Complaint, filed herein on November 16, 2004, be withdrawn.

Accordingly, this case is hereby dismissed.

Copies of this Order shall be served by the Hearing Clerk upon each of the parties. The Hearing Clerk is requested to show the addresses to which the copies were mailed, and the mailing dates.

In re: AYSEN BROS., INC., BLANCHARD FARMS, INC., PATRICK RICHARD FARMS, D & R BLANCHARD FARMS, INC., JOHN GOODE FARMS, CLAUDE BROS., INC., SJM FARMS, INC., BOUDREAUX ENTERPRISE RJB, LLC.
SMA Docket No. 04-0001
and
RENE CLAUSE & SONS, INC. AND A. N. SIMMONS ESTATE.
SMA Docket No. 04-0002.
Order Dismissing Petitions and Claims by Intervenors.

Risley C. Triche for Petitioners.
Christopher H. Riviere for Intervenors.
Jeffrey Kahn for CCC.

Order by Administrative Law Judge, Victor A. Palmer.

BACKGROUND

These proceedings are pursuant to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended by the Farm Security and Rural Adjustment Act of 2002, as they pertain to the establishment and transfer of flexible marketing allotments for sugar. (7 U.S.C. § 1359aa-1359kk, “the Act”). The sugar loan and allotment program is administered by the United States Department of Agriculture’s Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC). In addition to making loans to processors of domestically grown sugarcane and domestically grown sugar beets who must then pay growers of these commodities not less than minimum amounts that are established by the Department of Agriculture, (See 7 C.F.R. §1435.100-1435.106), CCC establishes flexible marketing allotments for sugar for any crop year in which they are required by the Act. Under a formula expressed in the Act, limitations are placed on the percentage of the American Sugar Market that may be supplied by foreign growers and the rest is divided between sugar derived from domestically grown sugar beets and sugar from domestically grown sugarcane. Additionally, the allotments for sugar derived from sugarcane is further allotted among the States in accordance with the Act and implementing regulations. An allotment for cane sugar is allocated among multiple cane sugar processors in the State of Louisiana, (which is the only proportionate share State subject to 7 U.S.C. §1359d(b)(1)(D)), on the basis of past marketings and processings of sugar, and the processor’s ability to market its portion of the allotment allocated for the crop year. The Act further requires that a processor’s allocation of an allotment shall be shared among growers served by the processor in a fair and equitable manner that reflects the growers’ production histories. Louisiana is the only State in which growers have assigned allotments. When a processing facility is closed in Louisiana,
sugarcane growers that delivered sugarcane to the facility prior to the closing may elect to deliver their sugarcane to another processing plant by filing a petition under 7 U.S.C. § 1359ff (c)(8)(A) to have their allocations modified to allow the delivery. Upon the filing of such a petition, CCC may increase the allocation of the processing facility to which the growers have elected to deliver their sugarcane to a level that does not exceed that company’s processing capacity, and the increased allocation is then deducted from the allocation of the owner of the closed processing facility. (7 U.S.C. §1359ff(c)(8)(B) and (C)).

The Petitioners are Louisiana growers of sugarcane and members of the South Louisiana Sugar Cooperative (the Cooperative). Each Petitioner had entered into an agreement to supply all of their sugarcane production to the Cooperative. When the Petitioners entered into these agreements, the Cooperative was operating a sugarcane processing facility known as the Glenwood Cooperative Sugar Mill at Napoleon, Louisiana to which Petitioners delivered their sugarcane for processing. However, for economic reasons, the Cooperative closed this facility.

After the closure, these growers petitioned the Secretary, pursuant to 7 U.S.C. §1359ff(c)(8)(A), to move their respective sugar marketing allocations, commensurate with their sugarcane production histories at the closed facility, to other sugarcane processors who agreed to accept their sugarcane. The pertinent provisions of the Act (7 U.S.C. §1359ff(c)(8)) are as follows:

(8) PROCESSING FACILITY CLOSURES -
(A) IN GENERAL B If a sugarcane processing facility subject to this subsection is closed and the sugarcane growers that delivered the sugarcane to the facility prior to the closure elect to deliver their sugarcane to another processing company, the growers may petition the
Secretary to modify allocations under this part to allow the delivery.

(B) INCREASED ALLOCATION FOR PROCESSING COMPANY B The Secretary may increase the allocation to the processing company to which the growers elect to deliver the sugarcane, with the approval of the processing company, to a level that does not exceed the processing capacity of the processing company, to accommodate the change in deliveries.

(C) DECREASED ALLOCATION FOR CLOSED COMPANY B The increased allocation shall be deducted from the allocation to the company that owned the processing facility that has been closed and the remaining allocation shall be unaffected.

(D) TIMING B The determinations of the Secretary on the issues raised by the petition shall be made within 60 days after the filing of the petition.

On July 17, 2003, those petitions were granted by CCC even though by letter of June 24, 2003, the Cooperative had requested their denial as being inconsistent with and in violation of its contracts with the growers. The Cooperative was advised at that time (Agency Certified Record, page 174):

‘...We regret the potential negative effect that our decision may have upon South Louisiana. However, we believe that section 359f(c)(8) of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as amended, encourages the Department of Agriculture to honor grower petitions to transfer allocation commensurate with their production history if their mill closes.

On July 21, 2003, the Cooperative requested reconsideration of the July 17th decision.
On October 10, 2003, CCC denied the Cooperative’s request for reconsideration (Agency Certified Record, pp.256 - 258), stating that:

...Based upon the information available to CCC...CCC has determined to deny the Cooperative's request to reverse its July 17, 2003, approval of the growers’ transfer requests. The growers meet the statutory conditions necessary for CCC to allow the transfer. However, in allowing these transfers to occur, CCC wishes to make clear that this approval does not affect in any manner private contractual obligations that the Growers may have and that the provisions of 359f of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 may not be used to avoid contractual obligations involving the Growers and other parties.

In initially approving the Growers’ request, CCC did not pre-empt any existing rights and obligations of the Growers or any other party; similarly, today’s determination in no way affects any obligation that may exist in any private contract or agreement between the Growers and any other party. If the Growers have a contractual obligation requiring that they deliver sugarcane to a processor, their action in requesting CCC to allow a transfer of allocation to another processor does not abrogate any obligation under the private contract.

CCC is approving the transfer of the allocations based solely upon the determination that the processor to whom they have delivered sugarcane in the past is no longer functioning and, thus, under section 359f of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, the Growers may
at their own initiation, request that CCC transfer allocation to another processor. To the extent the Growers have initiated two separate courses of action that are contradictory, namely (1) entering into private agreements regarding the delivery of sugarcane that they produce to a specified processor and (2) requesting that CCC approve a transfer of allocation to another processor, the Growers must accept responsibility for the consequences of their actions.

While CCC is denying the Cooperative’s request for reconsideration of CCC’s July 17, 2003 determination, in light of the erroneous assumption of the Growers that CCC’s July 17, 2003 determination preempts other contractual obligations of the Growers, CCC will allow the Growers until October 24, 2003 to weigh the consequences of their requests. Unless notified in writing prior to October 24, 2003, CCC will consider the transfer of the Growers’ allocation, to the processors designated by the Growers to be final.

Except as set forth in the immediately preceding paragraph, CCC will not, under section 359f of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, accept petitions to transfer sugar cane allocations to a new processor once harvest begins.

On October 23, 2003, the petition in SMA Docket No. 04-0001 was filed to appeal those parts of the reconsideration opinion that stated the July 17th determination did not preempt other contractual obligations that the growers may owe, and that CCC would not accept further applications for transfers once harvest began. The petition
alleges that State laws were indeed preempted by CCC by its own final rule addressing the preemption of inconsistent State laws that it previously published in the Federal Register on August 26, 2002. It alleged further that CCC had not been given authority to fix deadlines. On November 17, 2003, CCC filed an Answer and a Motion to Dismiss the Petition. On November 25, 2003, a second Petition was filed by other growers making identical allegations in SMA Docket No. 04-0002. On December 12, 2003, CCC filed an Answer and Motion to Dismiss this second Petition.

Responses by Petitioners to the Answers and Motions to Dismiss were filed on December 10, 2003 in SMA Docket No. 04-0001, and on December 22, 2003 in SMA Docket No. 04-0002.

Notices of Intent to Intervene in both cases were thereafter filed by South Louisiana Sugar Cooperative, Inc., M.A. Patout & Son, Ltd., Raceland Raw Sugar Corporation, and Lafourche Sugars, L.L.C. On April 9, 2004, I entered an Order based on a teleconference held the day before in which May 28, 2004, was set as the date by which the parties would file the Agency Certified Record, motions with supporting briefs, specific identification of the Petitioners in SMA Docket No. 04-0001 and memoranda showing the facts in full as they know them and their legal arguments.

The parties complied with the deadline. The two proceedings have been consolidated and the caption for SMA Docket No. 04-0001 has been changed to show the actual Petitioners.

Upon a careful reading of the Agency Certified Record and the motions and memoranda filed, I have determined to dismiss both petitions as well as the requests by the Intervenors to set aside the reconsideration determination for the reasons that follow:

**DISMISSAL OF THE PETITIONS**

CCC has urged three reasons for the dismissal of the petitions.

First, CCC contends that the Petitioners were not adversely affected by any part of the reconsideration determination and are
therefore without standing to appeal. This argument is rejected. Petitioners were indeed adversely affected by those portions of the reconsideration decision stating that they may be in violation of their contractual obligations if they send their sugarcane to facilities other than those owned by the Cooperative, and that the earlier decision in their favor was not intended to suggest otherwise. Petitioners therefore have standing to appeal that part of the reconsideration decision.

I agree, however, with CCC’s second contention that Petitioners do not have standing to appeal the reconsideration decision’s imposition of a deadline upon further grower applications for transfer of sugar marketing allocations. The Petitioners are all growers whose transfer applications were granted and none of them can claim to be adversely affected by this part of the decision. The Act (7 U.S.C §1357ii(a)) specifically limits appeals to: any person adversely affected by reason of any such decision upon which relief can be granted.

CCC’s third reason for dismissal is the one that is conclusive and leads me to dismiss both petitions in their entirety. The petitions fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The essence of the Petitioners’ claims for relief is that in granting Petitioners’ requests to transfer their sugar marketing allocations, CCC thereby preempted State common law and could not later assert otherwise.

CCC is correct that it was not granted and did not exercise the power to preempt conflicting State common law. Petitioners contend that federal preemption of State common law took place when CCC promulgated a rule in implementation of the Act on August 26, 2002, (67 Federal Register 54925, at 54926), which provided:
The rule should have referenced Executive Order 12988 which had replaced Executive Order 12778. The language of both Executive Orders was, however, identical.
sense. CCC’s and the Secretary’s expertise does not extend to interpreting and applying the principles of common law to alleged contractual breaches.

Although I have found no decisions looking to federal preemption of State common law, the Supreme Court has addressed preemption of Federal common law by federal statutes. In Oneida County, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Etc., 470 U.S. 226, at 235-240, 105 S. Ct. 1245, at 1252-1254 (1985), the Supreme Court held that common law rights of action are not preempted by a federal statute when the statute did not speak directly to the question of remedies and did not establish a comprehensive remedial plan. The displacement of common law by a federal statute is, therefore, not to be lightly inferred.

The sugar allotment program can operate without preemption of the common law. CCC has demonstrated this to be so in the case before us.

The Act states that upon the close of a sugarcane processing facility, the growers that delivered sugarcane to that facility may elect to deliver their sugarcane to another processing company and petition the Secretary to modify processing company allocations to facilitate that election. 7 U.S.S. §1359 ff (c)(8).

CCC interpreted this language as encouraging the Department of Agriculture to honor such grower petitions. (Agency Certified Record, page 174).

This interpretation is permissible and consistent with the language and purposes of the Act. There is nothing in the Act to suggest that CCC’s actions should preempt State common law or that CCC should interpret, weigh and apply the common law before coming to a decision on a petition by growers to modify allocations to allow them to deliver their sugarcane to another processing facility when a facility where they formerly made deliveries has closed.
The petition may be filed by growers who “elect to deliver their sugarcane to another processing company” in light of the facility closure, (7 U.S.C. §1359ff(c)(8)(A)). Upon the filing of the petition, CCC then undertakes to determine whether the processing company where the growers elect to deliver the sugarcane has given its approval to the delivery, and that it has sufficient capacity to accommodate the change in deliveries. (7 U.S.C. §1359ff (c)(8)(B)). The section requires no further inquiry or finding by CCC. The allocation to that processing company may then be increased, and deducted from the allocation to the company that owned the closed facility. The section requires that a determination be made within 60 days after the filing of the petition. The language of the section and the purposes of the Act do not appear to contemplate that CCC will hold court during those 60 days and review contracts and actions taken under them to determine their validity and whether the growers may be breaching their terms. Those issues rightly belong with the State Courts that customarily interpret and apply the common law when contracts are in dispute.

In Louisiana Sugar Cane Products Inc. v. Louisiana Sugar Cooperative, Civil Action No. 04-0136 (USDC, E.D. LA, April 28, 2004), copy attached as Exhibit D to CCC’s Brief, proceedings involving the Act were remanded by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana to a State of Louisiana Court. The United States District Court stated, at page 4 of the Order, that the State Court was the proper forum because “the Court is convinced that the claims asserted in plaintiff’s petition revolve around, and depend upon, state law issues of contract.”

Here too, the proper forum for the Petitioners, the Cooperative and the other Intervenors to determine who first breached the contracts between them and what their appropriate remedies should be, if any, is a State Court, and not a proceeding before the Secretary.

In that the Act and the Secretary’s actions under it have not operated to preempt State common law, which is the essence of
Petitioners’ claims, the petitions are hereby dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

The Intervenors have similarly asserted that CCC should have denied the growers’ petitions for transfer of marketing allocations because they were in breach of contractual obligations owed the Cooperative. Again, the Secretary was being asked to act in place of a State Court that is the proper forum to interpret and administer State common law. For the reasons expressed above, the Secretary was not empowered to interpret and apply State common law and CCC was not therefore being arbitrary and capricious or abusing its discretion when it refused to do so. The Intervenors have likewise failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and their various requests, claims and motions for any action beyond sustaining the reconsideration decision as issued, are also dismissed.

Copies of this Order shall be served by the Hearing Clerk upon each of the parties.

In re: SOUTHWEST TOBACCO WAREHOUSE, INC.
TIPS Docket No. 04-0001.
Order Dismissing Case.
Filed July 9, 2004.

Kenneth Vail, for Complainant.
Respondent, Pro se.
Order issued by Marc R. Hillson, Chief Administrative Law Judge.

The above-captioned case filed May 17, 2004 is DISMISSED.
This is an administrative proceeding for the assessment of a civil penalty for a violation of the regulations governing the prohibition of the importation of pork and fruit from Italy into the United States (9 C.F.R. §§ 94.0 et seq. and 7 C.F.R. § 319.56 et seq.), hereinafter referred to as the regulations, in accordance with the Rules of Practice in 7 C.F.R. §§ 1.130 et seq. and 380.1 et seq.

This proceeding was instituted under section 2 of the Act of February 2, 1903, as amended (21 U.S.C. § 111) and the Plant Protection Act (7 U.S.C. § 7701 et seq.) (Acts), and the regulations promulgated thereunder, by a complaint filed on April 25, 2002, by the Acting Administrator of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, United States Department of Agriculture. The complaint sought civil penalties as authorized by the Acts. This complaint specifically alleged that the respondent illegally imported approximately one kilogram of pork sausage and 36 fresh persimmon fruit from Italy into the Untied States at Detroit, Michigan.
The respondent failed to file an answer within the time prescribed in 7 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). Section 1.136(c) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.136(c)) provides that the failure to file an answer within the time provided under 7 C.F.R. § 1.136(a) shall be deemed an admission of the allegations in the complaint. Further, the failure to file an answer constitutes a waiver of hearing. (7 C.F.R. § 1.139). Accordingly, the material allegations in the complaint are adopted and set forth in this Default Decision and Order as the Findings of Fact, and this Decision is issued pursuant to section 1.139 of the Rules of Practice applicable to this proceeding. (7 C.F.R. § 1.139).

Findings of Fact

1. Giuseppa Daddio Martinisi, herein referred to as respondent, is an individual whose mailing address is 12170 Randee Road, New Port Richey, Florida 34654.

2. On or about October 15, 2000, respondent imported approximately one kilogram of pork sausage from Italy into the United States at Detroit, Michigan, in violation of 9 C.F.R. §§ 94.9(b)(1), 94.9(b)(3), 94.12(b)(1), and 94.12(b)(3) because the pork sausage was not verified as treated and/or was not accompanied by a certificate, as required.

3. On or about October 15, 2000, the respondent imported approximately 36 fresh persimmon fruit into the United States from Italy, at Detroit, Michigan, in violation of 7 C.F.R. §§ 319.56(c) and 319.56-2(e) because the persimmon fruit are prohibited unless imported under permit, as required.

Conclusion

By reason of the Findings of Fact set forth above, the respondent has violated the Acts and the regulations (9 C.F.R. §§ 94.0 et seq. and 7
C.F.R. § 319.56 et seq.) issued under the Acts. Therefore, the following Order is issued.

**Order**

The respondent is hereby assessed a civil penalty of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00). This penalty shall be payable to the “Treasurer of the United States” by certified check or money order, and shall be forwarded within thirty (30) days from the effective date of this Order to:

United States Department of Agriculture
APHIS Field Servicing Office
Accounting Section
P.O. Box 3334
Minneapolis, Minnesota  55403

Respondent shall indicate that payment is in reference to A.Q. Docket No. 02-0006.

This order shall have the same force and effect as if entered after a full hearing and shall be final and effective thirty five (35) days after service of this Default Decision and Order upon respondent, unless there is an appeal to the Judicial Officer pursuant to section 1.145 of the Rules of Practice applicable to this proceeding. (7 C.F.R. § 1.145).

[This Decision and Order became final October 5, 2004.-Editor]
DEFAULT DECISION

ANIMAL WELFARE ACT

In re: DAVID GILBERT, d/b/a GILBERT’S EDUCATIONAL PETTING ZOO AND SAFARI LAND ZOO.
AWA Docket No. 04-0001.
Decision and Order by Reason of Admission of Facts.

AWA – Default – Exotic animals.

Colleen Carrol for Complainant.
Respondent, Pro se.
Order and Decision by Chief Administrative Law Judge, Marc R. Hillson.

DECISION

This proceeding was instituted under the Animal Welfare Act, as amended (7 U.S.C. § 2131 et seq.) (the “Act”), by a complaint filed by the Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, United States Department of Agriculture, alleging that Respondent David Gilbert, an individual doing business as Gilbert’s Educational Petting Zoo and Safari Land Zoo, willfully violated the Act and the Regulations and Standards promulgated thereunder (9 C.F.R. § 1.1 et seq.) (the “Regulations” and “standards”).

On October 24, 2003, the Hearing Clerk sent to Respondent David Gilbert, by certified mail, return receipt requested, copies of the complaint and the Rules of Practice governing proceedings under the Act (7 C.F.R. §§ 1.130-1.151). The package was mailed to the respondent’s current mailing address, which Respondent had provided to Complainant. Respondent Gilbert was informed in the accompanying letter of service that an answer should be filed pursuant to the Rules of Practice and that failure to answer any allegation in the complaint would constitute an admission of that
allegation. Respondent Gilbert actually received the complaint on October 29, 2003. Said Respondent has failed to file an answer to the complaint.

On January 28, 2004, no answer having been filed by Respondent, Complainant filed with the Hearing Clerk a Motion for Adoption of Proposed Decision and Order, contending that the failure to file an answer constituted an admission of the allegations in the complaint, and that a civil penalty of $8800, and certain injunctive relief, was warranted. On February 23, 2004, an unsigned, undated, handwritten document was submitted, apparently by Respondent, to the Hearing Clerk's office. While the Hearing Clerk properly treated the document as objections to Complainant's motion, the document offered no reason for the failure to file an answer, little refutation to the allegations in the complaint, and no dispute as to the requested civil penalty. Accordingly, I find that the objections to Complainant's motion are not meritorious.

Pursuant to sections 1.136 and 1.139 of the Rules of Practice, the material facts alleged in the complaint, are all admitted by Respondent's failure to file an answer or to deny. They are adopted and set forth herein as Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and this decision and order is issued pursuant to section 1.139 of the Rules of Practice.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Respondent David Gilbert is an individual whose address is 8772 160th Street, Swaledale, Iowa 50477. Said respondent does business as Safari Land Zoo and Gilbert's Educational Petting Zoo. Between October 20, 1995, and October 26, 2001, said respondent was operating as a dealer, and held AWA license number 42-B-0144, issued to David Gilbert. Thereafter, respondent operated as an exhibitor, and beginning March 12, 2002, held license number 42-C-0150.
2. At all times mentioned herein, respondent David Gilbert had ownership of approximately 45 exotic and wild animals. Said respondent has no history of previous violations of the Act or the Regulations. The gravity of the violations alleged herein is serious, involving failure to allow inspection, failing to ensure that animals had an adequate supply of water, and housing dangerous animals in inadequate facilities that would not restrict the entry of other animals or unauthorized persons.

3. On August 10, 2001, respondent willfully failed, during business hours, to allow APHIS officials to enter his place of business to inspect the facilities, animals and records therein.

4. On or about the following dates, respondent willfully failed to meet the minimum requirements for facilities in section 3.125 of the Standards (9 C.F.R. § 3.125), as follows:
   a. May 31, 2001. Respondent's housing facilities for its bear were not structurally sound and maintained in good repair to contain the animal securely. 9 C.F.R. § 3.125(a).
   b. May 31, 2001. Respondent's housing facilities for its tiger were not structurally sound and maintained in good repair to contain the animal securely. 9 C.F.R. § 3.125(a).
   c. August 13, 2001. Respondent's housing facilities for its bear were not structurally sound and maintained in good repair to contain the animal securely. 9 C.F.R. § 3.125(a).
   d. August 27, 2001. Respondent's housing facilities for its bear were not structurally sound and maintained in good repair to contain the animal securely. 9 C.F.R. § 3.125(a).
   e. May 31, 2001. Respondent failed to store supplies of food in facilities that adequately protect the food against deterioration or contamination by vermin, and specifically, respondent stored a deer carcass in his driveway. 9 C.F.R. § 3.125(c).

5. On or about the following dates, respondent willfully failed to
meet the minimum requirements for outdoor facilities in section 3.127 of the Standards (9 C.F.R. § 3.127), as follows:

a. May 31, 2001. Respondent failed to enclose his outdoor housing facilities for a bear by a perimeter fence of sufficient height to keep animals and unauthorized persons out. 9 C.F.R. § 3.127(d).

b. May 31, 2001. Respondent failed to enclose his outdoor housing facilities for a tiger by a perimeter fence of sufficient height to keep animals and unauthorized persons out. 9 C.F.R. § 3.127(d).

c. August 13, 2001. Respondent failed to enclose his outdoor housing facilities for a tiger by a perimeter fence of sufficient height to keep animals and unauthorized persons out. 9 C.F.R. § 3.127(d).

d. August 27, 2001. Respondent failed to enclose his outdoor housing facilities for a tiger by a perimeter fence of sufficient height to keep animals and unauthorized persons out. 9 C.F.R. § 3.127(d).

6. On or about the following dates, respondent willfully failed to meet the minimum requirements for watering in section 3.130 of the Standards (9 C.F.R. § 3.130), as follows:

a. May 31, 2001. Respondent failed to provide potable water to a bear as often as necessary for the health and comfort of the animal. 9 C.F.R. § 3.130.

b. May 31, 2001. Respondent failed to provide potable water to a tiger as often as necessary for the health and comfort of the animal. 9 C.F.R. § 3.130.

c. August 13, 2001. Respondent failed to provide potable water to a tiger as often as necessary for the health and comfort of the animal. 9 C.F.R. § 3.130.

7. On or about the following dates, respondent willfully violated section 2.100(a) of the Regulations (9 C.F.R. § 2.100(a)), by failing to meet the minimum requirements for employees in section 3.132 of
the Standards (9 C.F.R. § 3.132), as follows:

b. August 13, 2001. Respondent failed to utilize an sufficient number of adequately-trained employees to maintain a professionally-acceptable level of husbandry practices. 9 C.F.R. § 3.132.
c. August 27, 2001. Respondent failed to utilize an sufficient number of adequately-trained employees to maintain a professionally-acceptable level of husbandry practices. 9 C.F.R. § 3.132.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. On August 10, 2001, respondent failed, during business hours, to allow APHIS officials to enter his place of business to inspect the facilities, animals and records therein, in willful violation of section 2146 of the Act and section 2.126 of the Regulations. 7 U.S.C. § 2146(a), 9 C.F.R. § 2.126.

2. On or about the following dates, respondent willfully violated section 2.100(a) of the Regulations (9 C.F.R. § 2.100(a)), by failing to meet the minimum requirements for facilities in section 3.125 of the Standards (9 C.F.R. § 3.125), as follows:

a. May 31, 2001. Respondent's housing facilities for its bear were not structurally sound and maintained in good repair to contain the animal securely. 9 C.F.R. § 3.125(a).
b. May 31, 2001. Respondent's housing facilities for its tiger were not structurally sound and maintained in good repair to contain the animal securely. 9 C.F.R. § 3.125(a).
c. August 13, 2001. Respondent's housing facilities for its bear were not structurally sound and maintained in good repair to contain the animal securely. 9 C.F.R. § 3.125(a).
d. August 27, 2001. Respondent's housing facilities for its bear were not structurally sound and maintained in good repair to contain the animal securely. 9 C.F.R. § 3.125(a).
e. May 31, 2001. Respondent failed to store supplies of food in facilities that adequately protect the food against deterioration or contamination by vermin, and specifically, respondent stored a deer carcass in his driveway. 9 C.F.R. § 3.125(c).

3. On or about the following dates, respondent willfully violated section 2.100(a) of the Regulations (9 C.F.R. § 2.100(a)), by failing to meet the minimum requirements for outdoor facilities in section 3.127 of the Standards (9 C.F.R. § 3.127), as follows:
   a. May 31, 2001. Respondent failed to enclose his outdoor housing facilities for a bear by a perimeter fence of sufficient height to keep animals and unauthorized persons out. 9 C.F.R. § 3.127(d).
   b. May 31, 2001. Respondent failed to enclose his outdoor housing facilities for a tiger by a perimeter fence of sufficient height to keep animals and unauthorized persons out. 9 C.F.R. § 3.127(d).
   c. August 13, 2001. Respondent failed to enclose his outdoor housing facilities for a tiger by a perimeter fence of sufficient height to keep animals and unauthorized persons out. 9 C.F.R. § 3.127(d).
   d. August 27, 2001. Respondent failed to enclose his outdoor housing facilities for a tiger by a perimeter fence of sufficient height to keep animals and unauthorized persons out. 9 C.F.R. § 3.127(d).

4. On or about the following dates, respondent willfully violated section 2.100(a) of the Regulations (9 C.F.R. § 2.100(a)), by failing to meet the minimum requirements for watering in section 3.130 of the Standards (9 C.F.R. § 3.130), as follows:
   a. May 31, 2001. Respondent failed to provide potable
water to a bear as often as necessary for the health and comfort of the animal. 9 C.F.R. § 3.130.
b. May 31, 2001. Respondent failed to provide potable water to a tiger as often as necessary for the health and comfort of the animal. 9 C.F.R. § 3.130.
c. August 13, 2001. Respondent failed to provide potable water to a tiger as often as necessary for the health and comfort of the animal. 9 C.F.R. § 3.130.

5. On or about the following dates, respondent willfully violated section 2.100(a) of the Regulations (9 C.F.R. § 2.100(a)), by failing to meet the minimum requirements for employees in section 3.132 of the Standards (9 C.F.R. § 3.132), as follows:
b. August 13, 2001. Respondent failed to utilize an sufficient number of adequately-trained employees to maintain a professionally-acceptable level of husbandry practices. 9 C.F.R. § 3.132.
c. August 27, 2001. Respondent failed to utilize an sufficient number of adequately-trained employees to maintain a professionally-acceptable level of husbandry practices. 9 C.F.R. § 3.132.

Order

1. Respondent David Gilbert, his agents and employees, successors and assigns, directly or through any corporate or other device, shall cease and desist from violating the Act and the Regulations and Standards.

2. Respondent David Gilbert is assessed a civil penalty of $8,800. The provisions of this order shall become effective on the first day after this decision becomes final. This decision becomes final
without further proceedings 35 days after service as provided in sections 1.142 and 1.145 of the Rules of Practice. Copies of this decision shall be served upon the parties.
DEFAULT DECISIONS

PLANT QUARANTINE ACT

In re: PONCE AIRLINES SERVICES a/k/a P.A.S.
P.Q. Docket No. 04-0006.
Decision and Order.
Filed July 6, 2004.

PQ – Default – Improper disposal.

Thomas Bolick, for Complainant.
Respondent, Pro se.
Decision and Order issued by Marc R. Hillson, Administrative Law Judge.

This is an administrative proceeding for the assessment of a civil penalty for a violation of the Plant Protection Act of June 20, 2000, as amended (7 U.S.C. §§ 7701 et seq.)(the Act), in accordance with the Rules of Practice in 7 C.F.R. §§ 1.130 et seq. and 380.1 et seq.

This proceeding was instituted under the Act by a complaint filed on March 26, 2004, by the Administrator of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, United States Department of Agriculture and served by certified mail on respondent Ponce Airlines Services (P.A.S.) on March 30, 2004. Pursuant to section 1.136 of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.136), respondent P.A.S. was informed in the complaint and the letter accompanying the complaint that an answer should be filed with the Hearing Clerk within twenty (20) days after service of the complaint, and that failure to file an answer within twenty (20) days after service of the complaint constitutes an admission of the allegations in the complaint and waiver of a hearing. Respondent’s answer thus was due no later than April 19, 2004, twenty days after service of the complaint (7 C.F.R. § 136(a)). Respondent P.A.S. never filed an answer to the complaint and the Hearing Clerk’s Office mailed it a No Answer Letter on April 22, 2004.
Therefore, respondent P.A.S. failed to file an answer within the time prescribed in 7 C.F.R. § 1.136(a) and failed to deny or otherwise respond to an allegation of the complaint. Section 1.136(c) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.136(c)) provides that the failure to file an answer within the time provided under 7 C.F.R. § 1.136(a) or to deny or otherwise respond to an allegation of the complaint shall be deemed an admission of the allegations in the complaint. Furthermore, since the admission of the allegations in the complaint constitutes a waiver of hearing (7 C.F.R. § 1.139) and respondent’s failure to file an answer is deemed such an admission pursuant to the Rules of Practice, respondent’s failure to answer is likewise deemed a waiver of hearing. Accordingly, the material allegations in the complaint are adopted and set forth in this Default Decision as the Findings of Fact, and this Decision is issued pursuant to section 1.139 of the Rules of Practice applicable to this proceeding (7 C.F.R. § 1.139).

Findings of Fact

1. Respondent P.A.S. is the agent in Puerto Rico for various American airlines and has a mailing address of World Cargo Blvd., Terminal D, Base Muniz, Carolina, Puerto Rico 00979.
2. On or about March 21, 2001, in San Juan, Puerto Rico, respondent P.A.S. removed from Atlas Air Flight GT1062 (Aircraft # N-808MC) regulated garbage, which had originated in Colombia, and disposed of it in an unauthorized manner, in violation of 7 C.F.R. § 330.400.

Conclusion

By reason of the Findings of Fact set forth above, P.A.S. has violated the Act. Therefore, the following Order is issued.

Order

Respondent P.A.S. is hereby assessed a civil penalty of four thousand dollars ($4,000.00). This penalty shall be payable to the
“Treasurer of the United States” by certified check or money order, and shall be forwarded within thirty (30) days from the effective date of this Order to:

United States Department of Agriculture
APHIS Field Servicing Office
Accounting Section
P.O. Box 3334
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55403

Respondent P.A.S. shall indicate that payment is in reference to P.Q. Docket No. 04-0006.

This order shall have the same force and effect as if entered after a full hearing and shall be final and effective thirty five (35) days after service of this Default Decision and Order upon respondent P.A.S. unless there is an appeal to the Judicial Officer pursuant to section 1.145 of the Rules of Practice applicable to this proceeding (7 C.F.R. § 1.145).

[This Decision and Order became final August 16, 2004.-Editor]

In re: ALFREDO GONZALEZ.
P.Q. Docket No. 03-0004.
Decision and Order.
Filed July 6, 2004.

P.Q. - Default – Avocados.

James Booth, for Complainant.
Respondent, Pro se.
Decision and Order issued by Marc R. Hillson, Administrative Law Judge.

This is an administrative proceeding for the assessment of a civil penalty for a violation of the regulations governing the prohibition of the importation of avocados from Mexico into the United States (7
This proceeding was instituted under the Plant Protection Act (7 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7772)(Act), by a complaint filed by the Acting Administrator of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service on October 29, 2002, alleging that respondent Alfredo Gonzalez violated the Act and regulations promulgated under the Acts (7 C.F.R. § 319.56 et seq.).

The complaint sought civil penalties as authorized by section 424 of the Plant Protection Act (7 U.S.C. § 7734). This complaint specifically alleged that on three different occasions respondent illegally imported large quantities of fresh Hass avocados from Mexico into the United States.

The respondent failed to file an answer within the time prescribed in 7 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). Section 1.136(c) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.136(c)) provides that the failure to file an answer within the time provided under 7 C.F.R. § 1.136(a) shall be deemed an admission of the allegations in the complaint. Further, the failure to file an answer constitutes a waiver of hearing. (7 C.F.R. § 1.139).

Accordingly, the material allegations in the complaint are adopted and set forth in this Default Decision as the Findings of Fact, and this Decision is issued pursuant to section 1.139 of the Rules of Practice applicable to this proceeding. (7 C.F.R. § 1.139).

Findings of Fact

1. Alfredo Gonzalez, hereinafter referred to as respondent, is an individual with a mailing address of 160 W. San Ysidro Blvd. A, San Ysidro, California 92173.
2. On or about July 29, 1998, at San Ysidro, California, the respondent imported approximately 169 fresh Hass avocados from Mexico into the United States in violation of 7 C.F.R. §§ 319.56(c) and 319.56-2ff, because importation of such avocados into the United States is prohibited except under specific conditions.
3. On or about February 23, 2000, at San Ysidro, California, the
respondent imported approximately 15 boxes of fresh Hass avocados from Mexico into the United States in violation of 7 C.F.R. §§ 319.56(c) and 319.56-2ff, because importation of such avocados into the United States is prohibited except under specific conditions.

4. On or about February 29, 2000, at Otay Mesa, California, the respondent imported approximately 12 boxes of fresh Hass avocados from Mexico into the United States in violation of 7 C.F.R. §§ 319.56(c) and 319.56-2ff, because importation of such avocados into the United States is prohibited except under specific conditions.

Conclusions

By reason of the Findings of Fact set forth above, the respondent(s) has violated the Act and the regulations issued under the Act (7 C.F.R. § 319.56 et seq). Therefore, the following Order is issued.

Order

The respondent, Alfredo Gonzalez, is assessed a civil penalty of three thousand dollars ($3,000.00). The respondent shall pay three thousand dollars ($3,000.00) as a civil penalty. This civil penalty shall be payable to the “Treasurer of the United States” by certified check or money order, and shall be forwarded within thirty (30) days from the effective date of this Order to:

United States Department of Agriculture
APHIS Field Servicing Office
Accounting Section
P.O. Box 3334
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55403

Respondent shall indicate on the certified check or money order that payment is in reference to P.Q. Docket No. 03-0004

This order shall have the same force and effect as if entered after a full hearing and shall be final and effective thirty five (35) days after
service of this Default Decision and Order upon respondent, unless there is an appeal to the Judicial Officer pursuant to 7 C.F.R. § 1.145 of the Rules of Practice.

[This Decision and Order became final August 27, 2004.-Editor]

In re: JENNIFER LE.
P.Q. Docket No. 03-0005.
Decision and Order.
Filed July 6, 2005.

P.Q. - Default – Postal shipments.

James Booth, for Complainant.
Respondent, Pro se.

Decision and Order issued by Marc R. Hillson, Administrative Law Judge.

This is an administrative proceeding for the assessment of a civil penalty for a violation of the regulations governing the prohibition of the movement of importation of certain types of fruit from Hawaii into the continental United States (7 C.F.R. § 318.13 et seq.) hereinafter referred to as the regulations, in accordance with the Rules of Practice in 7 C.F.R. §§ 1.130 et seq. and 380.1 et seq.

This proceeding was instituted under the Plant Protection Act (7 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7772)(Act), by a complaint filed by the Acting Administrator of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service on November 7, 2002, alleging that respondent Jennifer Le violated the Act and regulations promulgated under the Acts (7 C.F.R. § 318.13 et seq.). The complaint sought civil penalties as authorized by section 424 of the Plant Protection Act (7 U.S.C. § 7734). This complaint specifically alleged that on or about February 2, 2001, at Honolulu, Hawaii, the respondent offered to a common carrier, specifically the U.S. Postal Service approximately 6.4 pounds of fresh whole star apples for shipment from Hawaii to the continental United States.

The respondent failed to file an answer within the time prescribed in 7 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). Section 1.136(c) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.136(c)) provides that the failure to file an answer within
the time provided under 7 C.F.R. § 1.136(a) shall be deemed an admission of the allegations in the complaint. Further, the failure to file an answer constitutes a waiver of hearing, (7 C.F.R. § 1.139). Accordingly, the material allegations in the complaint are adopted and set forth in this Default Decision as the Findings of Fact, and this Decision is issued pursuant to section 1.139 of the Rules of Practice applicable to this proceeding. (7 C.F.R. § 1.139).

Findings of Fact

1. Jennifer Le, hereinafter referred to as respondent, is an individual with a mailing address of 2230 Lokilana Street, Honolulu, Hawaii 96819.
2. On or about February 2, 2001, at Honolulu, Hawaii, the respondent offered to a common carrier, specifically the U.S. Postal Service, approximately 6.4 pounds of fresh whole star apples for shipment from Hawaii to the continental United States in violation of 7 CFR §§ 318.13(b) and 318.13-2(a) because movement of such fruits into or through the continental United States is prohibited.

Conclusion

By reason of the Findings of Fact set forth above, the respondent(s) has violated the Act and the regulations issued under the Act (7 C.F.R. § 318.13 et seq.). Therefore, the following Order is issued.

Order

The respondent, Jennifer Le, is assessed a civil penalty of five hundred dollars ($500.00). The respondent shall pay five hundred dollars ($500.00) as civil penalty. This civil penalty shall be payable to the “Treasurer of the United States” by certified check or money order, and shall be forwarded within thirty (30) days from the effective date of this Order to:
United States Department of Agriculture
APHIS Field Servicing Office
Respondent shall indicated on the certified check or money order that payment is in reference to P.Q. Docket No. 03-0005.

This order shall have the same force and effect as if entered after a full hearing and shall be final and effective thirty five (35) days after service of this Default Decision and Order upon respondent, unless there is an appeal to the Judicial Officer pursuant to 7 C.F.R. § 1.145 of the Rules of Practice.

[This Decision and Order became final August 27, 2004.-Editor].

In re: RENE VILLALPANDO LIERAS.
P.Q. Docket No. 03-0006.
Decision and Order.
P.Q. - Default – Advocados.

James Booth, for Complainant.
Respondent, Pro se.
Decision and Order issued by Marc R. Hillson, Administrative Law Judge.

This is an administrative proceeding for the assessment of a civil penalty for a violation of the regulations governing the prohibition of the importation of avocados from Mexico into the United States (7 C.F.R. § 319.56 et seq.) hereinafter referred to as the regulations, in accordance with the Rules of Practice in 7 C.F.R. §§ 1.130 et seq. and 380.1 et seq.

This proceeding was instituted under the Plant Protection Act (7 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7772)(Act), by a complaint filed by the Acting Administrator of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service on November 7, 2002, alleging that the respondent violated the Act and
The complaint sought civil penalties as authorized by section 424 of the Plant Protection Act (7 U.S.C. § 7734). This complaint specifically alleged that on three different occasions respondent illegally imported over one half ton of fresh Hass avocados from Mexico into the United States.

The respondent failed to file an answer within the time prescribed in 7 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). Section 1.136(c) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.136(c)) provides that the failure to file an answer within the time provided under 7 C.F.R. § 1.136(a) shall be deemed an admission of the allegations in the complaint. Further, the failure to file an answer constitutes a waiver of hearing. (7 C.F.R. § 1.139). Accordingly, the material allegations in the complaint are adopted and set forth in this Default Decision as the Findings of Fact, and this Decision is issued pursuant to section 1.139 of the Rules of Practice applicable to this proceeding. (7 C.F.R. § 1.139).

Findings of Fact

1. Rene Villalpando Lieras, hereinafter referred to as the respondent, is an individual whose mailing address is 113 N. Lindsay Street, Lake Elsinore, California 92530.
2. On or about January 5, 1999, at San Ysidro, California, the respondent imported approximately 1,100 pounds of fresh Hass avocados from Mexico into the United States, in violation of 7 C.F.R. §§ 319.56(c) and 319.56-2ff, because importation of such avocados into the United States is prohibited except under specific conditions.
3. On or about January 6, 1999, at San Luis, Arizona, the respondent imported approximately 1,100 pounds of fresh Hass avocados from Mexico into the United States, in violation of 7 C.F.R. §§ 319.56(c) and 319.56-2ff, because importation of such avocados into the United States is prohibited except under specific conditions.
4. On or about January 6, 1999, at Calexico, California, the respondent imported approximately 1,100 pounds of fresh Hass avocados from Mexico into the United States, in violation of 7 C.F.R. §§ 319.56(c) and 319.56-2ff, because importation of such avocados
into the United States is prohibited except under specific conditions.

Conclusion

By reason of the Findings of Fact set forth above, the respondent has violated the Act and the regulations issued under the Act (7 C.F.R. § 319.56 et seq). Therefore, the following Order is issued.

Order

The respondent, Rene Villalpando Lieras, is assessed a civil penalty of three thousand dollars ($3,000.00). The respondent shall pay three thousand dollars ($3,000.00) as a civil penalty. This civil penalty shall be payable to the “Treasurer of the United States” by certified check or money order, and shall be forwarded within thirty (30) days from the effective date of this Order to:

United States Department of Agriculture
APHIS Field Servicing Office
Accounting Section
P.O. Box 3334
Minneapolis, Minnesota  55403

Respondent shall indicate on the certified check or money order that payment is in reference to P.Q. Docket No. 03-0006

This order shall have the same force and effect as if entered after a full hearing and shall be final and effective thirty five (35) days after service of this Default Decision and Order upon respondent, unless there is an appeal to the Judicial Officer pursuant to 7 C.F.R. § 1.145 of the Rules of Practice.
[This Decision and Order became final October 15, 2004.-Editor].
In re: RICARDO LOPEZ.
P.Q. Docket No. 04-0004.
Decision and Order.
Filed July 31, 2004.

P.Q. - Default – Forgery of certificate.

Thomas Bolick, for Complainant.
Respondent, Pro se.
Decision and Order issued by Marc R. Hillson, Administrative Law Judge.

This is an administrative proceeding for the assessment of a civil penalty for a violation of the Plant Protection Act of June 20, 2000, as amended (7 U.S.C. §§ 7701 et seq.) (the Act), in accordance with the Rules of Practice in 7 C.F.R. §§ 1.130 et seq. and 380.1 et seq.

This proceeding was instituted under the Act by a complaint filed on March 1, 2004, by the Administrator of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, United States Department of Agriculture and served by certified mail on respondent Ricardo Lopez on March 5, 2004. Pursuant to section 1.136 of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.136), respondent Ricardo Lopez was informed in the complaint and the letter accompanying the complaint that an answer should be filed with the Hearing Clerk within twenty (20) days after service of the complaint, and that failure to file an answer within twenty (20) days after service of the complaint constitutes an admission of the allegations in the complaint and waiver of a hearing. Respondent Ricardo Lopez’s answer thus was due no later than March 25, 2004, twenty days after service of the complaint (7 C.F.R. § 136(a)). Respondent Ricardo Lopez never filed an answer to the complaint and the Hearing Clerk’s Office mailed him a No Answer Letter on April 1, 2004.

Therefore, respondent Ricardo Lopez failed to file an answer within the time prescribed in 7 C.F.R. § 1.136(a) and failed to deny or otherwise respond to an allegation of the complaint. Section 1.136(c) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.136(c)) provides that the failure to file an answer within the time provided under 7 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)
or to deny or otherwise respond to an allegation of the complaint shall be deemed an admission of the allegations in the complaint. Furthermore, since the admission of the allegations in the complaint constitutes a waiver of hearing (7 C.F.R. § 1.139) and respondent Ricardo Lopez’s failure to file an answer is deemed such an admission pursuant to the Rules of Practice, respondent’s failure to answer is likewise deemed a waiver of hearing. Accordingly, the material allegations in the complaint are adopted and set forth in this Default Decision as the Findings of Fact, and this amended Decision is issued pursuant to section 1.139 of the Rules of Practice applicable to this proceeding (7 C.F.R. § 1.139).

Findings of Fact

1. Respondent Ricardo Lopez is an individual with a mailing address of 511 Shiloh Drive, Apt. 6, Laredo, Texas 78043.
2. On or about April 5, 2001, Respondent Ricardo Lopez forged the signature of a USDA Plant Protection and Quarantine officer onto a federal phytosanitary certificate and presented the forged certificate to agricultural officials of the Government of Mexico, in violation of sections 424(b)(1) and 424(c) of the PPA (7 U.S.C. § 7734(b)(1) and 7734(c)).

Conclusion

By reason of the Findings of Fact set forth above, respondent Ricardo Lopez has violated the Act. Therefore, the following amended Order is issued.

Order

Respondent Ricardo Lopez is hereby assessed a civil penalty of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00). This penalty shall be payable to the “Treasurer of the United States” by certified check or money order, and shall be forwarded within thirty (30) days from the effective date of this Order to:

United States Department of Agriculture
In re: JODY ELENEKI.
P.Q. Docket No. 02-0008.
Decision and Order.


Tracey Manoff, for Complainant.
Respondent, Pro se.

Decision and Order issued by Marc R. Hillson, Administrative Law Judge.

This is an administrative proceeding for the assessment of a civil penalty for violations of the Plant Protection Act (7 U.S.C. §§ 7701 et seq. (Act) and the regulation promulgated thereunder (7 C.F.R. § 318.60)(regulation), in accordance with the Rules of Practice in 7 C.F.R. §§ 1.130 et seq. and 380.1 et seq.

This proceeding was instituted by a complaint filed on June 19, 2002 by the Administrator of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, United States Department of Agriculture. The complaint alleged the following:
On or about April 18, 2001, at Honolulu, Hawaii, the respondent offered to a common carrier, specifically Federal Express, approximately 1.5 pounds of rooted ginger plants with soil for shipment from Hawaii to the continental United States, in violation of 7 C.F.R. § 318.60, because movement of such plants with soil from Hawaii into or through the continental United States is prohibited.

The respondent failed to file an answer to the complaint within the time prescribed in 7 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). Section 1.136(c) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 136(c)) provides that the failure to file an answer within the time provided under 7 C.F.R. § 1.136(a) shall be deemed an admission of the allegations in the complaint. The failure to file an answer also constitutes a waiver of hearing. 7 C.F.R. § 1.139. Accordingly, the material allegations in the complaint are adopted and set forth herein as the Findings of Fact, and this Decision is issued pursuant to section 1.139 of the Rules of Practice applicable to this proceeding. 7 C.F.R. § 1.139.

Findings of Fact

1. Jody Eleneki, respondent herein, is an individual whose mailing address is Title Guaranty Escrow Services, Inc., 450 Kilauea Avenue, Hilo, Hawaii 96720.
2. On or about April 18, 2001, respondent offered to a common carrier, specifically Federal Express, approximately 1.5 pounds of rooted ginger plants with soil for shipment from Hawaii to the continental United States.

Conclusion

By reasons of the facts contained in the Findings of Facts above, the respondent has violated 7 C.F.R. § 318.60. Therefore, the following Order is issued.

Order
The respondent is hereby assessed a penalty of five hundred dollars ($500.00). This penalty shall be payable to the “Treasurer of the United States” by certified check or money order, and shall be forwarded within thirty (30) days from the effective date of this Order to:
United States Department of Agriculture
APHIS Field Servicing Office
Accounting Section
P.O. Box 55403
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55403

Respondents shall indicate that payment is in reference to P.Q. Docket No. 02-0008.

This Order shall have the same force and effect as if entered after a full hearing and shall be final and effective thirty five (35) days after service of this Decision and Order upon respondent, unless there is an appeal to the Judicial Officer pursuant to section 1.145 of the Rules of Practice applicable to this proceeding. 7 C.F.R. § 1.145.

[This Decision and Order became final October 28, 2004.—Editor]
the movement or importation of certain types of fruit from Hawaii into the continental United States (7 C.F.R. §§ 318.13(b) and 318.13-2(a)) hereinafter referred to as the regulations, in accordance with the Rules of Practice in 7 C.F.R. §§ 1.130 et seq. and 380.1 et seq.

This proceeding was instituted under the Plant Protection Act (7 U.S.C. §§ 7701-7772)(Act), by a complaint filed by the Acting Administrator of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, United States Department of Agriculture, on March 11, 2002.

The complaint alleged that respondent(s) Toilea Nivila, and/or Toilea Jr. violated the Act and regulations promulgated under the Act (7 C.F.R. §§ 318.13(b) and 318.13-2(a)) by illegally offering for shipment and/or moving mangoes from Hawaii into the continental United States. This complaint sought civil penalties as authorized by section 424 of the Plant Protection Act (7 U.S.C. § 7734).

This complaint specifically alleged that on or about July 10, 2000, the respondent(s), at the Honolulu International Airport, Honolulu, Hawaii, offered to a common carrier, specifically Federal Express, approximately twenty-two (22) pounds of fresh mangoes for shipment from Hawaii to the continental United States, in violation of 7 C.F.R. §§ 318.13(b) and 318.13-2(a), because such offer for shipment or movement of such fruit from Hawaii into or through the continental United States is prohibited.

The respondent failed to file an answer within the time prescribed in 7 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). Section 1.136(c) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.136(c)) provides that the failure to file an answer within the time provided under 7 C.F.R. § 1.136(a) shall be deemed an admission of the allegations in the complaint. Further, the failure to file an answer constitutes a waiver of hearing. (7 C.F.R. § 1.139). Accordingly, the material allegations in the complaint are adopted and set forth in this Default Decision as the Findings of Fact, and this Decision is issued pursuant to section 1.139 of the Rules of Practice applicable to this proceeding. (7 C.F.R. § 1.139).

Findings of Fact

1. Toilea Nivila, and/or Toilea, Jr., hereinafter referred to as the
respondent(s), is an individual(s) whose mailing address is P.O. Box 251, Kihei, Hawaii 96753.

2. On or about July 10, 2000, at the Honolulu International Airport, Honolulu, Hawaii, the respondent(s) offered to a common carrier, specifically Federal Express, approximately twenty-two (22) pounds of fresh mangoes for shipment from Hawaii to the continental United States, in violation of 7 C.F.R. §§ 318.13(b) and 318.13-2(a), because such offer for shipment or movement of such fruit from Hawaii into or through the continental United States is prohibited.

Conclusion

By reason of the Findings of Fact set forth above, the respondent(s) has violated the Act and the regulations issued under the Act (7 C.F.R. § 319.56 et seq). Therefore, the following Order is issued.

Order

Respondent(s), Toilea Nivila, and/or Toilea, Jr., is hereby assessed a civil penalty of seven hundred and fifty dollars ($750.00). This penalty shall be payable to the “Treasurer of the United States” by certified check or money order, and shall be forwarded within thirty (30) days from the effective date of this Order to:

United States Department of Agriculture
APHIS Field Servicing Office
Accounting Section
P.O. Box 3334
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55403

Respondent shall indicate on the certified check or money order that payment is in reference to P.Q. Docket No. 02-0006.

This order shall have the same force and effect as if entered after a full hearing and shall be final and effective thirty five (35) days after service of this Default Decision and Order upon respondent, unless
there is an appeal to the Judicial Officer pursuant to 7 C.F.R. § 1.145 of the Rules of Practice.
[This Decision and Order became final December 22, 2004.-Editor]

In re: ST. JOHNS SHIPPING COMPANY, INC., AND BOBBY L. SHIELDS a/k/a. LEBRON SHIELDS a/k/a. L. SHIELDS a/k/a BOBBY LEBRON SHIELDS a/k/a. COOTER SHIELDS d/b/a BAHAMAS RO RO SERVICES, INC.
P.Q. Docket No. 03-0015.
Decision and Order.

Thomas Bolick for Complainant.
Craig Galle for Respondent.

Decision and Order by Chief Administrative Law Judge, Marc. R. Hillson.

Default Decision and Order

This is an administrative proceeding for the assessment of a civil penalty for a violation of the Plant Protection Act of June 20, 2000, as amended (7 U.S.C. §§ 7701 et seq.) (the Act), in accordance with the Rules of Practice in 7 C.F.R. §§ 1.130 et seq. and 380.1 et seq.

This proceeding was instituted under the Act by a complaint filed on September 23, 2003, by the Administrator of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, United States Department of Agriculture and served by certified mail on respondent Bobby L. Shields a.k.a. Lebron Shields a.k.a. L. Shields a.k.a. Bobby Lebron Shields a.k.a. Cooter Shields d/b/a Bahamas RO RO Services, Inc. (hereinafter “Shields”) on October 23, 2003. Pursuant to section 1.136 of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.136), respondent Shields was informed in the complaint and the letter accompanying the complaint that an answer should be filed with the Hearing Clerk within twenty
(20) days after service of the complaint, and that failure to file an answer within twenty (20) days after service of the complaint constitutes an admission of the allegations in the complaint and waiver of a hearing. Shields’ answer thus was due no later than November 12, 2003, twenty days after service of the complaint (7 C.F.R. § 136(a)).

On October 23, 2003, Shields filed a letter requesting that his time to submit an answer to the complaint be extended to November 14, 2003. I issued an order granting the extension of time to answer on October 30, 2003. On November 19, 2003, the Hearing Clerk received a letter dated November 10, 2003 and postmarked November 12. Although that letter was addressed to me, rather than the Hearing Clerk, and was apparently delayed in its trip to USDA in Washington, D.C. by being irradiated at an outside location, I conclude that this letter was timely filed. The letter, which I am construing to be Shields’ answer, did not deny or fully address the allegations listed in the complaint.

Arguing that Shields either failed to file an answer within the time prescribed in 7 C.F.R. § 1.136(a) or failed to deny or otherwise respond to an allegation of the complaint, complainant on February 26, 2004 filed a Motion for Proposed Adoption of Default Decision and Order. Section 1.136(c) of the Rules of Practice (7 C.F.R. § 1.136(c)) provides that the failure to file an answer within the time provided under 7 C.F.R. § 1.136(a) or to deny or otherwise respond to an allegation of the complaint shall be deemed an admission of the allegations in the complaint. While I rule that the answer was timely filed, Shield failure to address the specific allegations of the complaint are deemed an admission pursuant to the Rules of Practice. Accordingly, the material allegations in the complaint are adopted and set forth in this Default Decision as the Findings of Fact, and this Decision is issued pursuant to section 1.139 of the Rules of Practice applicable to this proceeding (7 C.F.R. § 1.139).

Complainant filed a Motion for Adoption of Proposed Default Decision with respect to Shields on February 6, 2004. Although
Shields received a copy of this Motion on March 1, 2004, no response was ever filed.

Although the Proposed Default Decision would have me assess a $15,000 civil penalty against Shields, I am assessing a penalty of only $1,000. The statute on its face limits the penalty that can be assessed against an individual who violates its provisions to $1,000 “in the case of an initial violation of this chapter by an individual moving regulated articles not for monetary gain.” 7 U.S.C. § 7734(b)(1)(A). There is no allegation in the Complaint or in the Motion that Respondent has a previous violation or that he was moving regulated articles for monetary gain. Further, the statute specifies that the Secretary must “take into account the nature, circumstance, extent and gravity of the violation.” Id., at (b)(2).

Even in the case of a default decision, the Secretary or her designee must at least address the statutory requirements concerning penalty assessment. While the Rules of Practice state that failure to file an Answer “shall be deemed . . . an admission of the allegation in the Complaint,” Rule 1.136(c), no allegations made in the Complaint support the requested penalty. Under the minimal facts alleged here, I see no basis to assess a penalty greater than $1,000.

Findings of Fact

1. Respondent Bobby Lebron Shields d/b/a Bahamas RO RO Services is a cargo agent operating a freight forwarding business incorporated in Florida with a mailing address of 437 N.E. Bayberry Lane, Jensen Beach, Florida 34957.
2. On or about September 1, 2001, respondent Bobby Lebron Shields d/b/a Bahamas RO RO Services violated section 413(c) of the Act (7 U.S.C. § 7713(c)) by moving from a port of entry cargo from the Bahamas manifested as “toys and crafts” (container no. 2929862, bill of lading no. 1), without inspection by, and authorization for entry into or transit through the United States from, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Plant Protection and Quarantine. Section 413(c) of the Act prohibits any
person from moving any imported plant or plant product, plant pest, noxious weed, or article from a port of entry unless the imported plant or plant product, plant pest, noxious weed, or article is inspected and authorized for entry into or transit through the United States by the U.S. Department of Agriculture.

**Conclusion**

By reason of the Findings of Fact set forth above, respondent Bobby Lebron Shields d/b/a Bahamas RO RO Services has violated the Act and the regulations issued under the Act. Therefore, the following Order is issued.

**Order**

Respondent Bobby Lebron Shields d/b/a Bahamas RO RO Services is hereby assessed a civil penalty of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00). This penalty shall be payable to the "Treasurer of the United States" by certified check or money order, and shall be forwarded within thirty (30) days from the effective date of this Order to:

United States Department of Agriculture  
APHIS Field Servicing Office  
Accounting Section  
P.O. Box 3334  
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55403

Respondent Shields shall indicate that payment is in reference to P.Q. Docket No. 03-0015.  
This order shall have the same force and effect as if entered after a full hearing and shall be final and effective thirty five (35) days after
service of this Default Decision and Order upon respondent Shields unless there is an appeal to the Judicial Officer pursuant to section 1.145 of the Rules of Practice applicable to this proceeding (7 C.F.R. § 1.145).
CONSENT DECISIONS
(Not published herein-Editor)

AGRICULTURAL MARKETING AGREEMENT ACT

Circle C. Watermelons and Paul Collins. AMA WRPA Docket No. 04-0001. 9/14/04.

Nathan Jones, d/b/a King Crown Organic Farm. AMAA Docket No. 04-0004. 12/7/04.

ANIMAL QUARANTINE ACT

Federal Express Corporation. A.Q. Docket No. 03-0004. 10/6/04.

ANIMAL WELFARE ACT

Illusion Management, Inc. and Terrell J. Diamond. AWA Docket No. 03-0030. 7/6/04.

Tom Kaelin, d/b/a Kaelin’s Kennel, and Petes Direct, Inc. AWA Docket No. 02-0005. 7/19/04.


Kathy Mock, d/b/a Mock’s Kennel. AWA Docket No. 03-0018. 9/30/04.

Michael V. Memmer. AWA Docket No. 02-0027. 10/12/04.

Tom Parker d/b/a African Northwest, Inc. AWA Docket No. 03-0002. 12/16/04.
Chester Gaither, d/b/a Chet’s Pets. AWA Docket No. 04-0034. 12/16/04.

ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT

Matsui Nursery, Inc., a/k/a Matsui Wholesale Florist, Inc. ESA Docket No. 03-0001. 8/2/04.

FEDERAL MEAT INSPECTION ACT

Mr. Steven Matteson, Mr. Kenneth E. Barrows, and North American Packers. FMIA Docket No. 04-0007. 7/27/04.

Sardinha Sausage. FMIA Docket No. 04-0006. 9/13/04.

Crescent Custom Slaughtering, Inc., d/b/a Crescent Custom Meats. FMIA Docket No. 04-0005. 9/15/04.

HORSE PROTECTION ACT

Betsy H. Edwards and Cecil M. Hinkle, Jr. HPA Docket No. 03-0004. 10/7/04.

Willie Cook. HPA Docket No. 99-0029. 10/14/04.

David Polk. HPA Docket No. 04-0002. 10/20/04.

Larry W. Mesimer. HPA Docket No. 04-0002. 10/29/04.

Patti Magee and Michael Magee. HPA Docket No. 02-0004. 11/29/04.

INSPECTION AND GRADING ACT
American Meats Processors, L.L.C. I&G Docket No. 04-0002. 8/19/04.

ORGANIC FOODS PRODUCTION ACT

Michael Northrop, d/b/a Michael Northrop & Sons. OFPA Docket No. 04-0001. 7/23/04.

PLANT QUARANTINE ACT

Moctezuma Import, Inc. P.Q. Docket No. 03-0002. 10/12/04.


POULTRY PRODUCTS INSPECTION ACT

Mr. Steven Matteson, Mr. Kenneth E. Barrows, and North American Packers. PPIA Docket No. 04-0008. 7/27/04.

Sardinha Sausage. PPIA Docket No. 04-0007. 9/13/04.

Crescent Custom Slaughtering, Inc., d/b/a Crescent Custom Meats. PPIA Docket No. 04-0006. 9/15/04.